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 Foreword
Who could be against compliance with basic labour standards, the prevention of 
child labour, the promotion of sustainable development and the protection of 
biodiversity, the environment and animal welfare? If the question is posed in these 
terms, any right-thinking person is of course in favour of all these things. The next 
relevant questions for policy makers are: what is the best way to take account of 
these societal concerns and values, especially when it comes to promoting them in 
other countries? And how will developing countries be affected if their exports are 
denied access to the markets of developed countries in an effort to enforce 
compliance with rules and standards that are designed to meet these concerns and 
values? These are complex and sensitive questions, particularly when one 
considers that such rules and standards are often intimately related to a country’s 
standard of living and general level of development.
Societal concerns like those mentioned above are often referred to as non-trade 
concerns (NTCs). They are at the centre of a debate within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU), and with many third countries, 
including developing countries. Attempts to meet non-trade concerns through 
domestic regulation in the form of rules and standards almost always have 
repercussions and unintended side effects on world trade and its continued 
liberalisation, as well as on poverty alleviation and sustainable development. How 
can we deal with this challenge? It is the position of the Dutch government that 
non-trade concerns deserve attention, because of their intrinsic importance and 
because ignoring them would undermine public support for the multilateral trading 
system. This view is shared by many members of parliament who have been 
urging the government to take an active role in the matter. The Dutch government 
is eager to examine to what extent it is possible and desirable to address non-trade 
concerns while ensuring the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, 
what role it can (and should) play in that process and what policy instruments are 
best suited for the job. It is important to bear in mind that any measure designed to 
achieve non-trade concern objectives should meet Dutch and European WTO 
obligations without having a discriminatory or trade distorting effect.
These considerations are, however, only a fi rst step; there is no national or 
international consensus on what non-trade concerns entail, which of them are truly 
global or cross-border in nature, what measures are permitted under current WTO 
rules and what instruments will actually work in practice. As regards the WTO’s 
legal framework, it is uncertain where the grey area lies in the interpretation of 
treaties, how WTO case law evolves and what the relationship is to other 
international treaties containing trade-related provisions. Governments, legal 
experts, and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the 
private sector have widely divergent views on the WTO conformity and the 
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effectiveness of different instruments in the mounting debate on addressing 
non-trade concerns.
As demand continues to grow for some kind of public intervention, non-trade 
concerns have already left their mark in various areas of policy. We see evidence 
of this in the form of sustainability requirements for products such as biofuels, 
timber and fi sh and requirements related to improved working conditions and 
animal welfare. Where these societal concerns manifest themselves in unilateral, 
mandatory instruments, the link to trade can sometimes generate tension with the 
legally binding framework of the WTO. It is not always clear to what extent such 
a link is possible and/or desirable in policy terms.
Given this lack of clarity, a study was conducted under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by three leading experts on international economic and 
public law, economics and non-trade concerns. The study focused on unilateral 
measures that lay down rules for production processes and methods in the 
producing country that do not or hardly affect the properties of the product or the 
market and the environment in the importing country. The study also examined 
a number of specifi c measures to assess their (potential) economic impact on 
developing countries.
I am pleased to have been given the opportunity to write this foreword to the 
report you are now reading, which was published by my Ministry. In my opinion it 
is a unique study that will make an important contribution to the academic and 
public debate and the development of public-sector policy (especially trade policy), 
both here and abroad. It also offers guidance on the possible roles that society and 
the private sector can play. For the record, I should point out that the analyses and 
conclusions presented in this book do not necessarily represent the opinion of the 
Dutch government. 
Obviously, this study is not the last word on the subject. The Dutch government 
intends to refl ect further on its stance on non-trade concerns. At the start of 2008 
we plan to release a new position paper which will be debated with parliament. 
Prior to this, the Ministry of Economic Affairs will organise a broad-based, public 
dialogue on non-trade concerns in which all relevant ministries will participate. 
That dialogue will solicit input from all other relevant stakeholders and involve 
the present study as well.
Of course, I will continue to support every initiative that seeks to improve the 
environment, working conditions and animal welfare, whether here or in 
developing countries. I do recognise the sense of urgency that some feel with 
regard to certain non-trade concerns. As Minister for Development Cooperation, 
I also see it as my duty to ensure that Dutch and EU policies on non-trade concerns 
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respect the sovereignty and the priorities of the developing countries without 
reverting to neo-protectionism. I share their suspicion that some trade measures 
ostensibly aimed at rectifying non-trade concerns are actually prompted by 
protectionist motives. Certain unilateral measures are being presented as socially 
responsible, even though they have the effect of providing unfair protection to 
European or Dutch producers.
I have always been an advocate of dialogue and the pursuit of joint solutions that 
offer opportunities for all parties involved. These opportunities may come in the 
form of voluntary partnerships and customised multilateral frameworks that could 
contain effective trade measures. But there is no sense in unilaterally shutting out 
products from developing countries that do not accommodate or meet our societal 
concerns. Not only will this not solve the problems in question; by taking this 
drastic step, we would also be depriving these countries of the chance to trade and 
grow towards a workable solution. Only by working together to develop 
international standards that take account of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, different circumstances and capacity, we can achieve sustainable 
development on a global scale, reduce poverty and raise the level of labour 
standards, environmental protection and animal welfare.
I hope this book contributes to a broad-based international dialogue, in which 
the participants carry out careful analyses and listen to one another, and where 
the discussion results in a balanced outcome that does justice to all interests and 
interested parties.
Bert Koenders
Minister for Development Cooperation
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Executive Summary
 Introduction
The Netherlands is highly dependent on international trade for its economic 
prosperity. Successive Dutch governments have, therefore, always supported the 
further liberalization of international trade. At the same time, the public debate on 
economic globalization and international trade reveals that citizens as well as 
policy makers fear the corrosive impact of international trade on the core societal 
values on which Dutch society is founded. They fear that international trade, in 
particular a further liberalization thereof, may undermine or put at risk policies and 
measures for the protection of public health, the environment, labour rights, social 
welfare, good governance, national security, cultural identity, food safety, access to 
knowledge, consumer interests and animal welfare. There is a general consensus 
in the Netherlands that these non-trade concerns (NTC’s), which cover very 
different societal aspirations and fears, must be addressed in Dutch government 
policy and measures relating to international trade.
Many of the trade measures introduced by developed countries to address 
non-trade concerns have been met by developing countries with much suspicion 
and opposition. Developing countries often suspect that such measures are 
inspired by protectionist motives and intentions, rather than genuine non-trade 
concerns. Moreover, developing countries perceive these measures as an attempt 
by developed countries to impose their social, ethical or cultural values and 
preferences on exporting developing countries.
Over the last two years, the debate in the Netherlands on trade measures 
addressing non-trade concerns has focused on two important and politically 
sensitive issues, namely:
the sustainability of the large-scale production of biomass as an alternative  –
source of energy; and
the production of livestock products in a manner that is consistent with animal  –
welfare requirements.
With regard to the fi rst issue – sustainable biomass production – in February 2007 
the Project Group Duurzame Productie van Biomassa, a commission established 
by the government and chaired by Jacqueline Cramer (hereinafter the ‘Cramer 
Commission’), issued a report on the Toetsingskader voor Duurzame Biomassa 
(hereinafter the ‘Cramer Report’). This report discusses the risks associated with 
large-scale biomass production and establishes a list of criteria for the sustainable 
production of biomass. These criteria (hereinafter the ‘Cramer sustainability 
criteria’) refl ect a broad range of non-trade concerns, including environmental 
protection, global warming, food security, biodiversity, economic prosperity and 
social welfare. The Cramer Report invites the Dutch government to give effect to 
the Cramer sustainability criteria by incorporating them into relevant policy 
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instruments. The report recognizes, however, that the implementation of the 
Cramer sustainability criteria (including the establishment of a certifi cation system) 
will require careful consideration of the obligations of the Netherlands under EU 
and WTO law.
With regard to the second issue – animal welfare – modern methods of intensive 
agricultural production have generated, especially in Europe, increased concern 
about the treatment of farm animals, in particular with regard to their housing, 
nutrition, transportation and slaughter. Individual EU Member States, including the 
Netherlands, as well the EU itself, have adopted wide-ranging animal welfare 
legislation.
Governments called upon to address non-trade concerns may do so by using 
different types of measures. Prominent among these are measures concerning 
processes and production methods of products. These measures may concern 
either:
product-related –  processes and production methods (PR PPMs), i.e. measures 
that prescribe processes and production methods that affect the characteristics 
of products (e.g. measures prohibiting the use of growth hormones for cattle 
in the production of meat, or prohibiting the use of pesticides in the production 
of vegetables); or
non-product-related –  processes and production methods (nPR PPMs), i.e. 
measures that prescribe processes and production methods that do not, 
or in a negligible manner only, affect the characteristics of the products 
(e.g. a measure requiring that tuna fi shing vessels use dolphin-friendly nets).
The second type of measure, i.e. measures concerning nPR PPMs, is – much more 
than measures concerning PR PPMs – the subject of controversy. Pursuant to its 
terms of reference, this study therefore focuses on three main issues relating to 
unilateral non-product-related PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns, 
namely:
the consistency of unilateral nPR PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns  –
with the obligations under the WTO Agreement (see Part 1);
the relevance of other international agreements for unilateral nPR PPM  –
measures addressing non-trade concerns (see Part 2); and
the economic effectiveness and effi ciency, as well as the impact on developing  –
countries, of unilateral nPR PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns 
(see Part 3).
In the present study, these issues are examined primarily with regard to existing, 
proposed or still purely hypothetical measures for implementing the Cramer 
criteria for the sustainable production of biomass, or measures for the protection 
and promotion of animal welfare.
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Part 1  WTO Consistency of Unilateral nPR PPM Measures addressing 
Non-Trade Concerns 
Part 1 of this study deals with the consistency with WTO law of unilateral measures 
concerning non-product-related processes and production methods (nPR PPMs) 
addressing non-trade concerns (NTCs). In WTO law, four categories of basic 
substantive rules can be distinguished:
rules on non-discrimination, including the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)  –
treatment obligation and the national treatment obligation;
rules on market access, including rules on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade; –
rules on ‘unfair’ trade, including rules on anti-dumping duties, subsidies and  –
countervailing duties; and
rules on confl icts between trade liberalization and other societal values and  –
interests, including the general public policy exceptions, the national and 
international security exceptions; the economic emergency exception; 
the regional integration exceptions and the rules on special and differential 
treatment of developing countries. These exceptions allow WTO members to 
maintain or adopt otherwise WTO-inconsistent measures in order to address 
non-trade concerns.
These basic substantive rules (and exceptions) of WTO law are set out in the 
annexes to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (the ‘WTO Agreement’). These annexes contain in total 19 WTO 
agreements. In view of the focus of this study on unilateral measures concerning 
nPR PPMs, not all of the WTO agreements are of relevance. In this study, the focus 
is on the obligations and exceptions set out in the WTO agreements on trade in 
goods, and in particular, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘the GATT 
1994’), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the ‘TBT Agreement’), 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the ‘SCM Agreement’) 
and the Agreement on Agriculture.
 Relevant obligations under the GATT 1994
In examining the consistency with the GATT 1994 of nPR PPM measures 
addressing non-trade concerns such as the sustainability of biomass 
production or animal welfare, the most relevant obligations are, fi rst of all, 
the non-discrimination obligations of the GATT 1994, namely:
the MFN treatment obligation of Article I:1; and –
the national treatment obligation of Article III. –
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 prohibits discrimination between like products 
originating in, or destined for, different countries. The principal purpose of the MFN 
treatment obligation of Article I:1 is to ensure equality of opportunity to import 
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from, or to export to, all WTO Members. Article III of the GATT 1994 prohibits 
discrimination against imported products. Generally speaking, it prohibits 
Members from treating imported products less favourably than like domestic 
products once the imported products have entered the domestic market. Article III 
obliges WTO Members to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported 
products in relation to domestic products. The principal purpose of the national 
treatment obligation of Article III is to ensure that internal taxes (Article III:2) or 
internal regulation (Article III:4) ‘not be applied to imported or domestic products 
so as to afford protection to domestic production’. With respect to internal taxes, 
Article III:2, fi rst sentence, requires that imported products not be taxed in excess 
of like domestic products, while Article III:2, second sentence, requires that the 
imported products not be taxed such as to afford protection to directly competitive 
or substitutable domestic products. With respect to internal regulation, Article III:4 
requires that imported products be treated no less favourably than like domestic 
products. 
The present report contains a detailed analysis of the requirements of each of the 
non-discrimination obligations under Articles I and III of the GATT 1994, and the 
relevance of these obligations for existing, proposed or still purely hypothetical 
measures implementing the Cramer criteria for the sustainable production of 
biomass, or measures for the protection and promotion of animal welfare. This 
Executive Summary, however, focuses on only three issues that are of particular 
relevance in the examination of the consistency of nPR PPM measures addressing 
Non-trade concerns with the GATT non-discrimination obligations. 
The fi rst of these issues is whether the process and production method (PPM) by 
which a product is produced is of relevance in determining whether products are 
‘like’. Generally speaking, the non-discrimination obligations apply only between 
‘like products’. Products that are not ‘like’ may be treated differently. Therefore, 
the determination of whether products are like (or not), is important. It is debated 
whether, under current WTO law, the PPM by which a product is produced is 
relevant in determining whether products are ‘like’ if that PPM does not affect the 
physical characteristics of the product. 
It is often said that such nPR PPMs are not relevant. This was defi nitely the 
conclusion reached by the GATT Panel in the US – Tuna I (Mexico) case in 1991. In 
line with this case law, one might conclude that biomass produced inconsistently 
with the Cramer sustainability criteria is ‘like’ biomass produced consistently with 
these criteria; and that livestock products not produced consistently with animal 
welfare requirements are ‘like’ livestock products produced consistently with these 
requirements. However, the case law on the concept of ‘likeness’ has evolved since 
the 1991 US – Tuna I (Mexico) case. The question of whether nPR PPMs may be of 
relevance in the determination of ‘likeness’ now requires a more nuanced answer 
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than that given by the Panel in US – Tuna I (Mexico). As the Appellate Body ruled in 
2001 in EC – Asbestos, the determination of ‘likeness’ is, fundamentally, a 
determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between 
and among products. It should be noted that the manner in which products are 
made (i.e. PPMs), may have an impact on the preferences and tastes of consumers 
for these products, and thus on the nature and the extent of the competitive 
relationship between these products. If carpets made by children are shunned by 
consumers in a particular market, a situation may arise in which there is in fact no 
(or only a weak) competitive relationship between these carpets and carpets made 
by adults. In the light of the nature and the extent of the competitive relationship 
between them, carpets made by children and carpets made by adults could in such 
a situation be found not to be ‘like’. However, it seems unlikely that this type of 
situation will often arise as consumers in most markets are in their choice between 
products primarily guided by the price and other aspects that are not related to the 
conditions (e.g. environmental, labour or animal welfare conditions) under which 
the products were produced. 
The second issue relating to the non-discrimination obligations of the GATT 1994 
to be addressed in this Executive Summary also concerns the concept of ‘likeness’. 
The GATT Panel in the US – Malt Beverages case ruled in 1992 that in determining 
whether two products subject to different treatment are ‘like’ products, it is 
necessary to consider whether such product differentiation is being made ‘so as to 
afford protection to domestic production’. According to this case law, products that 
are treated differently for reasons other than the protection of domestic production 
(such as the protection of the environment or public health) are not ‘like’ products. 
This so-called ‘aim-and-effect’ test for determining ‘likeness’ was, however, 
rejected in 1996 by the Panel in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and has never 
been applied by WTO panels or the Appellate Body.
The third issue relating to the non-discrimination obligations of the GATT 1994 
to be addressed in this Executive Summary concerns the requirement of ‘treatment 
no less favourable’ of Article III:4. The fact that a measure distinguishes between 
‘like products’ does not suffi ce to conclude that this measure is inconsistent with 
Article III:4. As the Appellate Body ruled in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the 
formal difference in treatment between domestic and imported ‘like’ products is 
neither necessary nor suffi cient for a violation of Article III:4. Formally different 
treatment of imported products does not necessarily constitute less favourable 
treatment, while the absence of formal difference in treatment did not necessarily 
mean that there was no less favourable treatment. Whether or not imported 
products are treated ‘less favourably’ than like domestic products should be 
assessed instead by examining whether a measure modifi es the conditions of 
competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products. 
However, as the Appellate Body ruled in 2005 in Dominican Republic – 
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Import and sale of Cigarettes, the existence of a detrimental effect on a given 
imported product resulting from a measure does not necessarily imply that this 
measure accords less favourable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect 
is explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the 
product, such as the market share of the importer in this case.
In examining the consistency with the GATT 1994 of nPR PPM measures 
addressing non-trade concerns such as the sustainability of biomass production 
or animal welfare, other relevant obligations under the GATT 1994 are
the obligations regarding tariffs of Article II; and –
the obligations regarding non-tariff barriers of Article XI. –
With regard to tariffs, Article II:1(a) and (b), fi rst sentence, of the GATT 1994 prohibit 
Members to impose customs duties above the maximum level (i.e. the tariff 
binding) to which they have committed themselves during tariff negotiations. 
On the tariff classifi cation of products there are no specifi c GATT rules. Note, 
however, that, as the GATT Panel in Spain – Unroasted Coffee ruled in 1981, 
the general MFN treatment obligation also applies to tariff classifi cation. 
‘Like’ products can, therefore, not be classifi ed differently. Article II:1(b),
second sentence, prohibits duties and charges other than ordinary customs duties:
unless (and then only to the extent that) these other duties and charges  –
have been recorded in the Goods Schedule of the Member concerned; or
unless the duties and charges fall under one of the three exceptions provided  –
for under Article II:2.
With regard to the fi rst of these exceptions, namely, the exception relating to 
border tax adjustment, note that through border tax adjustment WTO Members 
may impose domestic taxes and charges on imports, and exempt or reimburse 
them on exports. It is quite doubtful, however, that border tax adjustment is 
permitted for taxes related to nPR PPMs (such as a special domestic tax on 
non-free-range eggs).
With regard to non-tariff barriers, Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 provides for a 
straightforward prohibition of quantitative restrictions on trade in goods. While it 
is clear that the scope of application of Article XI:1 covers more than bans and 
quotas, it is unclear how broad is its scope of application. It has been argued that 
nPR PPM measures are caught under Article XI, and not under Article III:4. 
However, there is little, if any, support for this position in the case law. GATT and 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have given Article III:4 a very broad scope of 
application. Whether Articles III:4 and XI can both be applicable to a specifi c nPR 
PPM measure is not clear from the case law to date, but the approach taken by 
the Panel in EC – Asbestos seems to suggest that this is not possible.
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 Relevant exceptions from obligations under the GATT 1994
The GATT 1994 provides for multiple exceptions from the obligations it imposes on 
Members. These exceptions allow Members – under certain conditions and within 
certain limits – to adopt or maintain otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures. With 
respect to nPR PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns, the most relevant 
of these exceptions are the general exceptions of Article XX of the GATT 1994, 
in particular, paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and (g) thereof. The application of Article XX 
gives rise to a number of interesting issues, which are all discussed in the present 
report. This Executive Summary, however, focuses on two issues which are of 
particular importance for the justifi cation of otherwise GATT-inconsistent nPR PPM 
measures. 
The fi rst of these issues is the jurisdictional limitation on the application of Article 
XX. To date, the Appellate Body has not yet ruled on whether measures that 
protect, or purport to protect, a societal value or interest outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Member taking the measure, can be justifi ed under Article XX. 
There is no explicit jurisdictional limitation contained in Article XX. As discussed 
below, the wording of Article XX(b) does not explicitly limit the protection of life 
and health to the territory of the Member enacting the measure at issue. 
Likewise, the wording of Article XX(a) (concerning the protection of public morals) 
and Article XX(g) (concerning the preservation of exhaustible natural resources) 
has no such explicit limitation either. However, the question is whether there is an 
implied jurisdictional limitation, in that Article XX cannot be invoked to protect 
societal values outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Member concerned. The 
GATT Panels in US – Tuna I (Mexico) and US – Tuna II (EEC) ruled in 1991 and 1994 
that Article XX(b) and (g) cannot justify measures that pursue the protection of 
public health and environmental policy objectives outside the jurisdiction of the 
Member enacting the measure. However, in 1998 the Appellate Body in 
US – Shrimp explicitly refused to pass upon the question of whether there is an 
implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, on the nature or extent 
of that limitation. 
It merely noted that in the specifi c circumstances of the US – Shrimp case, 
there was a suffi cient nexus between the migratory and endangered sea turtles 
and the United States for the purposes of Article XX(g). Note, however, that the 
Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences found in 2004 that the policy refl ected in the EC 
measure at issue in that case was not one designed for the purpose of protecting 
human life or health in the European Communities and, therefore, this measure 
was not a measure for the purpose of protecting human life or health under 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.
The second issue relating to the application of Article XX of particular importance 
for the justifi cation of otherwise GATT-inconsistent nPR PPM measures, relates to 
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the chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau requires that a measure that meets the 
requirements of one of the paragraphs of Article XX (and is thus provisionally 
justifi ed), is not applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifi able 
discrimination. As the Appellate Body ruled in 1998 in US – Shrimp, when a 
measure is applied without any regard for the difference in conditions between 
countries and in a rigid and infl exible manner, the application of the measure may 
constitute ‘arbitrary discrimination’ within the meaning of the chapeau of Article 
XX. Conditioning market access on the adoption by the exporting Member of 
essentially the same regulation as in force in the importing Member constitutes 
‘arbitrary discrimination’. However, as the Appellate Body found in 2001 in 
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), authorizing an importing Member to 
condition market access on exporting Members putting in place regulation 
comparable in effectiveness to that of the importing Member gives suffi cient 
latitude to the exporting Member with respect to the regulation it may adopt to 
achieve the level of effectiveness required. It allows the exporting Member to adopt 
regulation that is suitable to the specifi c conditions prevailing in its territory. 
According to the Appellate Body, conditioning market access on the adoption of a 
programme comparable in effectiveness, allows for suffi cient fl exibility in the 
application of the measure so as to avoid ‘arbitrary discrimination’. It has been 
noted that the Appellate Body thus seems to introduce in the chapeau of Article XX 
an ‘embryonic’ and ‘soft’ requirement on Members to recognize the equivalence of 
foreign measures comparable in effectiveness 
The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp also addressed the question of whether the 
application of the measure at issue in this case constituted an ‘unjustifi able 
discrimination’ within the meaning of the chapeau. The Appellate Body found that 
while the United States negotiated with some Members a multilateral agreement 
for the protection of sea turtles (the Inter-American Convention for the Protection 
and Conservation of Sea Turtles), it did not pursue negotiations with other 
Members (including the complainants). According to the Appellate Body, this is 
plainly discriminatory and unjustifi able. The unjustifi able nature of this 
discrimination emerged clearly when one considered the cumulative effects of the 
failure of the United States to pursue negotiations for establishing consensual 
means of protection and conservation of sea turtles. In US – Shrimp (Article 
21.5 – Malaysia), the Appellate Body made it clear that, in order to meet the 
requirement of the chapeau of Article XX, a Member needs to make serious efforts, 
in good faith, to negotiate a multilateral solution before resorting to unilateral 
measures. Failure to do so may lead to the conclusion that the discrimination is 
‘unjustifi able’.
In addition to the general exceptions of Article XX, the GATT 1994 provides inter 
alia for exceptions from GATT obligations aimed at helping developing-country 
Members to benefi t more from international trade. The most prominent of these 
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exceptions is the Enabling Clause, which allows inter alia that developed-country 
Members give preferential tariff treatment to developing-country Members. 
This exception to the MFN treatment obligation is the legal basis for the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes adopted by many developed-
country Members in favour of developing-country Members. The GSP scheme 
of the European Communities provides, however, for additional preferential tariff 
treatment for developing-country Members that pursue specifi c domestic policies 
(with regard to labour standards, the environment and the fi ght against drug 
production and traffi cking). India contested the GATT consistency of the Drug 
Arrangements of the EC GSP scheme. As the Appellate Body ruled in 2004 in 
EC – Tariff Preferences, a developed-country Member may grant additional 
preferential tariff treatment to some, and not to other, developing-country 
Members, as long as additional preferential tariff treatment is available to all 
similarly situated developing-country Members. Similarly situated developing-
country Members are all those that have the development, fi nancial and trade 
needs to which additional preferential tariff treatment is intended to respond.
 Relevant obligations under other multilateral agreements on trade in goods
The present report examines the WTO consistency of nPR PPM measures 
addressing non-trade concerns also with respect to the obligations of Members 
under the TBT Agreement and the WTO agreements providing rules on subsidies. 
The report contains a detailed discussion of the obligations under the TBT 
Agreement. This Executive Summary focuses on an essential preliminary question, 
namely, whether nPR PPM measures fall within the scope of application of the 
TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement applies to technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment procedures relating to: 
products (both industrial and agricultural); and –
related processes and production methods. –
The issue of the applicability of the TBT Agreement to nPR PPM measures was 
discussed during the negotiations on the TBT Agreement, but the negotiators 
failed to reach agreement. Discussions since 1995 have only highlighted the deep 
division among the WTO membership on this issue. The defi nitions in Annex 1, 
paragraphs 1–3, to the TBT Agreement seem to indicate that technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures relating to PR-PPMs do not fall 
within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement. The defi nitions refer to 
‘characteristics for products and related processes and production methods’ 
[emphasis added]. Note, however, that in the last sentence of the defi nitions of 
technical regulations and standards, it is stated that technical regulations and 
standards also include measures that are concerned with ‘terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process 
or production method’ [emphasis added]. Therefore, while there may be 
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uncertainty and debate about whether technical regulations, standards or 
conformity assessment procedures relating to nPR PPMs in general fall within the 
scope of application of the TBT Agreement, it is clear that ‘labelling requirements’ 
relating to nPR PPMs are TBT measures within the meaning of Annex 1 to the TBT 
Agreement and thus fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement. 
The WTO rules on subsidies are primarily contained in two agreements, namely, 
the SCM Agreement, which applies to all subsidies within the meaning of Articles 
1 and 2 of that Agreement; and the Agreement on Agriculture, which applies, in 
addition to the SCM Agreement, to subsidies on agricultural products. In case of 
confl ict between the rules of the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on 
Agriculture, the latter prevails. 
The applicability of the Agreement on Agriculture to subsidies on biomass or 
biofuels depends on whether these products are classifi ed as agricultural products, 
i.e. in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) Chapters 
1–24 (except fi sh and fi sh products), plus the HS Headings and Codes listed in 
Annex 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture. In this Executive Summary, it it suffi cient 
to mention that under the SCM Agreement import substitution subsidies, i.e. 
subsidies contingent on the use of domestic products over imported products, 
are prohibited and must be withdrawn without delay. Subsidies are de facto 
contingent on the use of domestic products over imported products, if the 
subsidies are granted on the condition to use products that are produced according 
to nPR PPMs which foreign producers cannot, or can only with great diffi culty, 
apply. Under the Agreement on Agriculture, agricultural export subsidies are either 
subject to reduction commitments or prohibited. Domestic agricultural support 
measures are also subject to reduction commitments. However, certain domestic 
agricultural support measures, commonly referred to as ‘green box’ measures, 
are exempted from the reduction commitments. Note that, as set out in Annex 2 
to the Agreement on Agriculture, these ‘green box’ measures include certain 
payments under a government environment or conservation programme that are 
dependent on the fulfi lment of specifi c conditions under the programme, including 
conditions related to production methods and inputs. Subsidies to farmers to 
compensate them for the extra costs associated with meeting animal welfare 
requirements may constitute ‘green box’ measures.
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Part 2  Relevance of other International Agreements for Unilateral 
nPR PPM Measures addressing Non-Trade Concerns
Environmental, human rights and labour standards are the subject of specifi c 
international agreements, which occasionally contain provisions that have 
a bearing on international trade. Also, the programmes developed by 
intergovernmental, private or non-governmental organizations setting 
environmental and social standards often impact on international trade. 
 International environmental agreements
Out of the 200 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) currently in 
existence, the WTO has identifi ed 14 MEAs containing trade related provisions, 
mostly concerning product-related PPMs. These include the 1973 Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); 
the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987 
Montreal Protocol; the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity and its 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol; 
and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Common features of most of these 
agreements include import and/or export restrictions both between Parties and 
with regard to third states. Also, Parties may choose to adopt unilateral measures 
addressing non-product-related PPMs in furtherance of the objectives of 
environmental agreements. Most of these trade restrictions violate the GATT 
non-discrimination obligations (Articles I and III) or the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions (Article XI) and, therefore, must be held against the requirements of 
the general exceptions and the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. The present 
report examines a number of these trade restrictions.
 International agreements on human rights and labour standards
Unlike environmental agreements, most human rights treaties do not contain 
explicit trade-restrictive provisions. Furthermore, it can be observed that whereas 
Article XX of the GATT 1994 contains an explicit environmental exception, a clear 
social exception is absent. Also, where trade restrictions under environmental 
treaties in most cases concern product-related PPMs, the type of human rights 
measures of concern for the current discussion generally relate to labour 
standards, a typical example of non-product-related PPMs. Important human rights 
treaties in this respect include the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights as well as the 1965 
International Convention on Discrimination; the 1979 Convention on the Rights of 
Women; the 1984 Anti-Torture Convention; and the 1989 International Convention 
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on the Rights of the Child. This study pays particular attention to the core labour 
standards incorporated in the1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as an 
example of the relation between core human rights and WTO law, and to the 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions. The present report concludes that as a result of the absence of explicit 
trade-restrictive provisions in multilateral human rights agreements and a social 
clause in Article XX of the GATT 1994, as well as the jurisdictional limitations 
arguably ‘implied’ by the WTO dispute settlement bodies, it is extremely 
diffi cult – if not impossible – to justify trade restrictions relating to human rights 
concerns under Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
 International measures addressing non-trade concerns
An increasing number of regulatory programmes addressing (non-product-related) 
social and environmentally sound production is being developed at the 
international level. Examples of such programmes include those adopted by 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the special incentive arrangements of the 
EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); by the private sector, such as the 
Euro Retailer Working Group Good Agricultural Practices (EurepGAP); and by NGOs 
such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certifi cation programme for timber, 
and the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) certifi cation programme. Most of 
the private and NGO initiatives set standards aimed at certifi cation of products. 
Since adherence to these programmes is voluntary and does not involve 
government regulation, they fall outside the scope of the GATT 1994. However, it is 
not certain whether these programmes are covered by the TBT Agreement either, 
since it is not clear whether non-product-related PPMs (other than labelling) are 
within the scope of the TBT Agreement.
 Confl ict rules
Most authors regard trade law, human rights law and environmental law as 
three separate branches of public international law, without an a priori hierarchy 
between these systems. Therefore, a confl ict between norms in these fi elds 
must be resolved through the rules of treaty interpretation of Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – which has attained the status of 
customary international law – and through the confl ict rules of Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention. Article 31 determines that ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
Article 31(2) specifi es what should be understood by the context of a treaty, 
while Article 31(3) provides inter alia for ‘any applicable rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ to be taken into account. 
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On several occasions, WTO dispute settlement bodies have used non-WTO law 
to interpret the terms of the WTO Agreement. 
As regards the application of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, the Appellate 
Body has taken a narrow approach, defi ning ‘between the parties’ as meaning all 
WTO Members. If a confl ict cannot be resolved through interpretation, 
recourse should be made to the confl ict rules contained in Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention and customary international law. The two main confl ict rules, 
i.e. lex posterior derogat lex anterior (a newer rule prevails over an older rule) 
and lex specialis derogat lex generalis (a more specifi c rule prevails over a more 
general rule), relate to the aspects of temporality and speciality. There is an 
interplay between these rules. For the current discussion, the fi rst rule implies that, 
in principle, environmental or human rights treaties adopted since 1994 shall 
prevail over the WTO Agreement. This is also the case for principles that have 
attained the status of international customary law since then. Furthermore, 
more specifi c international environmental or human rights norms shall, 
in principle, prevail over general WTO norms. This is of relevance for the analysis 
of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
 Other international agreements: alternative or complementary to WTO law?
A balanced approach to the WTO as a legal system will take into account its place 
within the wider corpus of international law – as demonstrated by the reference in 
the Preamble of the WTO Agreement to sustainable development, and to the 
international law in the fi eld of sustainable development, but will also accept its 
limitations as a consequence of its speciality. Besides using environmental and 
human rights agreements to determine the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
WTO Agreement, WTO dispute settlement bodies should use these agreements as 
a factual reference in their analysis of Article XX of the GATT 1994. The observation 
that a measure was taken pursuant to a widely ratifi ed environmental or human 
rights agreement should be considered relevant factual evidence that the measure 
taken was legitimate. Yet, in the current state of legal doctrine, the direct 
application of non-WTO norms as ‘legal norms’ by the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies is considered a bridge too far. 
Finally, the best way to address non-product-related PPM concerns is through the 
negotiation of multilateral agreements that expressly contain trade measures to 
further their objectives. These agreements must be open to all WTO Members and 
must impose equal obligations on countries ‘where the same conditions prevail’ 
so as to avoid discrimination. 
XLII
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
Part 3  Economic Effi ciency and Effectiveness of Unilateral nPR PPM 
Measures addressing Non-Trade Concerns, and their Impact on 
Developing Countries
 Measures related to the production of biofuels in developing countries
Bioethanol has a high potential as an effective and effi cient instrument for climate 
policy. Using it for more policy objectives, such as energy security or agricultural 
support in the EU, would undermine the effectiveness and effi ciency of climate 
policy. Many developing countries have a comparative advantage in the supply of 
biofuels and biomass, and are capable of yielding large reductions in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission, measured over the life cycle of the fuel. Bioethanol from 
tropical regions is the ideal substitute for mineral gasoline: it is competitive at the 
current fuel prices, much cheaper than all alternatives that are available now and 
in the foreseeable future, and ranks highest in reducing GHG emissions (more than 
80 per cent). At present, the cost per tonne of GHG reduction using Brazilian 
ethanol is a fraction (around 5 per cent) of the cost using ethanol from grain 
produced in the EU. However, the EU does not have a coherent policy with respect 
to bioethanol. EU import tariffs vary between zero and €19.2 per hectoliter, 
depending on the exporting country and type of ethanol. At the same time, 
the EU Common Agricultural Policy subsidizes ethanol production in the EU. 
In the near future, the production of bioethanol in developing countries will rise 
considerably, in response to rising domestic demand for ethanol as a fuel, 
and to rising import demand from developed countries. On the supply side, 
the EU market for biofuels is highly distorted by the Common Agricultural Policy, 
the subsidies for innovative fuels and the EU’s common trade policy. As a result, the 
price of bioethanol in the EU does not refl ect its relative scarcity globally. Bioethanol 
from tropical countries has a high potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
the short run in an effective and effi cient way. In order to realize this potential, 
the EU will have to devise a coherent trade policy with respect to bioethanol:
The difference in preferential tariff arrangements under GSP and the high MFN  –
tariff should be eliminated by gradually lowering the MFN tariff to the level of 
mineral fuels.
In order to develop the untapped potential in Africa, support will be necessary  –
to improve the physical infrastructure for export, to fi nance feasibility studies, 
and to create a favourable climate for private investment in biomass 
production.
It has been proposed by the Cramer Commission to make the import of  –
bioethanol conditional upon meeting certain sustainability criteria. With regard 
to the criteria on GHG emissions, bioethanol from developing countries could 
be an effective and effi cient instrument, given its effi cient reduction of GHG 
emissions on a well-to-wheels basis.
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With regard to the other sustainability criteria, it is questionable whether it would 
be wise to impose these conditions, apart from the question whether it would be 
permitted under EU and WTO law, for several reasons.
Firstly, an importing country has a potential impact on part of the production only 
(the EU currently imports only 1 per cent or less of all bioethanol produced in 
Brazil). Even if the exporting country meets the sustainability criteria for that small 
part of the production, little would change in the sector. The exporting country may 
also respond by shifting its exports to less demanding markets. Thus, trying to 
encourage an entire economy to adopt more sustainable methods of production by 
imposing conditions on a tiny part of its production for export, would be a case of 
the tail wagging the dog. 
Secondly, even if the exporter were to adapt the production process throughout 
the sector, the regulatory situation would differ signifi cantly from the rest of the 
economy. This may greatly distort relative prices and wages. It cannot be assumed 
that the sustainability and welfare of the exporting economy as a whole would 
improve; it might even deteriorate. Research into the issue of child labour has 
made it clear that import constraints on goods produced using child labour do not 
necessarily improve the lot of the children in the exporting economy, at least in the 
short and medium term. 
Thirdly, exporting developing countries may perceive these criteria as a form of 
eco- or labour protectionism. Given the experiences of these countries in the 
recent past, and the imminent risk that regulatory systems of importing countries 
are captured by rent-seeking groups, this perception is not without grounds. The 
practical effect of implementing the criteria will be an increase in the cost of 
production. Although it is diffi cult to estimate the precise cost-increasing effect as 
a simple percentage, it is clear that it could be substantial. For ethanol produced 
in the São Paulo region (where 60 per cent of Brazilian sugar and ethanol are 
produced), for example, it is estimated that total production costs could rise by 
24–56 per cent, increasing the cost per litre by €0.12. This would come on top of 
the EU import tariff of €0.19 per litre. On the whole, the impression of disguised 
protectionism is diffi cult to refute, and the opportunity to introduce an effective 
and effi cient climate policy based on bioethanol will be lost. There are more 
effective and effi cient ways to achieve these objectives of sustainability: by 
concluding international agreements, by supporting aspects of sustainable 
production fi nancially, and via transfer of technology. 
 Standards and labelling for animal welfare
The modern consumer demands a large choice among differentiated products, 
adequate information and a guarantee for a few credence attributes, mainly with 
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respect to health aspects. Credence attributes are product attributes that can not be 
assessed by the (potential) buyer through inspection of the product in the shop. 
The supplier does have knowledge over these attributes. This is a matter of 
information asymmetry. These health attributes have the nature of a public good 
and should be regulated by mandatory standards and/or labels by the government. 
It is far from clear, however, whether animal welfare aspects have this public good 
nature. For credence attributes that do not have a public good nature, voluntary 
labelling is a suffi cient and effi cient solution to solve the problem of market 
failures due to information asymmetry. 
Primary producers in developing countries may be able to profi t from higher 
standards as long as they are able to invest in upgrading their production 
processes, in certifi cation and marketing. However, fi nancial systems in developing 
countries might not cater to these investment needs as fi rms may be small and 
lack collateral, and local banks may not operate along the lines of market 
incentives. Thus higher standards (including voluntary private sector schemes such 
as EurepGAP) may favour large production companies and big retailers. 
Certifi cation of small fi rms is relatively expensive; collective certifi cation could be a 
solution but requires costly organization and monitoring/sanctioning. Again, big 
fi rms may be in a more favourable position. Small producers may benefi t if the 
right institutions are in place to provide training, information and certifi cation at 
reasonable prices.
Given the potential problems developing country exporters have in complying with 
higher norms and standards, which are increasingly being demanded by private 
importers in rich countries, and often come on top of high tariffs and restrictive 
quota, governments should practice utmost restraint in making policy decisions 
that add to the regulatory barriers to imports from developing countries. 
International harmonization could prevent the proliferation of different standards, 
as this will only add to the costs to developing country producers of meeting those 
standards.
Development cooperation can play an important role in stimulating the export 
performance of domestic fi rms in developing countries. Technical and fi nancial 
support for research, local extension services, monitoring and testing facilities that 
help small and middle sized fi rms to set up and improve export ventures, organize 
small producers for collective initiatives in labelling, certifi cation and marketing are 
examples in this regard.
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1 International trade and non-trade concerns
The economic prosperity of the Netherlands is highly dependent on international 
trade. In 2006, the openness of the Dutch economy in terms of international trade 
in goods was equal to 57 per cent of Dutch GDP.1 It is therefore not surprising that 
the Netherlands, acting in the context of the European Union or independently, has 
always pursued a free trade policy and is a strong supporter of further liberalization 
of international trade. In recent years, however, the liberalization of international 
trade has encountered growing hostility and resistance from large segments of 
Dutch civil society. Citizens as well as policy makers fear the corrosive impact of 
international trade on the core societal values on which Dutch society is built. 
Many fear that international trade, and in particular its further liberalization, may 
undermine or put at risk policies and measures aimed at the protection of public 
health, the environment, labour rights, social welfare, good governance, national 
security, cultural identity, food safety, access to knowledge, consumer interests and 
animal welfare. There is a general consensus in the Netherlands that these non-
trade concerns, which cover very different societal aspirations and fears, must be 
addressed in Dutch government policy and measures relating to international 
trade.2 
In the Dutch Parliament, the importance of taking into account and addressing 
non-trade concerns has been repeatedly stressed in debates and motions on 
trade policy.3 For example, a motion proposed by Kris Douma and Corien Jonker, 
adopted on 28 June 2005, called upon the Dutch government to plead for an EU 
1 Calculated from data in CBS, Nationale Rekeningen 2006 (Voorburg/Heerlen 2007). The average of exports 
and imports is expressed as a percentage of GDP.
2 Note, for example, that the Land- en Tuinbouworganisatie Nederland (LTO Nederland) stated on the eve of 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005: ‘Bij de liberalisering van de wereldhandel 
dient een gelijk speelveld voor alle partijen en uitgangspunt te zijn. Producten die vrij geïmporteerd worden 
uit landen buiten de EU moeten voldoen aan dezelfde eisen als waar de Europese boeren en tuinders aan 
moeten voldoen. Het gaat hierbij in het bijzonder om eisen op het gebied van bescherming van 
voedselveiligheid, traceerbaarheid, arbeidsvoorwaarden, milieu, dierwelzijn, en platteland. Als dit niet het 
geval is, komt dit neer op aanzienlijke concurrentienadelen’. See Persbericht LTO Nederland, 13 December 
2005, EU moet pas op de plaats maken bij WTO handelsoverleg: LTO Nederland waarschuwt voor ‘eenzijdige 
ontwapening’.
3 See, for example, Kamerstuk 103451, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 25074, nr. 140; Kamerstuk 
104526, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 30800 XIV, nr. 81; Kamerstuk 105740, Tweede Kamer, 
vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 25074, nr. 143; Kamerstuk 106074, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 22112, 
nr. 509; Kamerstuk 106149, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 21501-32, nr. 204, Kamerstuk 106156, 
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 30800 XIV, nr. 86; Kamerstuk 106173, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 
2006-007, 21501-32, nr. 205; Kamervragen 27702, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, Aanhangsel van 
de Handelingen, 1149.
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effort to include non-trade concerns on the agenda for the next round of 
multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO.4
The trade measures introduced by developed countries to address non-trade 
concerns have been met with much suspicion and opposition on the part of 
developing countries, who often see trade protectionist intentions, rather than 
genuine non-trade concerns, behind these measures. From the perspective of 
developing countries, the emphasis put on non-trade concerns by developed 
countries is often a means to justify existing forms and levels of protection of 
domestic production or, worse, a means to introduce new forms of protection. 
Moreover, developing countries object to trade measures addressing non-trade 
concerns as an attempt by developed countries to impose their social, 
ethical or cultural values and preferences on exporting developing countries.
Over the last two years, the debate in the Netherlands on trade measures 
addressing non-trade concerns has focused on two important and politically 
sensitive issues, namely:
the sustainability of the large-scale production of biomass as an alternative  –
source of energy; and
the production of livestock products in a manner that is consistent with  –
animal welfare requirements.
In view of the relative scarcity of fossil fuels and their adverse effects on the 
environment, it is expected that over the next decades biomass will become an 
important alternative source of energy. However, the large-scale production of 
biomass may itself harm the environment and may have adverse economic and 
social effects on the people involved in its production or, more generally, on the 
population of the producing countries. In February 2007 the Project Group 
Duurzame Productie van Biomassa, set up by the Dutch government and chaired 
by Jacqueline Cramer (hereinafter the ‘Cramer Commission’), issued a report 
entitled Toetsingskader voor duurzame biomassa (hereinafter the ‘Cramer 
Report’).5 This report discussed the risks associated with the large-scale production 
of biomass and established a list of criteria for the sustainable production of 
biomass. These criteria (hereinafter the ‘Cramer sustainability criteria’) relate to 
a broad range of non-trade concerns, including environmental protection, global 
warming, food security, biodiversity, economic prosperity and social welfare. 
4 See Ministeriële Conferentie van de Wereldhandelsorganisatie (WTO): Motie van de leden Douma en Jonker, 
Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 25074, nr. 92.
5 Toetsingskader voor duurzame biomassa (Cramer report). Final report of the project group 
‘Duurzame productie van biomassa’, chaired by Professor Jacqueline Cramer, 2007. 
Available at www.vrom.nl/docs/20070427-toetsingskader-duurzame-biomassa.pdf. 
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The Cramer sustainability criteria (and related sustainability indicators referred to 
in parentheses) stipulate that biomass production and use must:
achieve reductions in –  greenhouse gas emissions throughout the entire lifecycle 
of biofuels, including the in the production or processing of the biomass from 
which biofuels are produced (compared with fossil fuels, the net emission 
reduction for biofuels used for transport, for example, must be at least 30%);
have no adverse effects on the –  availability of food or the availability of 
agricultural products for non-food uses such as building materials or medicines 
(no specifi c sustainability indicators have yet been established for this 
purpose);
ensure the protection of –  biodiversity (no large-scale production of biomass in 
or in the vicinity of ‘gazetted protected areas’ or areas of ‘high conservation 
value’);
have no adverse effects on the –  local environment and, in particular, on the 
quality of the soil, water and air (in compliance with national limits on the 
use of pesticides and artifi cial fertilizers, as well as use of ‘best practice’ 
production methods);
contribute to –  the economic prosperity of the local community and have 
no negative effects on the regional and national economy (no specifi c 
sustainability indicators have yet been established for this purpose); and
contribute to the –  welfare of the workers involved in biomass production and of 
the local population (in compliance with the relevant requirements established 
by the International Labour Organization (ILO), i.e. Social Accountability 8000 
and the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy), and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other international agreements).6
For the production of biomass to qualify as ‘sustainable’, it must meet the Cramer 
sustainability criteria. Note that the Cramer Report explicitly mentions that no 
distinction is made between imported biomass and biomass produced in the 
Netherlands. Both have to meet the Cramer sustainability criteria.7 The Cramer 
sustainability criteria for biomass production are similar to those currently under 
development in the United Kingdom.8 The Cramer Report stresses the importance 
of establishing a certifi cation system for biomass.9 Only with such a certifi cation 
system in place, will it be possible to determine whether the biomass 
6 See Cramer Report, p. IV, as well as Tables 1 and 2. Note that the Cramer Report also ‘translates’ these 
criteria into nine principles for application at the micro-level (see Box 6.1.1 of the Report, p.32).
7 See Cramer Report, p. II.
8 B. Dehue et al., Sustainability Reporting within the RTFO: Framework Report (Utrecht: Ecofys, 2007). 
Available at www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/rtforeporting/sustainabilityreporting. 
9 See Cramer Report, pp.IV and 33.
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(or the resulting biofuel) used in the Netherlands has been produced in a 
sustainable manner, i.e. in a manner consistent with the Cramer sustainability 
criteria. 
The sustainability criteria set out in the report resulted from an extensive 
consultation process involving the most important Dutch stakeholders. 
Stakeholders in biomass-exporting countries were not consulted, 
although the importance of such consultations is explicitly recognized.10 
The Cramer Report invites the Dutch government to give effect to the Cramer 
sustainability criteria by incorporating them into relevant policy instruments. 
As the report notes, the relevant policy instruments in the short run are, fi rst, 
the Regeling Milieukwaliteit Electriciteitsproductie (MEP), which concerns the 
environmentally friendly production of electricity, and, second, the obligation 
to use biofuels for road transport. In the future, it is expected that the criteria for 
the sustainable production of biomass will also be implemented in other policy 
instruments. The report recognizes that the implementation of the Cramer 
sustainability criteria in policy instruments (as well as the establishment of 
a certifi cation system) will take time, and that it will also require careful 
consideration of the obligations of the Netherlands under EU and WTO law.11
In addition to the sustainability of large-scale biomass production, the current 
debate in the Netherlands on trade measures addressing non-trade concerns also 
deals with animal welfare. Modern methods of intensive agricultural production 
have generated – especially in Europe – increasing concern about the treatment of 
farm animals, in particular with regard to their housing, nutrition, transport and 
slaughter. Consumer surveys seem to suggest that there is growing demand for 
animal-welfare friendly products (such as free-range eggs). Individual EU Member 
States, including the Netherlands, as well the EU itself, have adopted wide-ranging 
animal welfare legislation. EU animal welfare legislation currently in force relates, 
inter alia, to minimum standards for the husbandry of hens, veal calves and pigs. 
For other farm animals (e.g. broiler chickens and turkeys), production standards 
are under consideration. The EU has also adopted legislation on animal welfare 
regarding the transportation and ‘humane’ slaughter of farm animals. Note that 
the Council of Europe has adopted several conventions on animal welfare that 
have been an important source of inspiration for EU and national animal welfare 
regulations.12 
10 See Cramer Report, p.34.
11 See Cramer Report, p. 33.
12 These conventions elaborate inter alia elaborate the fi ve freedoms for animals, namely, the freedom to 
turn around, the freedom to groom themselves, the freedom to get up, the freedom to lie down and the 
freedom to stretch their limbs.
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The growing concern regarding animal welfare is refl ected not only in existing or 
proposed regulations, but also in private sector standards for the production of 
livestock products that are being developed and applied by producers and/or 
retailers.13 McDonalds, for example, has instituted animal welfare programmes for 
its suppliers, requiring that these suppliers meet animal welfare requirements that 
are much stricter than those set out in national legislation.14 The World Organization 
for Animal Health (OIE), in its 2001–2005 strategic plan, identifi ed the development 
of international standards on animal welfare as a priority, and has formally 
established a Working Group on Animal Welfare. However, setting international 
standards for animal welfare – even if this is done on a scientifi c basis – is diffi cult 
due to differences of religious, economic, social and cultural nature between 
countries. In the context of the Doha Development Round negotiations, the EU has 
stated that its objective is to ensure that further liberalization of trade in 
agricultural products does not undermine EU efforts to improve the welfare of 
animals.15
2 Measures addressing non-trade concerns
Governments called upon to address non-trade concerns may do so by using 
different types of measures.16 A fi rst important distinction to be made among 
measures to address non-trade concerns is that between international and 
unilateral measures.
2.1 International measures addressing non-trade concerns
International measures addressing non-trade concerns include bilateral, regional 
and multilateral agreements, intergovernmental and private international 
standards, and international codes of conduct. Examples of such international 
measures are the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Protection and 
13 While these private standards are, by their nature, voluntary, compliance with these standards may become 
the industry norm from which producers can, in practice, not afford to deviate. See D. Blandford, J.C. 
Bureau, L. Fulponi and S. Henson, ‘Potential implications of animal welfare concerns and public policies in 
industrialized countries for international trade’, in B. Krissoff, M. Bohman and J. Caswell (eds), Global Food 
Trade and Consumer Demand for Quality (New York: Kluwer, 2002), p.13. 
14 Ibid., p.20.
15 See the EC’s Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal to the WTO negotiations on agriculture, issue 20, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external/wto/document/neg_en.pdf.
16 Governments will often opt for a combination of the different types of measures available.
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Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the Forest Stewardship 
Council certifi cation programme for timber. These and other international 
measures addressing non-trade concerns are discussed in Part II of this report.17 
As discussed in Part I of this report, several WTO agreements also contain 
provisions address non-trade concerns.18 In many cases, international measures 
addressing non-trade concerns will allow national governments – under certain 
conditions – to take unilateral measures to address non-trade concerns, as 
discussed in the next section. 
2 .2 Unilateral measures addressing non-trade concerns
Unilateral measures addressing non-trade concerns take many different forms and 
can be distinguished in various ways. First, a distinction can be made between 
command-and-control measures (e.g. prohibitions or quantitative restrictions) and 
price-based measures (customs duties and internal taxes (sanctions) or subsidies 
(incentives)).19 Second, a distinction can be made between border measures (e.g. 
customs duties; import bans or import restrictions) and internal measures (internal 
regulation (including labelling), internal taxes or subsidies). Third, a distinction 
can be made between measures applicable to imports only (which constitute 
de jure discrimination) and measures applicable to imports and domestic products 
(which may constitute de facto discrimination). Fourth, a distinction can be made 
between measures determining the characteristics of products and measures 
concerning the processes and production methods of products. Fifth, within the 
category of measures concerning the processes and production methods of 
products, a further distinction can be made between:
measures concerning  – product-related processes and production methods 
(PR PPMs), i.e. measures that prescribe processes and production methods that 
affect the characteristics of the products produced (e.g. measures prohibiting 
the use of growth hormones for cattle in the production of meat, or the use of 
pesticides in the production of vegetables); and
measures concerning  – non-product-related processes and production methods 
(nPR PPMs), i.e. measures that prescribe processes and production methods 
that do not, or in a negligible manner only, affect the characteristics of the 
products produced (e.g. a measure requiring that tuna fi shing vessels use 
dolphin-friendly nets).
17 See below, p. 165.
18 See below, p. 13.
19 See WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Taxes and Charges for Environmental Purposes – Border Tax 
Adjustment, Note by the Secretariat, WT/CTE/W/47, dated 2 May 1997, para. 2.
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Finally, within the category of measures concerning nPR PPMs, a further distinction 
can be made between:
measures concerning nPR PPMs affecting a purely national situation in the  –
country of production (e.g. measures concerning child labour or animal 
welfare);
measures concerning nPR PPMs affecting a transboundary situation  –
(e.g. measures concerning air or water pollution across national borders);
measures concerning nPR PPMs affecting a situation in multiple/undetermined  –
national territories (e.g. measures concerning the protection of migratory 
species); and 
measures concerning nPR PPMs affecting a global situation (e.g. measures  –
concerning climate change or the depletion of the ozone layer).20 
3 Focus of this study
As stated in the terms of reference of this study, measures concerning nPR PPMs 
are – much more than measures concerning PR PPMs or other measures referred 
to above – the subject of controversy. At present this is particularly the case with 
regard to measures addressing concerns relating to the large-scale production of 
biomass and animal welfare concerns. In view of the policy debates and calls for 
action referred to above, there is an urgent need for more clarity regarding the kind 
of measures concerning nPR PPMs that are both legal and effective, and which also 
take into account the interests of developing countries. 
3.1 Measures dealt with in this study
The unilateral measures to give effect to nPR PPMs, such as the sustainability 
criteria for biomass production or animal welfare requirements, can take many 
different forms. The following list includes some measures that are already 
applied; most of those listed, however, are not (yet) in force (and, therefore, 
still hypothetical) but have been suggested by policy makers and/or stakeholders 
as appropriate and effective measures for either the Netherlands or the European 
Union to take:21
20 See OECD, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations 
on Use of PPM-Based Trade Measures, OECD/GD(97) (Paris: OECD, 1997), p.137.
21 It is clear that under EU law the Netherlands no longer has any competence to introduce a number of the 
measures discussed below (e.g. granting preferential customs duties to products produced consistently 
with nPR PPMs).
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An  – import prohibition on products not produced consistently with nPR PPMs 
(e.g. an import prohibition on biomass not produced consistently with the 
Cramer sustainability criteria; or an import prohibition on livestock products not 
produced consistently with animal welfare requirements);
Preferential customs duties –  for products produced consistently with nPR PPMs 
(e.g. lower customs duties for biomass produced consistently with the Cramer 
sustainability criteria; or higher customs duties for meat from animals that have 
not been kept, fed, transported or slaughtered in accordance with specifi c 
animal welfare requirements);
Country-specifi c customs duties –  for imports from countries that have national 
legislation incorporating specifi c nPR PPMs (e.g. lower customs duties for 
biomass imported from countries which have been certifi ed as requiring that 
the production of biomass conforms to the Cramer sustainability criteria and 
equivalent criteria);
Domestic prohibition –  of the use or sale of products produced inconsistently 
with the nPR PPMs (e.g. a prohibition on the use in the production of biofuels 
from biomass produced inconsistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria; 
or a prohibition on the sale of foie gras from geese that were force-fed); 
Technical regulations  – (mandatory) setting out nPR PPMs for products used or 
sold (e.g. a technical regulation stipulating that eggs must be produced in 
conditions where battery cages hold no more than eight laying hens per m2);
Government or private standards  – (voluntary) setting out nPR PPMs for products 
used or sold (e.g. a standard agreed upon by oil and electricity companies that 
the biomass they use must meet the Cramer sustainability criteria; or a 
standard agreed upon by retailers that they will only sell animal-welfare-
friendly products).
Compulsory blending requirements  – specifying that the products blended 
must be produced consistently with nPR PPMs (e.g. a regulation excluding 
from the compulsory blending of fossil and biofuels, biofuels from biomass 
not produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria);
Mandatory or voluntary labelling  – regarding nPR PPMs (e.g. labelling on 
livestock products indicating whether they are produced consistently with 
specifi c animal welfare requirements);
Voluntary certifi cation programmes or schemes  – regarding nPR PPMs 
(e.g. a government or private organization certifying that specifi c biomass 
has been produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria; 
or that livestock products have been produced consistently with animal 
welfare requirements);
Tax reductions, exemptions or rebates  – for products produced consistently with 
nPR PPMs (e.g. a reduction in excise duties on biofuels made from biomass 
produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria; or a reduction in 
the VAT on animal-welfare-friendly products);
11
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Border tax adjustments –  levied on imported products to offset nPR PPM-based 
domestic taxation;
Government procurement requirements  – favouring products produced 
consistently with nPR PPMs (e.g. a requirement that public buses must use 
biofuels from biomass produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability 
criteria; or a requirement that public hospitals and schools may only buy 
livestock products produced consistently with animal welfare requirements);
Direct subsidies  – to assist producers with the additional cost incurred in meeting 
nPR PPMs (e.g. payments to oil or electricity companies to offset the additional 
costs of using biomass or biofuels from biomass produced consistently with 
the Cramer sustainability criteria; or payments to farmers to offset the 
additional costs resulting from complying with animal welfare requirements)
Export refunds  – to overcome the competitive disadvantage that producers have 
on the world market as a result of stricter domestic regulation setting out nPR 
PPMs (e.g. export refunds for meat and livestock products to compensate for 
the higher production costs resulting from complying with animal welfare 
requirements); and
Reporting requirements  – relating to nPR PPMs (e.g. a requirement for industrial 
users of biomass (oil companies and electricity companies) to report whether 
the biomass they use is produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability 
criteria (and subsequently leaving it to the consumers/civil society to act on 
the basis of this information).
3.2 Issues dealt with in this study
 Pursuant to its terms of reference, this study focuses on three main issues, namely:
the consistency of unilateral nPR PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns  –
with the obligations under the WTO Agreement (see Part 1);
the relevance of other international agreements for unilateral nPR PPM  –
measures addressing non-trade concerns (see Part 2); and
the economic effectiveness and effi ciency as well as the impact on developing  –
countries of unilateral nPR PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns 
(see Part 3).
These issues will be examined with regard to the existing, proposed or still purely 
hypothetical measures relating to the sustainable production of biomass or the 
protection and promotion of animal welfare discussed in the previous section.
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1 Introduction
The fi rst part of this study deals with the consistency with WTO law of unilateral 
measures concerning non-product-related processes and production methods 
(nPR PPMs) addressing non-trade concerns.
1.1 The nature and scope of WTO law
WTO law is a complex and extensive set of international rules dealing with trade in 
goods, trade in services and the protection of intellectual property rights. It covers 
a broad spectrum of national measures ranging from customs duties, import 
quotas and customs formalities to food safety regulations, restrictions on foreign 
investment and national security measures. In WTO law, four categories of basic 
substantive rules can be distinguished:
rules on non-discrimination, including the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)  –
treatment obligation and the national treatment obligation;
rules on market access, including rules on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade  –
in goods and rules on market access for services and service suppliers;
rules on ‘unfair’ trade, including rules on anti-dumping duties, subsidies and  –
countervailing duties; and
rules on confl icts between trade liberalization and other societal values and  –
interests, including the general public policy exceptions, the national and 
international security exceptions; the economic emergency exception; 
the regional integration exceptions, and the rules on special and differential 
treatment of developing countries.
Very important among the rules of the last category above are the general 
exceptions of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT 
1994’) and Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (‘GATS’).22 
These general exceptions allow WTO Members to adopt or maintain otherwise 
GATT 1994 or GATS inconsistent measures addressing non-trade concerns, such as 
public morals, public health and the environment.23 The term ‘non-trade concern’ 
does not appear in the basic WTO agreement, the Marrakesh Agreement on the 
Establishment of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter the ‘WTO Agreement’). 
However, the Preamble to the WTO Agreement states that WTO Members, 
when pursuing the economic objectives of the WTO, should:
22 The texts of the GATT 1994 and the GATS are available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm. 
23 For an in-depth discussion of Article XX of the GATT 1994, see below, p. 89. 
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allow for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development.24 [emphasis added] 
The term ‘non-trade concern’ is applied in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, which states that agricultural trade liberalization commitments should 
be made: 
in an equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, 
including food security and the need to protect the environment.25 [emphasis added]
In Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, WTO Members agreed that they 
would continue negotiations on the further liberalization of trade in agricultural 
products taking into account, inter alia, ‘non-trade concerns’.26 
With respect to the extent to which non-trade concerns can be considered, 
and affect the scope of existing WTO obligations and exceptions, it is important 
to note that the Appellate Body stated in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II:
WTO rules are not so rigid or so infl exible as not to leave room for reasoned 
judgements in confronting the endless and ever changing ebb and fl ow of real facts in 
real cases in the real world. They will serve the multilateral trading system best if they 
are interpreted with that in mind.27
As discussed below in detail, in US – Shrimp, when interpreting the scope of 
application of one of the general exceptions to obligations under the GATT 1994, 
the Appellate Body stated:
The words of Article XX(g), ‘exhaustible natural resources’, were actually crafted 
more than 50 years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
24 See paragraph 1 of the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm. 
25 See paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture, available at 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm. 
26 Reference to ‘non-trade concerns’ was also made in paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 
November 2001, and in paragraph 2 of Annex 2 to the Doha Framework Agreement of August 2004. 
For the EU, the champion of non-trade concerns within the WTO, addressing these concerns in the Doha 
Development Round is a condition for the further liberalization of trade in agricultural products and the 
lowering of domestic support. See EC Proposal for Modalities in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations, 
dated 27 January 2003 (133 Committee, MD:625/02 REV4).
27 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 122-3.
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conservation of the environment. While Article XX was not modifi ed in the Uruguay 
Round, the preamble attached to the WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to 
that Agreement were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of 
environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy. … From the 
perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that the 
generic term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its content or reference 
but is rather ‘by defi nition, evolutionary’.28 [Emphasis added]
Also note that in two prominent disputes involving measures concerning the 
protection of the environment (US – Gasoline, the fi rst dispute before the Appellate 
Body and US – Shrimp, the dispute referred to in the previous paragraph), 
the Appellate Body added a paragraph at the end of its reports explaining, 
in straightforward language, the scope of the freedom of WTO Members to adopt 
trade-restrictive measures addressing non-trade concerns (in casu the protection 
of the environment). In US – Shrimp, for example, the Appellate Body stated: 
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided in this 
appeal. We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment is 
of no signifi cance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that 
the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures 
to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. 
And we have not decided that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, 
plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, 
to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they 
should and do.
What we have decided in this appeal is simply this: although the measure of the 
United States in dispute in this appeal serves an environmental objective that is 
recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g) of Article XX of the GATT 1994, 
this measure has been applied by the United States in a manner which constitutes 
arbitrary and unjustifi able discrimination between Members of the WTO, contrary to 
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. […] As we emphasized in United 
States – Gasoline, WTO Members are free to adopt their own policies aimed at 
protecting the environment as long as, in so doing, they fulfi ll their obligations and 
respect the rights of other Members under the WTO Agreement.29
WTO Members are free to adopt or maintain unilateral measures addressing 
non-trade concerns as long as, in doing so, they act consistently with their 
obligations under WTO law.
28 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 129-130. See below, p. 110.
29 Appellate Body Report,US – Shrimp, paras. 185-186. See also Appellate Body Report, 
US – Gasoline, pp.29-30.
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1.2  Relevant WTO agreements
The basic substantive rules of WTO law, listed above, are set out in the Annexes to 
the WTO Agreement. These Annexes contain in total 19 WTO agreements. In view 
of the focus of this study on unilateral measures concerning nPR PPMs, not all of 
the WTO agreements are of relevance. In this study, the focus will be on the 
obligations and exceptions set out in the WTO agreements on trade in goods, 
and in particular, the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(the ‘TBT Agreement’), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(the ‘SCM Agreement’) and the Agreement on Agriculture. This study does not deal 
with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(the ‘SPS Agreement’) as the provisions of this agreement in principle do not apply 
to measures concerning nPR PPMs.30
2  Relevant obligations under the GATT 1994
This section addresses the most relevant obligations under the GATT 1994, 
namely, the MFN treatment obligation of Article I, the national treatment obligation 
of Article III, the obligations regarding tariff barriers to trade of Article II, and the 
obligations regarding non-tariff barriers of Article XI of the GATT 1994.31
2.1 MFN treatment obligation
Article I of the GATT 1994, entitled ‘General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment’, 
states in paragraph 1:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection 
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for 
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, 
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
30 The scope of application of the SPS Agreement is limited to measures addressing risks associated with pests 
and diseases and measures addressing food borne risks. By defi nition, therefore, SPS measures are 
measures concerning PR PPMs. For an in-depth discussion of the provisions of the SPS Agreement, see D. 
Prevost and P. Van den Bossche, ‘The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’, 
in P. Macrory, A. Appleton and M. Plummer (eds.) The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and 
Political Analysis (Springer, 2005), pp.231-370.
31 This section is based on, and in parts further elaborates on and updates, P. Van den Bossche, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2005, reprinted 2006), pp.309-318 
(MFN treatment obligation), pp.326-364 (national treatment obligation), pp.377-441 (obligations regarding 
tariff barriers; and pp.441-480 (except 458-466) (obligations regarding non-tariff barriers). 
See www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521529815. 
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exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any [Member] to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other [Members].
2.1.1 Scope and nature of the MFN treatment obligation
The MFN treatment obligation set out in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is a 
‘cornerstone of the GATT’ and ‘one of the pillars of the WTO trading system’.32 
In US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, the Appellate Body ruled:
For more than fi fty years, the obligation to provide most-favoured-nation treatment in 
Article I of the GATT 1994 has been both central and essential to assuring the success 
of a global rules-based system for trade in goods.33
The importance of the MFN treatment obligation to the multilateral trading system 
is undisputed. However, the proliferation of customs unions, free trade agreements 
and other preferential arrangements in the last 15 years has led to a situation in 
which much of world trade is not conducted in accordance with the MFN treatment 
obligation. Since 1995, 206 preferential agreements have been notifi ed to the WTO, 
180 of which are currently in force.34 Considering this reality of widespread 
preferential treatment, i.e. non-MFN treatment, in trade relations between WTO 
Members, the 2005 Sutherland Report on The Future of the WTO arrived, not 
without some pathos and emotion, at the following conclusion regarding the MFN 
treatment obligation:
… nearly fi ve decades after the founding of the GATT, MFN is no longer the rule; 
it is almost the exception. Certainly, much trade between the major economies is still 
conducted on an MFN basis. However, what has been termed the ‘spaghetti bowl’ 
of customs unions, common markets, regional and bilateral free trade areas, 
preferences and an endless assortment of miscellaneous trade deals has almost 
reached the point where MFN treatment is exceptional treatment.35
32 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 101.
33 Appellate Body Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para 297. See also Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Autos, para. 69; and Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 101. 
34 See WTO website, Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, at 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey1_e.htm. 
35 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General of the WTO, Supachai Panitchpakdi, 
The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (the ‘Sutherland Report’) 
(WTO, 2005), para. 60. 
20
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
It is clear that in practice MFN treatment is less prevalent than one might expect 
of ‘one of the pillars of the WTO trading system’. Nevertheless, MFN treatment is, 
and remains, a core obligation for WTO Members. Any deviation from this 
obligation will have to be justifi ed.
 
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 prohibits discrimination between like products 
originating in, or destined for, different countries.36 The principal purpose of the 
MFN treatment obligation is to ensure equality of opportunity to import from,
 or to export to, all WTO Members. In EC – Bananas III, the Appellate Body stated, 
with respect to WTO non-discrimination obligations (such as the obligation set 
out in Article I:1):
The essence of the non-discrimination obligations is that like products should be treated 
equally, irrespective of their origin. As no participant disputes that all bananas are like 
products, the non-discrimination provisions apply to all imports of bananas, irrespective 
of whether and how a Member categorizes or subdivides these imports for 
administrative or other reasons.37
Article I:1 covers not only ‘in law’, or de jure, discrimination but also ‘in fact’, or 
de facto, discrimination. A measure may be said to discriminate in law (or de jure) 
in a case in which it is clear from reading the text of the law, regulation or policy 
that it discriminates. If the measure does not appear on the face of the law, 
regulation or policy to discriminate, it may still be found to discriminate de facto if, 
on reviewing all the facts relating to the application of the measure, it becomes 
obvious that it discriminates in practice or in fact. It follows from this that the 
non-discrimination obligation of Article I:1 applies not only to ‘origin-based’ 
measures but also to measures which are ‘origin neutral’.38 Measures that appear, 
on the surface, to be ‘origin-neutral’ can give certain countries more opportunity 
to trade than others and can, therefore, be in violation of the non-discrimination 
obligation of Article I:1.
36 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Autos, para. 84.
37 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 190. Note that the Appellate Body also referred to the non-
discrimination obligations set out in Articles X:3(a) and XIII of GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Import 
Licensing Agreement.
38 In Canada – Autos, the Appellate Body rejected Canada’s argument that Article I:1 does not apply to 
measures which appear, on the surface, to be ‘origin-neutral’. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, 
para. 78. See also GATT Panel Report, EEC – Imports of Beef, paras. 4.2 and 4.3. In this case, the Panel in this 
case found that EC regulations making the suspension of an import levy conditional on the production of a 
certifi cate of authenticity were inconsistent with the MFN obligation of Article I:1 after it was established that 
the only certifying agency authorized to produce a certifi cate of authenticity was an agency in the United 
States.
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2.1.2 Consistency with Article I of the GATT 1994
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 sets out a three-tier test of consistency. There are three 
questions which must be answered to determine whether there is a violation of the 
MFN treatment obligation of Article I:1, namely:
whether the measure at issue confers a trade ‘advantage’ of the kind covered  –
by Article I:1;
whether the products concerned are ‘like’ products; and –
whether the advantage at issue is granted ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to  –
all like products concerned.
 2.1.2.1 Does the measure at issue confer a trade ‘advantage’?
The MFN treatment obligation concerns any advantage granted by any Member 
with respect to:
customs duties, other charges on imports and exports and other customs  –
matters;
internal taxes; and –
internal regulations affecting the sale, distribution and use of products. –
Both panels and the Appellate Body have recognized that Article I:1 clearly casts a 
very wide net.39 In Canada – Autos, the Appellate Body usefully clarifi ed the scope 
of Article I:1 by ruling:
Article I:1 requires that ‘any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all other Members’. [emphasis added] The words of Article I:1 
refer not to some advantages granted ‘with respect to’ the subjects that fall within the 
defi ned scope of the Article, but to ‘any advantage’; not to some products, but to 
‘any product’; and not to like products from some other Members, but to like products 
originating in or destined for ‘all other’ Members.40
In other words, the MFN treatment obligation requires that any advantage granted 
by a Member to any product from or for another country be granted to all like 
products from or for all other Members.
39 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 206. See GATT Panel Report, US – MFN Footwear, para. 6.8; 
and also GATT Panel Report, US – Customs User Fee, para. 122.
40 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 79.
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 2.1.2.2 Are the products concerned ‘like’ products’?
Article I:1 concerns any product originating in or destined for any other country 
and requires that an advantage granted to such products shall be accorded to 
‘like products’ originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members. 
It is only between ‘like products’ that the MFN treatment obligation applies. 
Products that are not ‘like’ may be treated differently.
The concept of ‘like products’ is used not only in Article I:1 but also in Article III:2, 
fi rst sentence, and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.41 This concept plays a very 
important role in GATT law. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘like products’ is not 
defi ned in the GATT 1994. It is generally accepted that the concept of ‘like products’ 
has different meanings in the different contexts in which it is used. In 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body illustrated the possible 
differences in the scope of the concept of ‘like products’ as used in different 
provisions by evoking the image of an accordion:
The accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different places as different 
provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of 
those places must be determined by the particular provision in which the term ‘like’ is 
encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given 
case to which that provision may apply.42
The meaning of the concept of ‘like products’ in Article I:1 was addressed in a 
number of GATT working party and panel reports.43 In Spain – Unroasted Coffee, 
the Panel had to decide whether various types of unroasted coffee (‘Colombian 
mild’, ‘other mild’, ‘unwashed Arabica’, ‘Robusta’ and ‘other’) were ‘like products’ 
within the meaning of Article I:1. Spain applied zero customs duties on ‘Colombia 
mild’ and ‘other mild’, while it imposed a 7 per cent customs duty on the other 
three types of unroasted coffee. Brazil, which exported mainly ‘unwashed Arabica’, 
claimed that the Spanish tariff regime was inconsistent with Article I:1. In 
examining whether the various types of unroasted coffee were ‘like products’ to 
which the MFN treatment obligation applied, the Panel considered:
41 In addition, the concept of ‘like products’ is also used in Articles II:2(a), VI:1(a), IX:1, XI:2(c), XIII:1, XVI:4 and 
XIX:1 of the GATT 1994.
42 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 114.
43 See e.g. Working Party Report, Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, para. 8; and GATT Panel Report 
EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2. In the latter case, the Panel decided, on the basis of ‘such factors as 
the number of products and tariff items carrying different duty rates and tariff bindings, the varying protein 
contents and the different vegetable, animal and synthetic origin of the protein products’, that the various 
protein products at issue could not be considered as ‘like products’ within the meaning of Articles I and III of 
the GATT 1947.
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the characteristics of the products; –
their end-use; and –
the tariff regimes of other Members. – 44
After careful consideration of these criteria, the Panel concluded that all six types 
of unroasted coffee were ‘like products’.
In addition to the characteristics of the products, their end-use and the tariff 
regimes of other Members – the criteria used by the GATT Panel in 
Spain – Unroasted Coffee – a WTO panel examining whether products are ‘like’ 
within the meaning of Article I:1 would now defi nitely also consider consumers’ 
tastes and habits, a criterion or factor not yet referred to in Spain – Unroasted 
Coffee. Since the case law on ‘likeness’ within the meaning of Article I:1 of the 
GATT 1994 is limited, the case law on ‘likeness’ within the meaning of Article III of 
the GATT 1994, discussed below, should be considered even though the scope of 
the concept of ‘likeness’ may differ.45
It is debatable whether, under current WTO law, the processes or production 
methods (PPMs) by which products are produced are relevant in determining 
whether those products are ‘like’, if the processes or production methods do not 
affect the physical characteristics of the products. It is often said that such non-
product-related processes and production methods (nPR PPMs) are not relevant.46 
Consequently, one might conclude that biomass produced inconsistently with the 
Cramer sustainability criteria is ‘like’ biomass produced consistently with these 
criteria; and that livestock products not produced consistently with animal welfare 
requirements are ‘like’ livestock products produced consistently with these 
requirements. However, as will be discussed below in the context of the national 
treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, there may be situations in 
which it would not be correct to come to these conclusions.47 
 2.1.2.3 Is the advantage at issue granted ‘immediately and unconditionally’?
Article I:1 requires that any advantage granted by a WTO Member to imports from 
any country must be granted ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to imports from all 
44 GATT Panel Report, Spain – Unroasted Coffee, paras. 4.6-4.9.
45 Note the warning by Mavroidis ‘against “lock, stock and barrel” transfers of interpretations reached in Article 
III GATT, into the four corners of Article I GATT.’ P. Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 
A Commentary, Oxford Commentaries on GATT/WTO Agreements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p.119.
46 For the meaning of the concept of nPR PPMs, see above, p. 8-9.
47 See below, p. 51.
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other WTO Members.48 Once a WTO Member has granted an advantage to imports 
from a country, it cannot make the granting of that advantage to imports of other 
WTO Members conditional upon those other WTO Members ‘giving something in 
return’ or ‘paying’ for the advantage.49 The granting of an advantage within the 
meaning of Article I:1 may also not be conditional on whether a Member has 
certain characteristics, has certain legislation or undertakes certain action. In 
Belgium – Family Allowances, a dispute of 1952 concerning a Belgian law providing 
for a tax exemption for products purchased from countries which had a system of 
family allowances similar to that of Belgium, the Panel held that the Belgian law at 
issue:
introduced a discrimination between countries having a given system of family 
allowances and those which had a different system or no system at all, and made the 
granting of the exemption dependent on certain conditions.50
The Panel concluded that the advantage – the exemption from a tax – was not 
granted ‘unconditionally’ and that the Belgian law was, therefore, inconsistent with 
the MFN treatment obligation of Article I:1.
In Indonesia – Autos, the Panel found in its report of 1998 with respect to the 
requirement under Article I:1 that advantages shall be granted ‘unconditionally and 
immediately’, as follows:
under the February 1996 car programme the granting of customs duty benefi ts to parts 
and components is conditional to their being used in the assembly in Indonesia of a 
National Car. The granting of tax benefi ts is conditional and limited to the only Pioneer 
company producing National Cars. And there is also a third condition for these benefi ts: 
the meeting of certain local content targets. Indeed under all these car programmes, 
customs duty and tax benefi ts are conditional on achieving a certain local content value 
for the fi nished car. The existence of these conditions is inconsistent with the provisions 
of Article I:1 which provides that tax and customs duty advantages accorded to 
products of one Member (here on Korean products) be accorded to imported like 
products from other Members ‘immediately and unconditionally’.51
48 Note that Article I:1 also requires that any advantage granted by a WTO Member to exports to any country 
must be accorded ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to exports to all other WTO Members. However, the 
study focused on the non-discriminatory treatment of imports from different origins.
49 See in the respect, the Working Party Report on the ‘Accession of Hungary’, L/3889, adopted on 30 July 1973, 
BISD 20S/34, para. 12.
50 GATT Panel Report, Belgium – Family Allowances, para. 3.
51 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.146.
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According to the Panel in Indonesia – Autos under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, 
trade advantages – in casu tax and customs duty benefi ts – could not:
be made conditional on any criteria that is not related to the imported 
product itself.52
In support of this statement, the Panel referred to the Report in Belgian Family 
Allowances.53 Note, however, that the Panel in Canada – Autos found in its report of 
2000 as follows:
.. we believe that the panel decisions and other sources referred to by Japan do not 
support the interpretation of Article I:1 advocated by Japan in the present case 
according to which the word ‘unconditionally’ in Article I:1 must be interpreted to mean 
that subjecting an advantage granted in connection with the importation of a product to 
conditions not related to the imported product itself is per se inconsistent with Article 
I:1, regardless of whether such conditions are discriminatory with respect to the origin 
of products. Rather, they accord with the conclusion from our analysis of the text of 
Article I:1 that whether conditions attached to an advantage granted in connection with 
the importation of a product offend Article I:1 depends upon whether or not such 
conditions discriminate with respect to the origin of products.54
The Panel in Canada – Autos found that the term ‘unconditionally’ does not mean 
that all conditions are prohibited. According to the Panel, ‘unconditionally’ refers to 
the obligation that MFN treatment towards another WTO Member shall not be 
conditional on reciprocal conduct by that other Member. The Panel stated:
… it appears to us that there is an important distinction to be made between, on the 
one hand, the issue of whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is 
subject to conditions, and, on the other hand, whether, an advantage, once it has been 
granted to the products of any country, is accorded ‘unconditionally’ to the like product 
of all other Members. 
52 Ibid., para. 14.143.
53 Ibid., para. 14.144.
54 Panel Report, Canada – Autos, para. 10.29.
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An advantage can be granted subject to conditions without necessarily implying 
that it is not accorded ‘unconditionally’ to the like products of other Members.55 
The Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences, however, opted in its Report of 2003 for a yet 
another and again stricter meaning of the term ‘unconditionally’. The measure at 
issue in this case was additional tariff preferences granted under the Drug 
Arrangements of the EC Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to developing 
countries that are experiencing grave problems relating to the production of and 
traffi c in illegal drugs. According to India, the complainant, ‘the term 
‘unconditionally’ in Article I:1 means that any such advantage must be accorded to 
like products of all other Members regardless of their situation or conduct’.56 
According to the European Communities, however, ‘unconditionally’ should be 
understood to mean that ‘any advantage granted may not be subject to conditions 
requiring compensation’.57 The Panel did not agree with the European 
Communities, and stated that:
In the Panel’s view, moreover, the term ‘unconditionally’ in Article I:1 has a broader 
meaning than simply that of not requiring compensation. While the Panel acknowledges 
the European Communities’ argument that conditionality in the context of traditional 
MFN clauses in bilateral treaties may relate to conditions of trade compensation for 
receiving MFN treatment, the Panel does not consider this to be the full meaning of 
‘unconditionally’ under Article I:1, Rather, the Panel sees no reason not to give that 
term its ordinary meaning under Article I:1, that is, ‘not limited by or subject to any 
conditions’.58
Consequently, according to the Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences, a trade advantage 
is granted ‘unconditionally’ as required under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 when the 
granting of the advantage is ‘not limited by or subject to any conditions’. As the 
tariff preferences at issue in EC – Tariff Preferences were limited by or subject to 
55 Ibid., para. 10.24. Note that the Appellate Body in Canada – Autos found: ‘The measure maintained by 
Canada accords the import duty exemption to certain motor vehicles entering Canada from certain countries. 
These privileged motor vehicles are imported by a limited number of designated manufacturers who are 
required to meet certain performance conditions. In practice, this measure does not accord the same import 
duty exemption immediately and unconditionally to like motor vehicles of all other Members, as required 
under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. The advantage of the import duty exemption is accorded to some motor 
vehicles originating in certain countries without being accorded to like motor vehicles from all other 
Members. Accordingly, we fi nd that this measure is not consistent with Canada’s obligations under Article I:1 
of the GATT 1994’. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 85.
56 Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.55.
57 Ibid., para. 7.56.
58 Ibid., para. 7.59.
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conditions the Panel concluded that they were not granted ‘unconditionally’ and 
thus were inconsistent with Article I:1. 
The strict meaning given to the term ‘unconditionally’ in 2003 by the Panel in 
EC – Tariff Preferences contrasts with the less exact meaning given to this term in 
2000 by the Panel in Canada – Autos. This term clearly requires clarifi cation by the 
Appellate Body. Whether a Member granting a trade advantage, for example a 
lower customs duty, to biomass produced consistently with the Cramer 
sustainability criteria, while not granting this advantage to other biomass, acts 
inconsistently with the MFN treatment obligation of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, 
may depend on whether one adopts the strict test of EC – Tariff Preferences or the 
more fl exible test of Canada – Autos. Under the strict test of EC – Tariff Preferences, 
namely, whether granting of the advantage is ‘not limited by or subject to any 
conditions’, preferential tariff treatment of biomass produced consistently with the 
Cramer sustainability criteria clearly constitutes a violation of Article I:1 of the 
GATT 1994. Under the more fl exible test of Canada – Autos, the preferential tariff 
treatment for biomass produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability 
requirements constitutes a violation of Article I:1 of the GATT only if this condition 
discriminates with respect to the origin of the products. Establishing whether such 
discrimination exists requires a diffi cult and fact-intensive investigation. 
2.2 National treatment obligation
Article III of the GATT 1994, entitled ‘National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation’, states, in relevant part:
1.  The [Members] recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regula tions 
requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specifi ed amounts or 
proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production.
2.  The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the territory of any 
other [Member] shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products. Moreover, no [Member] shall otherwise apply internal taxes or 
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the 
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
3. ...
4.  The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the territory of any other 
[Member] shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and require ments affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
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The provisions of Article III, quoted above, should always be read together with the 
provisions of the Ad Article III Note contained in Annex I, entitled ‘Notes and 
Supplementary Provisions’, of the GATT 1994.
2.2.1 Scope and nature of the national treatment obligation 
Article III of the GATT 1994 prohibits discrimination against imported products. 
Generally speaking, it prohibits Members from treating imported products less 
favourably than like domestic products once the imported products have entered 
the domestic market. In 1958, in Italy – Agricultural Machinery, a dispute 
concerning an Italian law providing special conditions for the purchase on credit of 
Italian-produced tractors and other agricultural machinery, the Panel stated with 
regard to Article III:
that the intention of the drafters of the Agreement was clearly to treat the imported 
products in the same way as the like domestic products once they had been cleared 
through customs. Otherwise indirect protection could be given.59
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body stated with respect to the 
purpose of the national treatment obligation of Article III:
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the 
application of internal tax and regulatory measures. More specifi cally, the purpose of 
Article III is to ensure that internal measures ‘not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic producers’. Toward this end, Article III 
obliges Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported 
products in relation to domestic products. ‘[T]he intention of the drafters of the 
Agreement was clearly to treat the imported products in the same way as the like 
domestic products once they had been cleared through customs. Otherwise indirect 
protection could be given’.60
59 GATT Panel Report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery, para. 11. As discussed below, the Panel in this early GATT 
case, the Panel in fact erred when it stated that imported products must be treated ‘in the same way’ as like 
domestic products. Under Article III:4, the paragraph of Article III at issue, imported products must be treated 
no less favourably than like domestic products. See below, p. 51. 
60 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 16. In a footnote, the Appellate Body referred to GATT 
Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.10 (for the fi rst quote); GATT Panel Report, US – Superfund, para. 
5.1.9; Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 5.5(b); and GATT Panel Report, Italy – Agricultural 
Machinery, para. 11 (for the second quote). See also Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, 
para. 119; and Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.108. 
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In Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body identifi ed the objectives of 
Article III as ‘avoiding protectionism, requiring equality of competitive conditions 
and protecting expectations of equal competitive relationships’.61
Article III of the GATT 1994 covers not only ‘in law’ or de jure discrimination; it also 
covers ‘in fact’ or de facto discrimination.62 In other words, Article III applies not 
only to ‘origin-based’ measures, which are discriminatory by defi nition; it also 
applies to ‘origin-neutral’ measures that in spite of their ‘origin-neutrality’ may 
nevertheless be discriminatory. An example of an ‘origin-based’ measure to which 
the non-discrimination obligation of Article III has been applied is the measure at 
issue in Korea – Various Measures on Beef. In that case, the disputed measure was 
a dual retail distribution system for the sale of beef under which imported beef 
was, inter alia, to be sold in specialist stores selling only imported beef or in 
separate sections of supermarkets. An example of an ‘origin-neutral’ measure to 
which the non-discrimination obligation of Article III has been applied is the 
measure at issue in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II.63 In that case, the disputed 
measure was tax legislation that provided for higher taxes on vodka (domestic and 
imported) than on shochu (domestic and imported).
Note that unlike Article I discussed above, Article III only applies to internal 
measures, and not to border measures. In addition to Article I, Articles II and XI, 
discussed below, also apply to border measures. It is not always easy to 
distinguish an internal measure from a border measure when the measure is 
applied to imported products at the time or point of importation.64 Moreover, 
as the Panel in India – Autos noted: 
… it … cannot be excluded a priori that different aspects of a measure may affect the 
competitive opportunities of imports in different ways, making them fall within the 
scope either of Article III (where competitive opportunities on the domestic market are 
affected) or of Article XI (where the opportunities for importation itself, i.e. entering the 
market, are affected), or even that there may be, in perhaps exceptional circumstances,
61 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 120. In Canada – Periodicals, the Appellate Body 
stated: ‘The fundamental purpose of Article III of the GATT 1994 is to ensure equality of competitive 
conditions between imported and like domestic products.’ See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 
8. See also Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.182.
62 On the meaning of the concepts of de jure and de facto discrimination, see above, p. 8.
63 Another example is the ban on asbestos and asbestos-containing products at issue in EC – Asbestos.
64 See Ad Article III Note. See also Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 8.89 and 8.91, and Panel Report, 
India – Autos, para. 7.224.
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a potential for overlap between the two provisions, as was suggested in the case of 
state trading.65
Of particular importance for the scope of application of Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994, is the question of whether nPR PPM measures, i.e. measures regulating the 
process and production methods of products which do not affect the characteristics 
or properties of these products, fall within the scope of Article III:4. As discussed 
below, it has been argued that these nPR PPM measures constitute border 
measures controlled by Article XI of the GATT 1994, and not by Article III:4.66
The general principle that internal measures should not be applied so as to afford 
protection to domestic production is elaborated in Article III:2 with regard to 
internal taxation and in Article III:4 with regard to internal regulation. In Article III:2, 
two non-discrimination obligations can be distinguished: one obligation, set out in 
the fi rst sentence of Article III:2, relates to internal taxes on ‘like products’; and the 
other obligation, set out in the second sentence of Article III:2, relates to internal 
taxes on ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’. The sections below will 
discuss:
the GATT national treatment test of Article III:2, fi rst sentence, for internal taxes  –
on like products;
the GATT national treatment test of Article III:2, second sentence, for internal  –
taxes on directly competitive or substitutable products; and
the GATT national treatment test of Article III:4 for internal regulation. –
2.2.2 GATT consistency of internal taxes on like products
Article III:2, fi rst sentence, of the GATT 1994 states:
The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the territory of any other 
[Member] shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic 
products.
This provision sets out a two-tier test of consistency of internal taxation. In 
Canada – Periodicals, the Appellate Body found:
[T]here are two questions which need to be answered to determine whether there is a 
violation of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994: (a) whether imported and domestic products 
are like products; and (b) whether the imported products are taxed in excess of the 
65 Ibid., para. 7.224.
66 See below, p. 86.
31
WTO Consistency of Unilateral nPR PPM Measures addressing NTCs
domestic products. If the answers to both questions are affi rmative, there is a violation 
of Article III:2, fi rst sentence.67
In brief, the two-tier test of consistency of internal taxation with Article III:2, fi rst 
sentence, therefore requires the examination of:
whether the imported and domestic products are  – like products; and
whether the imported products are  – taxed in excess of the domestic products.
However, before applying the test under Article III:2, fi rst sentence, it has to be 
determined whether the measure at issue is an ‘internal tax or other internal 
charge of any kind’ within the meaning of that provision.
 2.2.2.1 Is the measure at issue an ‘internal tax on products’?
Article III:2, fi rst sentence, concerns ‘internal taxes and other charges of any kind’ 
which are applied ‘directly or indirectly’ on products. Examples of such internal 
taxes on products are value added taxes (VAT), sales taxes and excise duties. 
Income taxes or import duties are not covered since they are not taxes on products 
or are not internal taxes.68 The words ‘applied directly or indirectly on products’ 
should be understood to mean ‘applied on or in connection with products’. It has 
been suggested that a tax applied ‘indirectly’ is a tax applied, not on a product as 
such, but on the processing of the product. VAT or excise duties on biomass or 
biofuels are defi nitely internal taxes within the scope of application of Article III:2. 
Taxes imposed on the processing of biomass into biofuels may also be considered 
to be internal taxes within the scope of application of Article III:2. Customs duties 
on biomass or biofuels or income taxes on companies producing biomass or 
biofuels are not internal taxes within the meaning of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994.
Note that the regulatory objective pursued by the tax measure is of no relevance to 
the question of whether the measure is an internal tax within the meaning of 
Article III:2. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body stated that 
Members may pursue, through their tax measures, any given policy objective 
provided they do so in compliance with Article III:2. In Argentina – Hides and 
Leather, the Panel rejected Argentina’s contention that the tax legislation at issue in 
that case was designed to achieve effi cient tax administration and collection, and 
as such did not fall under Article III:2.69 The fact that a tax measure applicable on 
biomass or livestock products is adopted to promote the protection of the 
environment or animal welfare (and not to raise revenue for the government) is of 
67 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 468.
68 Note that an income tax regulation can be considered to be an internal regulation and thus fall within the 
scope of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, discussed below , p. 51.
69 Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.144.
32
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
no relevance to the question of whether the measure is an internal tax within the 
meaning of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994.70
 2.2.2.2 Are the products concerned ‘like products’?
Similar to the concept of ‘like products’ in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, the concept 
of ‘like products’ in Article III:2, fi rst sentence, is not defi ned in the GATT 1994. 
There are, however, a considerable number of GATT and WTO dispute settlement 
reports that shed light on the meaning of the concept of ‘like products’ in Article 
III:2, fi rst sentence.
Under the Japanese tax system at issue in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the 
internal tax imposed on domestic shochu was the same as that imposed on 
imported shochu; the higher tax imposed on imported vodka was also imposed on 
domestic vodka. Identical products (not considering brand differences) were thus 
taxed identically. However, the question in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II was 
whether shochu and vodka should be considered to be ‘like products’. If shochu 
and vodka were found to be ‘like’, vodka could not be taxed in excess of shochu. 
The Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II addressed the scope of the 
concept of ‘like products’ within the meaning of Article III:2, fi rst sentence. The 
Appellate Body fi rst stated that this concept should be interpreted narrowly 
because of the existence of the concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable 
products’ used in the second sentence of Article III:2. The Appellate Body ruled:
Because the second sentence of Article III:2 provides for a separate and distinctive 
consideration of the protective aspect of a measure in examining its application to a 
broader category of products that are not ‘like products’ as contemplated by the fi rst 
sentence, we agree with the Panel that the fi rst sentence of Article III:2 must be 
construed narrowly so as not to condemn measures that its strict terms are not meant 
to condemn. Consequently, we agree with the Panel also that the defi nition of ‘like 
products’ in Article III:2, fi rst sentence, should be construed narrowly.71
70 Note, however, that according to the Panel in US – Tobacco, a fi nancial penalty provision for the enforcement 
of a domestic law is not an ‘internal tax or charge of any kind’ within the meaning of Article III:2, fi rst 
sentence. Such a fi nancial penalty provision is an internal regulation with the meaning of Article III:4 of the 
GATT 1994. See GATT Panel Report, US – Tobacco, para. 80. Also, the Panel in EEC – Animal Feed Proteins did 
not consider a security deposit to be a fi scal measure, although this deposit accrued to the EEC when the 
buyers of vegetable proteins failed to fulfi l the obligation to purchase milk powder. The Panel considered the 
security deposit, including any associated cost, to be only an enforcement mechanism for the purchase 
requirement and, as such, should be examined with the purchase obligation (which is an international 
regulation subject to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994). See GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, 
para. 4.4.
71 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 112-13.
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Subsequently, the Appellate Body expressly agreed with the basic approach for 
determining ‘likeness’ set out in the 1970 report of the Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments.72 This Working Party found that:
the interpretation of the term should be examined on a case-by-case basis. This would 
allow a fair assessment in each case of the different elements that constitute a ‘similar’ 
product. Some criteria were suggested for determining, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether a product is ‘similar’: the product’s end-uses in a given market; consumers’ 
tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the product’s properties, 
nature and quality.73
This basic approach was followed in almost all later GATT panel reports involving a 
GATT provision in which the concept of ‘like products’ was used.74 According to the 
Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, this approach should be helpful 
in identifying on a case-by-case basis the range of ‘like products’ that fall within the 
limits of Article III:2, fi rst sentence of the GATT 1994. However, the Appellate Body 
added:
Yet this approach will be most helpful if decision makers keep ever in mind how narrow 
the range of ‘like products’ in Article III:2, fi rst sentence, is meant to be as opposed to 
the range of ‘like’ products contemplated in some other provisions of the GATT 1994 
and other Multilateral Trade Agreements of the WTO Agreement. In applying the 
criteria cited in [the report of the Working Group on] Border Tax Adjustments to the 
facts of any particular case, and in considering other criteria that may also be relevant in 
certain cases, panels can only apply their best judgement in determining whether in 
fact products are ‘like’. This will always involve an unavoidable element of individual, 
discretionary judgement.75
The criteria listed in the report of the Working Group on Border Tax Adjustments 
did not include the tariff classifi cation of the products concerned. Yet, tariff 
classifi cation has been used as a criterion for determining ‘like products’ in several 
panel reports.76 The Appellate Body acknowledged in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II 
72 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97. The Working Party considered the 
concept of ‘like’ or ‘similar’ products as used throughout the GATT.
73 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, para. 18.
74 See e.g. GATT Panel Report, Australia – Ammonium Sulphate; GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed 
Proteins; GATT Panel Report, Spain – Unroasted Coffee; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I; 
and GATT Panel Report, US – Superfund.
75 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 113.
76 See e.g. GATT Panel in Spain – Unroasted Coffee, discussed above in the context of Article I:1 of the GATT 
1994.
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that uniform classifi cation in tariff nomenclatures based on the Harmonized 
System can be of help in determining ‘likeness’.77
The fact that ‘likeness’ under Article III:2, fi rst sentence, is to be narrowly construed 
as compared to ‘likeness’ under other provisions, is clearly demonstrated in the 
2004 case Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes. In that case, the 
Panel had found that domestic and imported cigarettes were ‘like’ products under 
Article III:4, before turning to complainant’s claim of inconsistency with Article III:2, 
fi rst sentence. As provided for in its Selective Consumption Tax legislation, the 
Dominican Republic increased the taxes on cigarettes. The increase of taxes on 
imported cigarettes was based on the value of the nearest similar product on the 
domestic market. The Panel noted, fi rstly, that it was aware of the fact that fi nding 
‘likeness’ under Article III:4 does not guarantee a fi nding of ‘likeness’ under Article 
III:2, fi rst sentence. It then went on to state that:
… imported cigarettes can generally be considered as like products to domestic 
Dominican Republic cigarettes within the meaning of the fi rst sentence of Article III:2 of 
the GATT. Indeed, the available evidence demonstrates that both imported and 
domestic cigarettes have similar physical properties; they are made from similar 
materials; have a similar presentation; they have the same end-use (i.e. they are 
smoked by consumers); and they are classifi ed under the same tariff heading 
24402.20.00. However, for the purpose of the analysis within the fi rst sentence of 
Article III:2 of the GATT, a narrowly construed interpretation of the likeness requirement, 
would require the Panel to additionally consider the fact that, within the general product 
description, cigarettes are presented to consumers distinguished by brands. Under the 
identifi cation of these brands, cigarettes compete within specifi c price segments 
against each other. The distinction between different price segments may be particularly 
important for the analysis under Article III:2 of the GATT, since the Selective 
Consumption Tax was applied on an ad valorem basis, i.e. was related to the price of 
the product.78
Honduras, the complainant in this case, contended that the imported Viceroy brand 
had been treated for tax purposes as similar to higher-priced brands like Marlboro 
and Kent, rather than to the brand with which it had an equivalent retail price, 
Líder.79 The Dominican Republic responded to this that it had determined that the 
nearest similar domestic cigarettes to Viceroy were Marlboro, and not Líder, 
because:
77 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 114-115.
78 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, paras. 7.330-331.
79 Ibid., paras.7.321-323.
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… its custom authorities considered that the Viceroy cigarettes were similar in quality 
to domestic higher-priced Marlboro and Kent, and not to the lower-priced Líder, since 
the declared customs value of Viceroy cigarettes was higher than the price of Líder 
and even of Marlboro and Kent.80
 The Panel agreed with the respondent that ‘quality is an important factor in the 
determination of the likeness of products’. However, the Panel then stated that:
… it does not think that values declared by importers for customs purposes can be the 
only factor used in order to determine the quality of a product. The Dominican Republic 
admits that the imported Viceroy cigarettes had the same retail selling price as the 
domestic Líder cigarettes. The Panel believes that, if prices of a product are to be 
considered as a function of their quality, then the actual price of the product in the 
marketplace should be in principle more relevant than the value declared in customs.81
The Panel in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes thus concluded 
that in examining whether the Selective Consumption Tax was consistent with 
Article III:2, fi rst sentence, it would consider:
… as products ‘alike’ to the imported cigarettes, those domestic cigarettes that were 
sold at a similar price and, more specifi cally, will consider that Viceroy cigarettes 
imported in the Dominican Republic are alike to domestic Líder cigarettes.82
The actual price at which products are sold on the market of the importing country 
is thus a factor – in addition to the factors identifi ed in the report of the Working 
Group on Border Tax Adjustment – to be considered when determining whether 
products are ‘like’ within the meaning of Article III:2, fi rst sentence.
In US – Malt Beverages, the Panel held that national legislation giving special tax 
credits to products of small fi rms (whether domestic or foreign) would constitute 
discrimination against products from a larger foreign fi rm and therefore infringed 
Article III because its products would be treated less favourably than the like 
products of a small domestic fi rm.83 The fact that products were produced by small 
or large fi rms was irrelevant in the determination of their ‘likeness’. The Panel 
pointed out that:
80 Ibid., para. 7.326.
81 Ibid., para. 7.333.
82 Ibid., para. 7.336.
83 GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.19.
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… the United States did not assert that the size of the breweries affected the nature of 
the beer produced or otherwise affected beer as a product.84
According to the Panel in US – Malt Beverages, processes and production methods 
that do not affect the nature, quality or property of products, in other words non-
product related processes and production methods (nPR-PPMs), are irrelevant in 
the determination of ‘likeness’.
The same Panel also considered, however, with regard to the determination of 
‘likeness’, that:
the like product determination under Article III:2 also should have regard to the purpose 
of the Article ... The purpose is ... not to prevent contracting parties from using their 
fi scal and regulatory powers for purposes other than to afford protection to domestic 
production. Specifi cally, the purpose of Article III is not to prevent contracting parties 
from differentiating between different product categories for policy purposes unrelated 
to the protection of domestic production... Consequently, in determining whether two 
products subject to different treatment are like products, it is necessary to consider 
whether such product differentiation is being made ‘so as to afford protection to 
domestic production’.85
The Panel found domestic wine containing a particular local variety of grape ‘like’ 
imported wine not containing this variety of grape after considering that the 
purpose of differentiating between the wines was to afford protection to the local 
production of wine. The Panel noted that the United States did not advance any 
alternative policy objective for the differentiation. It is clear from the Panel’s 
argumentation that, if the United States had advanced a legitimate (i.e. non-
protectionist) policy objective for the product differentiation, the Panel would not 
have considered the products ‘like’. According to the Panel in US – Malt Beverages, 
the reason for the product differentiation was to be considered when deciding on 
the ‘likeness’ of products. 
In a dispute concerning, inter alia, special tax levels for luxury vehicles, US – Taxes 
on Automobiles, the Panel elaborated further this approach of determining 
‘likeness’.86 The United States imposed a retail excise tax on cars over US$30,000, 
and the Panel had to determine whether cars with prices above and below 
US$30,000 were ‘like products’. The complainant in this dispute, the European 
Communities, argued before the Panel that ‘likeness’ should be determined on the 
84 Ibid.
85 GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.24-25.
86 GATT Panel Report, US – Taxes on Automobiles, paras. 5.8ff. Note that this report was never adopted.
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basis of factors such as the end-use of the products, their physical characteristics 
and tariff classifi cation. The United States, however, contended that the key factor 
in determining ‘likeness’ should be whether the measure was applied ‘so as to 
afford protection to domestic industry’. The Panel reasoned that the determination 
of ‘likeness’ would, in all but the most straightforward cases, have to include an 
examination of the aim and effect of the particular tax measure. According to the 
Panel in US – Taxes on Automobiles, ‘likeness’ should be examined in terms of 
whether the less favourable treatment was based on a regulatory distinction taken 
so as to afford protection to domestic production. In casu, the Panel decided that 
the luxury tax was not implemented to afford protection to the domestic 
production of cars, and that cars above and below US$30,000 could not, for the 
purpose of the luxury tax, be considered to be ‘like products’ under Article III:2, 
fi rst sentence.87
The ‘aim-and-effect’ test for determining ‘likeness’ was, however, explicitly rejected 
in 1996 by the Panel in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II. The Panel explained its 
rejection of the ‘aim-and-effect’ test as follows:
… the proposed aim-and-effect test is not consistent with the wording of Article III:2, 
fi rst sentence. The Panel recalled that the basis of the aim-and-effect test is found in the 
words ‘so as to afford protection’ contained in Article III:1. The Panel further recalled 
that Article III:2, fi rst sentence, contains no reference to those words. Moreover, the 
adoption of the aim-and-effect test would have important repercussions on the burden 
of proof imposed on the complainant. The Panel noted in this respect that the 
complainants, according to the aim-and-effect test, have the burden of showing not only 
the effect of a particular measure, which is in principle discernible, but also its aim, 
which sometimes can be indiscernible. The Panel also noted that very often there is a 
multiplicity of aims that are sought through enactment of legislation and it would be a 
diffi cult exercise to determine which aim or aims should be determinative for applying 
the aim-and-effect test. Moreover, access to the complete legislative history, which 
according to the arguments of the parties defending the aim-and-effect test, is relevant 
to detect protective aims, could be diffi cult or even impossible for a complaining party 
to obtain. Even if the complete legislative history is available, it would be diffi cult to 
assess which kinds of legislative history (statements in legislation, in offi cial legislative 
reports, by individual legislators, or in hearings by interested parties) should be primarily 
determinative of the aims of the legislation.88
87 Ibid.
88 Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.16.
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The United States had argued that the ‘aim-and-effect’ test should be applied only with 
respect to origin-neutral measures. The Panel noted, however, that neither the wording 
of Article III:2, nor that of Article III:1 support a distinction between origin-neutral and 
origin-specifi c measures.89
In support of its rejection of the ‘aim-and-effect’ test in determining ‘likeness’ in the 
context of Article III:2, the Panel in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II further noted this 
test would allow Members to circumvent the disciplines of Article XX of the GATT 
1994, discussed below, and therefore make this provision redundant.90 The Panel 
considered that:
… the list of exceptions contained in Article XX of GATT 1994 could become redundant 
or useless because the aim-and-effect test does not contain a defi nitive list of grounds 
justifying departure from the obligations that are otherwise incorporated in Article III. 
The purpose of Article XX is to provide a list of exceptions, subject to the conditions 
that they ‘are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifi able discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction of international trade’, that could justify deviations from the 
obligations imposed under GATT. Consequently, in principle, a WTO Member could, for 
example, invoke protection of health in the context of invoking the aim-and-effect test. 
The Panel noted that if this were the case, then the standard of proof established in 
Article XX would effectively be circumvented. WTO Members would not have to prove 
that a health measure is ‘necessary’ to achieve its health objective. Moreover, 
proponents of the aim-and-effect test even shift the burden of proof, arguing that it 
would be up to the complainant to produce a prima facie case that a measure has both 
the aim and effect of affording protection to domestic production and, once the 
complainant has demonstrated that this is the case, only then would the defending 
party have to present evidence to rebut the claim.91 
The Panel thus concluded for reasons relating to the wording of Article III as well as 
its context that the ‘aim-and-effect’ test proposed by Japan and the United States 
should be rejected.92
89 Ibid., para. 6.17.
90 See below, p. 89.
91 Ibid., para. 6.17.
92 Ibid.
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The Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II implicitly affi rmed the Panel’s 
rejection of the aim-and-effect test.93
  2.2.2.3  Is the tax applied on the imported product ‘in excess’ of the tax on the 
domestic product?
Pursuant to Article III:2, fi rst sentence, internal taxes on imported products should 
not be ‘in excess of’ the internal taxes applied to ‘like’ domestic products. In 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body established a strict benchmark 
for the ‘in excess of’ requirement. The Appellate Body ruled:
Even the smallest amount of ‘excess’ is too much. The prohibition of discriminatory 
taxes in Article III:2, fi rst sentence, is not conditional on a ‘trade effects test’ nor is it 
qualifi ed by a de minimis standard.94
On the absence of a ‘trade effects test’, the Appellate Body stated in the same case, 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II:
it is irrelevant that the ‘trade effects’ of the tax differential between imported and 
domestic products, as refl ected in the volumes of imports, are insignifi cant or even 
non-existent; Article III protects expectations not of any particular trade volume but 
rather of the equal competitive relationship between imported and domestic 
products.95 [emphasis added]
With respect to the absence of a de minimis standard, note that in US – Superfund 
the Panel had already ruled in 1987:
The rate of tax applied to the imported products is 3.5 cents per barrel higher than the 
rate applied to the like domestic products... The tax on petroleum is ... inconsistent with 
the United States’ obligations under Article III:2, fi rst sentence.96
93 The Appellate Body stated: ‘With these modifi cations to the legal reasoning in the Panel Report, we affi rm 
the legal conclusions and the fi ndings of the Panel with respect to “like products” in all other respects’. See 
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 115.
94 Ibid. See also Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.244.
95 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 110.
96 GATT Panel Report, US – Superfund, para. 5.1.1. In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the Panel rejected 
Argentina’s argument that the tax burden differential between imported and domestic products would only 
exist for a thirty-day period and therefore was de minimis. See Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, 
para. 11.245.
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In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the Panel emphasized that Article III:2, fi rst 
sentence, requires a comparison of actual tax burdens rather than merely of 
nominal tax burdens. The Panel ruled:
It is necessary to recall the purpose of Article III:2, fi rst sentence, which is to ensure 
‘equality of competitive conditions between imported and like domestic products’. 
Accordingly, Article III:2, fi rst sentence, is not concerned with taxes or charges as such 
or the policy purposes Members pursue with them, but with their economic impact on 
the competitive opportunities of imported and like domestic products. It follows, in our 
view, that what must be compared are the tax burdens imposed on the taxed products.
We consider that Article III:2, fi rst sentence, requires a comparison of actual tax 
burdens rather than merely of nominal tax burdens. Were it otherwise, Members could 
easily evade its disciplines. Thus, even where imported and like domestic products are 
subject to identical tax rates, the actual tax burden can still be heavier on imported 
products. This could be the case, for instance, where different methods of computing 
tax bases lead to a greater actual tax burden for imported products.97
With respect to the methods of computing the tax basis, the Panel in 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I stated:
in assessing whether there is tax discrimination, account is to be taken not only of the 
rate of the applicable internal tax but also of the taxation methods (e.g. different kinds 
of internal taxes, direct taxation of the fi nished product or indirect taxation by taxing the 
raw materials used in the product during the various stages of its production) and of the 
rules for the tax collection (e.g. basis of assessment).98
In Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the importance of the tax 
basis in determining whether a tax measure is consistent with Article III:2 was 
further illustrated. In that case, the Dominican Republic taxed domestic cigarettes 
based on the average retail selling price of each brand, whereas, by contrast, the 
tax basis for imported cigarettes was calculated on the value of the ‘nearest similar 
product on the domestic market.’ According to the complainant, Honduras, this 
difference in tax basis resulted in certain lower-priced imported cigarettes being 
taxed at a rate higher than the one which would have corresponded according to 
their actual selling price. Honduras thus contended that the Dominican Republic 
acted inconsistently with Article III:2, fi rst sentence. The Panel agreed with 
Honduras. It found that:
97 Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, paras. 11.182-11.183.
98 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.8.
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According to the available evidence, during the year 2003, the retail selling prices for 
imported cigarettes under the brand Viceroy and domestic cigarettes under the brand 
Líder were the same, i.e. RD$18 per packet. However, these cigarettes were not taxed 
on the same basis. While each packet of Viceroy cigarettes paid RD$6.54 in Selective 
Consumption Tax, a packet of Líder only paid RD$5.34. That means that, while the 
actual tax burden for Viceroy cigarettes was 36.33 per cent of its retail selling price, for 
Líder it was 29.66 per cent.99
On the basis of these considerations, the Panel concluded that the Dominican 
Republic imposed an internal tax on certain imported cigarettes in excess to the tax 
applied on the like domestic products and therefore acted in a manner inconsistent 
with Article III:2, fi rst sentence, of the GATT.100
While it is the actual tax burden on the ‘like products’ which must be examined, it 
should be noted that the Panel in EEC – Animal Feed Proteins ruled that an internal 
regulation which merely exposed imported products to a risk of discrimination 
constitutes, by itself, a form of discrimination and therefore less favourable 
treatment within the meaning of Article III.101
A Member which applies higher taxes on imported products in some situations but 
‘balances’ this by applying lower taxes on the imported products in other 
situations also acts inconsistently with the national treatment obligation of Article 
III:2, fi rst sentence. The Panel in Argentina – Hides and Leather ruled:
Article III:2, fi rst sentence, is applicable to each individual import transaction. It does not 
permit Members to balance more favourable tax treatment of imported products in 
some instances against less favourable tax treatment of imported products in other 
instances.102
If differences in taxes are based upon the nationality of producers or the origin of 
the parts and components contained in the products, these tax differences are – as 
the Panel in Indonesia – Autos found – necessarily inconsistent with the national 
treatment obligation of Article III:2, fi rst sentence.103 Such instances of de jure tax 
discrimination are usually easy to identify and have become, probably for that 
reason, uncommon. However, Article III:2, fi rst sentence, also covers origin-neutral 
99 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para 7.357
100 Ibid., para. 7.358.
101 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para. 141. See also GATT Panel Report, US – Tobacco, 
paras. 95-97.
102 Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.260. See GATT Panel Report, US – Tobacco, para. 98.
103 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.112.
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internal tax measures. Such measures can constitute de facto discrimination.104 An 
example of de facto discrimination under Article III:2, fi rst sentence, can be found 
in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes. In that case, the Panel fi rst 
found that the legislation on the basis of which the added tax on cigarettes was 
determined, was itself not discriminatory.105 However, when the Panel 
subsequently examined the manner in which the tax legislation actually applied, it 
came to the conclusion – as discussed above – that there was suffi cient evidence to 
indicate that imported cigarettes were taxed in excess of Dominican Republic 
cigarettes, and that the tax measure was therefore inconsistent with Article III:2, 
fi rst sentence.106
In 2006, under the ‘umbrella’ of the EC directive on biofuels, EC Directive 2003/30, 
Belgium adopted a biofuels law which provides, inter alia, for a lower excise duty 
on fuels containing a minimum percentage of bioethanol or biodiesel.107 However, 
the relevant requirements are such that de facto this bioethanol or biodiesel must 
be of Belgian origin produced from Belgian biomass. As will be discussed below, 
such a measure is not only inconsistent with Article III:2, but also with the SCM 
Agreement because the measure – as described above – clearly constitutes a 
prohibited import substitution subsidy within the meaning of Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement.108 Under the ‘umbrella’ of EC Directive 2003/30, the Netherlands 
currently applies lower excise duties on biofuels produced from three specifi c 
vegetable oils than it applies to other biofuels. To the extent that the biofuels 
produced from these three specifi c vegetable oils are ‘like’ other biofuels, the 
higher excise duties on the latter biofuels is inconsistent with Article III:2, fi rst 
sentence, of the GATT 1994.109
While it is clear that border tax adjustment is possible for indirect taxes levied on 
products, the extent to which indirect taxes on inputs, incorporated or exhausted 
in the production process, to the fi nal product can be adjusted at the border, 
whether on exports or on imports, remains to be clarifi ed. The GATT Panel in 
US – Superfund considered that taxes on substances entering in the composition 
104 See above, p. 28.
105 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.353.
106 Ibid., paras. 7.354-358. See also the analysis above, p. 40-41.
107 Wet betreffende de biobrandstoffen van 10 juni 2006, Belgisch Staatsblad, 16 juni 2006, 30632-30637.
108 See below, p. 158. It is assumed that Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994 does not apply here since the measure 
at issue is not the ‘payment of a subsidy exclusively to domestic producers’ within the meaning of that 
provision. See below, p. 73.
109 If the biofuels concerned are not ‘like’ within the strict meaning of Article III:2, fi rst sentence, they are at least 
‘directly competitive or substitutable’ within the meaning of Article III:2, second sentence and thus fall under 
the rules of this provision, discussed below, p. 43.
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of the fi nal product could be adjusted at the border. However, it is not clear, in this 
particular case, whether those substances were still physically present in the fi nal 
product, or whether they had been exhausted in the production process, and the 
Panel made no distinction to that effect.110
2.2.3  GATT consistency of internal taxes on directly competitive or substitutable products
The second sentence of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 states:
Moreover, no Member shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to 
imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in 
paragraph 1.
As discussed above, the relevant leading principle set forth in Article III:1 is that 
internal taxes and other internal charges ‘should not be applied to imported or 
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.’
Furthermore, the Ad Article III Note provides with respect to Article III:2:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the fi rst sentence of paragraph 2 would be 
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases 
where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on 
the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly 
taxed.
The relationship between the fi rst and the second sentence of Article III:2 was 
addressed by the Appellate Body in Canada – Periodicals, a dispute concerning, 
inter alia, the Canadian excise tax on magazines. The Appellate Body considered:
there are two questions which need to be answered to determine whether there is a 
violation of [the fi rst sentence of] Article III:2 of the GATT 1994: (a) whether imported 
and domestic products are like products; and (b) whether the imported products are 
taxed in excess of the domestic products. If the answers to both questions are 
affi rmative, there is a violation of Article III:2, fi rst sentence. If the answer to one 
question is negative, there is a need to examine further whether the measure is 
consistent with Article III:2, second sentence.111
110 See Committee on Trade and Environment, Taxes and Charges for Environmental Purposes. Note by the 
Secretariat, WT/CTE/W/47, paras. 68-70.
111 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 486.
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As the Appellate Body stated in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and again in 
Canada – Periodicals, Article III:2, second sentence, contemplates a ‘broader 
category of products’ than Article III:2, fi rst sentence.112 Furthermore, Article III:2, 
second sentence, sets out a different test of inconsistency. In Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II, the Appellate Body stated:
Unlike that of Article III:2, fi rst sentence, the language of Article III:2, second sentence, 
specifi cally invokes Article III:1. The signifi cance of this distinction lies in the fact that 
whereas Article III:1 acts implicitly in addressing the two issues that must be 
considered in applying the fi rst sentence, it acts explicitly as an entirely separate issue 
that must be addressed along with two other issues that are raised in applying the 
second sentence. Giving full meaning to the text and to its context, three separate 
issues must be addressed to determine whether an internal tax measure is inconsistent 
with Article III:2, second sentence. These three issues are whether:
1. | the imported products and the domestic products are ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable products’ which are in competition with each other;
2.  the directly competitive or substitutable imported and domestic products are ‘not 
similarly taxed’; and
3.  the dissimilar taxation of the directly competitive or substitutable imported and 
domestic products is ‘applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic production’.
Again, these are three separate issues. Each must be established separately by the 
complainant for a panel to fi nd that a tax measure imposed by a Member of the WTO is 
inconsistent with Article III:2, second sentence.113
In brief, the test of consistency of internal taxation with Article III:2, second 
sentence, thus requires an examination of:
whether the imported and domestic products are  – directly competitive 
or substitutable;
whether these products are  – not similarly taxed; and
whether the internal tax is  – applied so as to afford protection to domestic 
production.
112 Ibid., 470.
113 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 116. This part was later cited and endorsed by the 
Appellate Body, in Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 470, and in Appellate Body Report, 
Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 47.
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However, before this test of consistency of internal taxation can be applied, it must 
be established that the measure at issue is an ‘internal tax or other internal charge’ 
within the meaning of Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994.
 2.2.3.1 Is the measure at issue an ‘internal tax on products’?
As is the case with Article III:2, fi rst sentence, Article III:2, second sentence, is 
concerned with ‘internal taxes or other internal charges’ on products. For a 
discussion on the meaning and the scope of these concepts, recall the discussion 
above in the section dealing with Article III:2, fi rst sentence.114 With regard to this 
element of the test of consistency, there is no difference between the fi rst and 
second sentence of Article III:2.
 2.2.3.2 Are the products concerned ‘directly competitive or substitutable’?
The national treatment obligation of Article III:2, second sentence, applies to 
‘directly competitive or substitutable products’. The relevant WTO case law to date 
provides us with a number of examples of products that panels and/or the 
Appellate Body have found to be ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ on the 
market of a particular Member. In Canada – Periodicals, the ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable products’ were the split-run periodicals and non-split-run periodicals 
at issue in that case.115 In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and Korea – Alcoholic 
Beverages, shochu and soju, respectively, were found to be ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable’ with imported liquors such as whisky, vodka, brandy, cognac, rum 
and genever.116 In Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, the domestically produced pisco 
was considered ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ with imported distilled spirits 
such as whisky, brandy and cognac.117 In Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, the 
‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ were domestic soft drinks produced 
with cane sugar and foreign products produced with high fructose corn syrup.118 
Note that in this case, domestic soft drinks produced with cane sugar and imported 
soft drinks produced with beet sugar were considered ‘like’ under Article III:2, fi rst 
sentence. 
In Canada – Periodicals, the Appellate Body ruled that to be ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable’ within the meaning of Article III:2, second sentence, products do 
not – contrary to what Canada had argued – have to be perfectly substitutable. The 
114 See above, p. 31.
115 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 473.
116 Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para.6.32 (‘whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liqueurs’, 
para. 6.28), and Panel Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 10.98 (‘vodka, whiskies, rum, gin, brandies, 
cognac, liqueurs, tequila and ad-mixtures’, para. 10.57).
117 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 7.83
118 Panel Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.78. 
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Appellate Body noted:
A case of perfect substitutability would fall within Article III:2, fi rst sentence, while we 
are examining the broader prohibition of the second sentence.119
With regard to the relationship between the concept of ‘like products’ of Article 
III:2, fi rst sentence, and the concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ 
products of Article III:2, second sentence, the Appellate Body stated in 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages:
‘Like’ products are a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products: all like 
products are, by defi nition, directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not 
all ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products are ‘like’. The notion of like products 
must be construed narrowly but the category of directly competitive or substitutable 
products is broader. While perfectly substitutable products fall within Article III:2, fi rst 
sentence, imperfectly substitutable products can be assessed under Article III:2, 
second sentence.120
As to the meaning of the concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’, 
the Appellate Body stated in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages:
The term ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ describes a particular type of 
relationship between two products, one imported and the other domestic. It is evident 
from the wording of the term that the essence of that relationship is that the products 
are in competition. This much is clear both from the word ‘competitive’ which means 
‘characterized by competition’, and from the word ‘substitutable’ which means ‘able to 
be substituted’. The context of the competitive relationship is necessarily the 
marketplace since this is the forum where consumers choose between different 
products.121
The Appellate Body considers products to be ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ 
when they are interchangeable or offer alternative ways of satisfying a particular 
need or taste.122 The Appellate Body also considers that, in examining whether 
products are ‘directly competitive or substitutable’, an analysis of latent as well as 
extant demand is required since ‘competition in the market place is a dynamic, 
119 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 473.
120 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 118. In a footnote, the Appellate Body referred to 
the Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals.
121 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 114.
122 Ibid., para. 116.
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evolving process’.123 As the Appellate Body in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages stated, 
in justifi cation of its dynamic view of the concept of ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable products’:
In view of the objectives of avoiding protectionism, requiring equality of competitive 
conditions and protecting expectations of equal competitive relationships, we decline to 
take a static view of the term ‘directly competitive or substitutable’. The object and 
purpose of Article III confi rms that the scope of the term ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable’ cannot be limited to situations where consumers already regard products 
as alternatives. If reliance could be placed only on current instances of substitution, the 
object and purpose of Article III:2 could be defeated by the protective taxation that the 
provision aims to prohibit.124
With respect to the factors to be taken into account in establishing whether 
products are ‘directly competitive or substitutable’, the Appellate Body, in 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, agreed with the Panel in that case that these factors 
include, in addition to the physical characteristics, common end-use and tariff 
classifi cation of the products concerned, the competitive conditions in the relevant 
market.125 The Appellate Body held:
The GATT 1994 is a commercial agreement, and the WTO is concerned, after all, with 
markets. It does not seem inappropriate to look at competition in the relevant markets 
as one among a number of means of identifying the broader category of products that 
might be described as ‘directly competitive or substitutable’.
Nor does it seem inappropriate to examine elasticity of substitution as one means of 
examining those relevant markets. The Panel did not say that cross-price elasticity of 
demand is ‘the decisive criterion’ for determining whether products are ‘directly 
competitive or substitutable’.126
The Appellate Body considered an examination of the competitive conditions in the 
market, and, in particular, the cross-price elasticity of demand in that market, as a 
means of establishing whether products are ‘directly competitive or substitutable’. 
In Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body further clarifi ed:
123 Ibid., para. 114.
124 Ibid., para. 120.
125 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 117.
126 Ibid. In fact, the Panel in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II had found that: ‘… the decisive criterion in order to 
determine whether two products are directly competitive or substitutable is whether they have common 
end-uses, inter alia, as shown by elasticity of substitution.’ See Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 
para. 6.22.
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… studies of cross-price elasticity, which in our Report in Japan — Alcoholic 
Beverages were regarded as one means of examining a market, involve an assessment 
of latent demand. Such studies attempt to predict the change in demand that would 
result from a change in the price of a product following, inter alia, from a change in the 
relative tax burdens on domestic and imported products.127
However, in that case, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body was again 
careful to stress that cross-price elasticity of demand for products is not the 
decisive criterion in determining whether these products are ‘directly competitive 
or substitutable’. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel’s emphasis on the 
‘quality’ or ‘nature’ of competition rather than the ‘quantitative overlap of 
competition’. The Appellate Body shared the Panel’s reluctance to rely unduly on 
quantitative analyses of the competitive relationship.128 
Note that in establishing whether products are ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable’ in the market of one Member, the market situation in other Members 
may be relevant and can be taken into consideration. In Korea – Alcoholic 
Beverages, the Appellate Body stated:
It is, of course, true that the ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ relationship must be 
present in the market at issue, in this case, the Korean market. It is also true that 
consumer responsiveness to products may vary from country to country. This does not, 
however, preclude consideration of consumer behaviour in a country other than the one 
at issue. It seems to us that evidence from other markets may be pertinent to the 
examination of the market at issue, particularly when demand on that market has been 
infl uenced by regulatory barriers to trade or to competition. Clearly, not every other 
market will be relevant to the market at issue. But if another market displays 
characteristics similar to the market at issue, then evidence of consumer demand in 
that other market may have some relevance to the market at issue. This, however, can 
only be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking account of all relevant facts.129
Note that while biofuels and fossil fuels may not be ‘like products’ within the 
meaning of Article III:2, fi rst sentence, they may be ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable’ products within the meaning of Article III:2, second sentence, of the 
GATT 1994.
127 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 121.
128 Ibid., para. 134.
129 Ibid., para. 137.
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 2.2.3.3 Is the imported product ‘not similarly taxed’ as the domestic product?
The test of consistency of internal taxation with Article III:2, second sentence, 
subsequently requires an examination of whether the imported and domestic 
products are not similarly taxed. While under Article III:2, fi rst sentence, even the 
slightest tax differential in favour of the domestic product leads to the conclusion 
that the internal tax imposed on imported products is inconsistent with the 
national treatment obligation, under Article III:2, second sentence, the tax 
differential in favour of the domestic product has to be more than de minimis to 
support a conclusion that the internal tax imposed on imported products is WTO-
inconsistent. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body explained:
To interpret ‘in excess of’ and ‘not similarly taxed’ identically would deny any distinction 
between the fi rst and second sentences of Article III:2. Thus, in any given case, there 
may be some amount of taxation on imported products that may well be ‘in excess of’ 
the tax on domestic ‘like products’ but may not be so much as to compel a conclusion 
that ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ imported and domestic products are ‘not 
similarly taxed’ for the purposes of the Ad Article to Article III:2, second sentence.130
Whether any particular differential amount of taxation is de minimis or not must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Note that the ‘not similarly taxed’ requirement is met even if only some imported 
products are not taxed similarly to domestic products, while other imported 
products are taxed similarly. The Appellate Body stated in Canada – Periodicals 
that:
… dissimilar taxation of even some imported products as compared to directly 
competitive or substitutable domestic products is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the second sentence of Article III:2.131 [emphasis added]
 2.2.3.4  Is the internal tax applied ‘so as to afford protection to 
domestic production’?
The last element of the test under Article III:2, second sentence, is whether the 
internal taxes are applied ‘so as to afford protection to domestic production’. 
130 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 118. On the de minimis standard, see also Appellate 
Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 474; Appellate Body Report, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 49; and 
Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.115.
131 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 474. To support this conclusion, the Appellate Body referred to 
GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.14.
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This element must be distinguished from the previous element (‘not similarly 
taxed’).132
As to how to establish whether a tax measure was applied so as to afford 
protection to domestic production, the Appellate Body noted in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II:
Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, 
nevertheless its protective application can most often be discerned from the design, 
the architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure.133
To determine whether the application of a tax measure affords protection to 
domestic production, it is the application criteria, the structure and the overall 
application rather than the subjective intent of the legislator or regulator that must 
be examined. For example, if the tax measure operates in such a way that the 
lower tax brackets cover predominantly domestic production, whereas the higher 
tax brackets embrace largely imported products, the implication is that the tax 
measure is applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. 
As the Appellate Body acknowledged in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the very 
magnitude of the tax differential may be evidence of the protective application of a 
tax measure. Most often, however, other factors will also be considered. The 
Appellate Body noted in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II that:
It is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended objective if the particular tax 
measure in question is nevertheless, to echo Article III:1, ‘applied to imported or 
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production’. This is an issue of 
how the measure in question is applied.134
In Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, Chile argued that the internal taxation on alcoholic 
beverages at issue in that case was aimed at, among other things, reducing the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages with a high alcohol content. The Appellate 
Body held:
We recall once more that, in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, we declined to adopt an 
approach to the issue of ‘so as to afford protection’ that attempts to examine ‘the many 
reasons legislators and regulators often have for what they do’. We called for 
132 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 119, criticizing the Panel for failing 
to make this distinction. 
133 Ibid., p.120
134 Ibid., p.119.
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examination of the design, architecture and structure of a tax measure precisely to 
permit identifi cation of a measure’s objectives or purposes as revealed or objectifi ed in 
the measure itself. Thus, we consider that a measure’s purposes, objectively 
manifested in the design, architecture and structure of the measure, are intensely 
pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not that measure is applied so as to 
afford protection to domestic production.135 
As the Appellate Body noted, however, Chile failed to explain the rationale for the 
structure of the internal tax measure at issue, and, in particular, the truncated 
nature of the line of progression of tax rates, which effectively consists of two 
levels (27 per cent ad valorem and 47 per cent ad valorem) separated by only 4 
degrees of alcohol content. In the absence of an explanation for the structure of the 
Chilean tax measure, according to the Appellate Body, it was very diffi cult to reach 
any other conclusion than that the measure was applied as a protective measure. 
The Appellate Body emphasized that the mere statement of the four objectives 
pursued by Chile does not constitute effective rebuttal of the conclusion reached 
by the Panel that the Chilean tax measure is ‘applied so as to afford protection to 
domestic production’.136
Note, however, that in Canada – Periodicals, the Appellate Body did seem to give at 
least some importance to the statements of representatives of the Canadian 
Government about the policy objectives of the tax measure at issue.137
If biofuels and fossil fuels are considered to be ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable products’ within the meaning of Article III:2, second sentence, then 
the Netherlands would act inconsistently with Article III:2, second sentence, when 
the tax differential between biofuels and fossil fuels would be such as to afford 
protection to the domestic production of biofuels. This would be the case if the 
structure, architecture and design of the tax measure are such that the domestic 
products predominantly fall in the lower tax bracket while the imported products 
fall in the higher tax bracket.
2.2.4 GATT consistency of internal regulation on like products
The national treatment obligation of Article III of the GATT 1994 does not only 
concern internal taxation dealt with in Article III:2. Article III also concerns internal 
regulation, dealt with primarily in Article III:4. Article III:4 states, in relevant part:
135 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 71.
136 Ibid., para. 71. 
137 See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, pp. 475-6.
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The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the territory of any other 
[Member] shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
This provision sets out a three-tier test for the consistency of internal regulation. In 
Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body stated:
For a violation of Article III:4 to be established, three elements must be satisfi ed: that 
the imported and domestic products at issue are ‘like products’; that the measure at 
issue is a ‘law, regulation, or requirement affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use’; and that the imported products are 
accorded ‘less favourable’ treatment than that accorded to like domestic products.138
In other words, the three-tier test of consistency of internal regulation with Article 
III:4 thus requires examination of whether:
the measure at issue is a  – law, regulation or requirement covered by Article III:4;
the imported and domestic products are  – like products; and
the imported products are accorded  – less favourable treatment.
 2.2.4.1  Is the measure at issue a ‘law, regulation or requirement affecting 
internal sale…’?
Article III:4 concerns ‘all laws, regulations and requirements affecting [the] internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use [of products]’. 
Broadly speaking, the national treatment obligation of Article III:4 applies to 
regulations affecting the sale and use of products. In 1958 already, the Panel in 
Italy – Agricultural Machinery interpreted the scope of application of Article III:4 
broadly as including all measures that may modify the conditions of competition.139 
Later GATT panels built on this broad interpretation of the scope of Article III:4. In 
US – Section 337, for example, the Panel ruled that not only substantive laws, 
regulations and requirements, but also procedural laws, regulations and 
requirements can be regarded as ‘affecting’ the internal sale of imported goods.140
According to GATT case law, Article III:4 applies, inter alia, to:
minimum price requirements applicable to domestic and imported beer; – 141
limitations on points of sale for imported alcoholic beverages; – 142
138 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 133
139 GATT Panel Report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery, para. 12.
140 GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.10.
141 See GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), para. 5.30.
142 See GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), para.4.26.
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the requirement that imported beer and wine be sold only through in-state  –
wholesalers or other middlemen;143
a ban on all cigarette advertising; – 144
additional marking requirements such as an obligation to add the name of the  –
producer or the place of origin or the formula of the product;145
practices concerning internal transportation of beer; – 146 and trade-related 
investment measures.147
Note that a requirement for industrial users of biomass (oil companies and 
electricity companies) to report whether the biomass they use is produced 
consistently with the sustainability requirements is a requirement affecting the use 
of biomass and therefore falls within the scope of Article III:4. 
In Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Panel found that ‘the soft drink tax, the 
distribution tax and the bookkeeping requirements may be considered as 
measures that affect the internal use in Mexico of non-cane sugar sweeteners … 
within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994’.148 Internal taxes are thus not 
only subject to the disciplines of Article III:2, discussed above. They can also be 
measures within the meaning of Article III:4 and thus be subject to the disciplines 
of that provision.
In Canada – Autos, the Panel held that a measure can be considered to be a 
measure affecting, i.e. having an effect on, the internal sale or use of imported 
products even if it is not shown that under the current circumstances the measure 
has an impact on the decisions of private parties to buy imported products.149 
While, to date, most cases involving Article III:4 have concerned generally 
applicable ‘laws’ and ‘regulations’, Article III:4 also covers ‘requirements’ that may
143 See GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.32.
144 See GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes, para. 77.
145 See Working Party Report, Certifi cates of Origin, Marks of Origin, Consular Formalities, para. 13.
146 See GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), para. 5.12; and GATT Panel Report, 
US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.50.
147 See GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA, paras. 5.12 and 6.1.
148 Panel Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.113.
149 Panel Report, Canada – Autos, para. 10.84.
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apply to isolated cases only.150 Thus Article III:4 covers measures that apply both 
across the board and in isolated cases only.151
The question has arisen as to whether a ‘requirement’ within the meaning of 
Article III:4 necessarily needs to be a government-imposed requirement, or 
whether an action by a private party can constitute a ‘requirement’ to which Article 
III:4 applies. In Canada – Autos, the Panel examined commitments by Canadian car 
manufacturers to increase the value added to cars in their Canadian plants. These 
commitments were communicated in letters addressed to the Canadian 
government. The Panel qualifi ed these commitments as ‘requirements’ subject to 
Article III:4.152 According to the Panel, private action can be a ‘requirement’ within 
the meaning of Article III:4 if, and only if, there is such a nexus, i.e. a close link, 
between that action and the action of a government, that the government must be 
held responsible for that private action.153
Note that the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures contains an 
illustrative list of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) that are inconsistent 
with Article III:4.154 The list includes, for example, measures that:
are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law, or compliance with which is  –
necessary to obtain an advantage; and
require the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin; or  –
require that an enterprise’s purchases or use of imported products be limited to 
an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports.
It has been suggested that Article III:4 might not apply to ‘laws, regulations…’ 
making distinctions based on extra-territorial policy considerations not affecting 
the characteristics or properties of the products concerned.155 An example of such a 
law would be a law prohibiting the sale of biomass produced in the exporting 
country in a manner inconsistent with minimum labour standards or in an 
150 See GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA.
151 Ibid., para. 5.5. The measures at issue in Canada – FIRA were written undertakings by investors to purchase 
goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods, or in specifi ed amounts or proportions, or to 
purchase goods from Canadian sources.
152 The question of whether actions of private parties can qualify as ‘requirements’ within the meaning of Article 
III:4 was previously addressed in GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA, para. 5.4 and GATT Panel Report, 
EEC – Parts and Components, para. 5.21. The Panel in Canada – Autos explicitly refers to this case law and 
takes it further.
153 See Panel Report, Canada – Autos, paras. 10.106-10.107.
154 See Article 2.2 of, and the Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.
155 See G. Marceau and J. Trachtmann, ‘A map of the WTO law of domestic regulation of goods’, in G. Bermann 
and P. Mavroidis, Trade and Human Health and Safety (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.55.
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environmentally unfriendly manner. It might be argued that such laws regulating 
non-product related processes and production methods (nPR PPMs) fall under the 
scope of application of the prohibition of quantitative restrictions of Article XI of 
the GATT 1994 rather than the national treatment obligation of Article III:4 of the 
GATT 1994. However, the broad scope of application given to Article III:4 in the 
case law to date pleads against the exclusion of measures regulating nPR PPMs 
from the scope of application of Article III:4.
 2.2.4.2 Are the products concerned ‘like products’?
As with Articles I:1 and III:2, fi rst sentence, of the GATT 1994, both discussed above, 
the non-discrimination obligation of Article III:4 applies only to ‘like products’.156 The 
Appellate Body considered the meaning of the concept of ‘like products’ of Article 
III:4 in EC – Asbestos. In its report in this case, the Appellate Body fi rst noted that 
the concept of ‘like products’ was also used in Article III:2, fi rst sentence, and that, 
in previous reports, it had held that the scope of ‘like products’ was to be construed 
‘narrowly’ in that provision.157 The Appellate Body then examined whether this 
interpretation of ‘like products’ in Article III:2 could be taken to suggest a similarly 
narrow reading of ‘like products’ in Article III:4, since both provisions form part of 
the same Article. The Appellate Body reasoned as follows:
… we observe that, although the obligations in Articles III:2 and III:4 both apply to ‘like 
products’, the text of Article III:2 differs in one important respect from the text of Article 
III:4. Article III:2 contains two separate sentences, each imposing distinct obligations: 
the fi rst lays down obligations in respect of ‘like products’, while the second lays down 
obligations in respect of ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products. By contrast, 
Article III:4 applies only to ‘like products’ and does not include a provision equivalent to 
the second sentence of Article III:2.158
The Appellate Body considered that this textual difference between Article III:2 and 
Article III:4 had considerable implications for the meaning of the concept of ‘like 
products’ in these two provisions. After recalling the reasoning in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II underlying its ‘narrow’ interpretation of ‘like products’ in Article III:2, 
fi rst sentence, the Appellate Body subsequently observed: 
In construing Article III:4, the same interpretive considerations do not arise, because 
the ‘general principle’ articulated in Article III:1 is expressed in Article III:4, not through 
two distinct obligations, as in the two sentences in Article III:2, but instead through a 
156 See above, p. 21 and p. 30.
157 The Appellate Body referred in a footnote to Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 112 and 
113 and Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 473.
158 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 94.
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single obligation that applies solely to ‘like products’. … Thus, we conclude that, given 
the textual difference between Articles III:2 and III:4, the ‘accordion’ of ‘likeness’ 
stretches in a different way in Article III:4.159
In other words, the Appellate Body came to the conclusion that, unlike for the 
concept of ‘like products’ in Article III:2, there is no reason to give a narrow 
interpretation to the concept of ‘like products’ in Article III:4. Having made this 
distinction, the Appellate Body then proceeded to examine the meaning of this 
concept in Article III:4. It fi rst recalled that, in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, it had 
ruled that the broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid 
protectionism in the application of internal taxes and regulatory measures. As 
explicitly stated in Article III:1, the purpose of Article III is to ensure that internal 
measures ‘not be applied to imported and domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production’. To this end, Article III obliges Members of the 
WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products in 
relation to domestic products.160 This ‘general principle’ is not explicitly invoked in 
Article III:4. Nevertheless, it does ‘inform’ that provision.161 The Appellate Body in 
EC – Asbestos thus reasoned that the term ‘like product’ in Article III:4 must be 
interpreted to give proper scope and meaning to the anti-protectionism principle of 
Article III:1.162 It is clear that an internal regulation can only afford protection to 
domestic production if the internal regulation addresses domestic and imported 
products that are in a competitive relationship. In the absence of a competitive 
relationship between the domestic and imported products, internal regulation 
cannot be applied to these products so as to afford protection of domestic 
production.
The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos thus came to the following conclusion with 
respect to the meaning of ‘like products’ in Article III:4:
… a determination of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination 
about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among products. 
In saying this, we are mindful that there is a spectrum of degrees of ‘competitiveness’ 
or ‘substitutability’ of products in the marketplace, and that it is diffi cult, if not 
impossible, in the abstract, to indicate precisely where on this spectrum the word ‘like’ 
in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 falls. We are not saying that all products which are in 
some competitive relationship are ‘like products’ under Article III:4. In ruling on the 
measure at issue, we also do not attempt to defi ne the precise scope of the word ‘like’ 
159 Ibid., para. 96.
160 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 109-10.
161 Ibid., 111.
162 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 98.
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in Article III:4. Nor do we wish to decide if the scope of ‘like products’ in Article III:4 is 
co-extensive with the combined scope of ‘like’ and ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable’ products in Article III:2 ... In view of [the] different language [of Articles 
III:2 and III:4], and although we need not rule, and do not rule, on the precise product 
scope of Article III:4, we do conclude that the product scope of Article III:4, although 
broader than the fi rst sentence of Article III:2, is certainly not broader than the 
combined product scope of the two sentences of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994.163
In brief, the determination of whether products are ‘like products’ under Article III:4 
is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of the competitive 
relationship between these products. Note that the Appellate Body refers both to 
the nature and the extent of the competitive relationship. A mere economic 
analysis of the cross-price elasticity of demand for the products at issue will not 
suffi ce to determine whether these products are ‘like’. ‘Likeness’ is a matter of 
judgement – qualitatively as well as quantitatively.164 Precisely what the nature and 
extent of the competitive relationship needs to be for products to be ‘like’ within 
the meaning of Article III:4 cannot be indicated in the abstract. Nevertheless, it can 
be said that the concept of ‘like products’ in Article III:4 has a relatively broad 
scope. Its scope is broader than that of the concept of ‘like products’ in Article III:2, 
fi rst sentence. However, it is no broader than the combined scope of the concepts 
of ‘like product’ and ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ of Article III:2, 
fi rst and second sentence, respectively. In line with this reasoning, the Panel in 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks concluded that, as it had found soft drinks 
sweetened with cane sugar and soft drinks sweetened beet sugar to be ‘like’ under 
Article III:2, fi rst sentence, these products could also be considered ‘like’ under 
Article III:4.165 Furthermore, the Panel concluded that soft drinks sweetened with 
cane sugar and soft drinks sweetened with high-fructose corn syrup, which were 
considered ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ within the meaning of Article III:2, 
second sentence, were in a close competitive relationship and could thus be 
considered ‘like’ products within the meaning of Article III:4.166
Having reached a conclusion on the scope of ‘likeness’, the Appellate Body in 
EC – Asbestos then turned to the question of how it should determine whether 
products are ‘like’ within the meaning of Article III:4. The Appellate Body noted:
163 Ibid., paras. 99-100.
164 R. Howse and E. Türk, ‘The WTO impact on internal regulations’, in G. Bermann and P. Mavroidis, Trade and 
Human Health and Safety (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.91.
165 Panel Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.105.
166 Ibid., para. 8.106.
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As in Article III:2, in this determination, ‘[n]o one approach ... will be appropriate for all 
cases’. Rather, an assessment utilizing ‘an unavoidable element of individual, 
discretionary judgement’ has to be made on a case-by-case basis. The Report of the 
Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments outlined an approach for analyzing ‘likeness’ 
that has been followed and developed since by several panels and the Appellate Body. 
This approach has, in the main, consisted of employing four general criteria in analyzing 
‘likeness’: (i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the 
products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits – more comprehensively termed 
consumers’ perceptions and behaviour – in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff 
classifi cation of the products. We note that these four criteria comprise four categories 
of ‘characteristics’ that the products involved might share: (i) the physical properties of 
the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or 
similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as 
alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want 
or demand; and (iv) the international classifi cation of the products for tariff purposes.167
The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos hastened to add, however, that, while these 
general criteria, or groupings of potentially shared characteristics, provide a 
framework for analysing the ‘likeness’ of particular products, they are ‘simply tools 
to assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence’.168 The 
Appellate Body stressed that these criteria are ‘neither a treaty-mandated nor a 
closed list of criteria that will determine the legal characterization of products’.169 In 
each case, all pertinent evidence, whether related to one of these criteria or not, 
must be examined and considered by panels to determine whether products are 
‘like’. Such pertinent evidence could relate to the nPR PPMs of the products 
concerned. What is important is whether these nPR PPMs affect the competitive 
relationship in the market between the imported and domestic products 
concerned. With regard to the general criteria (i.e. physical properties; end-uses; 
consumers’ tastes/habits; tariff classifi cation), the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos 
fi nally noted:
167 Ibid., para. 101. In a footnote, the Appellate Body referred to Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II, 113 and 114; it also referred to Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.8, where the approach set out 
in the Border Tax Adjustments report was adopted in a dispute concerning Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. The 
Appellate Body noted in a footnote that the fourth criterion, tariff classifi cation, was not mentioned by the 
Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, but was included by subsequent panels (see e.g. GATT Panel Report, 
EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2; and GATT Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.6).
168 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 102.
169 Ibid.
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… under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the term ‘like products’ is concerned with 
competitive relationships between and among products. Accordingly, whether the 
Border Tax Adjustments framework is adopted or not, it is important under Article III:4 
to take account of evidence which indicates whether, and to what extent, the products 
involved are – or could be – in a competitive relationship in the marketplace.170
The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos was highly critical of the manner in which the 
Panel had examined the ‘likeness’ of chrysotile asbestos fi bres and PCG fi bres171 as 
well as the ‘likeness’ of cement-based products containing chrysotile asbestos 
fi bres and cement-based products containing PCG fi bres.172 The Appellate Body 
criticized the Panel for not examining each of the criteria set forth in the Report of 
the Working Group on Border Tax Adjustments, and for not examining these criteria 
separately. The Appellate Body also disagreed with the Panel’s refusal to consider 
the health risks posed by asbestos in the determination of ‘likeness’, stating:
… neither the text of Article III:4 nor the practice of panels and the Appellate Body 
suggest that any evidence should be excluded a priori from a panel’s examination of 
‘likeness’. Moreover, as we have said, in examining the ‘likeness’ of products, panels 
must evaluate all of the relevant evidence. We are very much of the view that evidence 
relating to the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination 
of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. We do not, however, consider that the 
evidence relating to the health risks associated with chrysotile asbestos fi bres need be 
examined under a separate criterion, because we believe that this evidence can be 
evaluated under the existing criteria of physical properties, and of consumers’ tastes 
and habits.173
In the opinion of the Appellate Body, the carcinogenic or toxic nature of chrysotile 
asbestos fi bres constitutes a defi ning aspect of the physical properties of those 
fi bres and must therefore be considered when determining ‘likeness’ under Article 
III:4.174 According to the Appellate Body, evidence relating to health risks may thus 
be relevant in assessing the competitive relationship in the marketplace between 
allegedly ‘like’ products.175
In a ‘concurring’ opinion (which was in fact a ‘dissenting’ opinion) in EC – Asbestos, 
one of the Members of the Appellate Body considered that, in view of the nature 
170 Ibid., para. 103.
171 PCG fi bres are polyvinyl alcohol (PVA), cellulose and glass fi bres. 
172 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 109.
173 Ibid., para. 113.
174 Ibid., para. 114.
175 Ibid., para. 115.
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and the quantum of the scientifi c evidence showing that the physical properties 
and qualities of chrysotile asbestos fi bres include or result in carcinogenicity, there 
is ample basis for a ‘defi nitive characterization’ of such fi bres as not ‘like’ PCG 
fi bres.176 This Appellate Body Member suggested that this ‘defi nitive 
characterization’ may and should be made even in the absence of evidence 
concerning end uses and consumers’ tastes and habits. As the Member explained:
It is diffi cult for me to imagine what evidence relating to economic competitive 
relationships as refl ected in end-uses and consumers’ tastes and habits could outweigh 
and set at naught the undisputed deadly nature of chrysotile asbestos fi bres, compared 
with PCG fi bres, when inhaled by humans, and therefore compel a characterization of 
‘likeness’ of chrysotile asbestos and PCG fi bres.177
The Member who wrote this separate opinion clearly did not share the position 
taken by the two other Appellate Body Members that the competitive relationship 
in the market is decisive in the determination of the ‘likeness’ of products under 
Article III:4.178 In the opinion of this Member, ‘the necessity or appropriateness of 
adopting a ‘fundamentally’ economic interpretation of the ‘likeness’ of products 
under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 does not appear to me to be free from 
substantial doubts’.179 There are no indications in subsequent case law that this 
critique of a ‘fundamentally’ economic interpretation of the concept of ‘likeness’ 
has (growing) support among the Members of the Appellate Body. It should be 
noted, however, that to the extent that a ‘less-economic interpretation’ of the 
concept of ‘likeness’ would gain acceptance, a difference between products in nPR 
PPMs may lead more easily to the conclusion that the products concerned are not 
‘like’.
With regard to the second and third criteria set out in the Report of the Working 
Group on Border Tax Adjustments, i.e. end-uses and consumers’ tastes and habits, 
the Appellate Body found in EC – Asbestos:
Evidence of this type is of particular importance under Article III of the GATT 1994, 
precisely because that provision is concerned with competitive relationships in the 
marketplace. If there is – or could be – no competitive relationship between products, a 
Member cannot intervene, through internal taxation or regulation, to protect domestic 
production. Thus, evidence about the extent to which products can serve the same 
176 Note that pursuant to Article 17.11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the opinions expressed in an 
Appellate Body report by an individual Member are expressed anonymously.
177 Ibid., para. 152.
178 Ibid., para. 153, in fi ne.
179 Ibid., para. 154.
61
WTO Consistency of Unilateral nPR PPM Measures addressing NTCs
end-uses, and the extent to which consumers are – or would be – willing to choose one 
product instead of another to perform those end-uses, is highly relevant evidence in 
assessing the ‘likeness’ of those products under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
We consider this to be especially so in cases where the evidence relating to properties 
establishes that the products at issue are physically quite different. In such cases, in 
order to overcome this indication that products are not ‘like’, a higher burden is placed 
on complaining Members to establish that, despite the pronounced physical 
differences, there is a competitive relationship between the products such that all of 
the evidence, taken together, demonstrates that the products are ‘like’ under Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994.180
With respect to end-uses, the Appellate Body found that, while it is certainly 
relevant that products have similar end-uses for a ‘small number of ... applications’, 
a panel must also consider the other, different end-uses for products. As the 
Appellate Body stated in EC – Asbestos:
It is only by forming a complete picture of the various end-uses of a product that a panel 
can assess the signifi cance of the fact that products share a limited number of end-
uses.181
With respect to consumers’ tastes and habits, the Appellate Body was very critical 
of the Panel for declining to examine this criterion because, as the Panel stated, 
‘this criterion would not provide clear results’.182 The Appellate Body noted that, in 
its opinion, consumers’ tastes and habits regarding asbestos fi bres or PCG fi bres, 
even in the case of commercial parties such as manufacturers, are very likely to be 
shaped by the health risks associated with a product that is known to be highly 
carcinogenic (as asbestos fi bres are).183
After reversing the Panel’s fi ndings, in EC – Asbestos, on the ‘likeness’ of chrysotile 
asbestos fi bres and PCG fi bres, the Appellate Body itself examined the ‘likeness’ of 
these products and came to the conclusion that the evidence was certainly far from 
suffi cient to satisfy the complainant’s burden of proving that chrysotile asbestos 
fi bres are ‘like’ PCG fi bres under Article III:4. 
180 Ibid., paras. 117 and 118.
181 Ibid., para. 119. 
182 Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.139.
183 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 122. 
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The Appellate Body considered that the evidence tended rather to suggest that 
these products are not ‘like products’.184
At a more general level, the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos, on the one hand, 
confi rmed (two to one) the prior case law by upholding the market-based, 
economic interpretation of the concept of ‘likeness’, but, on the other, it remedied 
the narrowness of this case law by allowing non-economic interests and values to 
be considered in the determination of ‘likeness’ (in casu ‘health concerns’). 
Two additional observations on the determination of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 of 
the GATT 1994 are called for: one observation regarding the ‘aim-and-effect’ 
approach already discussed above in the context of Article III:2, fi rst sentence, of 
the GATT 1994;185 and one observation regarding the relevance of non-product 
related process and production methods (nPR PPMs) discussed above in the 
context of both Article I and Article III:2 of the GATT 1994.186 
With regard to the ‘aim and effect’ approach to the determination of ‘likeness’, note 
that in 1992, in US – Malt Beverages, the Panel considered the question of whether 
low-alcohol beer and high-alcohol beer should be regarded as ‘like products’ 
within the meaning of Article III:4. Recalling its earlier statement on like product 
determinations under Article III:2, fi rst sentence, the Panel considered that:
… in the context of Article III, it is essential that such determinations be made not only 
in the light of such criteria as the products’ physical characteristics, but also in the light 
of the purpose of Article III, which is to ensure that internal taxes and regulations ‘not 
be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production’.187
The Panel noted that, on the basis of their ‘physical characteristics’, low- and high-
alcohol beers were ‘similar’. However, in order to determine whether low- and 
high-alcohol beers were ‘like products’ under Article III:4, the Panel considered that 
it had to examine whether the purpose of the distinction between low- and high-
alcohol beers was ‘to afford protection to domestic production’. The Panel noted 
that the United States had argued that the distinction was made to encourage the 
consumption of low- rather than high-alcohol beer. The Panel eventually concluded 
184 Ibid., para. 141. Also, with regard to the products containing asbestos and PCG fi bres, the Appellate Body 
concluded that Canada had not satisfi ed the burden of proof that these products were ‘like’ (see Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 147).
185 See above, p. 37. 
186 See above, p. 23 and p. 35-36.
187 GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.71.
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that the purpose of the regulatory distinction was not to afford protection to 
domestic production and that low- and high-alcohol beers were, therefore, not ‘like 
products’.188 For reasons discussed above in the context of Article III:2, this ‘aim-
and-effect’ approach to the determination of ‘likeness’ has been discredited and 
abandoned by WTO panels and the Appellate Body.189 A fi rst indication that WTO 
panels would not follow this ‘aim-and-effect’ approach was given in US – Gasoline, 
in which the Panel found that chemically identical imported and domestic gasoline 
were ‘like products’ because ‘chemically identical imported and domestic gasoline 
by defi nition have exactly the same physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff 
classifi cation, and are perfectly substitutable’.190 The aim and effect of the regulatory 
distinction made was not given any consideration in determining ‘likeness’.
With regard the relevance of nPR PPMs in determining ‘likeness’, note that the 
Panel in US – Tuna I (Mexico) found that differences in nPR PPMs are not relevant 
in determining ‘likeness’. The Panel stated:
Article III:4 calls for a comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a product with 
that of domestic tuna as a product. Regulations governing the taking of dolphins 
incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product. Article III:4 
therefore obliges the United States to accord treatment to Mexican tuna no less 
favourable than that accorded to United States tuna, whether or not the incidental 
taking of dolphins by Mexican vessels corresponded to that of United States vessels.191
However, as refl ected above, the thinking on the concept of ‘likeness’ has evolved 
since the 1991 US – Tuna I (Mexico) case. The question of whether nPR PPMs may 
be of relevance in the determination of ‘likeness’ now requires a more nuanced 
answer than that given by the Panel in US – Tuna I (Mexico). It should be noted that 
nPR PPMs may have an impact on consumer preferences and tastes, and thus on 
the nature and the extent of the competitive relationship between products. If 
carpets made by children are shunned by the consumers in a particular market, a 
situation may arise in which there is in fact no (or only a weak) competitive 
relationship between these carpets and carpets made by adults. In the light of the 
nature and the extent of the competitive relationship between them, carpets made 
by children and carpets made by adults could in such a situation be found to be not 
188 Ibid., paras. 5.25-5.26 and 5.71-5.76.
189 See above, p. 32.
190 Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.9.
191 GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna I (Mexico), para. 5.15. Note that this report was never adopted. The relevance 
of PPMs in determining whether products are ‘like’ was also rejected in the GATT Panel Report, US – Malt 
Beverages, GATT Panel Report, US – Taxes on Automobiles; Panel Report, US – Gasoline and Panel Report, 
Indonesia – Autos. 
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‘like’. However, it seems unlikely that this type of situation will often arise as 
consumers in most markets are in their choice between products primarily guided 
by the price and other aspects that are not related to the conditions (e.g. 
environmental, labour or animal welfare conditions) under which the products 
were produced. Some commentators have argued, however, that:
‘… the prevailing anti-PPM rationale in Geneva – and in the trade community more 
generally – has grown out of sync with market realities, namely, the interest of 
signifi cant numbers of consumers in the environmental consequences of how a 
product is produced.192
Note in this respect a Zogby poll of consumers in the United States in 2000, which 
showed that 75.4% of respondents found it unacceptable to induce moulting in 
laying hens by withholding feed, and 80.7% said they would be willing to pay more 
for eggs from hens raised in a ‘humane manner’.193 A UK survey revealed that 79% 
of respondents supported legislation to phase out battery cages in the EU, and 87% 
indicated that they were willing to pay more for eggs from non-battery cage 
hens.194
In the context of the current study, the question arises as to whether on the Dutch 
market:
the fact that biomass is, or is not, produced consistently with the Cramer  –
sustainability requirements; or
the fact that livestock products are, or are not, produced in accordance with  –
animal welfare requirements,
have signifi cant impacts on consumer preferences and tastes, and thus on the 
nature and the extent of the competitive relationship between the products 
concerned and their derivatives. If so, the products concerned and their derivatives 
may be found to be not ‘like’.
192 R. Howse, P. van Bork and C. Hedebrand, WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in the 
Creation of a Global Marketplace, IPC Discussion Paper, October 2006, referring to M. Araya, WTO 
Negotiations on Environmental Goods and Services: Maximizing Opportunities? Global Environmental and 
Trade Study (GETS), Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, June 2003, pp.1-2. 
193 A.B. Thiermann and S. Babcock, ‘Animal welfare and international trade’, Rev. Sci. Tech. (Int. Offi ce of 
Epizootics), vol. 24 (2005), p.751.
194 Ibid.
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 2.2.4.3  Are the imported products accorded ‘treatment no less favourable’ 
than the domestic products?
The fact that a measure distinguishes between ‘like products’ does not suffi ce to 
conclude that this measure is inconsistent with Article III:4.195 As the Appellate Body 
noted in EC – Asbestos:
… there is a second element that must be established before a measure can be held to 
be inconsistent with Article III:4 ... A complaining Member must still establish that the 
measure accords to the group of ‘like’ imported products ‘less favourable treatment’ 
than it accords to the group of ‘like’ domestic products.196
The Panel in US – Section 337 explained the ‘treatment no less favourable’ element 
of the Article III:4 test in clear terms, noting that:
the ‘no less favourable’ treatment requirement set out in Article III:4, is unqualifi ed. 
These words are to be found throughout the General Agreement and later Agreements 
negotiated in the GATT framework as an expression of the underlying principle of 
equality of treatment of imported products as compared to the treatment given either 
to other foreign products, under the most favoured nation standard, or to domestic 
products, under the national treatment standard of Article III. The words ‘treatment no 
less favourable’ in paragraph 4 call for effective equality of opportunities for imported 
products in respect of the application of laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transporta tion, distribution or use of 
products. This clearly sets a minimum permissible standard as a basis.197 [emphasis 
added]
The Panel in US – Section 337 thus interpreted ‘treatment no less favourable’ as 
requiring ‘effective equality of competitive opportunities’. In later GATT and WTO 
reports, the Appellate Body and panels have consistently interpreted ‘treatment no 
less favourable’ in the same way.198
195 In other words, regulatory distinctions between ‘like products’ are not necessarily inconsistent with Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994. See below, p. 66.
196 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 100. See also R. Howse and E. Türk, ‘The WTO impact on internal 
regulations’. Howse and Türk argue that while the Appellate Body has rejected the ‘aim-and-effect’ test with 
respect to likeness, it has in effect brought this test back in at this stage of considering whether there is less 
favourable treatment. R.
197 GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.11.
198 See e.g. GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), paras. 5.12-5.14 and 5.30-5.31; GATT 
Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.30; Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.10; Panel Report, 
Canada – Periodicals, 75; Panel Reports, EC – Bananas III, paras. 7.179-7.180; and Panel Report, Japan – Film, 
para. 10.379.
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In US – Gasoline, a dispute concerning legislation designed to prevent and control 
air pollution, the Panel found that the measure at issue afforded less favourable 
treatment to imported gasoline than to domestic gasoline because, for domestic 
refi ners of gasoline, an individual baseline (representing the quality of the gasoline 
produced by that refi ner in 1990) was established while, for importers of gasoline, 
the more onerous statutory baseline applied.199 Recalling the ruling of the Panel in 
US – Section 337 that the words ‘treatment no less favourable’ in paragraph 4 call 
for effective equality of opportunities for imported products, the Panel in 
US – Gasoline concluded that 
since, under the baseline establishment methods, imported gasoline was effectively 
prevented from benefi ting from as favourable sales conditions as were afforded 
domestic gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a product, imported 
gasoline was treated less favourably than domestic gasoline.200
Although the ‘less favourable treatment’ fi nding of the Panel in EC – Asbestos had 
not been appealed, the Appellate Body could not resist noting that:
The term ‘less favourable treatment’ expresses the general principle, in Article III:1, that 
internal regulations ‘should not be applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic 
production’. If there is ‘less favourable treatment’ of the group of ‘like’ imported 
products, there is, conversely, ‘protection’ of the group of ‘like’ domestic products.201
In Korea – Various Measures on Beef, a dispute concerning a dual retail distribution 
system for the sale of beef under which imported beef was, inter alia, to be sold in 
specialized stores selling only imported beef or in separate sections of 
supermarkets, the Panel ruled that:
any regulatory distinction that is based exclusively on criteria relating to the nationality 
or the origin of the products is incompatible with Article III.202
However, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel and reversed this ruling. 
According to the Appellate Body the formal difference in treatment between domestic 
and imported ‘like’ products is neither necessary nor suffi cient for a violation of Article 
III:4. Formally different treatment of imported products did not necessarily constitute 
less favourable treatment while the absence of formal difference in treatment did not 
199 Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.10
200 Ibid., para. 6.10.
201 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 100.
202 Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 6.27.
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necessarily mean that there was no less favourable treatment.203 
The Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef stated:
We observe ... that Article III:4 requires only that a measure accord treatment to 
imported products that is ‘no less favourable’ than that accorded to like domestic 
products. A measure that provides treatment to imported products that is different 
from that accorded to like domestic products is not necessarily inconsistent with Article 
III:4, as long as the treatment provided by the measure is ‘no less favourable’. 
According ‘treatment no less favourable’ means, as we have previously said, according 
conditions of competition no less favourable to the imported product than to the like 
domestic product.
This interpretation, which focuses on the conditions of competition between imported 
and domestic like products, implies that a measure according formally different 
treatment to imported products does not per se, that is, necessarily, violate Article 
III:4.204
The Appellate Body recalled that this point was already persuasively made in the 
GATT Panel Report in US – Section 337.205 The Appellate Body concluded in 
Korea – Various Measures on Beef:
A formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic products is thus 
neither necessary, nor suffi cient, to show a violation of Article III:4. Whether or not 
imported products are treated ‘less favourably’ than like domestic products should be 
assessed instead by examining whether a measure modifi es the conditions of 
competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products.206
In US – Gasoline, the Panel rejected the US argument that the requirements of 
Article III:4 were met because imported gasoline was treated similarly to domestic 
gasoline from similarly situated domestic parties.207 The Panel pointed out, inter 
alia, that:
203 See also GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.11; and Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.25.
204 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 135-6.
205 The Panel in that case had to determine whether United States patent enforcement procedures, which were 
formally different for imported and for domestic products, violated Article III:4. See GATT Panel Report, 
US – Section 337, para. 5.11.
206 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 137.
207 Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.11. The Appellate Body did not address this fi nding of the Panel.
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[the] wording [of Article III:4] does not allow less favourable treatment dependent on 
the characteristics of the producer.208
In US – Gasoline, the Panel also rejected the US contention that the regulation at 
issue treated imported products ‘equally overall’ and was therefore not 
inconsistent with Article III:4.209 Under Article III:4, as under Articles I:1 and III:2, 
‘balancing’ less favourable treatment with more favourable treatment does not 
‘excuse’ the less favourable treatment.210 Finally, when establishing whether there 
is ‘treatment less favourable’, what is to be compared is the treatment given to the 
group of imports as a whole and the treatment given to the group of domestic 
products as a whole. A fi nding of ‘treatment less favourable’ cannot be based on 
the fact that products of the particular foreign producer face less favourable 
conditions of competition than the products of a particular domestic producer.
Note that in a recent case, Canada – Wheat Imports and Grain Exports, the Panel 
stated that the measure at issue, i.e. a prohibition to enter foreign grain in grain 
elevators unless specifi cally authorized, would appear to be inconsistent with 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 because imported grain is treated less favourably than 
like domestic grain.211 However, as the Panel noted, Canada argued that the 
measure at issue: 
… does not adversely affect the conditions of competition for imported grain as 
compared with like domestic grain. More particularly, Canada argues that the 
authorization process is not onerous; that elevator operators are very familiar with the 
process; that authorizations are consistently granted; that the CGC [Canadian Grain 
Commission] has discretion to always authorize receipt of foreign grain; and that 
advance authorization may be obtained.212 
The Panel recognized that, in the Canada – Wheat Imports and Grain Exports case, 
there may be legitimate reasons for Canada to treat domestic grain and like 
imported grain differently, for example, because the latter has not been subjected 
to the Canadian quality assurance system, which imposes certain restrictions and 
conditions on Canadian grain, including with respect to production.213 However, it 
was not clear to the Panel how the arguments put forward by Canada to justify the 
difference in treatment between domestic grain and like imported grain could 
208 Ibid.
209 See ibid., para. 6.14.
210 See GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.14.
211 Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Imports and Grain Exports, para. 6.187.
212 Ibid., para. 6.188.
213 Ibid., para. 6.209
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support the conclusion that the measure at issue treats imported grain ‘no less 
favourably’ than like domestic grain. The Panel, therefore, found as follows:
In conclusion, since the Panel is not persuaded by the defences put forward by Canada 
to suggest that the additional regulatory requirement imposed on imported grain 
pursuant to Section 57(c) of the Canada Grain Act does not impose any burden on 
imported grain or, at least, does not impose a burden that is not also borne by like 
domestic grain, the Panel confi rms its provisional conclusion above at paragraph 6.187 
that Section 57(c) of the Canada Grain Act is, as such, inconsistent with Article III:4 
of the GATT 1994.214
With respect to the tax stamp to be affi xed to all cigarette packets in the territory of 
the Dominican Republic, one of the measures at issue in Dominican 
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the Panel found that:
… although the tax stamp requirement is applied in a formally equal manner to 
domestic and imported cigarettes, it does modify the conditions of competition in the 
marketplace to the detriment of imports. The tax stamp requirement imposes additional 
processes and costs on imported products. It also leads to imported cigarettes being 
presented to fi nal consumers in a less appealing manner.215
Subsequently, the Panel noted:
… in this case, the differences in the conditions between imported and domestic 
products mean that the Dominican Republic should not apply the tax stamp 
requirement in a formally identical manner that does not take those differences into 
account, since this would, in practice, accord less favourable treatment to imported 
products. On the contrary, the Dominican Republic could have chosen to apply the 
requirement in a different manner to imported products, to ensure that the treatment 
accorded to them is de facto not less favourable.216
In Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes the Panel also found – and 
the Appellate Body upheld on appeal – that Honduras failed to establish that a 
requirement that importers and domestic producers post a bond of fi ve million 
pesos (RD$5 million) accorded less favourable treatment to imported cigarettes 
than that accorded to like domestic products, in a manner inconsistent with Article 
214 Ibid., para. 6.214
215 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.196
216 Ibid., para. 7.197.
70
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
III:4 of the GATT 1994.217 The reasoning underlying the rejection of this claim of 
inconsistency by Honduras introduced a new element in the case law on ‘less 
favourable treatment’ within the meaning of Article III:4. As the Appellate Body 
recalled in its Report, Honduras argued that the requirement to post a bond of 
RD$5 million accorded ‘less favourable treatment’ to imported cigarettes because, 
as the sales of domestic cigarettes are greater than those of imported cigarettes on 
the Dominican Republic market, the per unit cost of the bond requirement for 
imported cigarettes is higher than that for domestic products.218 
As discussed above, the Appellate Body ruled in Korea – Various Measures on Beef 
that imported products are treated less favourably than like products if a measure 
modifi es the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of 
imported products.219 In Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the 
Appellate Body elaborated on its ruling in Korea – Various Measures on Beef as 
follows:
However, the existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting 
from a measure does not necessarily imply that this measure accords less favourable 
treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or 
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the market 
share of the importer in this case. In this specifi c case, the mere demonstration that 
the per-unit cost of the bond requirement for imported cigarettes was higher than for 
some domestic cigarettes during a particular period is not, in our view, suffi cient to 
establish ‘less favourable treatment’ under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Indeed, the 
difference between the per-unit costs of the bond requirement alleged by Honduras is 
explained by the fact that the importer of Honduran cigarettes has a smaller market 
share than two domestic producers (the per-unit cost of the bond requirement being 
the result of dividing the cost of the bond by the number of cigarettes sold on the 
Dominican Republic market). In this case, the difference between the per-unit costs of 
the bond requirement alleged by Honduras does not depend on the foreign origin of 
the imported cigarettes. Therefore, in our view, the Panel was correct in dismissing the 
argument that the bond requirement accords less favourable treatment to imported 
cigarettes because the per-unit cost of the bond was higher for the importer of 
Honduran cigarettes than for two domestic producers.220 [emphasis added]
217 Ibid., paras. 7.311 and 7.316; and Appellate Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, 
para. 96. 
218 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 96.
219 See above, p. 67.
220 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 96.
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In brief, the Appellate Body ruled in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of 
Cigarettes that if the less favourable treatment can be explained by factors or 
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product (such as the market 
share of the importer), this less favourable treatment would not be inconsistent 
with Article III:4. 
In line with this ruling of the Appellate Body, the Panel in EC – Biotech Products, 
the Panel rejected Argentina’s claim of inconsistency with Article III:4 stating that:
Argentina has not adduced argument and evidence suffi cient to raise a presumption 
that the alleged less favourable treatment is explained by the foreign origin of the 
relevant biotech products.221
In the opinion of the Panel, Argentina, one of the complainants in EC – Biotech 
Products, failed to demonstrate that the (alleged) less favourable treatment was 
less favourable treatment within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, as 
Argentina did not demonstrate that this less favourable treatment is explained by 
the foreign origin of the imported product concerned.
In the context of this study, the question arises as to whether measures that give 
effect to the Cramer sustainability criteria for biomass production or measures that 
give effect to animal welfare requirements accord ‘treatment less favourable’ to 
imported products than to domestic products?222 The case law on Article III:4, 
discussed above, suggests that such measures accord ‘treatment less favourable’:
if they impose a heavier burden on imported products than they impose on  –
domestic products (or, in other words, if they do not give effective equality of 
competitive opportunities to imported products); and
if this heavier burden is explained by, i.e. results from, the foreign origin of the  –
imported products (or, in other words, if this lack of effective equality of 
competitive opportunities cannot be explained by factors or circumstances 
unrelated to the foreign origin of the imported products).
It is clear that complying with the Cramer sustainability criteria in the production of 
biomass or animal welfare requirements in the production of livestock products 
will, in many instances, impose a heavier burden on imported biomass or livestock 
products, and especially on biomass or livestock products imported from 
developing countries, than on Dutch or European domestic biomass or livestock 
221 Panel Report, EC – Biotech Products, para. 7.2514.
222 For a non-exhaustive list of such measures, see above, p. 9.
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products.223 This heavier burden is clearly explained by the foreign origin of the 
imported products because the heavier burden is the result of the signifi cant 
investments and policy changes that will be required in the exporting countries, 
especially developing countries, to meet the Cramer sustainability criteria and the 
animal welfare requirements which the importing country, in casu, the Netherlands 
or the European Union, impose on the exporting countries. 
Robert Howse and others have suggested that:
Where the difference in treatment derives from norms, criteria and methods widely 
accepted in the international community and which have developed through broad 
consultation among diverse states, and take into account the variety of conditions in 
different countries, it should be considerably more diffi cult for the complainant to 
establish that there is an overall bias against imports as a group.224
In the light of the current case law on Article III:4, discussed above, and Article XX 
of the GATT 1994, discussed below, however, these factors seem more relevant in 
the context of justifying a measure under Article XX than in the context of 
determining whether imported products are given less favourable treatment than 
like domestic products.
2.2.5 GATT consistency of particular types of internal regulation
In concluding this section on the national treatment obligation of Article III of the 
GATT 1994, we note that Article III sets out special rules for particular types of 
internal regulation which are of relevance in the context of this study, namely:
internal quantitative regulations; –
laws, regulations and requirements governing the procurement by  –
governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes; and
payments of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers.  –
 2.2.5.1 Internal quantitative regulations
According to Article III:5, no Member shall establish or maintain any internal 
quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in 
specifi ed amounts or proportions which requires that any specifi ed amount or 
223 To give one concrete example: a requirement for industrial users of biomass (oil companies and electricity 
companies) to report whether biomass they use is produced consistently with the sustainability 
requirements is inconsistent with Article III:4 if it is found to give treatment less favourable to imported 
biomass than to domestic biomass. This could be the case if the reporting obligations would be especially 
burdensome for biomass imported from developing countries.
224 R. Howse, P. van Bork and C. Hedebrand, WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in the 
Creation of a Global Marketplace, IPC Discussion Paper, October 2006.
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proportion of any product must be supplied from domestic sources.225 
A mixing regulation requiring that fuel sold in the Netherlands must contain a 
specifi ed proportion of biofuel (possibly biofuel from biomass produced 
consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria) may be inconsistent with Article 
III:5, if this biofuel must – as a result of the requirements imposed on the 
biofuel – de facto be Dutch biofuel. If the biofuel used in the mixing must meet 
requirements that cannot, or only with great diffi culty, be met by developing 
country Members, then a mixing requirement would constitute a de facto violation 
of Article III:5.
 2.2.5.2 Internal regulations concerning government procurement
According to Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994, the national treatment obligation of 
Article III does not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the 
procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental 
purposes.226 The Dutch government could thus require that fuel purchased for the 
public transport system or the heating of public buildings is biofuel from biomass 
produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria. The national 
treatment obligation of Article III:4 does not apply to such government purchases. 
Note that the plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement does 
provide for a national treatment obligation with regard to measures concerning 
government procurement. In addition, this agreement:
requires that procurement specifi cations be based on international standards  –
where available and, if not, on national technical regulations; 
expresses a preference for performance-based criteria; and  –
requires that the specifi cations do not constitute an unnecessary obstacle to  –
trade.
To date, however, only 13 WTO Members (counting the European Communities 
(EC) and the 27 EU Member States as one Member) are Parties to the Agreement 
on Government Procurement. Moreover, the EC has excluded from the scope of 
application of the Government Procurement Agreement measures relating to the 
procurement of energy or of fuels for the production of energy by a range of 
procurement entities.
225 Article III:5 has not yet been applied and interpreted by WTO panels or the Appellate Body. However, there is 
some relevant GATT case law, including GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para 4.5-4.9; GATT 
Panel Report, and, US –  Tobacco, paras. 66-69, as well as a few unadopted GATT panel reports (including 
GATT Panel Report, US – Taxes on Automobiles, paras. 3.300-3.313; and GATT Panel Report, 
Spain – Soyabean Oil, paras. 4.4-4.5).
226 Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 furthermore requires that these products are not purchased with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.
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 2.2.5.3 Subsidies to domestic producers
Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994 excludes payments of subsidies exclusively to 
domestic producers from the scope application of the national treatment obligation 
of Article III. Article III:8(b) states that the national treatment obligation of Article III 
shall ‘not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to producers’. Such 
subsidies are subject to the disciplines set out in Article XVI of the GATT 1994, the 
SCM Agreement and (in the case of subsidies to agricultural producers) the 
Agreement on Agriculture, discussed below.227
2.3 Obligations regarding tariff barriers to trade 
The most common and widely used barriers to market access for goods are 
customs duties. Further market access for goods is also impeded by other duties 
and charges. This section examines the GATT obligations regarding these tariff 
barriers to trade.
2.3.1 Obligations regarding ordinary customs duties
 2.3.1.1 Scope and nature of the obligations regarding customs duties
A customs duty, or tariff, is a fi nancial charge, in the form of a tax, imposed on 
products at the time of, and/or because of, their importation. Market access is 
conditional upon the payment of the customs duty. Governments can also impose 
customs duties on products at the time of, and/or because of, their exportation. 
However, this is uncommon and, therefore, not addressed in this study.
Customs duties are specifi c (e.g. €10 per tonne), ad valorem (e.g. 15% of the value) 
or mixed (10% per tonne and 15% of the value). Nowadays, ad valorem duties are 
by far the most widespread type of customs duty, although mixed duties on 
agricultural products are still common. Ad valorem, specifi c or mixed customs 
duties can be MFN duties, preferential duties or neither of the two:
MFN duties  – are the ‘standard’ customs duties that are applicable to all other 
WTO Members in compliance with the MFN treatment obligation of Article I:1 
of the GATT1994, discussed above.228 
Preferential duties  – are customs duties applied to specifi c countries pursuant to 
conventional or autonomous arrangements under which products from these 
countries are subject to duties lower than MFN duties (e.g. customs duties 
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme for all developing 
countries; under the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) scheme for least developed 
countries; or under the Cotonou Agreement for African, Caribbean and Pacifi c 
(ACP) countries). 
227 See below, p. 157.
228 See above, p. 18.
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Finally, there are customs duties that are neither MFN duties nor preferential  –
duties. These are the duties applicable on goods from the few countries that are 
not (yet) WTO Members and, therefore, do not benefi t from MFN treatment. 
The customs duties applied by the European Communities are set out in the  –
Common External Tariff of the European Community and in a large number of 
legal instruments concerning preferential arrangements. Accurate, up-to-date 
information on the duties applied can best be obtained through the TARIC 
database of the European Commission.229
Generally speaking, customs duties serve three purposes. First, customs duties are 
a source of revenue for governments. Especially for developing countries this is an 
important purpose. For industrialized countries with a well-developed system for 
direct and indirect taxation, this purpose has become much less important. 
Second, customs duties are used to protect domestic industries by giving domestic 
products a price advantage over imported products. Third, customs duties are used 
to support the importation of ‘preferred’ products (e.g. environmentally friendly 
products) by imposing lower duties on these products. In this way, customs duties 
could be used to support the importation and the use of biomass or biofuels from 
biomass produced consistently with of the Cramer sustainability criteria or 
livestock products produced consistently with animal welfare requirements. 
Whether this use of customs duties is compatible with the obligations of the 
European Communities (and the Netherlands) under the GATT 1994 is discussed in 
this section.
 2.3.1.2 Rules on tariff concessions
In principle, WTO Members are free to impose customs duties on imported 
products. WTO law and, in particular, the GATT 1994, does not prohibit the 
imposition of customs duties. However, it does recognize that customs duties often 
constitute signifi cant obstacles to trade. Article XXVIII bis of the GATT 1994, 
therefore, calls upon WTO Members to negotiate the reduction of customs duties. 
The negotiations conducted before 1995 by the GATT Contracting Parties led to 
very signifi cant reductions in customs duties.230 The negotiations on a further 
reduction of customs duties is an important element of the current Doha 
Development Round.
The results of negotiations on the reduction of customs duties, or tariffs, are 
referred to as ‘tariff concessions’ or ‘tariff bindings’. A tariff concession, or tariff 
229 The Integrated Tariff of the (European) Community (Tariff Integre Communautaire, TARIC) database: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds/en/tarhome.htm. 
230 In the late 1940s, the average duty on industrial products imposed by developed countries was about 40% 
per cent ad valorem. As Today, as a result of the eight GATT Rounds, the average duty of developed-country 
Members on industrial products is now as low as 3.9 per cent ad valorem.
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binding, is a commitment of a WTO Member not to raise the customs duty on a 
certain product above an agreed level. As a result of the Uruguay Round tariff 
negotiations, all, or almost all, customs duties imposed by developed-country 
Members are now ‘bound’, i.e. are subject to a maximum level. For the European 
Communities (and thus for the Netherlands), 100 per cent of customs duties on 
both agricultural products and industrial products are bound.231
The tariff concessions or bindings of a Member are set out in that Member’s 
Schedule of Concessions. Each Member of the WTO has a schedule, except when 
the Member is (as the Netherlands) part of a customs union in which case the 
Member has a common schedule with the other members of the customs union. 
The Schedules resulting from the Uruguay Round negotiations are all annexed to 
the Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994. Pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994, 
the Schedules of Members are an integral part of the GATT 1994. These Schedules, 
including the Schedule of the European Communities, can be found on the WTO 
website.232
As noted in the beginning of this section, under WTO law, customs duties are not 
prohibited. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules on customs 
duties. WTO rules on customs duties relate primarily to the protection of the tariff 
concessions or bindings agreed to in the context of tariff negotiations. The basic 
rules are set out in Article II:1 of the GATT 1994, which states:
a.  Each [Member] shall accord to the commerce of the other [Members] treatment no 
less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate 
Schedule annexed to this Agreement.
b.  The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any [Member], which 
are the products of territories of other [Members], shall, on their importation into 
the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or 
qualifi cations set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in 
excess of those set forth and provided therein ...
Article II:1(a) provides that Members shall accord to products imported from other 
Members treatment no less favourable than that provided for in their Schedule. 
Article II:1(b), fi rst sentence, provides that products described in Part I of the 
Schedule of any Member shall, on importation, be exempt from ordinary customs 
231 For the United States, 100 per cent of the tariff lines for agricultural products and 99.9 per cent of the tariff 
lines for industrial products are bound. See WTO Secretariat, Market Access: Unfi nished Business, Special 
Studies 6 (WTO, 2001), p.49. Most Latin American developing-country Members have also bound all customs 
duties; however, for Asian and African developing-country Members the situation is more varied.
232 See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm. 
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duties in excess of those set out in the Schedule. This means that products may not 
be subjected to customs duties above the tariff concessions or bindings.233
Note that while Article II:1 of the GATT prohibits Members to apply duties in excess 
of their tariff concession, it does not require Members to apply duties at that level. 
As the Appellate Body noted in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel:
A tariff binding in a Member’s Schedule provides an upper limit on the amount of duty 
that may be imposed, and a Member is permitted to impose a duty that is less than 
that provided for in its Schedule.234
For many Members, the customs duties on manufacturer products actually applied 
are often in fact lower that the tariff concessions for these products. The European 
Communities can thus apply on, for example, a livestock product produced 
consistently with animal welfare requirements, customs duties below the binding 
agreed to by the European Communities for the product concerned. Note, 
however, that, as discussed above, the application of a lower duty on livestock 
products produced consistently with animal welfare requirements and a higher 
duty on ‘like’ products produced otherwise, will constitute a violation of the MFN 
treatment obligation of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.235 
Some of the disputes under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 do not directly 
stem from the imposition of duties or charges in excess of those contained in the 
Schedules of Concessions but rather from the interpretation of the scope of 
application of the concessions made. By way of example of such dispute, consider 
the recent EC – Chicken Cuts dispute. In that case, the European Communities did 
not deviate from the customs duties as contained in its Schedule of Concessions. 
It did, however, reclassify a certain type of chicken meat, namely, frozen boneless 
chicken cuts impregnated with salt, under a different tariff heading, Heading 02.07. 
Under that particular tariff heading, the customs duty imposed was higher than 
that under the heading that should have been applied, according to the 
complainants in the case, namely, Heading 02.10. The outcome of the dispute 
depended on the interpretation of the tariff headings, and, more specifi cally, on the 
interpretation of the term ‘salted’. According to the European Communities, the key 
element under Heading 02.10 was preservation, and therefore the term ‘salted’ 
implied that the meat should be impregnated with salt suffi cient to ensure long-
term preservation. The complainants, Thailand and Brazil, contended that ‘salted’ 
233 With respect to the relationship between Article II:1(a) and (b), fi rst sentence, see Appellate Body Report, 
Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 45.
234 Ibid., para. 46.
235 See above, p. 18.
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did not imply long-term preservation and that the chicken cuts thus fell under 
Heading 02.10. 
The Panel and the Appellate Body followed the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation as contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body came to the conclusion that 
‘salted’ did not imply long-term preservation in any way and, therefore, that the 
chicken cuts did fall within the more favourable Heading 02.10. The European 
Communities had acted inconsistently with Article II:1(a) and (b) by wrongly 
classifying the chicken cuts, which resulted in treatment less favourable than that 
provided for in the Schedule. 
It is important to note that in interpreting the scope of tariff concessions that may 
be of relevance to biomass and livestock products, the rules of interpretation of 
Articles 31 and 32 are applied.236
Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 sets out rules as well as a procedure for the 
modifi cation or withdrawal of agreed tariff concessions. The modifi cation or 
withdrawal of a tariff concession or binding is based on the principle of 
renegotiation and compensation. When a tariff concession is modifi ed or 
withdrawn, compensation in the form of new concessions needs to be granted in 
order to maintain a general level of concessions not less favourable to trade. If 
negotiations fail to lead to an agreement on the appropriate level of compensation, 
Article XXVIII:3(a) provides that the Member that proposes to modify or withdraw 
the concession shall, in spite of the failure of the negotiations, be free to do so. In 
that case, however, other Members shall be free to withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions. In other words, if the European Communities would want 
to change its tariff bindings on certain non-preferred products in order to be able to 
impose duties above the current bindings, it will have to consider the ‘cost’ of this 
change.
 2.3.1.3 Rules on customs classifi cation 
As illustrated above, in the discussion of the EC – Chicken Cuts dispute, the 
imposition of customs duties requires the determination of the proper customs 
classifi cation of the imported good. WTO law does not specifi cally address the 
issue of customs classifi cation. In Spain – Unroasted Coffee, the Panel ruled:
236 For a discussion of the rules of interpretation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and the relevance of these rules in WTO dispute settlement, see P. Van den Bossche, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.206ff.
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that there was no obligation under the GATT to follow any particular system for 
classifying goods, and that a contracting party had the right to introduce in its customs 
tariff new positions or sub-positions as appropriate.237
However, in classifying products for customs purposes, Members have of course 
to consider their general obligations under WTO law, such as the MFN treatment 
obligation. As discussed above, the Panel in Spain – Unroasted Coffee ruled that:
whatever the classifi cation adopted, Article I:1 required that the same tariff treatment 
be applied to ‘like products’.238
Specifi c rules on classifi cation can be found in the International Convention on the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, which entered into force 
on 1 January 1988 and to which most WTO Members are party.239 The Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System, commonly referred to as the 
‘Harmonized System’, or HS, is an international commodity classifi cation system, 
developed under the auspices of the Brussels-based Customs Cooperation Council 
(CCC), known today as the World Customs Organization (WCO).240 As a result of the 
Harmonized System, the national tariffs and WTO schedules of concessions of all 
WTO Members who are a party to the HS Convention, have an identical structure 
with the same tariff lines up to the six-digit level.241 Beyond that level, the structure of 
national tariffs the WTO schedules differs as Members are free to introduce different 
(eight- or higher-digit level) tariff lines. To allow for a systematic and uniform 
classifi cation of goods, at least up to the six-digit level, the Harmonized System 
provides not only for a structured list of commodity descriptions, but also includes:
General Rules for the Interpretation of the  – Harmonized System; and
Explanatory Notes – .
WTO Members are not obliged under the GATT 1994, or under any other WTO 
agreement, to adopt the Harmonized System. However, as already noted, most 
WTO Members are a party to the International Convention on the Harmonized 
System. Consequently, most WTO Members use the Harmonized System, its 
237 GATT Panel Report, Spain – Unroasted Coffee, para. 4.4.
238 Ibid. See also above, p. 22; and GATT Panel Report, Japan – SPF Dimension Lumber, para. 5.9.
239 See www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/Conventions/conventions.html. 
240 To keep the Harmonized System up to date, to include new products (resulting from new technologies) and 
to take account of new developments in international trade, the Harmonized System is revised every four to 
six years. See Article 16 of the International Convention on the Harmonized System. To date, there have been 
revisions in 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2007.
241 In fact, the WTO Schedules of Concessions of all WTO Members, including those that are not a party to the 
HS Convention, follow the structure of the HS.
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General Rules for the Interpretation of the Harmonized System and its Explanatory 
Notes in their national tariffs and for the customs classifi cation of goods. 
Although the Harmonized System is not part of WTO law, it can be relevant to the 
interpretation and application of WTO obligations. In EC – Computer Equipment, 
the Appellate Body expressed its surprise that:
Neither the European Communities nor the United States argued before the Panel that 
the Harmonized System and its Explanatory Notes were relevant in the interpretation 
of the terms of Schedule LXXX. We believe, however, that a proper interpretation of 
Schedule LXXX should have included an examination of the Harmonized System and 
its Explanatory Notes.242
Note that the imposition of customs duties not only requires the determination of 
the proper customs classifi cation of the imported good. It may also require the 
determination of the customs value of the imported good (in the case of ad 
valorem duties) and the determination of the origin of the imported good (inter alia 
for the correct application of preferential duties). The WTO rules applicable on 
customs valuation (Article VII of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on the 
Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994, commonly referred to as the 
Customs Valuation Agreement), as well as the evolving WTO rules on national rules 
of origin (WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin), are beyond the scope of this study. 
In the context of this study the question arises as to whether a Member could 
distinguish in its national tariff between:
biomass (or biofuels from biomass) produced consistently with the Cramer  –
sustainability criteria (tariff line with lower duty); and
biomass (or biofuels from biomass) produced otherwise (tariff line with higher duty). –
A similar question arises with regard to livestock products produced consistently, 
or not, with animal welfare requirements. Distinguishing between these products 
in the national tariff and applying different duties is only possible if:
the differentiation takes place below the six-digit level (e.g. at the eight- or ten- –
digit level) because up to the six-digit level the structure of the national tariff of 
WTO Members (which are parties to the HS Convention) is determined by the 
HS Convention and this Convention does not provide for such distinction;
biomass (or biofuels from biomass) produced consistently with the Cramer  –
sustainability criteria are not ‘like’ the biomass (or biofuels from biomass) that 
are produced differently because, as discussed above in the context of the MFN 
treatment obligation of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, products that are ‘like’ may 
not be classifi ed differently; and
242 Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer Equipment, para. 89.
81
WTO Consistency of Unilateral nPR PPM Measures addressing NTCs
the newly applicable duties are not above the relevant binding set out in the  –
Schedule of Concessions of the Member concerned because otherwise the 
duties would be in violation with the obligation under Article II:1 of the GATT 
1994. 
The second of the conditions mentioned here is the most problematic. As 
discussed above, it is most likely that biomass (or biofuels from biomass) 
produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria and biomass (or 
biofuels from biomass) produced differently will be considered to be ‘like 
products’. As noted above, this would only be different if the fact whether the 
biomass is or is not produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria is 
highly relevant to consumers and determines their choices on the market. This is, 
however, unlikely.243
It has been suggested that in the context of the Doha Development Round tariff 
negotiations, Members should be able to ensure fair competition between 
domestic and imported products by applying smaller tariff reductions on products 
that do not meet the animal welfare requirements that apply to domestic products. 
The tariffs on products produced inconsistently with animal welfare requirements 
would thus be higher than those on products produced consistently with these 
requirements. As discussed above, this would constitute a violation of the MFN 
treatment of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, if products produced inconsistently with 
these requirements and products produced consistently with the requirements are 
‘like products’. As also explained above, in the current state of WTO law, it is most 
likely that these products will be considered to be ‘like’.
2.3.2 Obligations regarding other duties and charges
Next to ‘ordinary customs duties’, discussed above, fi nancial barriers to trade can 
also take the form of ‘other duties and charges’. ‘Other duties and charges’ are 
fi nancial charges, other than ordinary customs duties, imposed on, or in the 
context of, the importation of a good. ‘Other duties and charges’ form a residual 
category.
Examples of ‘other duties and charges’ taken from the GATT and WTO case law 
are:
an import surcharge, i.e. a duty imposed on an imported product in addition to  –
the ordinary customs duty;
a security deposit to be made on the importation of goods; –
a statistical tax imposed to fi nance the collection of statistical information;  –
243 See above, p. 63 ff.
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a customs fee, i.e. a fi nancial charge imposed for the processing of imported  –
goods by the customs authorities;
a transitional surcharge for economic stabilization imposed on imported goods;  –
and
a foreign exchange fee imposed on imported goods. –
To protect the tariff concessions set forth in the Schedules and to prevent 
‘circumvention’ of the prohibition of Article II:1(b), fi rst sentence, of the GATT 1994, 
to impose ordinary customs duties in excess of the tariff concessions, WTO law 
provides for rules on ‘other duties and charges’. These rules are set out in Article 
II:1(b), second sentence, and the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. It follows from these rules that Members may:
impose only ‘other duties and charges’ that have been properly recorded in  –
their Schedules; and
impose ‘other duties and charges’ only at a level that does not exceed the level  –
recorded in their Schedules.
In Chile – Price Band System, the Panel ruled on the WTO consistency of the other 
duties and charges at issue in this case, as follows:
Pursuant to the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b), 
such other duties or charges had to be recorded in a newly created column ‘other duties 
and charges’ in the Members’ Schedules ... Other duties or charges must not exceed 
the binding in this ‘other duties and charges’ column of the Schedule. If other duties or 
charges were not recorded but are nevertheless levied, they are inconsistent with the 
second sentence of Article II:1(b), in light of the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article II:1(b). We note that Chile did not record its PBS in the ‘other duties and charges’ 
column of its Schedule. We therefore fi nd that the Chilean [Price Band System] duties 
are inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994.244
In Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the Panel found that the two 
‘other duties or charges’ at issue in this case, namely, the transitional surcharge for 
economic stabilization and the foreign exchange fee imposed on imported 
products, had not been recorded in a legally valid manner in Schedule of 
Concessions of the Dominican Republic. The Panel ruled that the recording of the 
Selective Consumption Tax, i.e. an internal tax, could not be used as legal basis to 
justify the current transitional surcharge or the foreign exchange fee.245 With regard 
244 Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System, paras. 7.105 and 7.107-7.108. On appeal, the Appellate Body found 
that the Panel’s fi nding on Article II:1(b), second sentence, related to a claim that had not been made, and 
this fi nding was therefore in violation of Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). As a 
result, the Appellate Body reversed the fi nding.
245 See Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.86.
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to the transitional surcharge for economic stabilization, the Panel thus came to the 
following conclusion:
For all legal and practical purposes, what was notifi ed by the Dominican Republic in 
document G/SP/3 is equivalent to ‘zero’ in the Schedule. The Panel fi nds that the 
surcharge as an ‘other duty or charge’ measure is applied in excess of the level ‘zero’ 
pursuant to the Schedule. Therefore, the surcharge measure is inconsistent with Article 
II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.246
With regard to the foreign exchange fee, the Panel came to the same conclusion.247
There are a number of exceptions to the rule that Members may not impose ‘other 
duties or charges’ unless recorded and not in excess of the recorded level. 
Pursuant to Article II:2 of the GATT 1994, Members may – despite their obligations 
under Article II:1(b), second sentence – impose on imported products:
any fi nancial charge that is not in excess of the internal tax imposed on the like  –
domestic product;248 i.e. border tax adjustment;
WTO-consistent anti-dumping or countervailing duties; or –
fees or other charges ‘commensurate’ with, i.e. limited to, the cost of the  –
services rendered.249
With regard to the fi rst exception, namely, the exception relating to border tax 
adjustment, note that through border tax adjustment WTO Members may impose 
domestic taxes and charges on imports, and exempt or reimburse them on 
exports. The objective is to ensure trade neutrality of domestic taxation.250 Border 
tax adjustment on imported products in excess of taxes borne by like domestic 
246 Ibid., para. 7.89.
247 Ibid., para. 7.121.
248 Note that taxes that are not directly levied on products [i.e. direct taxes (taxes on wages, profi ts, interests, 
rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property)] are not eligible for 
border tax adjustment
249 Note that Article VIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 provides for the same obligation as Article II:2(c). The fees and 
charges for services rendered at issue in Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1(a) include, pursuant to Article VIII:4, fees and 
charges relating to consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certifi cates; quantitative restrictions; 
licensing; exchange control; statistical services; documents, documentation and certifi cation; analysis and 
inspection; and quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.
250 See Committee on Trade and Environment, Taxes and Charges for Environmental Purposes – Border Tax 
Adjustment. WT/CTE/W/47, para. 24. In the absence of a harmonized taxation system between trading 
partners, border tax adjustment aims at preventing double taxation or loopholes in taxation, and thus to 
preserve the competitive equality between domestic and imported products. 
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products is, as discussed above, in violation of the national treatment of Article III 
of the GATT 1994.251 
In the context of this study, the question arises whether the Netherlands could 
impose, by way of border tax adjustment, an additional charge on imported 
biomass (or imported biofuels from biomass) produced inconsistently with the 
Cramer sustainability criteria when in the Netherlands a tax is imposed on the 
domestic production of biomass in a manner not consistent with the Cramer 
sustainability criteria. Through border tax adjustment, the economic playing fi eld 
between imports and domestic products would be levelled. It is quite doubtful, 
however, that border tax adjustment is permitted for taxes related to nPR PPMs. If 
border tax adjustment were to be allowed in this situation, the consequence would 
be that imported biomass produced inconsistently with the Cramer sustainability 
criteria is subject to higher taxation than the (arguably) ‘like’ domestic biomass 
produced consistently with those criteria. As discussed above, this amounts to a 
violation of the national treatment obligation of Article III:2, fi rst sentence, of the 
GATT 1994.
With regard to the third exception to the rules on ‘other duties or charges’, namely, 
fees limited to the cost of services rendered, the Panel in US – Customs User Fee 
noted that the requirement that a fee or charge be limited in amount to the cost of 
the services rendered is in fact a dual requirement:
the fee or charge in question must fi rst involve a ‘service’ rendered to the  –
individual importer in question; and
the level of the charge must not exceed the approximate cost of that service’. – 252
The fi nancial charge at issue in US – Customs User Fee was a merchandise 
processing fee, in the form of an ad valorem charge without upper limits. The 
complainants, the European Communities and Canada, challenged the GATT-
consistency of an ad valorem charge without upper limit. The Panel found as 
follows: 
… the term ‘cost of services rendered’ in Articles II:2(c) and VIII:1 (a) must be 
interpreted to refer to the cost of the customs processing for the individual entry in 
question and accordingly that the ad valorem structure of the United States 
merchandise processing fee was inconsistent with the obligations of Articles II:2(c) 
and VIII:1(a) to the extent that it caused fees to be levied in excess of such costs.253
251 Ibid., para. 26. See also above, p. 39.
252 GATT Panel Report, US – Customs User Fee, para. 69. See also Panel Report, Argentina – Textiles and 
Apparel, para. 6.74; and Panel Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 6.69.
253 GATT Panel Report, US – Customs User Fee, para. 86.
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2.4 Obligations regarding quantitative restrictions on trade
Apart from customs duties and other duties or charges on imported goods, 
discussed above, trade in goods is also impeded by non-tariff barriers. This section 
focuses on the GATT rules applicable to quantitative restrictions. The next section 
briefl y discusses the GATT rules applicable to other non-tariff barriers.
A quantitative restriction is a measure that limits the quantity of a product that may 
be imported or exported.254 There are different types of quantitative restriction:
a  – prohibition, or ban, of a product; such a prohibition may be absolute or 
conditional, i.e. only applicable when certain defi ned conditions are not 
fulfi lled;
a  – quota, i.e. a measure indicating the quantity that may be imported or
exported; a quota can be a global quota, a global quota allocated among
countries, or a bilateral quota;
import and export  – licences; and 
other  – quantitative restrictions on the importation or exportation of products, 
such as a quantitative restriction made effective through State trading 
operations; a mixing regulation; a minimum price triggering a quantitative 
restriction; and a voluntary export restraint.255 
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, entitled ‘General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions’, sets out a general prohibition on quantitative restrictions, 
whether on imports or exports. As the Panel in Turkey – Textiles stated:
The prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions forms one of the cornerstones of 
the GATT system.256
Article XI:1 provides, in relevant part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
insti tuted or maintained by any [Member] on the importation of any product of the 
territory of any other [Member] or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other [Member].
254 Therefore, a tariff quota is not a quota; it is not a quantitative restriction See the unadopted GATT Panel 
Report, EEC – Bananas II, DS38/R, paras. 138-9. A tariff quota is a quantity which can be imported at a certain 
duty. Any quantity above that amount is subject to a higher (often much higher) tariff but can (in principle at 
least) still be imported.
255 For an illustrative list of quantitative restrictions, see Council for Trade in Goods, Decision on Notifi cation 
Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, G/L/59, dated 10 January 1996, Annex.
256 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, para. 9.63.
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As the Panel in Japan – Semi-Conductors noted, the wording of Article XI:1
… was comprehensive: it applied to all measures instituted or maintained by a 
contracting party prohibiting or restricting the importation, exportation or sale for export 
of products other than measures that take the form of duties, taxes or other charges.257 
[Emphasis added]
As an illustration of the broad scope of the prohibition on quantitative restrictions, 
consider the following examples of measures that were found to be inconsistent 
with Article XI:1:
In  – US – Shrimp, the Panel found that the United States acted inconsistently with 
Article XI:1 by imposing an import ban on shrimp and shrimp products 
harvested by vessels of foreign nations where the exporting country had not 
been certifi ed by the US authorities as using methods to avoid the accidental 
killing of sea turtles above certain levels.258
In  – EEC – Minimum Import Prices, the Panel found that the prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions in Article XI:1 applied to a system of minimum import 
prices.259
In  – Japan – Agricultural Products I, the Panel ruled that the prohibition of Article 
XI:1 applied to import restrictions made effective through an import monopoly, 
or more broadly through State trading operations.260
In  – India – Quantitative Restrictions, the Panel held that non-automatic import 
licensing systems are import restrictions prohibited by Article XI:1.261
While it is clear that the scope of application of Article XI:1 covers more than bans 
and quotas, it is unclear how broad is its scope of application beyond bans and 
quotas. As discussed above, it has been argued that nPR PPM measures are caught 
under Article XI (and not Article III:4, which would only apply to product-related 
measures). However, there is little, if any, support for this position in the case 
law.262
257 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 104.
258 See Panel Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 7.17 and 8.1. Previous GATT panels in US – Tuna II (EEC), para. 5.10, 
and US – Tuna I (Mexico), paras. 5.17–5.18, found similar measures also to be ‘restrictions’ within the 
meaning of Article XI.
259 See GATT Panel Report, EEC – Minimum Import Prices, para. 4.14. Also, restrictions on exports 
below a certain price fall within the scope of application of Article XI:1 (see GATT Panel Report, 
Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 117).
260 See GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products I, para. 5.2.2.2.
261 See Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions, para. 5.130.
262 See above, p. 54.
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Unlike other GATT provisions, Article XI refers not to laws or regulations but more 
broadly to measures. A measure instituted or maintained by a Member which 
restricts imports (or exports) is covered by Article XI, irrespective of the legal status 
of the measure.263 In Japan – Semi-Conductors, the Panel therefore ruled that non-
mandatory measures of the Japanese Government, restricting the export of certain 
semiconductors at below cost price, were nevertheless ‘restrictions’ within the 
meaning of Article XI:1.264
Note that, in addition, quantitative restrictions which do not actually impede trade 
are nevertheless prohibited under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.265 The Panel in 
EEC – Oilseeds I ruled in this respect in 1990:
the contracting parties have consistently interpreted the basic provisions of the General 
Agreement on restrictive trade measures as provisions establishing conditions of 
competition. Thus they decided that an import quota constitutes an import restriction 
within the meaning of Article XI:1 whether or not it actually impeded imports.266
On the other hand, the Panel in EEC – Minimum Import Prices found in 1978 that 
automatic import licensing does not constitute a restriction of the type meant to 
fall under the purview of Article XI:1.267
Finally, note that restrictions of a de facto nature are also prohibited under Article 
XI:1 of the GATT 1994. In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the issue arose as to 
whether Argentina had violated Article XI:1 by authorizing the presence of 
domestic tanners’ representatives in the customs inspection procedures for hides 
destined for export operations. According to the complainant (the European 
Communities), Argentina had thus imposed a de facto restriction on the 
exportation of hides inconsistent with Article XI:1. The Panel ruled:
There can be no doubt, in our view, that the disciplines of Article XI:1 extend to 
restrictions of a de facto nature.268
263 See GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 106.
264 See GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, paras. 104-17.
265 Such non-biting quotas, i.e. quotas above current levels of trade, cause increased transaction costs and create 
uncertainties that could affect investment plans .See GATT Panel Report, Japan – Leather II (US), para. 55.
266 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Oilseeds I, para. 150.
267 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Minimum Import Prices, para. 4.1.
268 Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.17.
88
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
However, the Panel concluded with respect to the Argentinean regulation providing 
for the presence of the domestic tanners’ representatives in the customs inspection 
procedures that there was insuffi cient evidence that this regulation really operated 
as an export restriction inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.269
The relationship between Article III, the national treatment obligation, and Article 
XI, the prohibition of quantitative restrictions, is not very clear. The Note Ad Article 
III states that internal measures applied to imported products at the time of 
importation are to be regarded as ‘internal measures’ falling within the scope of 
application of Article III:4. However, the Note Ad Article III leaves it unclear whether 
Article XI could also be applied to such measure. The issue of the relationship 
between Article III and Article XI was raised in EC – Asbestos and Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef. However, the Panels in both cases refrained from addressing 
the issue (by exercising judicial economy with regard to the claim of inconsistency 
with Article XI after having found a violation of Article III:4). Some commentators 
suggest that the Panels in the above cases might have proceeded to examine the 
measures at issue under Article XI if they had found that the measures were 
consistent with Article III:4.270 Note, however, that in EC – Asbestos, the 
inconsistency with Article XI:1 was Canada’s prime claim.271 The Panel’s decision to 
examine the inconsistency with Article III:4, rather than with Article XI:1 (Canada’s 
prime claim), seems to suggest that the Panel considered that Article XI:1 did not 
apply to the measure at issue. Unfortunately, the Panel does not state this explicitly 
and thus leaves the case law on this point unclear.
2.5 Obligations regarding other non-tariff barriers to trade
In addition to customs duties and other duties and charges (i.e. tariff barriers) and 
quantitative restrictions (i.e. the fi rst subcategory of non-tariff barriers), all 
discussed above, trade in goods is also impeded by ‘other non-tariff barriers’. As 
the term indicates, this is a residual category of measures and actions that 
restrict – to various degrees and in different ways – market access of goods.272 The 
category of ‘other non-tariff barriers’ covers measures and actions (or the absence 
thereof), such as technical barriers to trade, customs formalities and procedures, 
lack of transparency regarding applicable trade laws and regulations, unfair and 
269 Ibid., para. 11.55.
270 See e.g. N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence (London: 
Earthscan, 2005), p.209. 
271 Canada stated that if the Panel were to consider that the measure at issue could not be examined under both 
Article III:4 and Article XI, then the measure should be examined under Article XI.
272 See e.g. table of contents of the Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures, Note by the Secretariat, TN/MA/S/5/Rev.1, 
dated 28 November 2003.
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arbitrary application of trade measures, and government procurement practices. 
For some of these ‘other non-tariff barriers’ the GATT 1994 provides specifi c, albeit 
(very) rudimentary rules. This is the case for the lack of transparency (see Article 
X:1 and 2), the unfair and arbitrary application of trade measures (Article X:3(a)) 
and customs formalities and procedures (Article VIII:1–3). A detailed discussion of 
these GATT rules is beyond the scope of this study. The important rules on 
technical barriers are set out in the TBT Agreement and are discussed below.273
3 Relevant general exceptions from obligations under the GATT 1994
The protection of public health, the environment, public morals, consumer safety 
and national security are core tasks of governments. In order to protect and 
promote these and other societal values and interests, governments frequently 
adopt legislation or take measures that inadvertently or deliberately constitute 
barriers to trade. Members are often politically and/or economically ‘compelled’ to 
adopt legislation or measures which are inconsistent with rules of WTO law and, in 
particular, with the MFN treatment obligation, the national treatment obligation, 
the obligations with regard to tariff barriers to trade and the obligations with 
regard to non-tariff barriers to trade, all discussed above. Trade liberalization, and 
its principles of non-discrimination and rules on market access, often confl ict with 
other important societal values and interests.
This section and the next discuss the rules provided for in the GATT 1994 to 
reconcile trade liberalization with other societal values and interests. As discussed 
above, they address the wide-ranging exceptions to the basic GATT rules, allowing 
Members to adopt trade-restrictive legislation and measures that address non-
trade concerns.274 This section deals with the ‘general exceptions’ of Article XX of 
the GATT 1994, while section 4 addresses some other exceptions of interest in the 
context of this study. 275
273 See below, p. 136. As discussed above, the SPS Agreement, which applies to a specifi c category of technical 
barriers to trade, is not relevant in the context of this study and will therefore not be discussed. 
See above, p 18, fn. 30.
274 See above, p. 15.
275 This section is based on and in parts further elaborates and updates P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2005, reprinted 2006), pp.598-624. 
See www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521529815. 
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3.1 The nature and function of Article XX of the GATT 1994
Article XX of the GATT 1994, entitled ‘General Exceptions’, states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any [Member] of measures:
a. necessary to protect public morals;
b. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
c. relating to the importations and exportations of gold and silver;
d.  necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article 
II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the 
prevention of deceptive practices;
e. relating to the products of prison labour;
f.  imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value;
g.  relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption;
h.   undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity 
agreement …;
i.   involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure 
essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry …;
j.   essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
supply … 
Thus, Article XX allows Members to take measures addressing non-trade concerns 
and protecting important societal values, such as public health and the 
environment. Note that some of the paragraphs of Article XX have frequently been 
invoked and have given rise to a substantial body of case law (e.g. paragraphs (b), 
(d) and (g)). Other paragraphs, however, have been of much less importance in 
international trade law and practice (e.g. paragraphs (h), (i) and (j)).
3.1.1 Limited and conditional exceptions
The Panel in US – Section 337 noted, with respect to the nature and function 
of Article XX,
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that Article XX is entitled ‘General Exceptions’ and that the central phrase in the 
introductory clause reads: ‘nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement ... of measures ...’. Article XX(d) thus provides for a limited and 
conditional exception from obligations under other provisions. The Panel therefore 
concluded that Article XX(d) applies only to measures inconsistent with another 
provision of the General Agreement, and that, consequently, the application of Section 
337 has to be examined fi rst in the light of Article III:4. If any inconsistencies with 
Article III:4 were found, the Panel would then examine whether they could be justifi ed 
under Article XX(d).276
In general, Article XX is relevant and will be invoked by a Member only when a 
measure of that Member has been found to be inconsistent with another GATT 
provision. In such a case, Article XX will be invoked to justify the GATT-inconsistent 
measure. As the Panel in US – Section 337 noted, the central phrase in the fi rst 
sentence of Article XX is that ‘nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures ...’. Measures 
satisfying the conditions set out in Article XX are thus permitted, even if they are 
inconsistent with other provisions of the GATT 1994. As noted by the Panel in 
US – Section 337, however, Article XX provides for limited and conditional 
exceptions from obligations under other GATT provisions. The exceptions are 
‘limited’ as the list of exceptions in Article XX is exhaustive. This is problematic as 
Article XX –which was drafted in the late 1940s – does not explicitly provide for the 
protection of certain societal values – such as minimum labour standards – which 
are felt to be core values today.277 Measures for the protection or promotion of 
human rights, food security, minimum labour standards or animal welfare cannot 
be – at least not directly – justifi ed under Article XX since these grounds for 
justifi cation are not included in the exhaustive list of Article XX. Any attempt to 
include these grounds of justifi cation in Article XX are likely to meet strong 
opposition from developing country Members which fear that these new grounds 
will be used by developed country Members for trade protectionist purposes. 
The exceptions provided for in Article XX of the GATT 1994 are not only ‘limited’; 
they are also ‘conditional’ in that Article XX only provides for justifi cation of an 
otherwise illegal measure when the conditions set out in Article XX – and 
276 GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.9.
277 Note, however, that there has been very little debate on expanding the list of exceptions/grounds of 
justifi cation for otherwise GATT inconsistent measures. The current WTO DG, Pascal Lamy, while he was still 
EU Trade Commissioner argued in September 2004 for such expansion in the context of his proposal on the 
protection of collective preferences (see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_118929.
pdf). However, Peter Mandelson, his successor as EU Trade Commissioner, did not take over this idea. The 
European Parliament has reportedly commissioned a study on this issue, which is due to be published soon. 
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discussed below – are fulfi lled. While Article XX allows Members to adopt or 
maintain measures promoting or protecting important societal values, it provides 
an exception to, or limitation of, affi rmative commitments under the GATT 1994. In 
this light, it is not surprising that Article XX has played a central role in many GATT 
and WTO disputes.
3.1.2 Interpretation of Article XX
While it could be argued that it is an accepted principle of interpretation that 
exceptions are to be construed narrowly (singularia non sunt extendenda) and that 
Article XX should, therefore, be construed narrowly, the Appellate Body has not 
adopted this approach. Instead, it has advocated in US – Gasoline and US – Shrimp 
a kind of balancing between the general rule and the exception. It stated, with 
regard to Article XX(g), the exception at issue in both cases:
The context of Article XX(g) includes the provisions of the rest of the General 
Agreement, including in particular Articles I, III and XI; conversely, the context of 
Articles I and III and XI includes Article XX. Accordingly, the phrase ‘relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ may not be read so expansively as 
seriously to subvert the purpose and object of Article III:4. Nor may Article III:4 be given 
so broad a reach as effectively to emasculate Article XX(g) and the policies and interests 
it embodies. The relationship between the affi rmative commitments set out in, e.g. 
Articles I, III and XI, and the policies and interests embodied in the ‘General Exceptions’ 
listed in Article XX, can be given meaning within the framework of the General 
Agreement and its object and purpose by a treaty interpreter only on a case-to-case 
basis, by careful scrutiny of the factual and legal context in a given dispute, without 
disregarding the words actually used by the WTO Members themselves to express their 
intent and purpose.278
Clearly, therefore, the Appellate Body considers a narrow interpretation of the 
exceptions of Article XX, i.e. the exceptions allowing for, inter alia, trade-restrictive 
measures to protect public health or the environment, to be inappropriate. The 
Appellate Body advocates a balance between trade liberalization and other societal 
values.
3.1.3 Kind of measures justifi able under Article XX
With regard to the kind of measure that can be justifi ed under Article XX, the Panel 
in US – Shrimp ruled that Article XX could not justify measures that ‘undermine 
278 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 18.
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the WTO multilateral trading system’,279 and that a measure of a Member 
‘conditioning access to its market for a given product upon the adoption by the 
exporting Member of certain policies’ would undermine the multilateral trading 
system.280 According to the Panel in US – Shrimp, Article XX could therefore not 
justify measures that oblige exporting countries to change certain domestic 
policies and make them compliant with the policies of the importing country. An 
import ban on biomass not produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability 
criteria would be such measure, which – in the line of the ruling of the Panel in 
US – Shrimp – could not be justifi ed under Article XX. On appeal, however, the 
Appellate Body categorically rejected this ruling by the Panel on the scope of 
measures that Article XX could justify. The Appellate Body held:
conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market on whether exporting Members 
comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing 
Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the 
scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX. Paragraphs (a) to (j) 
comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions to substantive obligations 
established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic policies embodied in such 
measures have been recognized as important and legitimate in character. It is not 
necessary to assume that requiring from exporting countries compliance with, or 
adoption of, certain policies (although covered in principle by one or another of the 
exceptions) prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a priori incapable 
of justifi cation under Article XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the 
specifi c exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of 
interpretation we are bound to apply.281
Measures requiring that exporting countries comply with, or adopt, certain policies 
prescribed by the importing country are, in fact, typical of the measures that Article 
XX can justify. They are defi nitely not a priori excluded from the scope of Article 
XX. That is also, for example, the case for an import ban on biomass not produced 
consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria. Note, however, that – as 
discussed below – a measure that imposes in a rigid and infl exible manner purely 
domestic criteria on the importing Member without consultations or consideration 
of the different conditions in the exporting Member, will fail to meet the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX, namely, that a provisionally justifi ed 
measure is not applied in a manner that constitutes unjustifi able or arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.282
279 Panel Report, US – Shrimp, para. 7.44.
280 Ibid., para. 7.45.
281 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 121.
282 See below, p. 121.
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As the Appellate Body found in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 - Malaysia), an nPR PPM 
measure can be justifi ed under Article XX. This was the fi rst time that this was 
established. To date, the nPR PPM measure at issue in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 - 
Malaysia) has been the only nPR PPM measure that fulfi lled the requirements of 
Article XX. Other measures, such as those at issue in US – Shrimp and 
US – Gasoline, did not meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.283 
There is, however, defi nitely no reason to think that nPR PPM measures could 
not be justifi ed under Article XX.
3.1.4 Jurisdictional limitation on the application of Article XX?
The Appellate Body has yet to rule on whether measures that protect, or purport to 
protect, a societal value or interest outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Member 
taking the measure can be justifi ed under Article XX. There is no explicit 
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX. As discussed below, the wording of Article 
XX(b) does not explicitly limit the protection of life and health to the territory of the 
country enacting the measure at issue. Likewise, the wording of Article XX(a) and 
(g) has no such explicit limitation either. However, the question is whether there is 
an implied jurisdictional limitation, in that Article XX cannot be invoked to protect 
societal values outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Member concerned. 
In US – Tuna I (Mexico), the United States invoked Article XX(b) and (g) to justify 
the GATT-inconsistent prohibition on imports of yellowfi n tuna caught with nets 
that also catch and kill dolphins.284 The Panel, however, excluded from the scope of 
application of Article XX(b) and (g) all measures protecting human, animal or plant 
life or health, or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
outside the jurisdiction of the country enacting the measures concerned. The Panel 
argued that if Article XX(b) or XX(g) could justify trade-restrictive measures for the 
protection of life or health or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
outside the jurisdiction of the country enacting the measures, that country could 
unilaterally determine the public health and environmental policies of other 
countries (dependent as these countries may be on access to the market of the 
country enacting the measure at issue).285 
The Panel in US – Tuna II (EEC) confi rmed that Article XX(b) and (g) cannot justify 
measures that pursue the protection of public health and environmental policy 
283 See below, p. 119.
284 Unless the tuna exporting country proved that its programme for avoiding the accidental killing of dolphins 
was comparable to the US programme.
285 See GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna I (Mexico), paras. 5.27 and 5.32 (unadopted).
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objectives outside the jurisdiction of the Member enacting the measure.286 In the 
opinion of the Panel, countries should not be allowed under Article XX to take 
trade-restrictive measures that would force other countries to change their 
domestic environmental policies.
In US – Shrimp, a case involving an import ban on shrimp harvested through 
methods resulting in the incidental killing of sea turtles,287 the Appellate Body 
noted that sea turtles migrate to or traverse waters subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, and subsequently stated:
We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional 
limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. We note only 
that in the specifi c circumstances of the case before us, there is a suffi cient nexus 
between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the United 
States for purposes of Article XX(g).288
While the position of the Appellate Body on the use of Article XX of the GATT 1994 
for the protection or promotion of a societal value or interest outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Member taking the otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure is still 
undetermined, the Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences found that: 
… the policy refl ected in the Drug Arrangements is not one designed for the purpose of 
protecting human life or health in the European Communities and, therefore, the Drug 
Arrangements are not a measure for the purpose of protecting human life or health 
under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994.289 [emphasis added]
In the context of this study, the question arises as to whether otherwise GATT-
inconsistent measures giving effect to the Cramer sustainability criteria, discussed 
above, can be justifi ed under Article XX of the GATT 1994, or whether they fall 
outside the scope of this provision because of its jurisdictional limitation. The 
ruling of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp suggests that if a suffi cient nexus 
exists between, on the one hand, the protection of the societal values expressed in 
the Cramer sustainability criteria, and, on the other, the territory of the 
286 Note that the Panel in US – Tuna II (EEC) found that in addition to measures aiming to protect public policy 
objectives on the territory of the Member enacting the measure, Article XX also covers measures involving a 
Member’s exercise of jurisdiction over their own nationals and vessels. See GATT Panel Report , US – Tuna II 
(EEC), paras. 5.15-17, 5.20 and 5.31-33.
287 The United States allowed the importation of shrimp harvested in waters of a country certifi ed as complying 
with the US standards for the protection of sea turtles.
288 Ibid., para. 133.
289 Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.210
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Netherlands, Article XX may be applied. Such a nexus defi nitely exists when the 
measure at issue concerns nPR PPMs affecting a global situation (e.g. measures 
concerning climate change or the depletion of the ozone layer). Such a nexus may 
also exist when the measure at issue concerns nPR PPMs affecting a 
transboundary situation (e.g. measures concerning air or water pollution across 
national borders) or concerns nPR PPMs affecting a situation in multiple/
undetermined national territories (e.g. measures concerning the protection of 
migratory species). This nexus clearly does not exist, however, when the measure 
at issue concerns nPR PPMs affecting a purely national situation in the country of 
production (e.g. measures concerning minimum labour standards, human rights, 
the local environment, child labour or animal welfare). As stated above, the 
Appellate Body has still to rule on whether measures of this kind, when otherwise 
GATT inconsistent, can be justifi ed under the Article XX of the GATT 1994.
3.1.5 The two-tier test under Article XX
Article XX of the GATT 1994 sets out a two-tier test for determining whether an 
otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure can be justifi ed. In US – Gasoline, the 
Appellate Body stated:
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at 
issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions – paragraphs 
(a) to (j) – listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the 
opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: fi rst, provisional 
justifi cation by reason of characterization of the measure under Article XX(g); second, 
further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.290
Thus, for a GATT-inconsistent measure to be justifi ed under Article XX, it must meet:
the requirements of one of the exceptions listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) of  –
Article XX; and
the requirements of the introductory clause, commonly referred to as the  –
‘chapeau’, of Article XX. 
In examining whether a measure can be justifi ed under Article XX, one must 
always examine, fi rst, whether this measure can be provisionally justifi ed under 
one of the specifi c exceptions listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX and, if so, 
whether the application of this measure meets the requirements of the chapeau of 
Article XX. The following paragraphs will, therefore, fi rst discuss the specifi c 
exceptions and their requirements provided for in Article XX before analysing the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
290 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 22.
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3.2 Provisional justifi cation of otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures
As discussed above, the fi rst step in the two-tier test for determining whether an 
otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure is justifi ed under Article XX is to examine 
whether that measure meets the requirements of one of the exceptions listed in 
the paragraphs of Article XX. This section fi rst examines the exceptions set out in 
paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), on which there is a considerable body of WTO case law; 
and then addresses the exceptions set out in paragraphs (a) and (j), which have not 
been the subject of any dispute settlement to date.
3.2.1 Protection of life or health of humans, animals and plants
Article XX(b) concerns measures that are ‘necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health’. It sets out a two-tier test to determine whether a measure is 
provisionally justifi ed under this provision. The Panel in US – Gasoline stated that 
the United States, as the party invoking Article XX(b), had to establish:
that the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision was invoked fell 
within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
[and] that the inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were 
necessary to fulfi l the policy objectives ...291
In other words, for a GATT-inconsistent measure to be provisionally justifi ed under 
Article XX(b):
the policy objective pursued by the measure must be the protection of life or  –
health of humans, animals or plants; and
the measure must be necessary to fulfi l that policy objective. –
 3.2.1.1 Is the measure designed to ‘protect life or health…’?
The fi rst element of this test under Article XX(b) is relatively easy to apply and has 
not given rise to many interpretative problems. In Thailand – Cigarettes, for 
example, the Panel ruled with regard to this element of the test under Article XX(b):
Consequently, measures designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fell within 
the scope of Article XX(b).292
In EC – Tariff Preferences, the European Communities sought to justify under Article 
XX(b) its additional tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements of the EC 
291 Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.20. For a more recent application of this test, see Panel Report, 
EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 7.179 and 7.199.
292 GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes, para. 73.
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Generalized System of Preferences by arguing that:
… narcotic drugs pose a risk to human life and health in the European Communities and 
that tariff preferences contribute to the protection of human life and health by 
supporting the measures taken by other countries against the illicit production and 
traffi cking of those substances, thereby reducing their supply to the European 
Communities.293
In its examination of whether the additional tariff preferences of the Drug 
Arrangements are designed to achieve the stated health objectives, the Panel noted 
that it needed to consider not only the express provisions of the legislation or 
measures at issue, but also the design, architecture and structure of this legislation 
or these measures.294 As already noted above, the Panel in EC –Tariff Preferences 
came to the conclusion that:
… the policy refl ected in the Drug Arrangements is not one designed for the purpose of 
protecting human life or health in the European Communities and, therefore, the Drug 
Arrangements are not a measure for the purpose of protecting human life or health 
under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994.295
As Article XX(b) covers measures designed for the protection of ‘human, animal or 
plant life or health’, it covers public health policy measures as well as 
environmental policy measures. Measures to ensure that biofuels and electricity 
produced from biomass contribute to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions can 
certainly be considered to be measures designed for the protection of ‘human, 
animal or plant life or health’. As already noted above, there is no specifi c mention 
of the protection of animal welfare in Article XX, as a possible ground for 
justifi cation for otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures. It has been argued that 
there is an important correlation between animal welfare and animal health as 
poor animal welfare can affect animal health. If in specifi c cases such link can 
indeed be demonstrated, then a measure aimed at protecting animal welfare can 
be considered to be a measure whose policy objective is to protect animal life or 
health within the meaning of Article XX(b). 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a contemporary interpretation of the term 
‘animal health’ might include ‘animal welfare’. If ‘exhaustible natural resources’ are 
293 Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.180.
294 Ibid, para. 7.200. In support of this approach, the Panel referred to the Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 29 (relating to Article III:2 of the GATT 1994; see above, p. 49); and the Appellate 
Body Report, US – Shrimp, para.137 (relating to Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994; see below, p. 110). 
295 Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.210.
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now interpreted by the Appellate Body – in a contemporary and evolutionary 
manner – as including living natural resources, then the term ‘animal health’ can 
perhaps also be interpreted as including ‘animal welfare’. At present, however, 
there is little support, and few arguments, for such a ‘contemporary’ and 
‘evolutionary’ interpretation of the term ‘animal welfare’.
 3.2.1.2 Is the measure ‘necessary’ to protect life or health …?
The second element of the two-tier test under Article XX(b), the ‘necessity’ 
requirement, is more problematic than the fi rst. In Thailand – Cigarettes, the Panel 
examined whether Thailand’s import prohibition on cigarettes – inconsistent with 
Article XI of the GATT 1947 – was justifi ed under Article XX(b). The Panel ruled as 
follows:
that this provision clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health 
over trade liberalization; however, for a measure to be covered by Article XX(b) it had to 
be ‘necessary’.
The Panel concluded ... that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be 
considered to be ‘necessary’ in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative 
measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which 
Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy 
objectives.296
The principal health objectives advanced by Thailand to justify its import 
restrictions on cigarettes were twofold: fi rst, to ensure the quality of cigarettes by 
protecting the public from harmful ingredients in imported cigarettes; and, second, 
to reduce the consumption of cigarettes in Thailand. Applying its ‘necessity’ test 
defi ned above, the Panel in Thailand – Cigarettes therefore examined:
whether the Thai concerns about the quality of cigarettes consumed in Thailand could be 
met with measures consistent, or less inconsistent, with the General Agreement. It noted 
that other countries had introduced strict, non-discriminatory labelling and ingredient 
disclosure regulations which allowed governments to control, and the public to be informed 
of, the content of cigarettes. A non-discriminatory regulation implemented on a national 
treatment basis in accordance with Article III:4 requiring complete disclosure of ingredients, 
coupled with a ban on unhealthy substances, would be an alternative consistent with the 
General Agreement. The Panel considered that Thailand could reasonably be expected to 
take such measures to address the quality-related policy objectives it now pursues through 
an import ban on all cigarettes whatever their ingredients.297
296 GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes, paras. 73 and 75.
297 Ibid., para. 77.
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With regard to the second health objective of the import restriction at issue, 
namely, the reduction in the consumption of cigarettes:
The Panel then considered whether Thai concerns about the quantity of cigarettes 
consumed in Thailand could be met by measures reasonably available to it and 
consistent, or less inconsistent, with the General Agreement. ... A ban on the 
advertisement of cigarettes of both domestic and foreign origin would normally meet 
the requirements of Article III:4 [or] ... would have to be regarded as unavoidable and 
therefore necessary within the meaning of Article XX(b) because additional advertising 
rights would risk stimulating demand for cigarettes.298
The Panel in Thailand – Cigarettes thus came to the conclusion that there were in 
fact various measures consistent with the GATT which were reasonably available 
to Thailand to control the quality and quantity of cigarettes smoked and which, 
taken together, could achieve the health policy goals pursued by the Thai 
government. The import restrictions on cigarettes were therefore not ‘necessary’ 
within the meaning of Article XX(b).299
For the Panel in Thailand – Cigarettes, a measure is ‘necessary’ within the meaning 
of Article XX(b) only when there exists no alternative measure that is GATT-
consistent or less inconsistent, and that a Member could reasonably be expected 
to employ to achieve the public health objective pursued. It is clear that a Member 
can only be reasonably expected to employ an alternative measure when that 
measure is at least as effective in achieving the policy objective pursued.
In US – Gasoline, the Panel made an important clarifi cation as to the requirement 
of ‘necessity’ under Article XX(b): it is not the necessity of the policy objective but 
the necessity of the disputed measure to achieve that objective which is at issue. 
The Panel stated:
it was not the necessity of the policy goal that was to be examined, but whether or not 
it was necessary that imported gasoline be effectively prevented from benefi ting from 
as favourable sales conditions as were afforded by an individual baseline tied to the 
producer of a product. It was the task of the Panel to address whether these 
inconsistent measures were necessary to achieve the policy goal under Article XX(b). It 
was therefore not the task of the Panel to examine the necessity of the environmental 
objectives of the Gasoline Rule, or of parts of the Rule that the Panel did not specifi cally 
fi nd to be inconsistent with the General Agreement.300
298 Ibid., para. 78.
299 Ibid., para. 81.
300 Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.22.
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In EC – Asbestos, a dispute between Canada and the European Communities on a 
French ban on asbestos and asbestos products, Canada argued on appeal that the 
Panel had erred in applying the ‘necessity’ test under Article XX(b) of the GATT 
1994. In addressing Canada’s arguments in support of its appeal, the Appellate 
Body clarifi ed the ‘necessity’ test under Article XX(b) in three important respects.
First, the Appellate Body noted that:
it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of protection 
of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation. France has determined, and 
the Panel accepted, that the chosen level of health protection by France is a ‘halt’ to the 
spread of asbestos-related health risks. By prohibiting all forms of amphibole asbestos, 
and by severely restricting the use of chrysotile asbestos, the measure at issue is 
clearly designed and apt to achieve that level of health protection.301
It is therefore for WTO Members to determine the level of protection of health or 
the environment they consider appropriate. Other Members cannot challenge the 
level of protection chosen; they can only argue that the measure at issue is not 
‘necessary’ to achieve that level of protection.302
Second, in EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body clarifi ed the meaning of the requirement, 
formulated in Thailand – Cigarettes and US – Gasoline, that there is ‘no alternative to 
the measure at issue that the Member could reasonably be expected to employ’. 
Canada asserted, before the Appellate Body, that the Panel had erred in fi nding that 
‘controlled use’ of asbestos and asbestos products is not a reasonably available 
alternative to an import ban on asbestos. According to Canada, an alternative measure 
is only excluded as a ‘reasonably available’ alternative if implementation of that 
measure is ‘impossible’. The Appellate Body stated that, in determining whether a 
suggested alternative measure is ‘reasonably available’, several factors must be taken 
into account, alongside the diffi culty of implementation. The Appellate Body 
subsequently referred to its earlier fi ndings on the ‘necessity’ test under Article XX(d) 
in Korea – Various Measures on Beef.303 
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body noted with respect to ‘necessary’ in Article XX(b):
301 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 168.
302 As France did in EC – Asbestos, a WTO Member can thus chose a zero-risk level, even though this means that 
there will be few, if any, measures other than a ban that will achieve this level of protection.
303 It was held that there is no reason to interpret the ‘necessity’ requirement in Article XX(b) differently from 
that in Article XX(d) in the GATT.
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We indicated in Korea – Beef that one aspect of the ‘weighing and balancing process 
... comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative 
measure’ is reasonably available is the extent to which the alternative measure 
‘contributes to the realization of the end pursued’. In addition, we observed, in that 
case, that ‘[t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or values’ pursued, the 
easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ measures designed to achieve those ends. 
In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human life and 
health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening, 
health risks posed by asbestos fi bres. The value pursued is both vital and important in 
the highest degree.304
In deciding whether a measure is necessary, the Appellate Body therefore 
considers the importance of the societal value pursued by the measure at issue, as 
well as the extent to which the alternative measure will contribute to the protection 
or promotion of that value. Note that in criticism on this case law, the question has 
been raised as to whether it is appropriate for panels or the Appellate Body come 
to conclusions on the relative importance of societal values pursued by Members. 
Is it appropriate for panels or the Appellate Body to fi nd that the pursuit of 
religious purity or piety is a less compelling objective than the protection of human 
health?305
Third, instead of the requirement in Thailand – Cigarettes that the alternative 
measure needs to be GATT-consistent or less inconsistent, the Appellate Body in 
EC – Asbestos puts forward another requirement, namely, that the alternative 
measure must be less trade-restrictive than the measure at issue.306 In summarizing 
the test under Article XX(b), the Appellate Body held in EC – Asbestos:
The ... question ... is whether there is an alternative measure that would achieve the 
same end and that is less restrictive of trade than a prohibition.307
Canada, the complainant in EC – Asbestos, had asserted that ‘controlled use’ of 
asbestos and asbestos products represented a ‘reasonably available’ measure that 
304 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172.
305 See R. Howse and E. Türk, ‘The WTO impact on internal regulations: A case study of the EC – Asbestos 
dispute’, in G. Bermann and P. Mavroidis, Trade and Human Health and Safety (Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p.116.
306 Note that in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body still applied the Thailand – Cigarettes 
requirement that the alternative measure must be GATT-consistent or less inconsistent. See Appellate Body 
Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 165.
307 Ibid. A more recent application of this test can be found in the Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, 
para. 7.211. 
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would serve the same end as the ban on asbestos and asbestos products. The 
issue for the Appellate Body was, therefore, whether France could reasonably be 
expected to employ ‘controlled use’ practices to achieve its chosen level of health 
protection – a halt in the spread of asbestos-related health risks. The Appellate 
Body concluded that this was not the case. It reasoned as follows:
In our view, France could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative 
measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the Decree 
seeks to ‘halt’. Such an alternative measure would, in effect, prevent France from 
achieving its chosen level of health protection. On the basis of the scientifi c evidence 
before it, the Panel found that, in general, the effi cacy of ‘controlled use’ remains to be 
demonstrated. Moreover, even in cases where ‘controlled use’ practices are applied 
‘with greater certainty’, the scientifi c evidence suggests that the level of exposure can, 
in some circumstances, still be high enough for there to be a ‘signifi cant residual risk of 
developing asbestos-related diseases’. The Panel found too that the effi cacy of 
‘controlled use’ is particularly doubtful for the building industry and for DIY enthusiasts, 
which are the most important users of cement-based products containing chrysotile 
asbestos. Given these factual fi ndings by the Panel, we believe that ‘controlled use’ 
would not allow France to achieve its chosen level of health protection by halting the 
spread of asbestos-related health risks. ‘Controlled use’ would, thus, not be an 
alternative measure that would achieve the end sought by France.308
Note also that, with regard to the evaluation of the ‘necessity’ of a measure, the 
Appellate Body stated that:
In justifying a measure under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a Member may also rely, 
in good faith, on scientifi c sources which, at that time, may represent a divergent, but 
qualifi ed and respected, opinion. A Member is not obliged, in setting health policy, 
automatically to follow what, at a given time, may constitute a majority scientifi c 
opinion. Therefore, a panel need not, necessarily, reach a decision under Article XX(b) of 
the GATT 1994 on the basis of the ‘preponderant’ weight of the evidence.309
3.2.2 Ensuring compliance with GATT-consistent legislation
As mentioned above, Article XX(d) concerns and can justify measures:
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II 
308 Ibid., para. 174.
309 Ibid., para. 178.
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and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the 
prevention of deceptive practices.
Article XX(d) sets out a two-tier test for the provisional justifi cation of GATT-
inconsistent measures. In Korea – Various Measures on Beef, a dispute concerning 
the regulation of retail sales of both domestic and imported beef products (the dual 
retail system) designed to secure compliance with a consumer protection law, the 
Appellate Body ruled:
For a measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justifi ed provisionally under 
paragraph (d) of Article XX, two elements must be shown. First, the measure must be 
one designed to ‘secure compliance’ with laws or regulations that are not themselves 
inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994. Secondly, the measure must be 
‘necessary’ to secure such compliance. A Member who invokes Article XX(d) as a 
justifi cation has the burden of demonstrating that these two requirements are met.310
Thus, for a GATT-inconsistent measure to be provisionally justifi ed under Article 
XX(d):
the measure must be designed to  – secure compliance with national law, such as 
customs law or intellectual property law, which, in itself, is not GATT-
inconsistent; and
the measure must be  – necessary to ensure such compliance.311
 3.2.2.1 Is the measure designed to ‘secure compliance’ …?
With respect to the fi rst element of the Article XX(d) test, namely, that the measure 
must be designed to secure compliance with GATT-consistent laws or regulations, 
note that Article XX(d) itself clarifi es the ‘laws or regulations’ concerned by listing a 
few examples. This illustrative list includes laws or regulations relating to customs 
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies, the protection of patents, trade 
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices. With regard to the 
terms ‘to secure compliance’, the Panel in EEC – Parts and Components found that 
‘to secure compliance with laws and regulations’ means to enforce the obligations 
under these laws and regulations; it does not mean to secure the attainment of the 
310 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 157. See also Panel Report, US – Gasoline, 
para. 6.31.
311 Note that the Panel in Canada – Wheat Imports and Grain Exports applied a three-tier test. According to the 
Panel, for a GATT-inconsistent measure to be provisionally justifi ed under Article XX(d): (a) the measure 
justifi ed for which justifi cation is claimed must secure compliance with other laws or regulations; (b) those 
other laws or regulations must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994; and (c) the measure 
for which justifi cation is claimed must be necessary to secure compliance with those other laws or 
regulations. See Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Imports and Grain Exports, para. 6.218.
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objectives of the laws and regulations.312 
In US – Gasoline the Panel found with regard to the type of measures covered by 
Article XX(d) that:
maintenance of discrimination between imported and domestic gasoline contrary to 
Article III:4 under the baseline establishment methods did not ‘secure compliance’ with 
the baseline system. These methods were not an enforcement mechanism. They were 
simply rules for determining the individual baselines. As such, they were not the type of 
measures with which Article XX(d) was concerned.313
In Canada – Periodicals, Canada argued that the import prohibition of special edition 
periodicals under its Tariff Code 9958 was intended to secure the attainment of the 
objectives of Section 19 of the Income Tax Act, which itself allowed for the deduction 
of expenses for advertising in Canadian periodicals. The Panel decided, however, that 
Tariff Code 9958 cannot be regarded as an enforcement measure for Section 19 of 
the Income Tax Act. The Panel could therefore not accept Canada’s argument that the 
import prohibition of special edition periodicals under its Tariff Code 9958 could be 
justifi ed under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. Although the import prohibition under 
the Tariff Code made a contribution to the achievement of the objective of Section 19 
of the Income Tax Act, it was merely an incidental effect because the Tariff Code’s 
actual objective was different from that of the Income Tax Act.314
Two recent cases, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks and EC – Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications, provide further insights into the fi rst element of the 
Article XX(d) test. In Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body was called 
upon to clarify the meaning of the phrase ‘to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations’. Mexico had argued before the Panel that the measures at issue in this 
case were necessary to secure compliance ‘by the United States with the United 
States’ obligations under the NAFTA [the North American Free Trade Area], an 
international agreement that is a law not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
GATT 1994’.315 The Panel, however, found that:
the phrase ‘to secure compliance’ in Article XX(d) does not apply to measures taken by 
a Member in order to induce another Member to comply with obligations owed to it 
under a non-WTO treaty.316 
312 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Parts and Components, paras. 5.14-5.18.
313 Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.33. The Panel referred in a footnote to GATT Panel Report, EEC – Parts 
and Components, paras. 5.12-5.18.
314 Panel Report, Canada – Periodicals, para. 5.10.
315 Panel Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.162.
316 Ibid., para. 8.181
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In considering Mexico’s appeal against this Panel fi nding, the Appellate Body 
started with an analysis of the terms ‘laws or regulations’ of Article XX(d).317 
According to the Appellate Body:
The terms ‘laws or regulations’ are generally used to refer to domestic laws or 
regulations. As Mexico and the United States note, previous GATT and WTO disputes in 
which Article XX(d) has been invoked as a defence have involved domestic measures. 
Neither disputes that the expression ‘laws or regulations’ encompasses the rules adopted 
by a WTO Member’s legislative or executive branches of government. We agree with the 
United States that one does not immediately think about international law when 
confronted with the term ‘laws’ in the plural. Domestic legislative or regulatory acts 
sometimes may be intended to implement an international agreement. In such situations, 
the origin of the rule is international, but the implementing instrument is a domestic law 
or regulation. In our view, the terms ‘laws or regulations’ refer to rules that form part of 
the domestic legal system of a WTO Member. Thus the ‘laws or regulations’ with which 
the Member invoking Article XX(d) may seek to secure compliance do not include 
obligations of another WTO Member under an international agreement.318
The Appellate Body made it clear that ‘laws or regulations’ refer to domestic rules, 
and not the obligations of another WTO Member under an international agreement. 
Subsequently, the Appellate Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks turned to the 
terms ‘to secure compliance’, which ‘speak to the types of measures a WTO 
Member can seek to justify under Article XX(d)’ and ‘relate to the design of the 
measures to be justifi ed’.319 The Panel had argued that there was uncertainty 
regarding the effectiveness of the tax measures, and that it was therefore not 
convinced that these measures were meant ‘to secure compliance’. The Appellate 
Body, however, did not agree with this reasoning:
We see no reason, however, to derive from the Appellate Body’s examination of 
‘necessity’, in US – Gambling, a requirement of ‘certainty’ applicable to the terms ‘to 
secure compliance’. In our view, a measure can be said to be designed ‘to secure 
compliance’ even if the measure cannot be guaranteed to achieve its result with 
absolute certainty. Nor do we consider that the ‘use of coercion’ is a necessary 
component of a measure designed ‘to secure compliance’. Rather, Article XX(d) requires 
that the design of the measure contribute ‘to secur[ing] compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of’ the GATT 1994.320 
[emphasis added]
317 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, paras. 68-69.
318 Ibid., para. 69.
319 Ibid., para. 72.
320 Ibid., para. 74.
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The fact that the tax measures are designed ‘to secure compliance’, did not, 
however, alter the general conclusion of the Appellate Body that Article XX(d) was 
not applicable in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks. As explained above, the 
international obligations of other WTO Members, such as the United States’ 
obligations under the NAFTA, do not fall within the scope of the terms ‘laws or 
regulations’ the compliance with which Article XX(d) measures must be designed 
to secure. 
In EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications, the European Communities had 
invoked the exception of Article XX(d) to justify the otherwise GATT-inconsistent 
measures at issue in this case. The European Communities contended that these 
measures were employed to secure compliance with an EC regulation, namely, EC 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of 
geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. As the Panel in EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications noted, 
the terms ‘laws or regulations’ in Article XX(d) are qualifi ed by the phrase ‘not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement’. In other words, the ‘laws or 
regulations’ referred to in Article XX(d) have to be GATT-consistent. However, the 
Panel found that EC Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 to be inconsistent with 
the GATT 1994 and that this EC regulation, therefore, did not qualify as a ‘law or 
regulation’ within the meaning of Article XX(d).321
 3.2.2.2 Is the measure ‘necessary’ to secure compliance?
With respect to the second element of the Article XX(d) test, namely, the ‘necessity’ 
requirement, the GATT Panel Report in US – Section 337 stated:
It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent 
with another GATT provision as ‘necessary’ in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative 
measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent 
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a 
measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a 
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that 
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.322
The meaning given to the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(d) in US – Section 
337 was thus very similar to the meaning given to ‘necessity’ requirement of Article 
321 See Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (complaint by Australia), paras. 7.331-332, 
and Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (complaint by the United States), paras. 
7.296-297.
322 GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.26.
108
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
XX(b) in Thailand – Cigarettes, discussed above.323 A measure is ‘necessary’ within 
the meaning of Article XX(d) only when there exists no alternative measure that is 
GATT-consistent or less inconsistent, and that a Member could reasonably be 
expected to employ to ensure compliance with GATT-consistent laws or 
regulations.
In Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body further clarifi ed the 
‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body fi rst 
noted that:
We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the word 
‘necessary’ is not limited to that which is ‘indispensable’ or ‘of absolute necessity’ or 
‘inevitable’. Measures which are indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to 
secure compliance certainly fulfi l the requirements of Article XX(d). But other measures, 
too, may fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX(d), the term 
‘necessary’ refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this 
continuum lies ‘necessary’ understood as ‘indispensable’; at the other end, is 
‘necessary’ taken to mean as ‘making a contribution to’. We consider that a ‘necessary’ 
measure is, in this continuum, located signifi cantly closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’ 
than to the opposite pole of simply ‘making a contribution to’.324
The Appellate Body subsequently stated:
It seems to us that a treaty interpreter assessing a measure claimed to be necessary to 
secure compliance of a WTO-consistent law or regulation may, in appropriate cases, 
take into account the relative importance of the common interests or values that the 
law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. The more vital or important 
those common interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ a 
measure designed as an enforcement instrument.
There are other aspects of the enforcement measure to be considered in evaluating 
that measure as ‘necessary’. One is the extent to which the measure contributes to the 
realization of the end pursued, the securing of compliance with the law or regulation at 
issue. The greater the contribution, the more easily a measure might be considered to 
be ‘necessary’. Another aspect is the extent to which the compliance measure 
produces restrictive effects on international commerce, that is, in respect of a measure 
inconsistent with Article III:4, restrictive effects on imported goods. A measure with a 
323 See above, p. 99.
324 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161. 
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relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be considered as 
‘necessary’ than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects.325
In Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body thus came to the 
following conclusion concerning the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(d): 
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable’, may 
nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every 
case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include 
the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or 
regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by that 
law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or 
exports.326
An evaluation of whether a measure is ‘necessary’, as required by the second 
element of the test under Article XX(d), involves, in every case (in which the 
measure is not clearly ‘indispensable’), the weighing and balancing of factors such 
as:
the relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or  –
regulation to be enforced is intended to protect;
the extent to which the measure contributes to the securing of compliance with  –
the law or regulation at issue; and
the extent to which the compliance measure produces restrictive effects on  –
international trade.
As noted by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the weighing 
and balancing of these factors:
…is comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative 
measure which the Member concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ is 
available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available’.327
325 Ibid., paras. 162-163. In para. 165, the Appellate Body cited GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337, para. 5.26.
326 Ibid., para. 164.
327 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Certain Measures on Beef, para.166.
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Note that the Panels in Canada – Wheat Imports and Grain Exports (2004), 
Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes (2004), and EC – Trademarks 
and Geographical Indications (2005) applied the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article 
XX(d) as interpreted and clarifi ed by the Appellate Body in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef.328 
3.2.3 Preservation of exhaustible natural resources
Article XX(g) concerns measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources. Article XX(g) is fundamentally important because, together with Article 
XX(b), it permits measures that depart from core GATT rules for environmental 
protection purposes.
Article XX(g) sets out a three-tier test requiring that:
the policy objective pursued by the measures at issue be the ‘conservation of  –
exhaustible natural resources’;
the measures at issue ‘relate to’ the conservation of exhaustible natural  –
resources; and
the measures be ‘made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic  –
production or consumption’.
 3.2.3.1  Is the policy objective pursued the ‘conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources’?
With respect to the fi rst element of the test under Article XX(g), namely, that the 
measure must relate to the ‘conservation of exhaustible natural resources’, the 
Appellate Body, in US – Shrimp, adopted a broad, ‘evolutionary’ interpretation of 
the concept of ‘exhaustible natural resources’. In this case, the complainants had 
taken the position that Article XX(g) was limited to the conservation of ‘mineral’ or 
‘non-living’ natural resources. Their principal argument was rooted in the notion 
that ‘living’ natural resources are ‘renewable’ and therefore cannot be ‘exhaustible’ 
natural resources. The Appellate Body disagreed. It noted:
We do not believe that ‘exhaustible’ natural resources and ‘renewable’ natural resources 
are mutually exclusive. One lesson that modern biological sciences teach us is that 
living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction and, in that sense, 
‘renewable’, are in certain circumstances indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion 
and extinction, frequently because of human activities. Living resources are just as 
328 See Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Import and Grain Exports, paras. 6.222-248, Panel Report, Dominican 
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes (2004), paras.7.205-209, 212-215, 217-232; and Panel Reports, 
EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications, paras. 7.333-341 (Australia) and paras. 7.298-306 and 449-462 
(US).
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‘fi nite’ as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources.329
As already discussed in the Introduction to this Study, the Appellate Body noted 
with regard to the appropriate interpretation of the concept of ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’:
The words of Article XX(g), ‘exhaustible natural resources’, were actually crafted more 
than 50 years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment. While Article XX was not modifi ed in the Uruguay 
Round, the preamble attached to the WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to 
that Agreement were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of 
environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy. The preamble of 
the WTO Agreement — which informs not only the GATT 1994, but also the other 
covered agreements – explicitly acknowledges ‘the objective of sustainable 
development’.
... From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note 
that the generic concept of ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its 
content or reference but is rather ‘by defi nition, evolutionary’. It is, therefore, pertinent 
to note that modern international conventions and declarations make frequent 
references to natural resources as embracing both living and non-living resources.330
The Appellate Body thus concluded on the scope of the concept of ‘exhaustible 
natural resources’:
Given the recent acknowledgement by the international community of the importance 
of concerted bilateral or multilateral action to protect living natural resources, and 
recal ling the explicit recognition by WTO Members of the objective of sustainable 
develop ment in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we believe it is too late in the 
day to suppose that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 may be read as referring only to the 
conservation of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural resources. Moreover, two 
adopted GATT 1947 panel reports previously found fi sh to be an ‘exhaustible natural 
resource’ within the meaning of Article XX(g). We hold that, in line with the principle of 
effectiveness in treaty interpretation, measures to conserve exhaustible natural 
329 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 128.
330 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 129 and 130. See also above, p. XXXVII.
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resources, whether living or non-living, may fall within Article XX(g).331
 3.2.3.2  Does the measure ‘relate to’ the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources?
With respect to the second element of the test under Article XX(g), namely, that the 
measure must be a measure ‘relating to’ the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources, the GATT Panel in Canada – Herring and Salmon observed that:
Article XX(g) does not state how the trade measures are to be related to the 
conservation ... This raises the question of whether any relationship with conservation 
... [is] suffi cient for a trade measure to fall under Article XX(g) or whether a particular 
relationship ... [is] required. ... The Panel noted that some of the subparagraphs of 
Article XX state that the measure must be ‘necessary’ or ‘essential’ to the achievement 
of the policy purpose set out in the provision (cf. subparagraphs (a), (b), (d) and (j)) while 
subparagraph (g) refers only to measures ‘relating to’ the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources. This suggests that Article XX(g) does not only cover measures that 
are necessary or essential for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources but a 
wider range of measures. However, as the preamble of Article XX indicates, the 
purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the 
scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that 
commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed 
at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The Panel concluded for these 
reasons that, while a trade measure did not have to be necessary or essential to the 
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it had to be primarily aimed at the 
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as ‘relating to’ 
conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g).332
In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body accepted the Canada – Herring and Salmon 
interpretation of ‘relating to ... conservation’ as meaning ‘primarily aimed at 
conservation’. The Appellate Body stated in US – Gasoline:
All the participants and the third participants in this appeal accept the propriety and 
applicability of the view of the Herring and Salmon report and the Panel Report that a 
measure must be ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
in order to fall within the scope of Article XX(g). Accordingly, we see no need to 
examine this point further, save, perhaps, to note that the phrase ‘primarily aimed at’ is 
331 Ibid., para. 131. In a footnote, the Appellate Body also noted that the drafting history does not demonstrate 
an intent on the part of the framers of the GATT 1947 to exclude ‘living’ natural resources from the scope of 
application of Article XX(g). The Appellate Body also noted that in the GATT 1947 panel reports in US – Tuna 
(Canada), para. 4.9, and in Canada – Herring and Salmon, para. 4.4, fi sh had previously been found to be an 
‘exhaustible’ natural resource.
332 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Herring and Salmon, paras. 4.5-4.6.
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not itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for inclusion or 
exclusion from Article XX(g).333
Applying this test to the baseline establishment rules for the quality of gasoline, 
i.e. the measure at issue in US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body held that these rules 
were ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of clean air, an exhaustible natural 
resource. The Appellate Body considered that:
the baseline establishment rules cannot be regarded as merely incidentally or 
inadvertently aimed at the conservation of clean air in the United States for the 
purposes of Article XX(g).334
According to the Appellate Body, a ‘substantial relationship’ existed between the 
baseline establishment rules and the policy objective of preventing further 
deterioration of the level of air pollution.
The Appellate Body further clarifi ed its understanding of the concept of ‘relating to’ 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in US – Shrimp. In this case, the 
Appellate Body stated with regard to section 609 of Public Law 101-162 relating to 
the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, i.e. the measure in 
dispute:
In its general design and structure ... Section 609 is not a simple, blanket prohibition of 
the importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the consequences (or lack thereof) 
of the mode of harvesting employed upon the incidental capture and mortality of sea 
turtles. Focusing on the design of the measure here at stake, it appears to us that 
Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, is not disproportionately wide in its scope 
and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and conservation of sea turtle 
species. The means are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and 
ends relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving an 
exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is observably a close and real one.335
Thus, according to the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp, Article XX(g) requires ‘a close 
and real’ relationship between the measure and the policy objective. The means 
employed, i.e. the measure, must be reasonably related to the end pursued, i.e. 
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. A measure may not be 
disproportionately wide in its scope or reach in relation to the policy objective pursued.
333 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 18-19. In a footnote, the Appellate Body noted that the same 
interpretation had been applied in two recent unadopted panel reports: GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna II 
(EEC) and GATT Panel Report, US – Taxes on Automobiles.
334 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p.19.
335 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 141.
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 3.2.3.3  Is the measure ‘made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production and consumption’?
The third element of the test under Article XX(g), namely, that the measure at issue 
is ‘made effective in conjunction with ...’, has been interpreted by the Appellate 
Body in US – Gasoline as follows:
the ordinary or natural meaning of ‘made effective’ when used in connection with a 
measure – a governmental act or regulation – may be seen to refer to such measure 
being ‘operative’, as ‘in force’, or as having ‘come into effect’. Similarly, the phrase ‘in 
conjunction with’ may be read quite plainly as ‘together with’ or ‘jointly with’. Taken 
together, the [third] clause of Article XX(g) appears to us to refer to governmental 
measures like the baseline establishment rules being promulgated or brought into 
effect together with restrictions on domestic production or consumption of natural 
resources. Put in a slightly different manner, we believe that the clause ‘if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product or 
consumption’ is appropriately read as a requirement that the measures concerned 
impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also with respect to 
domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition 
of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of 
exhaustible natural resources.336
Basically, the third element of the Article XX(g) test is thus a requirement of ‘even-
handedness’ in the imposition of restrictions on imported and domestic products. 
Article XX(g) does not require imported and domestic products to be treated 
equally; it merely requires that they are treated in an ‘even-handed’ manner. The 
Appellate Body in US – Gasoline stated in this respect:
There is, of course, no textual basis for requiring identical treatment of domestic and 
imported products. Indeed, where there is identity of treatment – constituting real, not 
merely formal, equality of treatment – it is diffi cult to see how inconsistency with 
Article III:4 would have arisen in the fi rst place.337
Note that, if the requirement of ‘even-handedness’ is not met, it is also doubtful 
whether the measure at issue meets the ‘primarily aimed at ...’ requirement of the 
second element of the Article XX(g) test.338 The Appellate Body observed in 
US – Gasoline:
336 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 20-1.
337 Ibid., 21.
338 See also GATT Panel Report, Canada – Herring and Salmon, para. 4.7.
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if no restrictions on domestically-produced like products are imposed at all, and all 
limitations are placed upon imported products alone, the measure cannot be accepted 
as primarily or even substantially designed for implementing conservationist goals. The 
measure would simply be naked discrimination for protecting locally-produced goods.339
Applying the ‘even-handedness’ requirement to the baseline establishment rules, 
the measure at issue in US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body held as follows:
In the present appeal, the baseline establishment rules affect both domestic gasoline 
and imported gasoline, providing for – generally speaking – individual baselines for 
domestic refi ners and blenders and statutory baselines for importers. Thus, restrictions 
on the consumption or depletion of clean air by regulating the domestic production of 
‘dirty’ gasoline are established jointly with corresponding restrictions with respect to 
imported gasoline. That imported gasoline has been determined to have been accorded 
‘less favourable treatment’ than the domestic gasoline in terms of Article III:4, is not 
material for purposes of analysis under Article XX(g).340
In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body also stated that it did not believe that the 
third element of Article XX(g) was intended to establish an empirical ‘effects test’ 
for the availability of the Article XX(g) exception. The Appellate Body reasoned as 
follows:
In the fi rst place, the problem of determining causation, well-known in both domestic 
and international law, is always a diffi cult one. In the second place, in the fi eld of 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps 
years, may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a given 
measure may be observable. The legal characterization of such a measure is not 
reasonably made contingent upon occurrence of subsequent events. We are not, 
however, suggesting that consideration of the predictable effects of a measure is never 
relevant. In a particular case, should it become clear that realistically, a specifi c measure 
cannot in any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals, it would 
very probably be because that measure was not designed as a conservation regulation 
to begin with. In other words, it would not have been ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation 
of natural resources at all.341
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body confi rmed its approach to the third element of 
the Article XX(g) test. 342 In this case, the record showed that the United States 
339 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 21.
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid., 21-2.
342 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 144.
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had – albeit through earlier regulations – taken measures applicable to US shrimp 
trawl vessels to prevent the incidental killing of sea turtles. Because of these 
regulations imposing ‘restrictions on domestic production’, the import ban at issue 
in this case met the ‘even-handedness’ requirement of the third element of the 
Article XX(g) test. 
3.2.4 Protection of public morals
In addition to the exceptions set out Article XX(b), (d) and (g), discussed above, the 
GATT 1994 also provides for an exception concerning the protection of public 
morals. Article XX(a) states that nothing in the GATT 1994 shall prevent the 
adoption or enforcement of any measure ‘necessary for the protection of public 
morals’. To date, this provision has never been applied or interpreted by a GATT or 
WTO panel or the Appellate Body. Article XX(a) was referred to in US – Malt 
Beverages and US – Tuna I (Mexico) but in neither case did the Panel examine the 
relevance of this provision. In US – Tuna I (Mexico), Australia, a third party in this 
case, suggested that the measure at issue could be justifi ed under Article XX(a) as 
a measure against inhuman treatment of animals.343 From the Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of Saudi Arabia, it appears that this Member, 
which acceded to the WTO in December 2005, invokes Article XX(a) of the GATT 
1994 to ban, for example, the importation of the Holy Quran; alcoholic beverages 
and intoxicants of all kinds, including those containing alcohol in any intoxicating 
proportion; and all types of machines, equipment and tools for gambling or games 
of chance.344 
While Article XX(a) has not yet been the subject of dispute settlement, it is clear 
that for a measure to meet the requirements of the exception of Article XX(a), two 
separate requirements must be met, namely:
the policy objective pursued by the measure at issue must be the ‘protection of  –
public morals’; and
the measure at issue must be ‘necessary’ for the protection of public morals. –
 3.2.4.1 Is the policy objective pursued the ‘protection of public morals’?
With regard to the fi rst requirement of the test under Article XX(a) of the GATT 
1994, namely, whether the policy objective pursued by the measure at issue is the 
‘protection of public morals’, note that the concept of ‘public morals’ is not defi ned 
in the GATT 1994. Moreover, this concept has thus far not been interpreted by 
panels or the Appellate Body. However, the concept of ‘public morals’ is also used 
343 See GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna I (Mexico), para. 4.4.
344 See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the World Trade 
Organization, WT/ACC/SAU/61, dated 1 November 2005, Annex F, List of Banned Products.
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in Article XIV of the GATS, the counterpart of Article XX in the GATS. While ‘public 
morals’ are equally undefi ned in the GATS, the Panel in US – Gambling, has had 
occasion to clarify the meaning of this concept. According to the Panel, the content 
of ‘public morals’:
can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing 
social, cultural, ethical and religious values.345
The Panel noted moreover that the Appellate Body had stated on several occasions 
that, in applying similar societal concepts (such as public health), Members have 
‘the right to determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate’.346 The 
Panel in US – Gambling thus ruled that:
Members should be given some scope to defi ne and apply for themselves the 
concept[s] of ‘public morals’ […] in their respective territories, according to their own 
systems and scales of values.347
Looking at the dictionary meaning of the concept of ‘public morals’, the Panel 
noted ‘morals’ relate to ‘standards of right and wrong conduct’ and found that the 
measure that is sought to be justifi ed under Article XIV(a) must be aimed at 
protecting the interests of the people within a community or a nation as a whole.348 
The Panel in US – Gambling thus defi ned ‘public morals’ as being ‘standards of 
right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation’.349 
While US – Gambling concerned the concept of ‘public morals’ in Article XIV(a) of 
the GATS, the Panel’s fi ndings in this case are highly relevant for the interpretation 
of this concept in Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. 
It could be argued that the protection of public morals can be invoked as a ground 
for justifi cation by a Member adopting or maintaining a ban on the sale and use of 
products produced in a manner inconsistent with minimum labour standards or 
basic human rights.350 Recall that some of the Cramer sustainability criteria for the 
345 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.462.
346 See above, p. 101.
347 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.462.
348 Ibid., paras. 6.463-6.465.
349 Ibid, para. 6.465.
350 Whether trade restrictions on the products of child labour can be justifi ed as necessary to protect the public 
morals in the importing countries is disputed. See L. Brittan, ‘How to make trade liberalization popular’, 
World Economy, vol.18 (1995), p.761. Brittan pointed out that since for many families in developing countries 
child labour is a necessary for survival; trade restrictions on the products of child labour would therefore be 
morally unacceptable.
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production of biomass relate to production consistent with minimum labour 
standards and basic human rights.351 It could be argued that the sale or use in the 
Netherlands of biomass (or biofuels from biomass) produced inconsistently with 
these specifi c Cramer sustainability criteria would offend the core ‘standards of 
right and wrong’ of the Dutch population, and that the sale or use of such biomass 
should and could therefore be banned on the basis of Article XX(a). Whether the 
same reasoning also applies to livestock products produced inconsistently with 
animal welfare requirements, depends on whether in the Netherlands ‘public 
morals’, i.e. the core ‘standards of right and wrong’, also include ‘standards’ on 
animal welfare. In most WTO Member countries, this would defi nitely not be the 
case, but the question is whether this is the case in the Netherlands.
The dangers to international trade of an overly broad interpretation of the concept 
of ‘public morals’ and, thus, of the scope of application of Article XX(a) are 
obvious. Awareness of these dangers among WTO Members may explain why to 
date this ground for justifi cation has not yet been applied in GATT disputes.
 3.2.4.2 Is the measure ‘necessary’ to protect public morals?
As discussed above, it is not enough for Member to argue successfully that the 
policy objective of the measure concerned is the protection of public morals. The 
measure concerned must also be ‘necessary’ for the protection of the public 
morals of the Member adopting the measure. The ‘necessity’ requirement of Article 
XX(a) has never been the subject of dispute settlement. It is most likely, however, 
that if a panel or the Appellate Body would in the future be asked to interpret and 
apply the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(a), they will follow the now well 
established case law on the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(b) and (d).352 
Whether an import ban on foie gras meets the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article 
XX(a) will therefore depend on whether there is an alternative, less trade-restrictive 
measure that a Member could reasonably be expected to employ to protect its 
‘public morals’. To establish what can ‘reasonably be expected’ from a Member, 
panels and the Appellate Body will weigh the factors discussed above in the 
context of the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(b) and (d).353 
3.2.5 Acquisition or distribution of products in short supply
Finally, Article XX(j) of the GATT 1994 concerns measures ‘essential to the 
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply’. There is no 
case law on this exception, but it is clear that an otherwise GATT-inconsistent 
351 See above, p. 4.
352 See above, p. 99 and 107.
353 See above, p. 99 and 107.
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measure can be justifi ed under Article XX(j) only if:
the policy objective pursued by the measure at issue is ‘the acquisition or  –
distribution of products in short supply’; and
the measure at issue must be ‘essential’ for the acquisition or distribution of  –
products in short supply.
Whatever the precise scope of the concept of ‘products in short supply’ may be, it 
is unlikely that in the Netherlands biomass or livestock products are products in 
short supply. It is therefore unlikely that the policy objectives of measures taken 
with regard to biomass or to livestock products (to give effect to animal welfare 
requirements) are ‘the acquisition or distribution of products in short supply’, and 
that the requirement of the fi rst element of the test under Article XX(j) would be 
met.
With regard to the second element of this test, it is not clear how the term 
‘essential’ must be interpreted. However, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of 
this term, in its context (in particular the other exceptions of Article XX) and in the 
light of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, it seems that this term imposes a 
stricter requirement than the term ‘necessary’ used in Article XX(a), (b) and (d). In 
addition, for a measure to be justifi ed under Article XX(j), the provision explicitly 
states that the measure concerned must be consistent with the principle that all 
Members are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of the 
products in short supply. Moreover, the measure concerned must be discontinued 
as soon as the shortage of products concerned has ceased to exist.
3.3 Requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994
As discussed above, Article XX sets out a two-tier test for determining whether a 
measure that is otherwise inconsistent with GATT obligations can be justifi ed.354 
First, a measure must meet the requirements of one of the particular exceptions 
listed in the paragraphs of Article XX. This part of the test was discussed above. 
Second, the application of the measure concerned must meet the requirements of 
the chapeau of Article XX.
The legal requirements imposed by the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 
have been highly relevant in dispute settlement practice. Several of the most 
controversial decisions by panels and the Appellate Body have turned on these 
requirements. With regard to measures provisionally justifi ed under one of the 
paragraphs of Article XX, the chapeau of Article XX imposes:
354 See above, p. 99.
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the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.
3.3.1 Object and purpose of the chapeau
With respect to the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate 
Body ruled in US – Gasoline:
The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or 
its specifi c contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied. It 
is, accordingly, important to underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory 
clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention of ‘abuse of the exceptions of [what 
was later to become] Article [XX]’.355
Later, in US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body stated with regard to the chapeau:
… we consider that it embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of the 
need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Member to 
invoke one or another of the exceptions of Article XX, specifi ed in paragraphs (a) to (j), 
on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT 
1994, on the other hand. Exercise by one Member of its right to invoke an exception, 
such as Article XX(g), if abused or misused, will, to that extent, erode or render naught 
the substantive treaty rights in, for example, Article XI:1, of other Members. Similarly, 
because the GATT 1994 itself makes available the exceptions of Article XX, in 
recognition of the legitimate nature of the policies and interests there embodied, the 
right to invoke one of those exceptions is not to be rendered illusory.356
In short, the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX is to avoid that the 
application of provisionally justifi ed measures would constitute a misuse or abuse 
of the exceptions of Article XX. According to the Appellate Body, a balance must be 
struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and 
the substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT 1994. The chapeau is 
inserted at the head of the list of ‘General Exceptions’ in Article XX to ensure that 
this balance is struck, and to prevent abuse. 
With respect to the interpretation and application of the chapeau, in US – Shrimp 
the Appellate Body came to the following conclusion:
355 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 22.
356 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para 156.
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The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one 
of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to 
invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying 
substantive provisions (e.g. Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the 
competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the 
balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that 
Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not 
fi xed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at 
stake vary and as the facts making up specifi c cases differ.357
The interpretation and application of the chapeau in a particular case is a search for 
the appropriate line of equilibrium between the right of Members to adopt and 
maintain trade-restrictive legislation and measures that pursue certain legitimate 
societal values or interests and the right of other Members to trade. The search for 
this line of equilibrium is guided by the requirements set out in the chapeau that 
the application of the trade-restrictive measure may not constitute:
either ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination between countries where the  –
same conditions prevail’; or
‘a disguised restriction on international trade’. –
3.3.2 Arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination
For a measure to be justifi ed under Article XX, the application of that measure, pursuant 
to the chapeau of Article XX, should not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’. In US – Gasoline, 
the Appellate Body found that the ‘discrimination’ at issue in the chapeau of Article XX 
must necessarily be different from the discrimination addressed in other provisions of 
the GATT 1994, such as Articles I and III. The Appellate Body stated:
The enterprise of applying Article XX would clearly be an unprofi table one if it involved 
no more than applying the standard used in fi nding that the baseline establishment 
rules were inconsistent with Article III:4. That would also be true if the fi nding were one 
of inconsistency with some other substantive rule of the General Agreement.358 
As the Appellate Body noted:
The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a 
violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred. To proceed down 
that path would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the 
357 Ibid., para. 159.
358 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 23.
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exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of meaning. Such recourse would also confuse the 
question of whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the further and 
separate question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether that 
inconsistency was nevertheless justifi ed.359
According to the Appellate Body, the chapeau of Article XX does not prohibit 
discrimination per se, but rather, arbitrary and unjustifi able discrimination.
In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body also addressed the meaning of the words 
‘discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’. According to 
the Appellate Body, these words refer not only to discrimination between exporting 
countries where the same conditions prevail, but also to discrimination between an 
importing country and an exporting country where the same conditions prevail.360 
To date, panels and/or the Appellate Body have found in a number of cases that the 
application of a provisionally justifi ed measure constituted a means of unjustifi able 
or arbitrary discrimination. In US – Gasoline the Appellate Body concluded that the 
measure at issue constituted ‘unjustifi able discrimination’ for the following 
reasons:
We have above located two omissions on the part of the United States: to explore 
adequately means, including in particular cooperation with the governments of 
Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative problems relied on as justifi cation 
by the United States for rejecting individual baselines for foreign refi ners; and to count 
the costs for foreign refi ners that would result from the imposition of statutory 
baselines. In our view, these two omissions go well beyond what was necessary for 
the Panel to determine that a violation of Article III:4 had occurred in the fi rst place. The 
resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or 
unavoidable. In the light of the foregoing, our conclusion is that the baseline 
establishment rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their application, constitute ‘unjustifi able 
discrimination’.361
The Appellate Body decided that the application of the measure at issue 
constituted unjustifi able discrimination because the discrimination resulting from 
the measure at issue ‘must have been foreseen’, i.e. it was deliberate. The 
discrimination was ‘unjustifi able’ because it ‘was not merely inadvertent or 
unavoidable’.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid., 28-9.
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In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that, in order for a measure to be 
applied in a manner that would constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail’, three elements must exist:
First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination. As we stated in 
United States — Gasoline, the nature and quality of this discrimination is different 
from the discrimination in the treatment of products which was already found to be 
inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as Articles 
I, III or XI. Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifi able in character ... 
Third, this discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions 
prevail. In United States — Gasoline, we accepted the assumption of the participants 
in that appeal that such discrimination could occur not only between different exporting 
Members, but also between exporting Members and the importing Member 
concerned.362
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body further elaborated this test and stated: 
It may be quite acceptable for a government, in adopting and implementing a domestic 
policy, to adopt a single standard applicable to all its citizens throughout that country. 
However, it is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to 
use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the same 
comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force 
within that Member’s territory, without taking into consideration different conditions 
which may occur in the territories of those other Members.
We believe that discrimination results not only when countries in which the same 
conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of the measure 
at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory 
program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries.363
Applying its test to the US measure at issue in US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body 
came to the following conclusion:
Section 609, in its application, imposes a single, rigid and unbending requirement that 
countries applying for certifi cation ... adopt a comprehensive regulatory program that is 
essentially the same as the United States’ program, without inquiring into the 
362 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 150. See also Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 7.225-
235.
363 Ibid., paras. 164-165.
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appropriateness of that program for the conditions prevailing in the exporting countries.
Furthermore, there is little or no fl exibility in how offi cials make the determination for 
certifi cation pursuant to these provisions. In our view, this rigidity and infl exibility also 
constitute ‘arbitrary discrimination’ within the meaning of the chapeau.364
The Appellate Body thus decided that discrimination may also result when the 
same measure is applied on countries where different conditions prevail. When a 
measure is applied without any regard for the difference in conditions between 
countries and this measure is applied in a rigid and infl exible manner, the 
application of the measure may constitute ‘arbitrary discrimination’ within the 
meaning of the chapeau of Article XX.
To implement the recommendations and rulings in US – Shrimp, the United States 
amended the measure at issue in this case. In the opinion of Malaysia, however, 
this amended measure was still WTO inconsistent, and Malaysia therefore 
challenged the amended measure before an Article 21.5 panel. This Panel in 
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) concluded that, unlike the original US 
measure, the amended measure was justifi ed under Article XX and thus WTO-
consistent. In the appeal from this Panel report, the Appellate Body held:
In our view, there is an important difference between conditioning market access on 
the adoption of essentially the same programme, and conditioning market access on 
the adoption of a programme comparable in effectiveness. Authorizing an importing 
Member to condition market access on exporting Members putting in place regulatory 
programmes comparable in effectiveness to that of the importing Member gives 
suffi cient latitude to the exporting Member with respect to the programme it may adopt 
to achieve the level of effectiveness required. It allows the exporting Member to adopt 
a regulatory programme that is suitable to the specifi c conditions prevailing in its 
territory. As we see it, the Panel correctly reasoned and concluded that conditioning 
market access on the adoption of a programme comparable in effectiveness, allows 
for suffi cient fl exibility in the application of the measure so as to avoid ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifi able discrimination’.365
Note that the Appellate Body thus seems to introduce in the chapeau of Article XX 
an ‘embryonic’ and ‘soft’ requirement on Members to recognize the equivalence of 
foreign measures comparable in effectiveness.366 The Appellate Body found in 
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) that the amended US measure at issue in the 
364 Ibid., paras. 164, 165 and 177.
365 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 144.
366 See also, G. Marceau and J. Trachtmann, ‘A map of the WTO law of domestic regulations of goods’, in: G. 
Bermann and P. Mavroidis, Trade and Human Health and Safety (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.42.
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implementation dispute was suffi ciently fl exible to meet the standards of the 
chapeau.367 The Appellate Body added:
a measure should be designed in such a manner that there is suffi cient fl exibility to take 
into account the specifi c conditions prevailing in any exporting Member, including, of 
course, Malaysia. Yet this is not the same as saying that there must be specifi c 
provisions in the measure aimed at addressing specifi cally the particular conditions 
prevailing in every individual exporting Member. Article XX of the GATT 1994 does not 
require a Member to anticipate and provide explicitly for the specifi c conditions 
prevailing and evolving in every individual Member.368
The application of measures adopted to give effect to the Cramer sustainability 
criteria would constitute arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of the 
chapeau of Article XX if the application of these measures would make market 
access for biomass conditional upon the adoption by the exporting country of 
essentially the same sustainability criteria for the production of biomass. However, 
it follows from the Appellate Body’s ruling in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 - Malaysia) 
that the application of measures to give effect to the Cramer sustainability criteria 
would not constitute arbitrary discrimination if the application of these measures 
would make market access for biomass conditional on the adoption by the 
exporting country of a programme for the sustainable production of biomass 
comparable in effectiveness. More generally, if the Netherlands were to apply 
measures adopted to give effect to the Cramer sustainability requirements (such a 
certifi cation procedure) in an overly rigid and infl exible manner, the application of 
such measures would constitute arbitrary discrimination. The same reasoning 
applies to measures adopted to give effect to animal welfare requirements.
The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp also addressed the question of whether the 
application of the measure at issue constituted an ‘unjustifi able discrimination’ 
within the meaning of the chapeau. The Appellate Body noted the following:
Another aspect of the application of Section 609 [of Public Law 101-162] that bears 
heavily in any appraisal of justifi able or unjustifi able discrimination is the failure of the 
United States to engage the appellees, as well as other Members exporting shrimp to 
the United States, in serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of 
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of 
sea turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those 
other Members.369
367 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 145-8.
368 Ibid., para. 149.
369 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 166.
126
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
The Appellate Body made three observations in this respect. First, in enacting 
Section 609, the Congress of the United States expressly recognized the 
importance of securing international agreements for the protection and 
conservation of the sea turtle species. Second, the protection and conservation of 
highly migratory species of sea turtle, i.e. the very policy objective of the measure, 
demand concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of the many countries 
whose waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle migrations. Third, 
the United States negotiated and concluded one regional international agreement 
for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, namely, the Inter-American 
Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles.370 The existence of 
this agreement provided convincing demonstration that an alternative course of 
action was reasonably open to the United States for securing the legitimate policy 
goal of its measure, a course of action other than the unilateral and non-
consensual procedures of the import prohibition under Section 609. The record 
does not, however, show that serious efforts were made by the United States to 
negotiate similar agreements with any other country or group of countries. Finally, 
the record also does not show that the United States attempted to make use of 
such international mechanisms that exist to achieve cooperative efforts to protect 
and conserve sea turtles before imposing the import ban.371 The Appellate Body 
therefore concluded:
Clearly, the United States negotiated seriously with some, but not with other Members 
(including the appellees), that export shrimp to the United States. The effect is plainly 
discriminatory and, in our view, unjustifi able. The unjustifi able nature of this 
discrimination emerges clearly when we consider the cumulative effects of the failure 
of the United States to pursue negotiations for establishing consensual means of 
protection and conservation of the living marine resources here involved.372
As the Appellate Body noted, the principal consequence of the failure to pursue 
negotiations may be seen in the resulting unilateralism evident in the application 
of Section 609:
As we have emphasized earlier, the policies relating to the necessity for use of 
particular kinds of TEDs in various maritime areas, and the operating details of these 
policies, are all shaped by the Department of State, without the participation of the 
exporting Members. The system and processes of certifi cation are established and 
administered by the United States agencies alone. The decision-making involved in the 
370 Ibid., para. 169. 
371 The United States, for example, did not make any attempt to raise the issue of sea turtle mortality due to 
shrimp trawling in the CITES Standing Committee as a subject requiring concerted action by States.
372 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 172.
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grant, denial or withdrawal of certifi cation to the exporting Members, is, accordingly, 
also unilateral. The unilateral character of the application of Section 609 heightens the 
disruptive and discriminatory infl uence of the import prohibition and underscores its 
unjustifi ability.373
The extent to which a Member has to seek a multilateral solution to a problem 
before it may resort to unilateral measures was one of the main issues in 
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia). The Appellate Body made it clear that, in 
order to meet the requirement of the chapeau of Article XX, the Member needs to 
make serious efforts, in good faith, to negotiate a multilateral solution before 
resorting to unilateral measures.374 Failure to do so may lead to the conclusion that 
the discrimination is ‘unjustifi able’. 
If the Netherlands were to adopt unilateral measures to give effect to the Cramer 
sustainability criteria without fi rst undertaking a good faith effort to negotiate 
international criteria for the sustainable production of biomass, then these 
measures would constitute unjustifi able discrimination within the meaning of the 
chapeau of Article XX. The same reasoning applies to measures adopted to give 
effect to animal welfare requirements. 
Finally, note that the Appellate Body stated in US – Shrimp, that:
What is appropriately characterizable as ‘arbitrary discrimination’ or ‘unjustifi able 
discrimination’, or as a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’ in respect of one 
category of measures, need not be so with respect to another group or type of 
measures. The standard of ‘arbitrary discrimination’, for example, under the chapeau 
may be different for a measure that purports to be necessary to protect public morals 
than for one relating to the products of prison labour.375 
3.3.3 Disguised restrictions on international trade
With respect to the requirement that the application of a measure does not 
constitute a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’, the Appellate Body stated 
in US – Gasoline:
the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular 
measure amounts to ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination’, may also be taken into 
account in determining the presence of a ‘disguised restriction’ on international trade. 
373 Ibid.
374 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5– Malaysia), paras. 115-34.
375 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 120.
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The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or 
illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.376
The Panel in EC – Asbestos further clarifi ed the requirement of the chapeau that the 
application of the measure at issue does not constitute a ‘disguised restriction on 
international trade’ as follows:
… a restriction which formally meets the requirements of Article XX(b) will constitute an 
abuse if such compliance is in fact only a disguise to conceal the pursuit of trade-
restrictive objectives. However, as the Appellate Body acknowledged in Japan — 
Alcoholic Beverages, the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained. 
Nevertheless, we note that, in the same case, the Appellate Body suggested that the 
protective application of a measure can most often be discerned from its design, 
architecture and revealing structure.377
This approach to establishing whether a measure was applied so as to afford 
protection was, as discussed above, developed in relation to Article III:2 of the 
GATT 1994.378 In EC – Asbestos, however, the Panel saw no reason why this 
approach should not be applicable in other circumstances where it is necessary to 
determine whether a measure is being applied for protective purposes. The Panel 
in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) took the same approach.379 In short, a 
measure that is provisionally justifi ed under one of the paragraphs of Article XX 
will be considered to constitute ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’ if the 
design, architecture or structure of the measure at issue reveal that this measure 
does not pursue the legitimate policy objective on which the provisional 
justifi cation was based but, in fact, pursues trade-restrictive, i.e. protectionist, 
objectives. Such a measure cannot be justifi ed under Article XX of the GATT 1994.
4 Other relevant exceptions from obligations under the GATT 1994
In addition to the general exceptions from GATT obligations, discussed in the 
previous section, the GATT provides for a number of other exceptions that allow 
Members under specifi c conditions to adopt or maintain otherwise GATT-
inconsistent measures. These exceptions include the national security exception of 
Article XXI, the economic emergency exception of Article XIX (as elaborated in the 
Agreement on Safeguards), the regional integration exception of Article XXIV, the 
balance of payments exception of Articles XII and XVIII:B, the infant industry 
376 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 25.
377 Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.236.
378 See above, p. 49.
379 Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 5.138-5.144.
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exception of Article XVIII:A and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
exception of the Enabling Clause. This section addresses only those exceptions that 
are of particular relevance to the topic of this study, namely, the national security 
exception and the GSP exception.380
4.1 Security exceptions of Article XXI of the GATT 1994
Article XXI of the GATT 1994, entitled ‘Security Exceptions’, states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
a.  to require any [Member] to furnish any information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
b.   to prevent any [Member] from taking any action which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests
i.  relating to fi ssionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
ii. relating to the traffi c in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to  
 such traffi c in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly  
 for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
iii.  taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
c.  to prevent any [Member] from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
Unlike Article XX, Article XXI has not played a signifi cant role in the practice of 
dispute settlement under the GATT 1947, or the WTO to date. Article XXI has been 
invoked in only a few disputes.381 Nevertheless, this provision is not without 
importance. WTO Members do, on occasion, take trade-restrictive measures, either 
unilaterally or multilaterally, against other Members as a means to achieve national 
or international security and peace. 
380 This section is based on and in parts further elaborates and updates P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2005, reprinted 2006), pp.628-632 (national 
security exception) and pp.679-683 (GSP exception). See pp.633-679 for an analysis of the exceptions not 
discussed here. www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521529815. 
381 Article XXI of the GATT was invoked as a defence in US – Export Restraints (1949), US – Imports of Sugar 
from Nicaragua (1984), US – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua (1986), EEC – Trade Measures taken against 
the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (1991), and US – The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 
(Helms–Burton Act) (1996).
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Members taking such measures will seek justifi cation for these measures under 
Article XXI.
In the context of this study, Articles XXI(b)(iii) and XXI(c) are of particular interest. 
Article XXI(b)(iii) concerns ‘any action which [a Member] considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests … taken in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations’. Article XXI(c) concerns ‘any action in 
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.’
4.1.1 Protection of essential security interests
In international relations, national security takes precedence over the benefi ts of 
trade for various reasons and in various situations. One situation in which national 
security takes precedence over trade is when a State considers that it is necessary 
to restrict trade in order to protect strategic domestic production capabilities from 
import competition. The judgement as to which production capabilities deserve to 
be qualifi ed as strategically important differs among countries and is, to a great 
extent, a political decision. 
Defi ned broadly, energy production capabilities might be considered by some 
Members to be production capabilities of strategic importance to national security. 
While the GATT 1994 allows for considerable leeway to preserve national 
industries of strategic importance (e.g. by providing protection through import 
tariffs, production subsidies or government procurement), in some situations, 
Article XXI may provide justifi cation for otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures. A 
question that immediately arises, however, is the question of the ‘justiciability’ of 
Article XXI. As a matter of principle, Members must be able to seek judicial review 
of national measures taken by other Members pursuant to Article XXI. However, it 
is not clear how far such a review can go. It remains to be seen whether a panel or 
the Appellate Body will defi ne what an ‘essential national security interest’ is and 
what is ‘necessary’ to protect such an interest. The scope for judicial review seems 
to be limited by the language of Article XXI(b) itself. Article XXI(b) refers to what 
the Member concerned considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests. The use of the term ‘considers’ in Article XXI(b) seems to make 
the application of the exception largely self-judging and not suitable for review by 
panels and the Appellate Body. However, as stated above, it is imperative that a 
certain degree of judicial review be maintained; otherwise the provision would be 
prone to abuse without redress.382 At a minimum, panels should have the authority 
to conduct an examination as to whether the explanation provided by the Member 
382 See the GATT Panel’s statement in US – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, in GATT Activities 1986, pp.58-9.
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concerned is reasonable, or whether the measure constitutes an apparent abuse.383 
Uncertainty regarding the ‘justiciability’ of the exceptions of Article XXI(b), and 
their requirements, was apparent in the few cases in which Article XXI(b) has been 
raised.384
4.1.2 Implementation of obligations under the UN Charter
As explained above, Article XXI(c) of the GATT 1994 allows WTO Members to take 
actions required under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. This has been generally interpreted to mean that 
Members may depart from their GATT obligations in order to implement economic 
sanctions imposed by the United Nations. Article 41 of the UN Charter empowers 
the Security Council to impose economic sanctions pursuant to Article 39 of the 
Charter, once it has determined the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression. Note, however, that the International Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has advocated a broader interpretation of the scope 
of Article XXI(c) than is now commonly accepted. According to the ICFTU, the 
obligations under the UN Charter for the maintenance in international peace and 
security also include obligations relating to minimum labour standards set out in 
ILO Conventions. Measures taken to implement these minimum labour standards 
would thus be measures within the meaning of Article XXI(c) and be justifi ed even 
though they are inconsistent with basic GATT obligations. Presumably a similar 
argument could be made for measures taken to implement human rights 
obligations set out in UN human rights agreements. To date, however, there has 
been very little support for this broad interpretation of the scope of Article XXI(c) of 
the GATT 1994.385
383 See further also W. Cann, Creating standards and accountability for the use of the WTO security exception, 
Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 26 (2001), p.426. 
384 See e.g. US – Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua (1984) and US – Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 
(Helms–Burton Act) (1996).
385 Note that the issue of ‘justiciability’, discussed above with regard to Article XXI(b), appears to be less 
problematic for the exception provided in Article XXI(c), given that this provision does not refer to what the 
Member invoking the exception ‘considers’ to be necessary. The basis of the departure from GATT 
obligations must be an obligation under the UN Charter, and a panel can assess whether there is such an 
obligation.
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4.2 GSP exception and the Enabling Clause of the GATT 1994
The 1979 GATT decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, commonly referred to 
as the ‘Enabling Clause’, is now an integral part of the GATT 1994, Paragraph 1 
states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, [Members] may 
accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without 
according such treatment to other [Members].
Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause provides that the differential and more 
favourable treatment referred to in paragraph 1 includes:
Preferential tariff treatment accorded by [developed-country Members] to products 
originating in [developing-country Members] in accordance with the Generalized System 
of Preferences ...386
As the Appellate Body ruled in EC – Tariff Preferences, the Enabling Clause operates 
as an ‘exception’ to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.387 Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause 
explicitly exempts Members from complying with the obligation contained in Article 
I:1 for the purposes of providing differential and more favourable treatment to 
developing countries.388 The Enabling Clause authorizes developed-country Members 
to grant enhanced market access to products from developing countries extending 
beyond the access granted to like products from developed countries.389 This 
deviation from the MFN obligation of Article I:1 is allowed only when, and to the 
extent that, the conditions set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Enabling Clause are 
met. Paragraph 3 sets out the following substantive conditions:
Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause:
386 The footnote in the original reads: ‘As described in the Decision of the Contracting Parties of 25 June 1971, 
relating to the establishment of ‘generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences benefi cial to 
the developing countries’ (BISD 18S/24).
387 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 99.
388 See ibid., para. 90. Note that the Enabling Clause does not merely allow developed country Members to 
deviate from Article I:1 in the pursuit of ‘differential and more favourable treatment’ for developing 
countries; it encourages them to do so.
389 See ibid., para. 106. 
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a.  shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and 
not to raise barriers to or create undue diffi culties for the trade of any other 
[Members];
b.  shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and 
other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis;
c.  shall in the case of such treatment accorded by [developed-country Members] to 
developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modifi ed, to respond positively 
to the development, fi nancial and trade needs of developing countries.
Paragraph 4 sets out the procedural conditions for the introduction, modifi cation 
and withdrawal of a preferential measure for developing countries. Pursuant to 
paragraph 4, Members granting preferential tariff treatment to developing 
countries must notify the WTO and afford adequate opportunity for prompt 
consultations at the request of any interested Member with respect to any diffi culty 
or matter that may arise.
Note that most developed-country Members grant preferential tariff treatment to 
imports from developing countries under their respective Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) schemes. The Enabling Clause thus plays a vital role in 
promoting trade as a means of stimulating economic growth and development.390 
Of particular importance in the context of this study, however, is the question 
whether developed countries may under the Enabling Clause give some 
developing countries additional preferential tariff treatment. This was the central 
question in EC – Tariff Preferences. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 of 10 
December 2001, the EC’s Generalized System of Preferences Regulation, provided 
for fi ve preferential tariff ‘arrangements’, namely:
the ‘General Arrangements’; –
special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights; –
special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment; –
special arrangements for least-developed countries; and –
special arrangements to combat drug production and traffi cking. –
The General Arrangements, which provide for tariff preferences for all developing 
countries, and the special arrangements for least-developed countries, are not 
problematic. Both arrangements are justifi ed under the Enabling Clause: the 
General Arrangements under paragraph 2(a), discussed above; and the special 
arrangements for least-developed countries under paragraph 2(d). The latter 
provision states that the Enabling Clause also covers:
390 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 106.
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Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the context 
of any general or specifi c measures in favour of developing countries.
However, questions as to GATT-consistency arise with regard to the other 
preferential arrangements, i.e. the special incentive arrangements for the 
protection of labour rights, the special incentive arrangements for the protection of 
the environment and the special arrangements to combat drug production and 
traffi cking. Only some developing countries are benefi ciaries of these special 
arrangements. For example, additional tariff preferences under the special 
incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the special incentive 
arrangements for the protection of the environment are restricted to those 
countries that ‘are determined by the European Communities to comply with 
certain labour [or] environmental policy standards’, respectively. Preferences under 
the special arrangements to combat drug production and traffi cking (the ‘Drug 
Arrangements’) were provided only to 11 Latin American countries and Pakistan.391
While India, the complainant in EC – Tariff Preferences, challenged, in its panel 
request, the WTO-consistency of the Drug Arrangements as well as the special 
incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the environment, it 
later decided to limit its complaint to the Drug Arrangements. Accordingly, the 
EC – Tariff Preferences dispute, and the rulings in that case, concerned only the 
WTO-consistency of the Drug Arrangements. However, it is clear that the rulings in 
this case are also of relevance to other special arrangements.
 
The main substantive issue disputed between India and the European 
Communities in EC – Tariff Preferences was whether the Drug Arrangements were 
consistent with paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, and, in particular, the 
requirement of non-discrimination in footnote 3 thereto, quoted above.392 On this 
issue, the Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences found that:
the clear intention of the negotiators was to provide GSP equally to all developing 
countries and to eliminate all differentiation in preferential treatment to developing 
countries ...393
391 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 3. Preferences under the Drug Arrangements were 
provided to Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru and Venezuela.
392 The requirement of non-discrimination is derived from the words ‘non-discriminatory preferences’ in 
footnote 3. See above, footnote 386, on p. 132.
393 Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.144.
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According to the Panel, the term ‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 requires that 
identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing 
countries without differentiation.394 As the Drug Arrangements did not provide 
identical tariff preferences to all developing countries, the Panel concluded that the 
Drug Arrangements were inconsistent with paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause 
and, in particular, the requirement of non-discrimination in footnote 3 thereto.395 
On appeal, the Appellate Body modifi ed this fi nding.396 After a careful examination 
of the text, the context of footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, and 
the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the Enabling Clause, the 
Appellate Body came to the conclusion that:
the term ‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 does not prohibit developed-country 
Members from granting different tariffs to products originating in different GSP 
benefi ciaries, provided that such differential tariff treatment meets the remaining 
conditions in the Enabling Clause. In granting such differential tariff treatment, however, 
preference-granting countries are required, by virtue of the term ‘non-discriminatory’, to 
ensure that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP benefi ciaries, 
that is, to all GSP benefi ciaries that have the ‘development, fi nancial and trade needs’ to 
which the treatment in question is intended to respond.397
In other words, a developed-country Member may grant additional preferential 
tariff treatment to some, and not to other, developing-country Members, as long as 
additional preferential tariff treatment is available to all similarly situated 
developing-country Members. Similarly situated developing-country Members are 
all those that have the development, fi nancial and trade needs to which additional 
preferential tariff treatment is intended to respond.
The determination of whether developing-country Members are similarly situated 
must be based on objective and transparent criteria (applied with due process). 
With respect to the Drug Arrangements of the European Communities, however, 
the Appellate Body found in EC – Tariff Preferences that these arrangements 
provided for a closed list of 12 identifi ed benefi ciaries and contained no criteria or 
standards to provide a basis for distinguishing developing-country Members which 
are benefi ciaries under the Drug Arrangements from other developing-country 
Members.398 The Appellate Body therefore upheld – albeit for different reasons – the 
394 Ibid., paras. 7.161 and 7.176.
395 Ibid., para. 7.177.
396 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 174.
397 Ibid., para. 173.
398 Ibid., paras. 187 and 188. 
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Panel’s conclusion that the European Communities ‘failed to demonstrate that the 
Drug Arrangements are justifi ed under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause’.276
Note that under the EC GSP scheme, biofuels are granted tariff preferences. 
Biofuels imported from least-developed countries even benefi t from zero duties 
under the Everything but Arms scheme of the European Communities.399 In the 
context of this study, the question arises, however, whether it would be GATT-
consistent to grant (additional) preferential tariff treatment to biomass (or biofuels 
from biomass) from developing countries, if such biomass is produced consistently 
with the Cramer sustainability criteria. The ruling of the Appellate Body in EC – Tariff 
Preferences suggests that such preferential tariff treatment – which would 
obviously constitute a violation of the MFN treatment obligation of Article I:1 of the 
GATT 1994 – would be justifi ed under the Enabling Clause provided that the 
(additional) preferential tariff treatment is granted to all developing-country 
Members that that are similarly situated, i.e. that have the development, fi nancial 
and trade needs (e.g. food security, respect for minimum labour standards and 
human rights, protection of the local environment, regional and national economic 
prosperity) to which additional preferential tariff treatment is intended to respond.
5 Relevant obligations under the TBT Agreement
As discussed above, trade in goods is often obstructed by non-tariff barriers.400 
These non-tariff barriers take many different forms, but one of the most 
troublesome is the technical barrier to trade (TBT). In modern society, products are 
often subject to technical requirements relating to their characteristics and/or the 
manner in which they are produced, i.e. processes and production methods 
(PPMs).401 The purpose of these requirements may be the protection of life or 
health, the protection of the environment, the prevention of deceptive practices, or 
to ensure the quality of products. Regardless their legitimacy, however, these 
requirements often constitute formidable barriers to trade. Moreover, procedures 
set up to verify and/or certify whether a product meets certain requirements may 
also obstruct trade. In WTO law, these technical barriers to trade are divided into 
two categories:
the general category of technical barriers to trade, for which rules have been set  –
out in the TBT Agreement; and
a special category of technical barriers to trade, namely, sanitary and  –
phytosanitary measures, for which rules are provided in the SPS Agreement.
399 See R. Howse, P van Bork and C. Hedebrand, WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in 
the Creation of a Global Marketplace, IPC Discussion Paper, October 2006.
400 See above, p. 88.
401 See above, p. 8-9.
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For reasons explained above, this study does not deal with the rules on sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures set out in the SPS Agreement.402 
This section focuses on the rules applicable to the general category of technical 
barriers, as set out in the TBT Agreement.403 It fi rst addresses the scope of 
application of the TBT Agreement and then, successively, the main obligations 
under the TBT Agreement. These obligations of the TBT Agreement refl ect several 
principles that are also found in the GATT 1994, such as: the MFN treatment 
obligation, the national treatment obligation and the obligation to refrain from 
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. In EC – Asbestos, the 
Appellate Body observed that the TBT Agreement intends to further the objectives 
of the GATT 1994. However, it immediately noted that the TBT Agreement does so 
through a specialized legal regime, containing different and additional obligations 
to those of the GATT 1994.404
5.1 Scope of application of the TBT Agreement 
With respect to the scope of application of the TBT Agreement, this section 
distinguishes between the scope of application ratione materiae, i.e. the types of 
measure to which the agreement applies, and the scope of application ratione 
personae, i.e. the entities to whom rules of the TBT Agreement apply.
5.1.1 Scope of application ratione materiae 
As the Appellate Body stated in EC – Asbestos, the TBT Agreement applies to a 
‘limited class of measures’.405 The rules of the TBT Agreement apply to: 
technical regulations;  –
standards; and  –
conformity assessment procedures.  –
These three types of measure are defi ned in Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement.
402 See above, p. 18.
403 This section on the TBT Agreement is based on P. Van den Bossche, D. Prévost and Marielle Matthee, WTO 
Rules on Technical Barriers to Trade, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2005-6, available at 
www.unimaas.nl/default.asp?template=werkveld.htm&id=F60BL5P00MJO466V63M6&taal=nl. 
404 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 80. Therefore, caution needs to be used when transposing 
interpretation the interpretations given to these obligations under the GATT 1994 to the similar provisions in 
the TBT Agreement. The different context, structure and formulation of provisions of the TBT Agreement’s 
provisions can result in an interpretation that deviates from previously pronounced interpretations under the 
GATT 1994.
405 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 80.
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 5.1.1.1 Technical regulations
In Annex 1.1, a technical regulation is defi ned as:
… [a] document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, 
process or production method.
For example, a law requiring that batteries be rechargeable, a law requiring that 
mineral water be sold in glass bottles only, or a law requiring that gasoline be 
mixed with ethanol are all technical regulations within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement. 
In two disputes to date, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines, the panels and the 
Appellate Body had occasion to examine whether the measures at issue were 
‘technical regulations’ falling within the scope of the TBT Agreement. In 
EC – Asbestos, the measure at issue, a French decree, consisted of, on the one 
hand, a general ban on asbestos and asbestos-containing products and, on the 
other, limited exceptions referring to situations in which asbestos-containing 
products would be allowed. The Panel concluded that the ban itself was not a 
technical regulation, whereas the exceptions to the ban were.406 On appeal, the 
Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s fi nding that the measure at issue did not 
constitute a technical regulation. In addressing this issue, the Appellate Body fi rst 
fi rmly rejected the Panel’s approach of considering separately the ban and the 
exceptions to the ban. According to the Appellate Body, the ‘proper legal character’ 
of the measure cannot be determined unless the measure is looked at as a whole. 
The Appellate Body stated: 
Article 1 of the Decree contains broad, general prohibitions on asbestos and products 
containing asbestos. However, the scope and generality of those prohibitions can only 
be understood in light of the exceptions to it which, albeit for a limited period, permit, 
inter alia, the use of certain products containing asbestos and, principally, products 
containing chrysotile asbestos fi bres. The measure is, therefore, not a total prohibition 
on asbestos fi bres, because it also includes provisions that permit, for a limited 
duration, the use of asbestos in certain situations. Thus, to characterize the measure 
simply as a general prohibition, and to examine it as such, overlooks the complexities of 
the measure, which include both prohibitive and permissive elements.407
406 Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 8.63 and 8.70.
407 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 64.
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The Appellate Body thus concluded that the measure at issue was to be examined 
as an integrated whole, taking into account as appropriate the prohibitive and the 
permissive elements that are part of it.408
The Appellate Body then examined whether the measure at issue, considered as a 
whole, was a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. On 
the basis of the defi nition of a ‘technical regulation’ of Annex 1.1, quoted above, the 
Appellate Body set out a number of considerations for determining whether a 
measure is a technical regulation. This section discusses these considerations.
First, for a measure to be a ‘technical regulation’, it must ‘lay down’ – i.e. set forth, 
stipulate or provide – ‘product characteristics’. With respect to the term 
‘characteristics’, the Appellate Body noted: 
… the ‘characteristics’ of a product include, in our view, any objectively defi nable 
‘features’, ‘qualities’, ‘attributes’, or other ‘distinguishing mark’ of a product. Such 
‘characteristics’ might relate, inter alia, to a product’s composition, size, shape, colour, 
texture, hardness, tensile strength, fl ammability, conductivity, density, or viscosity. In 
the defi nition of a ‘technical regulation’ in Annex 1.1, the TBT Agreement itself gives 
certain examples of ‘product characteristics’ – ’terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements’. These examples indicate that ‘product 
characteristics’ include, not only features and qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but 
also related ‘characteristics’, such as the means of identifi cation, the presentation and 
the appearance of a product.409 
The Appellate Body also noted that a technical regulation may be confi ned to 
laying down only one or a few product characteristics.
Second, a ‘technical regulation’ must regulate the characteristics of products in a 
binding or compulsory fashion. According to the Appellate Body, it follows that: 
… with respect to products, a ‘technical regulation’ has the effect of prescribing or 
imposing one or more ‘characteristics’ – ‘features’, ‘qualities’, ‘attributes’, or other 
‘distinguishing mark’.410
Product characteristics may be prescribed or imposed with respect to products in 
either a positive or a negative form. That is, the document may provide, positively, 
that products must possess certain ‘characteristics’, or the document may require, 
408 Ibid.
409 Ibid., para. 67.
410 Ibid., para. 68.
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negatively, that products must not possess certain ‘characteristics’. In both cases, 
the legal result is the same: the document ‘lays down’ certain binding 
‘characteristics’ for products.411
Third, a ‘technical regulation’ must be applicable to an identifi able product or 
group of products. Otherwise, enforcement of the regulation will be, in practical 
terms, impossible. Clearly, identifi cation of the product coverage of a technical 
regulation is required. The Panel in EC – Asbestos interpreted this to mean that a 
‘technical regulation’ must apply to ‘given’ products which are actually named, 
identifi ed or specifi ed in the regulation. The Appellate Body disagreed. Nothing in 
the text of the TBT Agreement suggests that the products concerned need be 
named or otherwise expressly identifi ed in a ‘technical regulation’. The Appellate 
Body noted that:
… there may be perfectly sound administrative reasons for formulating a ‘technical 
regulation’ in a way that does not expressly identify products by name, but simply 
makes them identifi able – for instance, through the ‘characteristic’ that is the subject of 
regulation.412
On the basis of the above three considerations, the Appellate Body examined the 
measure at issue in EC – Asbestos, the French decree, noting that the fi rst and 
second paragraphs of Article 1 of the Decree imposed a prohibition on asbestos 
fi bres. According to the Appellate Body, prohibition on these fi bres does not, in 
itself, prescribe or impose any ‘characteristics’ on asbestos fi bres but simply bans 
them in their natural state. Accordingly, if this measure consisted only of a 
prohibition on asbestos fi bres, it might not constitute a ‘technical regulation’. The 
Appellate Body then noted, however: 
An integral and essential aspect of the measure is the regulation of ‘products 
containing asbestos fi bres’, which are also prohibited by Article 1, paragraphs I and II of 
the decree. It is important to note here that, although formulated negatively – products 
containing asbestos are prohibited – the measure, in this respect, effectively prescribes 
or imposes certain objective features, qualities or ‘characteristics’ on all products. That 
is, in effect, the measure provides that all products must not contain asbestos fi bres. 
Although this prohibition against products containing asbestos applies to a large 
number of products, and although it is, indeed, true that the products to which this 
prohibition applies cannot be determined from the terms of the measure itself, it seems 
to us that the products covered by the measure are identifi able: all products must be 
411 Ibid., para. 69.
412 Ibid., para. 70.
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asbestos free; any products containing asbestos are prohibited. We also observe that 
compliance with the prohibition against products containing asbestos is mandatory and 
is, indeed, enforceable through criminal sanctions.413
The prohibition of all asbestos-containing products is a measure that effectively 
prescribes – although negatively – certain objective characteristics for all products.
Furthermore, the Appellate Body noted that Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the French decree 
contain certain exceptions to the prohibitions found in Article 1 of the decree. Any 
person seeking to avail of these limited exceptions must provide a detailed 
justifi cation to the authorities, complete with necessary supporting documentation 
concerning ‘the state of scientifi c and technological progress’. Compliance with 
these administrative requirements is mandatory. 
Through the exceptions to the prohibitions, the measure at issue sets out the 
‘applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory’ for 
products with certain objective ‘characteristics’. 
The Appellate Body thus concluded in EC – Asbestos: 
Viewing the measure as an integrated whole, we see that it lays down ‘characteristics’ 
for all products that might contain asbestos, and we see also that it lays down the 
‘applicable administrative provisions’ for certain products containing chrysotile asbestos 
fi bres which are excluded from the prohibitions in the measure. Accordingly, we fi nd 
that the measure is a ‘document’ which ‘lays down product characteristics … including 
the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory’. For 
these reasons, we conclude that the measure constitutes a ‘technical regulation’ under 
the TBT Agreement.414 
Confi rming its ruling in EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines 
established a three-tier test for determining whether a measure is a ‘technical 
regulation’ under the TBT Agreement: 
the measure must apply to an identifi able product or group of products;  –
the measure must lay down product characteristics; – 415 and 
compliance with the product characteristics laid down in the measure must be  –
mandatory.416 
413 Ibid., para. 72.
414 Ibid., para. 75.
415 Note that the Appellate Body made no reference to ‘related processes and production methods’ because it 
was not relevant in the factual context of the case at hand.
416 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 176.
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Applying this test in EC – Sardines to EC Regulation 2136/89 on Common 
Marketing Standards for Preserved Sardines, the Appellate Body further clarifi ed its 
reasoning in EC – Asbestos. With regard to the fi rst element of its three-tier test, the 
Appellate Body held that a measure that did not expressly identify the products to 
which it applied could still be applicable to identifi able products (as required by the 
fi rst element of the test). The tool that the Appellate Body used to determine 
whether, in this case, Sardinops sagax was an identifi able product was by 
examining the way the EC Regulation was enforced. As the enforcement of the EC 
Regulation had led to a prohibition against labelling Sardinops sagax as ‘preserved 
sardines’, this product was therefore considered to be identifi able.417
With regard to the second element of the three-tier test, the question arose as to 
whether a ‘naming’ rule, such as the rule to name Sardina pilchardus ‘preserved 
sardines’ laid down product characteristics. In this respect, the Appellate Body held 
that product characteristics include means of identifi cation and that, therefore, the 
naming rule at issue defi nitely met the requirement of the second element of the 
test.418
 5.1.1.2 Standards
Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement defi nes a standard as: 
… [a] document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and 
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and 
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
Contrary to technical regulations, standards are of a voluntary nature, meaning 
compliance is not mandatory. The voluntary standards set by the European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), such as standards for 
mobile phones or handheld computers, are clearly standards within the meaning 
of the TBT Agreement. Other examples include the standards for sustainable forest 
management set by the Forest Stewardship Council, or the standards for the 
certifi cation of agricultural products set by EurepGAP. Companies comply with 
these voluntary standards set by public or private bodies for various reasons, 
ranging from the facility of having industry-wide common standards, to the wish to 
be responsive to the concerns of consumers or civil society. In fact, companies 
often have no choice but to adhere to the standards set by standardization bodies. 
Not adhering to these standards would, in practice, exclude their products from the 
417 Ibid., para. 184.
418 Ibid., paras. 190-191.
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market. It is therefore important that these voluntary standards are also subject to 
international disciplines under the TBT Agreement. Note that, to date, there is no 
case law further clarifying the concept of ‘standards’.
 5.1.1.3 Conformity assessment procedures
In addition to technical regulations and standards, conformity assessment 
procedures also fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement. 
Conformity assessment procedures are defi ned in Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement 
as: 
… any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in 
technical regulations or standards are fulfi lled. 
Examples of conformity assessment procedures include, for example, procedures 
for sampling, testing and inspection. To date, there is no case law clarifying the 
concept of ‘conformity assessment procedures’.
 5.1.1.4  Do nPR PPM measures fall within the scope of application of the 
TBT Agreement?
The TBT Agreement applies to technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures relating to: 
products (both industrial and agricultural); and –
related processes and production methods. – 419
It is much debated whether the processes and production methods, to which the 
TBT Agreement applies, include non-product-related processes and production 
methods (nPR PPMs ). This question is obviously of great importance in the context 
of this study as it determines whether the disciplines of the TBT Agreement apply 
to technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures relating 
to the Cramer sustainability criteria or animal welfare requirements. 
The issue of the applicability of the TBT Agreement to nPR PPM measures was 
discussed during the negotiations on the TBT Agreement. However, as has been 
explicitly recorded, the negotiators failed to reach agreement on this issue.420 The 
newly established WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) discussed this 
419 Article 1.3 and the explanatory note to Annex 1, paragraph 2, of the TBT Agreement. Note that the TBT 
Agreement does not apply to technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures that 
deal with services.
420 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade with regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Processes and Production 
Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics, Note by the Secretariat, G/TBT/W11, dated 29 August 1995.
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issue in 1996, although with specifi c regard to voluntary ‘eco-labelling’ schemes.421 
If anything, this discussion revealed the extent of the disagreement among 
Members on this issue. In the report of the Committee on Trade and Environment, 
it is noted that:
many delegations expressed the view that the negotiating history of the TBT 
Agreement indicates clearly that there was no intention of legitimizing the use of 
measures based on non-product-related PPMs under the TBT Agreement, and that 
voluntary standards based on such PPMs are inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Agreement as well as with other provisions of the GATT. There is objection to any 
attempt through CTE work on eco-labelling to extend the scope of the TBT Agreement 
to permit the use of standards based on non-product-related PPMs.422
The report also noted that:
Another view is that the defi nition of the term ‘Standard’ in the TBT Agreement is 
ambiguous with respect to its coverage of standards based on non-product-related 
PPMs. Some Members suggested that the defi nition does not seem to cover standards 
based, inter alia, on non-product-related PPMs. It cannot be stated, therefore, a priori, 
that such standards are inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement.423
The report went on to observe that: 
Still others have stated that the TBT Agreement does not cover measures based on 
non -product-related PPMs, and voluntary eco-labelling schemes/programmes based on 
LCA are not covered by transparency provisions of the Agreement, since criteria 
concerning non-product-related PPMs do not fall within the defi nition of ‘Standard’ in 
Annex 1.424
Finally, the report of the CTE noted:
Another view is that all forms of eco-labelling, including eco-labels that involve non-
product-related PPMs, are covered by the TBT Agreement and that the inclusion of 
non-product-related PPM-based elements in an eco-labelling regime is not per se a 
violation of WTO rules. According to this view, the TBT Agreement provides suffi cient 
fl exibility to permit non-product-related PPM-based eco-labelling to be used, subject to 
421 Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/1 (1996), paras. 66-81.
422 Ibid., para. 70.
423 Ibid., para. 71.
424 Ibid., para. 72. Note that ‘LCA’ stands for ‘life-cycle approaches’.
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appropriate trade disciplines, and the validity of any eco-labelling regime under the WTO 
must be judged according to the relevant rules of the multilateral trading system.425 
Some WTO Members suggested that the WTO confi rm that the provisions of the 
TBT Agreement and its Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and 
Application of Standards, discussed below, apply to all eco-labelling schemes/
programmes, whether voluntary or mandatory, and whether administered by 
governmental or non-governmental bodies. It was suggested that the scope of the 
TBT Agreement should be interpreted to cover the use of standards based on nPR 
PPMs in eco-labelling schemes/programmes, provided that these standards adhere 
to multilaterally agreed eco-labelling guidelines based on scientifi c criteria, and 
that they are transparent, consensual and non-discriminatory.426 However, in 
response to this proposal, other WTO Members stated that they saw no need to 
confi rm what is already included in existing provisions of the TBT Agreement, and 
opposed changing the interpretation or application of the TBT Agreement.427
The defi nitions in Annex 1, paragraphs 1–3, quoted above, seem to indicate that 
technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures relating to 
nPR PPMs do not fall with the scope of application of the TBT Agreement. The 
defi nitions refer to ‘characteristics for products and related processes and 
production methods’ [emphasis added]. However, note that in the last sentence of 
the defi nitions of technical regulations and standards, it is stated that technical 
regulations and standards also include measures that are concerned with 
‘terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply 
to a product, process or production method’ [emphasis added]. Therefore, while 
there may be uncertainty and debate about whether technical regulations, 
standards or conformity assessment procedures relating to nPR PPMs in general 
fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement, it is clear that ‘labelling 
requirements’ relating to nPR PPMs are TBT measures within the meaning of 
Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement, and thus fall within the scope of application of the 
TBT Agreement. 
A law requiring that eggs bear a label indicating that in the production process 
animal welfare requirements were met, is therefore a technical regulation to which 
the disciplines of the TBT Agreement apply. As noted above, it is doubtful that in 
view of the wording of the defi nitions of technical regulations and standards, and 
in particular the words ‘related processes and product methods’ [emphasis added], 
nPR PPM measures are TBT measures within the meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT 
425 Ibid., para. 73.
426 Ibid., para. 74.
427 Ibid., para. 75.
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Agreement., To date, however, no nPR PPM measure has been tested under the 
TBT Agreement. Some uncertainty and debate regarding the scope of the TBT 
Agreement is likely to persist as long as the Appellate Body has not yet ruled on 
this issue.428 If and when the Appellate Body rules that the TBT Agreement does not 
apply to nPR PPM measures, the analysis in this section would becomes largely 
without object. It would only still be of relevance to mandatory or voluntary 
labelling relating to nPR PPMs.429
5.1.2 Scope of application ratione personae 
Although the TBT Agreement is mainly addressed to central government bodies, it 
explicitly aims to extend the application of its rules to ‘other bodies’ responsible for 
the establishment of technical regulations, standards, or execution of conformity 
assessment procedures. These ‘other bodies’ covered by the TBT Agreement 
primarily consist of local government and non-governmental bodies. Local 
government bodies are all bodies of government other than the central 
government, such as provinces, Länder, cantons or municipalities. They include 
any organ subject to the ‘control of such a [local] government in respect of the 
activity in question’.430 Non-governmental bodies in the context of the TBT 
Agreement are defi ned as bodies other than central or local government bodies 
that ‘ha[ve] legal power to enforce a technical regulation’.431 The TBT Agreement 
extends its application to those ‘other bodies’ by imposing, on WTO Members, the 
obligation: 
to take measures in order to ensure compliance with the  – TBT Agreement by 
local government bodies and non-governmental bodies; or
to refrain from taking measures that could encourage actions by these other  –
bodies that are inconsistent with the provisions of the TBT Agreement. 
428 Note that if technical requirements setting out nPR PPMs are not subject to the disciplines of the TBT 
Agreement, the disciplines of the GATT 1994, and in particular the national treatment obligation of Article 
III:4, still applies. See above, p. 51-72.
429 With regard to conformity assessment procedures, note that they only fall within the scope of application of 
the TBT Agreement when they determine the conformity of products with technical regulations and 
standards which themselves fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement. Conformity 
assessment procedures to determine whether products meet the Cramer sustainability requirements set out 
technical regulations or standards are therefore only subject to the disciplines of the TBT Agreement to the 
extent that such technical regulations or standards fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement.
430 Annex 1.7 to the TBT Agreement.
431 Annex 1.8 to the TBT Agreement.
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It does so with respect to the obligations related to technical regulations, standards 
and procedures for assessment of conformity.432 Note in particular the ‘Code of 
Good Practice’ in Annex 3 to the TBT Agreement. This ‘Code of Good Practice’ 
applies to the preparation, adoption and use of standards. Members have to 
ensure that their central government standardizing bodies accept and comply with 
the ‘Code of Good Practice’. In addition, Members have, pursuant to Article 4 of the 
TBT Agreement, the obligation to take reasonable measures as are available to 
them to ensure that local and non-governmental standardizing bodies also accept 
and comply with the Code.433 
5.1.3 Relationship between the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994
The relationship between the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994 is not such that 
the applicability of one agreement triggers the exclusion of applicability of the 
other. Both agreements can apply simultaneously to the same measure.434 The 
Panel in EC – Asbestos held that in a case where both the GATT 1994 and the TBT 
Agreement appear to apply to a given measure, a panel must fi rst examine 
whether the measure at issue is consistent with the TBT Agreement, since this 
agreement deals ‘specifi cally and in detail’ with technical barriers to trade.435 
However, should a panel fi nd a measure to be consistent with the TBT Agreement, 
it must still examine whether the measure is also consistent with the GATT 1994. 
Note that, in general, the relationship between the GATT 1994 and the other 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods (including the TBT Agreement) is 
governed by the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement. 
This note provides that in case of confl ict between a provision of the GATT 1994 
and a provision of another multilateral agreement on trade in goods, the latter will 
prevail to the extent of the confl ict. However, such a confl ict between the TBT 
Agreement and the GATT 1994 is rather unlikely.
432 See Articles 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the TBT Agreement.
433 As of 18 November 2002, 145 standardizing bodies from 101 WTO Member countries had notifi ed their 
acceptance of the ‘Code of Good Practice’. See List of Standardizing Bodies that have accepted the Code of 
Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards.
434 Note that the relationship between the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement is quite different. Pursuant to 
Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement, the provisions of the TBT Agreement do not apply to sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures.
435 Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.16. On this point more generally, see the Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Bananas III, para. 204.
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5.2 MFN treatment and national treatment obligations 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides that, with respect to technical 
regulations: 
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from 
the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other 
country. 
The national treatment obligation and the MFN treatment obligation thus apply to 
technical regulations.436 Pursuant to Annex 3D and Article 5.1.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, these obligations also apply to standards and conformity assessment 
procedures, respectively. Thus, for example, a requirement that tropical wood from 
Brazil be labelled ‘tropical wood’, while there is no such requirement for tropical 
wood from African countries, would constitute a violation of the MFN treatment 
obligation set out in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Requiring accurate testing 
for the presence of genetically modifi ed organisms (GMOs) in corn arriving from 
the United States, while such verifi cation is not required for corn from Australia 
would constitute a violation of the MFN treatment obligation set out in Article 5.1.1 
of the TBT Agreement. A requirement that imported furniture is fi re-resistant, while 
no such requirement exists for domestically produced furniture, would constitute a 
violation of the national treatment obligation set out in Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement. 
When establishing whether certain treatment is discriminatory, the determination 
of ‘likeness’ of two products, which are subject to different treatment, is a 
prerequisite. The concept of ‘like products’ within the meaning of the relevant 
provisions of the TBT Agreement has not yet been the subject of dispute 
settlement proceedings. However, the concept of ‘like products’ has been clarifi ed 
in panel and Appellate Body reports relating to Articles I and III of the GATT.437 This 
case law is undoubtedly instructive for the interpretation of the concept of ‘like 
products’ in the context of the TBT Agreement. Note, however, that, as discussed 
above, the Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II has ruled that the 
concept of ‘like products’ has different meanings in the different contexts in which 
it is used.438 In this regard, it is useful to recall that in the GATT context a fi nding 
436 Note that with regard to technical regulations adopted by local government bodies or non-governmental 
bodies, Article 3 of the TBT Agreement requires Members to take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure compliance by such bodies with the provisions of Article 2.
437 See above, p. 22, p. 32 and p. 55.
438 See above, p. 22.
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that products are ‘like’ and are given discriminatory treatment can be overcome by 
a justifi cation of this discriminatory treatment on the basis of the Article XX 
exceptions.439 However, the ‘rule-exception’ relationship, which exists between, for 
example, Articles I and III of the GATT 1994, on the one hand, and Article XX of the 
GATT 1994, on the other, is not so clearly replicated in the TBT Agreement. The 
relationship between, for example, Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement 
remains to be clarifi ed.440
5.3 Necessity requirement 
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that, with respect to technical 
regulations: 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.
With respect to standards and conformity assessment procedures, Annex 3E and 
Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement provide for the same obligation that such 
measures shall not be ‘prepared, adopted or applied with the view to, or the effect 
of, creating unnecessary obstacles to trade’.
To ensure that technical regulations do not constitute unnecessary obstacles to 
trade, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement further requires that: 
 … technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfi l a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfi lment would create. 
Article 2.2 enumerates several legitimate objectives that may justify the creation of 
a trade obstacle in the form of a technical regulation. The list of legitimate policy 
objectives of Article 2.2 includes, inter alia: 
national security;  –
the prevention of deceptive practices; –
the protection of human health and safety, animal or plant life or health; and –
the protection of the environment.  –
As indicated by the words ‘inter alia’ introducing the list, this is not an exhaustive 
list of legitimate policy objectives. It will be up to panels and the Appellate Body to 
assess whether the policy objectives other than those listed, such as energy 
439 See above, p. 89.
440 On Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, see below, p. 149.
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security or animal welfare, are, in a particular case, legitimate policy objectives 
within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Moreover, note that Article 
2.2 does not specify whether the policy objectives referred to must be pursued 
within the territory of the Member enacting the technical regulation. Recall in this 
respect the discussion on the implicit jurisdictional limitation on Article XX of the 
GATT 1994.441
A technical regulation ‘justifi ed’ under Article 2.2 as necessary to fulfi l a legitimate 
policy objective at present will not automatically remain ‘justifi ed’ in the future. 
Article 2.3 of the TBT Agreement provides that: 
Technical regulations shall not be maintained if the circumstances or objectives giving 
rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed circumstances or objectives can 
be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner. 
Members thus continually have to assess the necessity of their technical 
regulations. They also have to continually assess whether their technical 
regulations are not more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfi l a legitimate policy 
objective. 
In assessing the necessity of their technical regulations, Members must, as is 
explicitly stated in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, take ‘account of the risks non-
fulfi lment would create’.442 It is clear that the risks of non-fulfi lment of a technical 
regulation, aimed at meeting consumer preferences or avoiding deceptive 
practices, will be different from the risks that non-fulfi lment of a regulation, aimed 
at the protection of human health, may entail. Note that the TBT Agreement does 
not explicitly require a quantitative evaluation of risk. It could therefore be argued 
that, in line with the case law on Article XX of the GATT 1994, that an indication of 
risks in qualitative terms would suffi ce to justify a more trade-restrictive 
measure.443 Moreover, it is likely that, again in line with the case law on Article XX 
of the GATT 1994, Members may rely on scientifi c sources which, although 
diverging from the majority scientifi c opinion, constitute a qualifi ed and respected 
opinion.444 Other elements that, according to Article 2.2, may be useful to consider 
in assessing the necessity of a technical regulation include: available scientifi c and 
technical information; related processing technology; and the intended end-uses of 
products. To date, there is no case law on the assessment of necessity under the 
441 See above, p. 94.
442 With regard to conformity assessment procedure, Article 5.1.1 states that risks of non-conformity shall be 
taken into account. Annex 3 E (standards) does not contain the provision of risks to be taken into account.
443 See in particular Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 167.
444 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 178. See above, p. 103.
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TBT Agreement. However, in line with the case law on the assessment of necessity 
under Article XX(b) and (d) of the GATT 1994, it is to be expected that the 
assessment of necessity under the TBT Agreement will also involve a process of 
‘weighing and balancing’ the above-mentioned and other factors and elements.445 
5.4 Use of international standards 
The harmonization of national technical regulations and standards around 
international standards greatly facilitates the conduct of international trade.446 
Harmonization around international standards diminishes the trade-restrictive 
effects of technical barriers to trade by minimizing the variety of requirements that 
exporters have to meet in their different export markets thus making it possible for 
them to take (more) advantage of economies of scale. Thus, the TBT Agreement 
requires Members to base their technical regulations on international standards. 
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides, in relevant part: 
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or 
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, 
as a basis for their technical regulations …447 
However, Article 2.4 further provides that Members do not have to base their 
technical regulations on international standards if: 
… such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate 
means for the fulfi lment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of 
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems. 
The Panel and Appellate Body reports in EC – Sardines illustrate the importance, as 
well as the contentious nature, of the requirement under Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement that a technical regulation be based on an international standard. The 
fi rst question that arose in this case was whether the international standard, 
‘Codex Stan 94’ developed by an international food standard-setting body, the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, constituted a relevant international standard for 
the purposes of Article 2.4. The Panel’s examination of this question focused on 
whether the product coverage of the Codex Stan 94 was similar to that of the EC’s 
445 See above, p. 102 and 109.
446 Also the harmonization of national conformity assessment procedures around international guides and 
recommendations for conformity assessment procedures facilitates international trade.
447 In view of this requirement, it is not surprising that Article 2.6 of the TBT Agreement requires Members to 
play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation of international standards for products 
for which they either have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations.
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technical regulation, the measure at issue. According to the Panel, the examination 
of relevance with regard to the subject matter entails an analysis of whether the 
Codex Stan 94 ‘bear[s] upon, relate[s] to or [is] pertinent to’ the EC’s technical 
regulation.448 The European Communities argued that while the Codex Stan 94 
deals with sardines and other sardine-type products, the EC’s technical regulation 
exclusively concerns the product Sardina pilchardus. However, the Panel 
concluded that this argument was not suffi cient to reject the relevance of Codex 
Stan 94 as an international standard, as both measures cover the same product 
(Sardina pilchardus) and include similar types of requirement in regard to this 
product such as labelling, presentation and packing media.
Another question that arose in EC – Sardines was whether the EC’s technical 
regulation was, as required by Article 2.4, based on the international standard. In 
line with the case law on the meaning of ‘based on’ in the SPS Agreement, the 
Panel in EC – Sardines concluded that the term ‘based on’ is not equivalent to the 
term ‘conform to’, but imposes the obligation to ‘employ or apply’ the international 
standard as ‘the principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of 
enacting the technical regulation’.449 According to the Appellate Body in 
EC – Sardines, this comes down to an analysis of ‘whether there is a contradiction 
between Codex Stan 94 and the EC regulation’.450 
As noted above, a technical regulation does not have to be based on the relevant 
international standard if that standard constitutes an inappropriate or ineffective 
means to achieve the legitimate objective pursued. In EC – Sardines, the Panel and 
the Appellate Body examined whether this exemption from the obligation to base 
the technical regulation on the relevant international standard was applicable. 
A fi rst step in this examination is whether a ‘legitimate objective’ is pursued. As 
indicated above, Article 2.2 of TBT Agreement contains a non-exhaustive list of 
legitimate policy objectives. The objectives pursued by the EC’s technical regulation 
at issue in EC – Sardines, namely, the protection of market transparency, consumer 
protection and fair competition, are not included in the list of Article 2.2. However, 
Peru, the complainant, did not contest the legitimacy of these objectives and the 
Panel thus refrained from ruling on their legitimacy.451
448 Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.68.
449 Ibid., para. 7.110.
450 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 249.
451 The Panel, however, referred to the interpretation of the Panel in Canada – Pharmaceuticals Patents of the 
concept of ‘legitimate interests’ as ‘a normative claim for protection of interests that are “justifi able” in the 
sense that they are supported by relevant public policies or other social norms’ (Panel Report, EC – Sardines, 
para. 7.121).
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A second step in the examination of the applicability of the Article 2.4 exemption is 
whether the international standard is an inappropriate or ineffective means to 
achieve the legitimate objective(s) pursued by the technical regulation. According 
to the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines, it is for the complainant to demonstrate 
that the international standard in question is both an effective and appropriate 
means to fulfi l a legitimate objective.452 The difference between effectiveness and 
appropriateness is that: 
the question of effectiveness bears upon the results of the means employed, whereas 
the question of appropriateness relates to the nature of the means employed.453 
In other words, the international standard ‘would be effective if it had the capacity 
to accomplish all … objectives [pursued], and it would be appropriate if it were 
suitable for the fulfi lment of all … objectives [pursued]’.454 To date, no international 
standards with regard to biomass (or biofuels) in general, or with regard to the 
sustainability of their production in particular, have been developed. For animal 
products and animal welfare the situation is somewhat different as the Council of 
Europe has adopted certain animal welfare standards. However, the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the competent international organization, has 
not yet adopted any animal welfare standards.
Note that, as provided for in Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement, a technical 
regulation that is adopted to achieve a legitimate objective explicitly enumerated in 
Article 2.2, and is in accordance with a relevant international standard, shall be 
presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to trade, as required by Article 2.2 
discussed above.455 This means that in combination with the enumerated legitimate 
objectives under Article 2.2, international standards have the function of exempting 
trade-restrictive technical regulations from the necessity requirement of the 
Article 2.2. 
With regard to conformity assessment procedures, the TBT Agreement introduces 
similar requirements in Article 5.4. Member countries shall use the relevant guides 
or recommendations, existing or imminent, as a basis for their conformity 
assessment procedures unless the guide or recommendation is an inappropriate 
means to ensure conformity. Unlike Article 2.4, the criterion of effectiveness of the 
international guide or recommendation is not mentioned in Article 5.4. With regard 
to standards, note Paragraph F of the Code of Good Practice.
452 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 287.
453 Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.116.
454 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 288.
455 Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement.
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5.5 Other obligations under the TBT Agreement
Apart from the basic obligations under the TBT Agreement discussed in the 
previous sections, the TBT Agreement also contains a number of other obligations 
which deserve to be mentioned. This section briefl y examines the provisions of the 
TBT Agreement relating to: 
equivalence and mutual recognition; –
product requirements in terms of performance; and  –
transparency and notifi cation. –
5.5.1 Equivalence and mutual recognition 
Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement provides: 
Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations 
of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are 
satisfi ed that these regulations adequately fulfi l the objectives of their own regulations. 
The TBT Agreement thus requires WTO Members to consider accepting, as 
equivalent, the technical regulations of other Members. They should, however, only 
do so if they are satisfi ed that the foreign technical regulations adequately fulfi l the 
legitimate objectives pursued by their own technical regulations. 
With regard to conformity assessment procedures, Article 6.1 of the TBT 
Agreement requires Members to accept the results of such procedures by other 
Member countries, even if their conformity assessment procedures differ, as long 
as they provide an assurance of conformity with the domestic technical regulations 
or standards. Compliance with international guides and recommendations on 
conformity assessment procedures shall be taken into consideration when 
evaluating the adequacy of the competent conformity assessment bodies. 
Members are encouraged to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of 
agreements acknowledging mutual recognition of the results of each other’s 
conformity assessment procedures.456
Article 9 of the TBT Agreement encourages the adoption of, and participation in, 
international and regional systems for conformity assessment. Such systems aim 
for cooperation between national certifi cation bodies of Members and often take 
the form of multilateral recognition agreements. Examples of such international or 
regional systems are the International Accreditation Forum (IFA) or the Worldwide 
System for Conformity Testing and Certifi cation of Electrical Equipment (IECEE).
456 See Article 6.3 of the TBT Agreement.
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5.5.2 Product requirements in terms of performance 
With respect to technical regulations, Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement provides: 
Wherever appropriate, Members shall specify technical regulations based on product 
requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics. 
The TBT Agreement thus prefers Members to adopt technical regulations on the 
basis of product requirements in terms of performance. With regard to standards, 
Annex 3I to the TBT Agreement provides for the same preference for standards 
based on product requirements in terms of performance.
5.5.3 Transparency and notifi cation 
When no relevant international standard exists or when a proposed technical 
regulation is not in accordance with a relevant international standard and the 
proposed technical regulation may have a signifi cant effect on trade of other 
Members, Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement requires Members to: 
publish a notice, at an early stage, in such a manner as to enable interested  –
parties in other Member states to become acquainted with the proposed 
technical requirement; 
notify other Members through the WTO Secretariat of the products to be  –
covered by the proposed technical regulation, together with a brief indication of 
the objective and rationale of the technical regulation. This notifi cation must be 
done at an early stage of the process, when amendments to the proposed 
technical regulation can still be made and comments can be taken into account; 
provide other Members, upon their request, with copies of and information on  –
the proposed technical regulation, including information on how the proposed 
technical regulation deviates from relevant international standards; and 
allow a reasonable time for other Members to make comments on the  –
proposed technical regulation, to discuss these comments upon request, and to 
take the comments and the resulting discussion into account when eventually 
deciding on the technical regulation. 
When a technical regulation is adopted to address an urgent problem of safety, 
health, environmental protection or national security, a Member may set aside the 
notifi cation (and consultation) requirements set out in Article 2.9 of the TBT 
Agreement. However, in such instances, Members are subject to certain 
notifi cation (and consultation) obligations after the adoption of the technical 
regulation.457
457 See Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement.
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Article 2.11 of the TBT Agreement requires that all adopted technical regulations 
are: 
… published promptly or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable 
interested parties in other Members to become acquainted with them. 
Except when a technical regulation addresses an urgent problem, as referred to 
above, technical regulations may not enter into force immediately after publication. 
Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement provides in relevant part: 
… Members shall allow a reasonable interval between the publication of technical 
regulation and their entry into force in order to allow time for producers in exporting 
Members … to adapt their products or methods of production to the requirements of 
the importing Member. 
Such a reasonable interval between the publication and the entry into force of a 
technical regulation is particularly important for producers in exporting developing 
country Members. 
The TBT Agreement contains similar provisions with regard to the notifi cation of 
standards and conformity assessment requirements.458 As an additional 
requirement for standards, the TBT Agreement requires Members’ national 
standardizing bodies to publish, at least every six months, their work programme 
and report on the progress regarding the preparation and adoption of standards.459
Note that the 1996 Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment states, 
with regard to proposals on transparency concerning voluntary eco-labelling 
schemes:
Another proposal is that full transparency should be encouraged to enable timely public 
input at each stage of an eco-labelling programme’s development. This would reduce 
the risk that environmental criteria in eco-labelling schemes/programmes narrowly 
refl ect national considerations, take different environmental approaches into account, 
and help ensure that foreign producers or countries with signifi cant trade interests in a 
labelled product have both timely and effective input throughout the entire eco-labelling 
process. Transparency provisions should emphasize the timely access to information 
regarding product group defi nition; the identifi cation and elaboration of environmental 
458 Annex 3 L, M, N and O of to the TBT Agreement (for standards) and Articles 5.6, 5.7 5.8 and 5.8 of the 
TBT Agreement (for conformity assessment procedures).
459 See Annex 3 J of to the TBT Agreement.
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criteria; procedures used in the awarding of labels, and other factors. Transparency, it 
has been noted, is of importance not only to the trading system but to the 
environmental policy objectives as well.460
6 Relevant WTO obligations on subsidies
Granting subsidies to promote the use of ‘preferred’ products or technologies (e.g. 
environmentally friendly products or technologies) is an important and often 
indispensable policy instrument for many WTO (developed country) Members.461 
The Netherlands currently subsidizes the production of electricity from ‘alternative’ 
energy sources, including biofuels, under the Subsidieregeling Milieukwaliteit van 
de Elektriciteitsproductie (MEP programme). Under the Unieke Kansenregeling 
(UKR), a programme for the reduction of CO2 emissions, the Netherlands has 
granted an investment subsidy of € 4 million for the construction of a biodiesel 
production plant in the southwest of the Netherlands (Terneuzen). Reportedly the 
biomass used by this plant would have to come from farmers of the region and 
would have to be consistent with the Cramer sustainability criteria. The 
Netherlands Ministry of Transport has proposed a subsidy programme 
(Subsidieprogramma CO2-reductie Innovatieve Biobrandstoffen (IBB programme) 
to promote the use of innovative biofuels for traffi c and transport as these sectors 
contribute signifi cantly to CO2 emissions.
 462
The WTO rules on subsidies are primarily contained in two agreements, namely, 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the ‘SCM Agreement’), 
which applies to all subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of that 
Agreement; and the Agreement on Agriculture, which applies, in addition to the 
SCM Agreement, to subsidies on agricultural products (or, to be precise, to 
subsidies that confer a benefi t to agricultural products). In case of confl ict between 
the rules of the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture, the latter rules 
prevail.463 Whether only the SCM Agreement or the SCM Agreement as well as the 
Agreement on Agriculture would apply to subsidies on biomass or biofuels 
depends on whether these products are classifi ed as agricultural products, i.e. in 
HS Chapters 1 to 24 (except fi sh and fi sh products), plus the HS Headings and 
Codes listed in Annex 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture. The HS does not refer to 
460 Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/1, para. 77.
461 This section is based on, and in parts further elaborates and updates P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2005, reprinted 2006), pp.551-595.
462 Staatscourant 2006, nr. 247, p.24.
463 See Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 and other 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods (including the SCM Agreement) apply subject to the provisions of 
the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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biomass as such, but it does refer in Chapters 1 to 24 to the various specifi c kinds 
of biomass used (e.g. sugar beet). Likewise, the HS does not refer to biofuels as 
such. It does, however, refer to ethanol (as a processed agricultural product), 
without distinguishing between ethanol used as biofuel or ethanol used for 
different purposes.
6.1 Obligations under the SCM Agreement
The principal WTO agreement on subsidies is the SCM Agreement. Article 1.1 of the 
SCM Agreement defi nes a subsidy as a ‘fi nancial contribution by a government or 
any public body’ whereby ‘a benefi t is … conferred’. Both the SCM Agreement as 
well as case law work out and clarify each element of this defi nition. Note, for 
example, that a ‘fi nancial contribution’ includes, in addition to direct cash 
payments, also the provision of goods and services and tax exemptions or 
rebates.464 Tax exemptions and rebates constitute fi nancial contributions by a 
government to the extent that the government has ‘forgone revenue otherwise 
due’.465 A ‘benefi t’ is being conferred if the subsidy confers a competitive advantage 
on the recipient (compared with the conditions that the recipient would otherwise 
have to face in the marketplace). In other words, a ‘benefi t’ is an advantage in 
relation to normal market conditions. As the Appellate Body noted in 
US – Softwood Lumber IV, determining whether a benefi t has been granted may 
be particularly diffi cult in situations where the market conditions have been 
pervasively infl uenced by government intervention and the ‘market’ can therefore 
not function as a benchmark in determining whether a benefi t was granted. This 
may be the case with regard to biofuels.466 Not all subsidies within the meaning of 
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement fall within the scope of application of the SCM 
Agreement. As provided for in Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement, the disciplines of 
the SCM Agreement apply only to subsidies that are ‘specifi c’ within the meaning 
of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.
464 See Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
465 If a Member, rather than giving a tax rebate to biofuels produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability 
criteria, were to adopt a new tax regulation under which the amount of the tax on biofuels depends on 
whether the biofuels have been produced consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria, it may be 
diffi cult to argue that the Member concerned has forgone revenue otherwise due. In that case, there may 
well be no ‘fi nancial contribution by a government’. The SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture 
would then not apply. Note, however, that this tax regulation may still be found to be inconsistent with the 
national treatment obligation of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. See above, p. 27. 
466 See Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 93. R. Howse, P van Bork and C. Hedebrand, 
WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and ContraintsConstraints in the Creation of a Global 
Marketplace, IPC Discussion Paper, October 2006.
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For a subsidy to be ‘specifi c’, it must be targeted, de jure or de facto, to a specifi c or 
limited class of industries or companies. A national health security system or 
vocational schooling are not specifi c subsidies within the meaning of Article 2 of 
the SCM Agreement since they are not targeted to, or to the benefi t of, a specifi c or 
limited class of industries or companies.
6.1.1 Prohibited subsidies
Under the SCM Agreement certain subsidies are prohibited while others are 
actionable, i.e. they can be challenged as WTO-inconsistent if they adversely affect 
the interests of other Members. The prohibited subsidies are:
export subsidies; and –
import substitution subsidies. –
As defi ned in Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, export subsidies are subsidies 
contingent upon export performance. Annex I of the SCM Agreement contains an 
‘Illustrative List of Export Subsidies’. As defi ned in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement, import substitution subsidies are subsidies contingent upon the use of 
domestic products over imported products. In the Netherlands, if the subsidies 
granted under the IBB programme or the MEP programme were to be contingent, 
de jure or de facto, on the use of Dutch biofuels, these subsidies would be 
prohibited. If the Netherlands were to make IBB or MEP subsidies conditional upon 
the use of biofuels from biomass produced in accordance with the Cramer 
sustainability criteria and these criteria cannot, or only with great diffi culty, be met 
by (most) developing country Members, it could be argued that these subsidies are 
de facto contingent upon the use of domestic products over imported products 
and, therefore, prohibited import substitution subsidies. To the extent that the 
subsidy granted under the Unieke Kansenregeling (UKR) programme for the 
construction of a biodiesel production plant in the southwest of the Netherlands is 
conditional upon the use by this plant of biomass produced by farmers of the 
region (de jure contingency) or biomass produced consistently with the Cramer 
sustainability criteria (arguably de facto contingency), this subsidy would be a 
prohibited import substitution subsidy. Subsidies that are found to be prohibited 
must be withdrawn, i.e. removed, without delay. If the subsidizing Member fails to 
withdraw a prohibited subsidy, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body must, upon the 
request of the complainant and by reverse consensus (i.e. automatically), authorize 
‘appropriate countermeasures’ (i.e. retaliation in the form of suspensions of 
concessions or other obligations).
6.1.2 Actionable subsidies
Unlike export subsidies and import substitution subsidies, most subsidies are not 
prohibited but are ‘actionable’. As noted above, this means that they can be 
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challenged in the event that they cause adverse effects to the interests of other 
Members. As provided for in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, there are three types 
of ‘adverse effects’ to the interests of other Members:
material injury,  – or threat thereof, to the domestic industry of another 
Member;467
nullifi cation or impairment  – of benefi ts accruing directly or indirectly to other 
Members under the GATT 1994; and
serious prejudice – , or threat thereof, to the interests of another Member.
Serious prejudice may arise were a subsidy has one or more of the effects 
described in Article 6 of the SCM Agreement, including the impediment of imports 
of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member, or the signifi cant 
price undercutting by the subsidized product in comparison to the like product of 
another Member in the same market.468 It is possible that the subsidies under the 
MEP, IBB and UKR programmes, referred to above, may have these effects and 
may, therefore, be considered to cause serious prejudice to the interests of other 
Members. If that is the case, the Netherlands would be, pursuant to Article 7 of the 
SCM Agreement, under an obligation to take appropriate steps to remove the 
adverse effects of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy itself. The Netherlands 
would have to do so within six months. If it fails to do so, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body must, upon the request of the complainant, authorize ‘appropriate 
countermeasures’.469
6.2 Obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture
As already noted above (in footnote), Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
states that:
The provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the other Multilateral Agreements in Annex 1A 
to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
467 See Article 15 of the SCM Agreement. Note that the concept of ‘injury’ also includes ‘material retardation of the 
establishment of a domestic industry. Also note that the concept of ‘like product’ in this context is specifi cally 
defi ned in the SCM Agreement. However, the approach to establishing ‘likeness’ under the SCM Agreement is, 
in fact, similar to the approach under the GATT 1994, as discussed above (see p. 22, p. 32 and p. 55).
468 Pursuant to Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, serious prejudice exists when the effect of the subsidy is to 
displace imports of a ‘like’ product into the market of the subsidizing member or to displace exports of the 
complaining Member to a third country market. Serious prejudice also exists when the effect of the subsidy 
is signifi cant price suppression or price undercutting with respect to the like products, or when the effect of 
the subsidy is an (sustained) increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular 
primary product or commodity. 
469 See above, p. 159.
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Therefore, the provisions of the SCM Agreement, discussed above, apply to 
subsidies to promote the use of agricultural products only to the extent that the 
Agreement on Agriculture does not provide for different, confl icting rules. 
Agricultural subsidies have traditionally been, and continue to be, a highly 
contentious issue in international trade. Agricultural subsidies were a major topic 
of discussion during the Uruguay Round, and are again high on the agenda of the 
Doha Development Round. Agricultural export subsidies and domestic agricultural 
support measures are indispensable instruments of the current agricultural policies 
of a number of developed-country Members and, most notably, the European 
Communities. At the same time, the trade interests and the economic development 
of many other Members are severely affected by these agricultural subsidies. The 
particularly sensitive nature of the issue of agricultural subsidies explains why the 
rules on the SCM Agreement do not apply in full to agricultural subsidies. The 
Agreement on Agriculture provides for special rules on agricultural subsidies 
which, in case of confl ict with the rules of the SCM Agreement, prevail over the 
latter rules.
6.2.1 Agricultural export subsidies
The prohibition of the SCM Agreement on export subsidies applies to agricultural 
export subsidies except as provided otherwise in the Agreement on Agriculture. 
A distinction must be made between export subsidies on:
agricultural products that are specifi ed in Section II of Part IV of a Member’s  –
GATT Schedule of Concessions; and
agricultural products that are not specifi ed in that section. –
With respect to the fi rst group of agricultural products, the export subsidies of the 
types listed in Article 9.1(a) to (f) of the Agreement on Agriculture, are subject to 
reduction commitments. As set out in the relevant section of their GATT Schedule, 
developed-country Members agreed to reduce the export subsidies on these products 
by an average of 36% by value (budgetary outlay) and 21% by volume (subsidized 
quantities). Developing-country Members agreed to reduce the export subsidies by an 
average of 24% by value and 14% by volume. WTO Members may not grant export 
subsidies of the types listed in Article 9.1 in excess of the budgetary outlay and 
quantitative levels specifi ed in their GATT Schedules.470 According to Article 10.1 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, export subsidies of a type that are not listed in Article 9.1, 
may not be applied in a manner that would result in circumvention of export subsidy 
commitments. This effectively prohibits any export subsidy other than those listed in 
Article 9.1. With regard to agricultural products not specifi ed in the relevant section of 
their GATT Schedule, Members shall not provide export subsidies.
470 See Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
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6.2.2 Domestic agricultural support measures
Apart from agricultural export subsidies, the Agreement on Agriculture also 
regulates domestic agricultural support measures. With respect to these measures, 
WTO Members have agreed to reduce the level of support. Developed-country 
Members agreed to reduce between 1995 and 2000 their ‘aggregate measurement 
of support’ (AMS) by 20%. Developing-country Members agreed to reduce their 
AMS by 13.3% in the period 1995-2004.471 WTO Members may not provide 
domestic support in excess of the commitment levels specifi ed in their GATT 
Schedules.472
Certain domestic agricultural support measures are exempted from the reduction 
commitments. These exempted domestic support measures are commonly referred 
to as ‘green box’ measures.473 As set out in Annex 2 to the Agreement on 
Agriculture, ‘green box’ measures include support for agricultural research and 
infrastructure, training and advisory services and domestic food aid.474 According 
to Annex 2, ‘green box’ measures must:
be provided through a publicly funded government programme (including  –
government revenue forgone) not involving transfers from consumers; and
not have the effect of providing price support to producers. – 475 
Moreover, the domestic support measures must meet the policy-specifi c criteria 
and conditions set out in paragraphs 2 to 13 of Annex 2. Most relevant in the 
context of this study are the conditions set out in paragraph 12, which concerns 
‘payments under environmental programmes’. Paragraph 12(a) states:
471 See Article 15.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
472 The commitments of Members on the reduction of domestic agricultural support measures are set out in 
Part IV of their GATT Schedule.
473 Note that the domestic support measures that are subject to reduction commitments, are often referred to as 
‘amber box’ measures. In addition to ‘green box’ measures, there is another category of domestic support 
measures that is exempted from reduction criteria. These measures, commonly referred to as the ‘blue box’ 
measures, include certain developing-country subsidies designed to encourage agricultural production, 
certain de minimis subsidies, and certain direct subsidies aimed at limiting agricultural production. See 
Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
474 Article 7 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that ‘green box’ measures must be maintained in 
conformity with the criteria set out in Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture. These criteria, discussed 
below, justify the exemption from the reduction commitments.
475 See para, 1(a) and (b) of Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture.
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Eligibility for such payments shall be determined as part of a clearly-defi ned government 
environment or conservation programme and be dependent on the fulfi lment of specifi c 
conditions under the government programme, including conditions related to 
production methods and inputs. [emphasis added]
Paragraph 12(b) states:
The amount of payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in 
complying with the government programme.
An example of such ‘green box’ measures is the subsidies in the form of 
exemptions from gasoline taxes granted to purchasers of biofuels under the 2003 
EC Biofuels Directive.476 Subsidies in the form of direct grants or tax exemptions or 
rebates to oil or electricity companies that use biomass (or biofuels from biomass) 
produced consistently with the environment-related Cramer sustainability criteria, 
may be ‘green box’ subsidies within the meaning of Annex 2 and, therefore, not 
subject to any limitation under the Agreement on Agriculture. However, these 
subsidies would have to be limited to an amount necessary to compensate oil or 
electricity companies for the extra cost of using biomass (of biofuels from 
biomass) that is produced consistently with the environment-related Cramer 
sustainability criteria. Note that in the context of the Doha Development Round, the 
European Communities initially proposed that direct subsidies granted to farmers 
to assist them with the extra costs incurred in meeting high animal welfare 
standards should be included in the category of ‘green box’ subsidies. As this 
proposal found very little support among the WTO membership, the European 
Communities no longer attaches much importance to it.
476 Note that it may be argued that the subsidy is not ‘specifi c’ (see above, p. XXXVIII) since the subsidy is not 
targeted to specifi c industries or companies but is available to all purchasers of biofuels. However, this 
argument could be refuted by pointing out that not the purchasers but the biofuel industry is the benefi ciary 
of this subsidy (upstream subsidy) and that the subsidy is therefore ‘specifi c’. It is assumed here that a 
‘benefi t’, in the sense of a competitive advantage, is conferred to the domestic biofuel industry.
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1 General introduction
Environment, human rights and labour standards are the subject of separate 
international agreements, as introduced in Part 1 of this report. Occasionally, such 
agreements contain provisions that have a bearing on international trade. These 
provisions either directly pose obligations upon parties that affect trade or allow 
for parties to install trade measures addressing environmental or social concerns. 
Examples include the regime of import and export restrictions under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) – which is in part obligatory and in part voluntary – and the protection of 
labour rights under the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Also, 
the production standards developed by private or non-governmental organizations, 
such as those of the Euro Retailer Working Group (EurepGAP) and the Forest 
Stewardship Council, have a direct bearing on international trade. 
The fi rst part of this chapter will address the WTO compatibility of these specifi c 
international agreements and measures, while the second part will assess the 
place and role of other norms of international law – such as those emanating from 
human rights and environmental agreements – in the WTO system. It must be 
noted that, so far, a dispute over confl icting obligations under environmental or 
human rights agreements on the one hand, and WTO law on the other, has not yet 
been put forward to the WTO dispute settlement system. However, there is an 
apparent need for answers in order to avoid or to address such disputes in future.
2  Obligations stemming from other international agreements and 
measures
This section describes the pertinent features of the international environmental and 
social agreements and measures introduced in section 1 above. It will address the 
obligations stemming from these agreements and measures and briefl y explain 
how these relate to WTO obligations. It will also assess some possibilities for 
installing unilateral measures based on these agreements and measures. 
2.1 International agreements on environmental protection
International environmental agreements occasionally resort to trade-related 
measures to further their objectives. Out of the 200 multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) currently in force, the WTO has identifi ed 14 agreements 
containing trade-related provisions.477 
477 See the Matrix on Trade Measures pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, prepared by 
the WTO Secretariat, WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.3, 16 February 2005, available at www.wto.org. 
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It should be noted that in most cases these trade provisions relate to product-
related processes and production methods (PR PPMs). Nonetheless, their relevance 
for the current discussion is twofold. First, the discussion on the relation of MEAs 
to WTO law is still not resolved, while the need for answers is of high relevance, 
notably in the context of unilateral measures adopted pursuant to these 
agreements. Second, these unilateral measures may relate to non-product related 
PPMs introduced in furtherance of the objectives of environmental agreements. 
Examples include a prohibition on harvesting techniques detrimental to biological 
diversity (protected under the Convention on Biological Diversity) or to 
endangered species (protected under CITES), and the levy of a carbon tax on 
products produced in an unsustainable way by States not party to the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
This subsection will review the major environmental agreements and their trade-
related provisions. Particular confl icts with WTO law will be assessed within the 
context of these treaties. Some common features of the environmental agreements 
– i.e. provisions on the transfer of technology to developing countries and 
provisions affecting non-Parties – and their relation to WTO law will be dealt with 
separately at the end of this subsection. 
2.1.1  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) 
CITES is among the earliest multilateral environmental conventions and regulates 
the trade in endangered species of wild fauna and fl ora.478 Its main purpose is to 
prevent overexploitation of wild animals and plants leading to their extinction. 
Article 2 of the Convention distinguishes three categories: 
‘species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade’,  –
listed in Appendix I to the Convention; 
‘ – species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may 
become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict 
regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival’, listed in 
Appendix II to the Convention; and 
‘species which any Party identifi es as being subject to regulation within its  –
jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as 
478 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), concluded in 
Washington, DC, on 3 March 1973 (entry into force 1 July 1975), 993 UNTS 243. As of early 2007, 169 states 
had ratifi ed CITES. On international wildlife law, see P. van Heijnsbergen, International Legal Protection of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1997); and S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law: An Analysis of 
International Treaties Concerned with the Conservation of Wildlife (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1985). 
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 needing the cooperation of other Parties in the control of trade’, listed in 
Appendix III to the Convention.479 
Requirements for trade in these species differ according to the appendix they are 
listed in, the Appendix I regime being the most severe. Trade in species listed in 
Appendix I requires both an export and an import permit, granted after approval of 
both a Scientifi c and Management Authority (Article III). The Scientifi c Authority 
must determine that trade in the species involved will not be detrimental to its 
survival. This is the so-called ‘no detriment’ requirement. For species listed in 
Appendix II the same requirements apply, except for the obligation to present an 
import permit (Article IV). Finally, a species listed in Appendix III only require an 
export permit for States that have included that species in Appendix III and do not 
need the approval of a Scientifi c Authority (Article V). Although the Convention 
does not specifi cally provide for it, export quotas for specifi c species can be 
installed by the Conference of the Parties or – on a voluntary basis – by Parties 
themselves. Furthermore, in order to enforce the provisions of the Convention, 
Parties are required to take domestic measures. According to Article VIII of the 
Convention, these shall include measures ‘to penalize trade in, or possession of 
[…] specimens’ and ‘to provide for the confi scation or return to the State of export 
of such specimens’. 
CITES is the only MEA that exclusively resorts to trade measures to protect the 
environment.480 These measures, which consist of import and export licences and 
(voluntary) quotas, are prima facie incompatible with Article XI of the GATT. 
However, these may be justifi ed under the general exception clauses of Article XX 
of the GATT.481 First, the measures may be considered necessary for the protection 
of animal and plant life and health (Article XX(b) of the GATT) since they intend to 
protect species threatened with extinction.482 It is diffi cult to think of another less 
479 Parties to the convention may propose amendments to Appendices I and II to be adopted by the Conference 
of the Parties (Article XV). Since inclusion of a species in Appendix III is voluntary and only relates to trade in 
species from the Party that has included them, amendments to Appendix III may be made by any Party at any 
time (Article XVI).
480 See G. van Calster, International and EU Trade Law: The Environmental Challenge (London: Cameron May, 
2000), p. 83.
481 For an in-depth analysis of Articles XI and XX GATT, see Part I of this study. 
482 Van Calster points out that the ‘no detriment requirement’ of CITES for trade in species listed in Appendices I 
and II might make it diffi cult for a country to justify the import restrictions under Article XX of the GATT, 
since this might result in a situation in which different trade restrictions apply for the same species 
depending on whether it is threatened or not in the region from which it originates. However, it could also be 
argued that in these circumstances ‘the same conditions’, as stipulated by Article XX of the GATT, do not 
apply. See G. van Calster, International and EU Trade Law, pp.110-121. 
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trade-restrictive way to attain this objective. Second, the measures relate to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources and are made effective in 
conjunction with domestic restrictions (Article XX(g) of the GATT). In the 
US – Shrimp case, the Appellate Body made it clear to be a proponent of 
international cooperation for the protection of the environment. Therefore, it is 
likely that the measures prescribed by a multilateral convention like CITES, that 
creates the same obligations for all Parties and serves a legitimate objective (i.e. 
the protection of species threatened with extinction), will be found compatible with 
WTO law. This leaves open the question of how to deal with the obligations the 
Convention creates for non-parties. Article X of the Convention states that 
where export or re-export is to, or import is from, a State not a Party to the present 
Convention, comparable documentation issued by the competent authorities in that 
State which substantially conforms with the requirements of the present Convention 
for permits and certifi cates may be accepted in lieu thereof by any Party. 
This provision essentially requires non-signatories to abide by the Convention in 
their trade relations with Parties to CITES. In its Resolution 9.5, the Conference of 
the Parties established strict criteria for documentation issued by non-parties.483 
That is not to say that these automatically amount to – in the words of Article XX of 
the GATT – ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination’. Much will depend on the 
interpretation of the CITES requirements in the context of WTO law. In the 
US – Shrimp case, the Appellate Body determined that requiring other countries to 
adopt ‘essentially the same’ regulatory programme amounts to arbitrary 
discrimination.484 However, in the follow-up to this case, the Appellate Body ruled 
483 Resolution 9.5, adopted at the ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties in Fort Lauderdale, 7-18 
November 1994; amended at the thirteenth meeting in Bangkok, 2-14 October 2004. The Conference of the 
Parties recommends that Parties only accept permits and certifi cates issues by non-signatories if they 
contain ‘i) the name, stamp and signature of a competent issuing authority; ii) suffi cient identifi cation of the 
species concerned for the purposes of the Convention; iii) certifi cation of the origin of the specimen 
concerned including the export permit number from the country of origin, or justifi cation for omitting such 
certifi cation; iv) in the case of export of specimens of a species included in Appendix I or II, certifi cation to 
the effect that the competent scientifi c institution has advised that the export will not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species (in case of doubt a copy of such advice should be required) and that the specimens 
were not obtained in contravention of the laws of the State of export; v) in the case of re-export, certifi cation 
to the effect that the competent authority of the country of origin has issued an export document that 
substantially meets the requirements of Article VI of the Convention; and vi) in the case of export or re-export 
of live specimens, certifi cation to the effect that they will be transported in a manner that will minimize the 
risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.’
484 For a discussion of the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, see Part I of this study. See 
also section 3.3 below. 
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that requiring other countries to adopt a programme which is ‘comparable in 
effectiveness’ is allowed. In this regard, the Appellate Body stated that 
…there is an important difference between conditioning market access on the adoption 
of essentially the same programme, and conditioning market access on the adoption of 
a programme comparable in effectiveness. Authorizing an importing Member to 
condition market access on exporting Members putting in place regulatory programmes 
comparable in effectiveness to that of the importing Member gives suffi cient latitude 
to the exporting Member with respect to the programme it may adopt to achieve the 
level of effectiveness required. It allows the exporting Member to adopt a regulatory 
programme that is suitable to the specifi c conditions prevailing in its territory.485
2.1.2  Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is a multilateral 
framework convention, negotiated in the early 1980s in response to concerns 
regarding acid rain and the depletion of the ozone layer by substances such as 
chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs).486 The Convention aims ‘to protect human health and 
the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human 
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer’. The Convention sets 
out general policy guidelines relating to research and systematic observations 
(Article 3) and to international cooperation in the legal, scientifi c and technical 
fi elds (Article 4). Amongst these guidelines is the obligation for Parties to 
‘cooperate in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards for 
the implementation of this Convention, with a view to the adoption of protocols 
and annexes’. Thus, the Convention provides for a framework for Parties to take 
further action through the adoption of protocols and annexes. 
So far, the Conference of the Parties has only adopted one – but highly 
successful – protocol to the Vienna Convention. The Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer aims 
485 See Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 144.
486 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, concluded in Vienna on 22 March 1985 (entry into force 22 
September 1988), 26 ILM 1529 (1987). As of early 2007, 191 states had ratifi ed the Vienna Convention. On this 
subject, see O. Yoshida, The International Legal Regime for the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001).
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to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably total 
global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their 
elimination on the basis of developments in scientifi c knowledge.487 
These precautionary measures consist of the phasing out of the consumption of 
certain controlled substances as specifi ed in the Annexes to the Protocol. Parties to 
the Protocol undertake to reduce their levels of consumption of ozone-depleting 
substances to an established base level. Article 2 of the Protocol allows for Parties 
to transfer portions of their calculated level of production of a number of the 
controlled substances to other Parties, ‘provided that the total combined calculated 
levels of production of the Parties concerned for any group of controlled 
substances do not exceed the production limits set out in those Articles for that 
group’. The Protocol also allows for limited transfer of portions of the consumption 
level of substances known as hydrochlorofl uorocarbons, which are considered less 
damaging to the ozone layer than CFCs. On the basis of Article 2(8), members of a 
regional economic integration organization such as the European Union may form 
a ‘bubble’, that is they may choose to jointly fulfi l their obligations in order to 
reduce their consumption levels.
Furthermore, Article 5 of the Protocol provides for preferential treatment for 
developing countries. It also makes the implementation of the Protocol by those 
Parties dependent upon the effective implementation of the provisions for fi nancial 
assistance and the transfer of technology by industrialized countries. While WTO 
law provides for special and preferential treatment for developing countries 
Members, the provision on the transfer of technology may confl ict with WTO law. 
This issue will be discussed below. 
Finally, Article 4 of the Protocol contains provisions for trade with non-parties to 
the Protocol. In theory, these provisions are the most problematic in relation to 
WTO law, because they provide for a complete ban on trade through a phasing-out 
method.488 This ban even applies to the export of technology for the production and 
utilization of substances that deplete the ozone layer and to the granting of 
subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programmes for the export of 
products, equipment, plant or technology that facilitate the production of such 
487 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, concluded in Montreal on 16 September 
1987 (entry into force 1 January 1989), 26 ILM 1550 (1987). As of early 2007, all Parties to the Vienna 
Convention had also ratifi ed the Montreal Protocol. For an explanation of the precautionary principle/
approach, see section 2.1.4 on the Cartagena Protocol below. 
488 In practice, almost the entire international community – 191 out of 192 States – have ratifi ed the Vienna 
Convention and its Montreal Protocol.
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substances.489 Furthermore, Article 4(4) relates to non-product-related production 
methods. It prohibits the import from non-parties of products ‘produced with, but 
not containing’ certain controlled substances. Finally, Article 4(8) determines that 
non-parties who de facto abide by the Protocol – as determined by the Parties – are 
exempted from the ban. These provisions clearly violate Article XI of the GATT. 
However, as pointed out by Yoshida, the measures in Article 4 of the Montreal 
Protocol are to be considered necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the protocol 
and to overcome the free-rider problem, i.e. the problem that non-parties benefi t 
from the measures taken under the protocol without taking their share in the 
measures to preserve the ozone layer.490 Furthermore, although in a strict sense 
CFCs or other ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) are not directly harmful to 
human, animal or plant life or health, it could be argued that their phasing-out is 
necessary to protect human, animal and plant life and health against the negative 
effects due to the depletion of the ozone layer.
2.1.3  Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal was drawn up in response to incidents in the 1980s 
involving the dumping of hazardous wastes by industrialized countries in 
developing states.491 This multilateral convention aims to regulate the trade in 
hazardous and other wastes with the objective of protecting human health and the 
environment from the dangers posed by such wastes. The Convention excludes 
radioactive wastes from its scope. 
Article 2 of the Convention defi nes wastes as ‘substances or objects which are 
disposed of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by 
the provisions of national law’. Article 4 of the Convention obliges Parties to reduce 
489 See Part I of this study for a discussion of the scope of measures falling within the scope of Article XI of the 
GATT. 
490 O. Yoshida, The International Legal Regime for the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2001). Yoshida argues that ‘without such trade restrictions, non-parties would 
simply increase their production as Parties gradually phase out their ozone-depleting substances (ODS) 
production, and it is possible that unrestricted imports from non-parties would impair the further 
development of CFC/ODS substitutes. Furthermore, if industries using ODSs simply moved to non-parties 
and then manufacture such products for export to the parties, this would eventually nullify the 
environmental benefi ts of the Montreal Protocol regime’ (p.139).
491 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 
concluded in Basel on 22 March 1989 (entry into force 5 May 1992), 28 ILM 657 (1989). As of April 2007, 170 
States had ratifi ed the Basel Convention. 
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to a minimum the generation and transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, 
and to ensure their environmentally sound management. Parties are not allowed to 
export wastes to countries that have prohibited the import of such wastes, or that 
have not consented in writing to the specifi c import, or when there is reason to 
believe that the wastes in question will not be managed in an environmentally 
sound manner.492 Trade with non-parties to the Convention is prohibited altogether, 
except through the conclusion of an agreement.493 Furthermore, the Convention 
adopts the ‘proximity principle’. The transboundary movement of wastes is only 
allowed if the exporting State does not have the capacity or facilities to dispose of 
the wastes in an environmentally sound manner, or when the wastes are required 
as a raw material for recycling or recovery industries in the importing State, or if it 
is in accordance with other criteria decided by the Parties. In addition, Article 4 
requires wastes to be packaged, labelled and transported in conformity with 
generally accepted international rules and standards.494 Article 6 provides for an 
extensive procedure for the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, based 
upon notifi cation by the exporting Party and prior informed consent by the 
importing State. 
Finally, Article 11 allows Parties to ‘enter into bilateral, or regional agreements or 
arrangements regarding transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other 
wastes with Parties or non-parties provided that such agreements or arrangements 
do not derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous 
wastes and other wastes as required by this Convention’. 
Furthermore, the provisions in these agreements or arrangements are not to be 
less environmentally sound. Examples of such regional agreements are the 1991 
Bamako Convention between the members of the former Organization of African 
Unity – which even provides for a complete import ban of hazardous wastes from 
non-Parties into Africa – and the 1995 Waigani Convention between the Pacifi c 
492 The second Conference of the Parties approved a ban for all export by OECD countries to non-OECD 
countries, known as the ‘Basel ban’. Failing to receive the required number of ratifi cations, the ban has not 
yet entered into force. See P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.694-695. 
493 See Article 11 further below.
494 This requirement is in conformity with and even exceeds the requirements of the TBT and SPS Agreements. 
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires national measures to be based on relevant international standards, 
if available. Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement requires Members to base their national measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist. 
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Island developing countries.495 Also, reference can be made to Article 32 of the 
2000 Cotonou Agreement, a mixed partnership agreement between the European 
Communities and the Member States of the EU on the one hand, and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacifi c (ACP) countries on the other, and to the EC Waste Shipment 
Regulation 259/93. Unlike its predecessor, the Lomé IV Convention, which 
contained a detailed provision on waste management, the Cotonou Agreement 
confi nes itself in Article 32 to mentioning that ‘cooperation on environmental 
protection and sustainable utilisation and management of natural resources shall 
[take] into account issues relating to the transport and disposal of hazardous 
waste’.496 The EC Waste Shipment Regulation contains a regime for members of the 
European Community concerning the shipment of hazardous wastes within, into 
and out of the European Community.497 
At least two features of the regime for the transboundary movement of wastes as 
set out in the Basel Convention are problematic in view of the requirements of 
WTO law.498 First, Article 4(5) of the Basel Convention prohibits Parties to trade with 
non-parties, which constitutes a violation of Articles I and XI of the GATT. The 
Convention does not include any exceptions to this rule, except for the possibility 
for a Party to conclude an agreement with a non-party through Article XI of the 
Convention. Nonetheless, held against the requirements of Article XX(b) of the 
GATT, this restriction may pass the test. The possibility offered by the Convention 
to conclude an agreement with a non-party – supplementary to the option for a 
non-party to join the Convention – may be deemed compatible with the ‘good faith 
efforts’ requirements as set out by the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp 
(Article 21.5 – Malaysia). 
The second aspect relates to the decisions by the second and third Conferences of 
the Parties to install an export ban on hazardous wastes from OECD countries to 
495 Bamako Convention on the ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes within Africa, concluded in Bamako on 30 January 1991 (entry into force 10 March 1999); 
Convention to Ban the Importation Into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to 
Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacifi c 
Region, concluded in Waigani on 16 September 1995 (not yet in force). 
496 Article 39 of the Lomé IV Convention contained a prohibition on the movement of hazardous and radioactive 
wastes from EC to ACP states and provided for consultation between Parties in case of diffi culties.
497 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste 
within, into and out of the European Community. Offi cial Journal L 30, 6/2/1993, p.1, as amended. 
498 The packaging and labelling requirements of Article 4(7)b could also pose problems. However, the Basel 
Convention requires these measures to be in conformity with ‘generally accepted and recognized 
international rules and standards’. This is compatible with the ‘international standards’ rule of the SPS and 
TBT Agreements. 
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developing countries, which also includes a ban on the export of hazardous wastes 
for recycling purposes. Although the Convention applies to both hazardous and 
other wastes, the ‘Basel ban’ – not yet applied – only prohibits shipments of 
hazardous wastes from industrialized to developing countries. Schoenbaum has 
argued that ‘an export ban on hazardous wastes may be justifi ed under GATT 
Article XX(b) on the same basis as export restrictions on domestically prohibited 
goods’ because they ‘have the potential to endanger human health and the 
environment’. In his opinion, 
even a discriminatory export ban may be upheld under Article XX(b) if the discrimination 
is not ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able … between countries where the same conditions 
prevail’. A ban that distinguishes between OECD and developing countries, arguably at 
least, could pass this test because of the very different conditions in developing 
countries’.499 
Actually, this is far from certain. First, the GATT does not contain an explicit 
exception for trade in dangerous goods. Second, the ‘Basel ban’ aims at 
extraterritorial application. If there is no genuine connection with the interests of 
the exporting party, i.e. to protect the health of its inhabitants or its domestic 
environment, it is doubtful whether the ban will be compatible with WTO 
obligations. The exporting state would have to prove that the environmentally 
unsound management of wastes in the importing state poses a risk to human 
health or the environment of the exporting state. This might be the case if the 
wastes were to pollute the sea.500 
2.1.4 Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
The Convention on Biological Diversity is a multilateral convention that aims at 
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefi ts arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate 
transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and 
to technologies, and by appropriate funding.501 
499 T. Schoenbaum, ‘International trade and environmental protection’, in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, eds, 
International Law and the Environment, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.727. Also, see 
M. Matsushita, T.J. Schoenbaum and P.C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Policy and Practice, 
2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.822.
500 See also Part I of this study for a discussion on the scope of Article XX(b) of the GATT.
501 Convention on Biological Diversity, concluded in Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992 (entry into force 29 
December 1993), 31 ILM 818 (1992). As of early 2007, 190 states had ratifi ed the Biodiversity Convention.
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Article 2 of the Convention defi nes biological diversity as ‘the variability among 
living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this 
includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.’ Although 
the Biodiversity Convention sets only broad policy goals and does not contain 
specifi c trade-related measures, it does contain some provisions that have been 
the subject of considerable debate within the context of the TRIPS Agreement on 
the protection of intellectual property. These provisions relate to the protection of 
traditional knowledge and folklore (Article 8(j)); the sharing of benefi ts arising out 
of the utilization of genetic resources (Article 15); access to and transfer of 
technology, including biotechnology (Article 16); and the handling of biotechnology 
and the distribution of its benefi ts (Article 19). A particular controversial subject is 
the sharing of benefi ts arising from traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
Indigenous peoples have acquired knowledge of genetic resources over centuries, 
without being able to identify a specifi c inventor as required under the TRIPS 
Agreement.502 Therefore, the pharmaceuticals industry has been able to register 
patents on plants and herbs for their medicinal effects without seeking the 
permission of, or having to compensate the original holders of the knowledge. The 
Biodiversity Convention purports to make this practice more diffi cult in the 
future.503 
On 29 January 2000, a Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity was 
adopted. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety addresses the issue of genetic 
modifi cation through biotechnology. It intends to minimize the potential risks for 
the environment and human health surrounding the use of living modifi ed 
organisms, better known as genetically modifi ed organisms (GMOs). It aims to 
ensure 
an adequate level of protection in the fi eld of the safe transfer, handling and use of 
living modifi ed organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse 
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health.504 
For this purpose, the Cartagena Protocol establishes a regulatory framework for 
the use or transboundary movement of GMOs consisting of different procedures, 
502 See C. Dommen, ‘Raising human rights concerns in the WTO’, in Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 24 (2002), 
pp.38-39. 
503 On this subject, see P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, pp.733-734.
504 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, concluded in Montreal on 29 
January 2000 (entry into force 11 September 2003), 39 ILM 1027 (2000). As of early 2007, 138 states had 
ratifi ed the Cartagena Protocol. 
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depending on the purpose of the use or the transboundary movement (e.g. the 
advanced informed agreement procedure of Articles 8–10 and 12 for the intentional 
introduction of GMOs into the environment of the importing Party, or the simplifi ed 
procedure of Article 11 for the direct use of GMOs as food or feed or for 
processing). A Party is free to decide, on the basis of a risk assessment, whether it 
will allow a certain GMO on its territory or not. 
The Protocol further stipulates, in Articles 10.6 and 11.8, that 
lack of scientifi c certainty due to insuffi cient relevant scientifi c information and 
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modifi ed 
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of 
import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from 
taking a decision […] in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects. 
These provisions incorporate the precautionary principle, sometimes referred to as 
the precautionary approach. In a somewhat other – more restricted – form, this 
principle is also incorporated into Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, which allows 
WTO Members to provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the 
basis of available pertinent information, in cases where relevant scientifi c evidence is 
insuffi cient.505 This right is coupled with the obligation for Members to ‘seek to obtain 
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and 
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period 
of time’. What constitutes ‘a reasonable period of time’ depends on the specifi c 
circumstances of the case and must therefore be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. Yet, Members have to make a real effort to seek to obtain additional 
information necessary to conduct a risk assessment.506 In other words, as long as 
measures taken under the Cartagena Protocol are based on available pertinent 
information, and Parties make a genuine effort to seek additional information to 
conduct a risk assessment, these measures are compatible with WTO law.
505 In EC – Hormones, the Panel considered that the precautionary principle would not override the explicit 
wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, ‘in particular since the precautionary principle has been 
incorporated and given a specifi c meaning in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement’. The Appellate Body determined 
that Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement does not exhaust the relevance of a precautionary principle. However, in 
the view of the Appellate Body, the principle ‘at least outside the fi eld of international environmental law, still 
awaits authoritative formulation’. Therefore, the Appellate Body upheld the fi nding of the Panel that the 
precautionary principle does not override the provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. See on 
this subject also S. Safrin, ‘Treaties in collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organization 
Agreements’, in American Journal of International Law, vol. 96, no. 3 (2002), p.610; and S.D. Murphy, 
‘Biotechnology and international law’, in Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 42, no. 1 (2001), pp.47-139. 
506 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II.
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2.1.5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is a multilateral 
convention that aims to achieve ‘the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’ and applies to all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol.507 
Just like the Montreal Protocol and the Cartagena Protocol, the Convention on 
Climate Change adopts a precautionary approach. Article 3(3) states that ‘where 
there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientifi c certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures’. Furthermore, the 
preamble to the Convention pronounces climate change to be a ‘common concern 
of humankind’, which calls for the ‘widest possible cooperation by all countries’. 
However, since ‘the largest share of historical and current global emissions has 
originated in developed countries’ and since they have the fi nancial and 
technological capabilities, the Convention proclaims that these countries should 
take the lead in combating the adverse effects of climate change. Therefore, the 
Convention adopts the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ as 
one of the cornerstones of the climate change regime, together with the principle 
of equity. This is made explicit in the commitments of Parties, as formulated in 
Article 4 of the Convention. Article 4(1) contains a number of general policy 
guidelines and reporting requirements that apply to all Parties.508 In this respect, 
Article 4(2) formulates stricter requirements for the industrialized countries and for 
those with economies in transition. For the latter category, some fl exibility is 
allowed. Furthermore, industrialized countries must provide fi nancial resources 
and transfer technology to developing-country Parties.509 The extent to which 
developing countries are required to implement the Convention is made 
507 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, concluded in New York on 9 May 1992 (entry into 
force 21 March 1994) 31 ILM 849 (1992). As of early 2007, 190 States had ratifi ed the Climate Change 
Convention. 
508 The Climate Change Convention differentiates between three groups of countries, listed in the appendices to 
the Convention. The fi rst group consists of industrialized Parties (listed in Appendix II). The second group 
consists of the industrialized countries and of countries undergoing the process of transformation from a 
planned to a market economy (Appendix I). The third group consists of developing countries (non-Annex I 
countries).
509 See Article 4(3) to (5) of the Convention.
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dependent on the effective implementation by industrialized countries of their 
commitments relating to fi nancial resources and transfer of technology.510
The Convention on Climate Change does not contain specifi c obligations 
concerning the reduction of greenhouse gases. These must be regulated through 
protocols. The Kyoto Protocol, containing a framework of measures for the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions until the year 2012, was adopted in 1997511 
and entered into force in 2005. The Kyoto Protocol is guided by the same principles 
as the Convention on Climate Change. These take shape in the Protocol’s regime, 
which only imposes targets for the limitation and reduction of greenhouse gases 
on industrialized countries and on countries with economies in transition (the 
Annex I countries, listed in Annex B to the Protocol). Furthermore, Article 11(2) of 
the Protocol reiterates the obligations for industrialized countries under the 
Convention, i.e. to provide additional fi nancial resources to assist developing 
countries with the implementation of the Convention. In order to achieve the 
emissions reduction targets, Parties are to implement measures into their domestic 
policies. To this effect, Article 2 of the Protocol contains a list of potential policy 
instruments. Complementary to domestic measures, Parties are allowed to fulfi l 
their commitments by reducing emissions abroad if this is more cost-effective than 
in their own countries. For this purpose, the Protocol contains three fl exible 
mechanisms: 
the Joint Implementation mechanism, which allows Annex I Parties to transfer  –
to or acquire from other Annex I Parties emission reduction units resulting from 
projects aimed at reducing emissions by sources or enhancing removals by 
sinks (Article 6); 
the Clean Development Mechanism, which makes it possible for Annex I  –
countries to gain emission credits from projects in non-Annex I countries aimed 
at achieving sustainable development (Article 12); and 
Emissions Trading, which allows the countries listed in Annex B (the Annex I  –
countries) to trade emission credits amongst each other (Article 17).512 
510 See Article 4(7) of the Convention.
511 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, concluded in Kyoto on 11 
December 1997 (entry into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 22 (1998). As of early 2007, 169 Parties to the 
Climate Change Convention had joined the Protocol. 
512 On the joint implementation mechanism, see O. Kuik, P. Peters and N.J. Schrijver (eds.), Joint Implementation 
to Curb Climate Change (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). On the subject of climate change, 
see also J. Gupta, The Climate Change Convention and Developing Countries: From Confl ict to Consensus? 
Environment and Policy Series (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
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Although the principles of both the Convention and the Protocol appear to be 
compatible with WTO law, certain measures taken pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol 
could resort to discrimination or be trade restrictive. The Kyoto Protocol leaves it 
open to Parties to decide on the domestic measures they will take to reach their 
emissions reduction targets. A number of countries have adopted measures – such 
as energy labelling, subsidies to promote the development and consumption of 
green energy, carbon and energy taxes, and border adjustment measures – that 
might confl ict with WTO rules.513 As far as the fl exible mechanisms of the Protocol 
are concerned, it is not certain yet whether they are compatible with the WTO 
agreements.514 Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether the WTO Agreement applies 
to emissions trading, since it is uncertain whether ‘emission credits’ can be defi ned 
as either goods or services.515 
2.1.6 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
The UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, commonly known as the Straddling Stocks Agreement, is a multilateral 
agreement that aims ‘to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
straddling fi sh stocks and highly migratory fi sh stocks’ (Article 2).516 As the full title 
suggests, this Agreement is supplementary to the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and must be ‘interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner 
513 These types of unilateral measures are considered more generally in Part I of this study on the compatibility 
of unilateral measures to protect environmental and social concerns with WTO law. For a more specifi c 
analysis of the compatibility of measures taken pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol with WTO law, see also 
Climate and Trade Rules: Harmony or Confl ict?, Report by the Swedish National Board of Trade, September 
2004. Available at www.kommers.se.
514 In their report, the Swedish National Board of Trade raises the question of whether the free allocation of 
emission credits within the European Union under the Joint Implementation Mechanism might constitute a 
subsidy in the sense of the SCM Agreement. However, as long as the system of allocation is designed and 
applied in a non-discriminatory way, it should be in conformity with WTO law. Also, with respect to the Clean 
Development Mechanism, problems could arise with regard to the transfer of technology in relation to the 
TRIPS Agreement. This problem, which is common to all environmental agreements providing for the 
transfer of technology to developing countries, will be discussed below. 
515 Swedish National Board of Trade, Climate and Trade Rules. See also T. Brewer, ‘The WTO and the Kyoto 
Protocol: Interaction issues’, in Climate Policy, vol. 4 (2004), pp.3-12.
516 UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, concluded in New York on 3 August 1995 (entry into force 11 December 2001) 34 ILM 
1542 (1995). As of early 2007, 65 states had ratifi ed the Straddling Stocks Agreement. 
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consistent with the Convention’ (Article 4). 
The Straddling Stocks Agreement adopts a precautionary approach to the 
conservation, management and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory 
fi sh stocks, and applies principally to fi sh stocks beyond areas under national 
jurisdiction.517 Parties are to set precautionary reference points to guarantee the 
conservation and sound management of a stock, which may not be exceeded. 
Furthermore, under the Agreement Parties have a duty to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of fi sh stocks. In order to make this cooperation 
effective, Article 8 of the Agreement provides for Parties to give effect to their duty 
to cooperate by becoming a member of a sub-regional or regional fi sheries 
management organization or a participant in a fi sheries management arrangement 
which has the competence to establish conservation and management measures 
for particular straddling or highly migratory fi sh stocks. Parties can also agree ‘to 
apply the conservation and management measures established by such an 
organization or arrangement’ or, where such an organization or arrangement does 
not exist, establish a new organization. 
The Agreement does not use trade-restrictive measures to further its objectives. 
Nonetheless, some of its provisions may have a bearing on trade. These provisions 
relate to Parties that are not members of a (sub)regional organization or 
participants in an arrangement (Article 17.4) on the one hand, and to non-parties to 
the Agreement (Article 33.2) on the other. The relevant provisions determine that 
members of a (sub)regional organization or participants in an arrangement shall 
take measures consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter 
activities of vessels which undermine the effectiveness of sub-regional or regional 
conservation and management objectives (Article 17.4), or which undermine the 
effective implementation of the Agreement (Article 33.2). Although these 
provisions do not restrict trade in a strict sense, a consistent application of the 
Agreement will result in a de facto import ban by the members of such 
organizations or participants in such arrangements on fi sh caught by these States. 
After all, if members of such organizations or participants in such arrangements are 
held to deter the fi shing activities of other States, they will certainly not buy the 
fi sh. Although these provisions are not themselves incompatible with WTO law, the 
unilateral measures adopted to give effect to these provisions will be incompatible 
with Article XI of the GATT. It remains to be seen whether these may be justifi ed 
under Article XX(b) or (g), since the provisions apply primarily to activities outside 
the limits of national economic jurisdiction. On the other hand, since the object of 
the treaty concerned constitutes ‘migratory’ fi sh, it could be argued on the basis of 
the Appellate Body Report in US – Shrimp that a suffi cient nexus exists between 
517 The Straddling Stocks Agreement also contains some provisions that apply within the jurisdiction of the 
Party. See Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement.
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unilateral measures adopted pursuant to the Agreement and the interests of the 
States concerned in protecting these fi sh.518
2.1.7 Some common features of environmental agreements
The majority of the environmental treaties discussed in this section contain 
provisions restricting or prohibiting trade with non-Parties to the agreements and/
or promoting the transfer of technology to developing countries. Both types of 
measures potentially confl ict with relevant WTO rules. 
The restriction or prohibition of trade with non-Parties is a common feature of 
several environmental agreements. Under CITES, trade with non-Parties is only 
allowed if these States provide comparable documentation. The Montreal Protocol 
prohibits trade with non-Parties altogether, except for trade with non-Parties who 
de facto abide by the Protocol. Finally, the Basel Convention only allows trade with 
non-Parties through the conclusion of bilateral agreements. The compatibility of 
this type of trade restriction depends largely on whether they pass the two-tier test 
of Article XX of the GATT. For the Basel Convention and the Montreal Protocol, this 
means that the restrictions must be deemed ‘necessary’ to attain their objective, 
while for CITES it must be established that they ‘relate to’ their objective.519 
As far as import prohibitions under the Montreal Protocol and the Basel 
Convention are concerned, these could probably be justifi ed under the general 
exception clauses of Article XX(b) of the GATT, because of the (potentially) harmful 
effects of the substances covered under these agreements to the human, animal or 
plant life or health in the importing State. Of course, the contention that these 
substances are harmful will have to be supported by (some) scientifi c evidence. A 
prohibition on the export of such substances, on the other hand, will be more 
diffi cult to justify under the relevant WTO provisions because of its extraterritorial 
application. Also, an export prohibition under CITES could be justifi ed by reference 
to Article XX(g) of the GATT relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources, but it is uncertain whether this exception could be invoked for an import 
prohibition. Furthermore, it must be determined that the measures do not 
generally constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination’. Of course, the 
518 See Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp. In para. 133, the Appellate Body stated that ‘sea turtles are highly 
migratory animals, passing in and out of waters subject to the rights of jurisdiction of various coastal states 
and the high seas. […] The sea turtle species here at stake, i.e., covered by Section 609, are all known to 
occur in waters over which the United States exercises jurisdiction. […] in the specifi c circumstances of the 
case before us, there is a suffi cient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations 
involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g)’. 
519 See Part I of this study for the different criteria of these tests.
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measures discriminate between Parties and non-Parties to the agreements. That is 
not to say that the discrimination is ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able’. However, this has to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.520 
The provisions on the transfer of technology to developing countries in the 
Montreal Protocol and the Biodiversity and Climate Change Conventions and their 
Protocols may confl ict with intellectual property rights protection under the TRIPS 
Agreement. These provisions require the States Parties to transfer technology to 
developing countries on preferential terms, while the rights on the technologies 
involved belong to (private) patent holders. Schoenbaum proposes to resolve 
these problems through the fi nancial mechanisms of the Conventions. The transfer 
of technology to developing countries on preferential terms could then be resolved 
by the provision of fi nancial resources to these countries to be used for the 
acquisition of technology. With regard to the Biodiversity Convention, Schoenbaum 
argues that 
nothing in the TRIPS Agreement would prohibit the use of an international fi nancial 
mechanism to assure access and the transfer of technology. Articles 15, 16 and 19 can 
be interpreted to mean that transfer of technology should be left to negotiations 
between private parties, but should be supplemented where needed by the fi nancial 
mechanism established by the Convention’s contracting parties under Articles 20 and 
21.521 
2.2 International agreements on human rights and labour standards
2.2.1 General remarks
Unlike environmental agreements, most human rights treaties do not contain 
explicit trade-restrictive provisions. Furthermore, it can be observed that whereas 
Article XX of the GATT contains an explicit environmental exception, a clear social 
exception is absent. Also, where trade restrictions under environmental treaties in 
most cases concern product-related process and production methods, the type of 
human rights trade measures of concern for the current discussion generally relate 
to labour standards, a typical example of non-product related PPMs. Important 
human rights treaties in this respect include the International Covenants on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights as well as the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
520 See Part I of this study for a discussion of what constitutes arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination. See also 
paragraphs 2.1.1. above and 3.3. below for an analysis in the context of the US – Shrimp case.
521 T. Schoenbaum, ‘International trade and environmental protection’, as quoted by P. Birnie and A. Boyle, 
International Law and the Environment, p.736.
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the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; 
the Anti-Torture Convention; and the International Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. These have attained broad – sometimes even almost 
universal – membership.522 Furthermore, several human rights have achieved the 
status of customary international law, some even amounting to peremptory norms 
of international law.523 
This section will concentrate on core labour rights as an example of the relation 
between core human rights and WTO law. Furthermore, cultural rights will be 
discussed within the context of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. 
2.2.2 International agreements on labour rights
The link between trade and labour rights is not a new concern to the WTO. Already 
under the GATT, the issue of ‘social dumping’ has been discussed. Moreover, the 
question of including a social clause in the WTO agreement has been on the 
agenda of the WTO since its very inception.524 Nevertheless, a solution reconciling 
the divergent interests of industrialized and developing countries on this point is 
still to be found. 
522 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted in New York on 16 December 1966 
(entry into force 3 January 1976; 155 parties as of early 2007), 6 ILM 368 (1967); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, adopted in New York on 16 December 1966 (entry into force 23 March 1976; 160 
parties as of early 2007), 6 ILM 368 (1967); the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 
New York on 20 November 1989 (entry into force 2 September 1990; 193 parties as of early 2007), 28 ILM 1456 
(1989); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted in New York on 10 December 1984 (entry into force 26 June 1987; 144 parties), 1465 UNTS 85; 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted in New York on 18 
December 1979 (entry into force 3 September 1981; 185 parties as of early 2007), 19 ILM 33 (1980); and 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted in New York on 21 
December 1965 (entry into force 4 January 1969; 173 parties as of early 2007), 660 UNTS 195.
523 The rights formulated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (General Assembly Resolution 217A(III), 
10 December 1948) are part of customary international law. Examples of peremptory norms include the right 
to life, the right to be free from torture and other inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment and the 
right to be free from slavery or servitude. Such non-derogatory human rights norms are listed in Article 4 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
524 See F. Weiss, ‘Trade and labor I’, in P.F.J. Macrory, A.E. Appleton and M.G. Plummer, The World Trade 
Organization: Economic and Political Analysis, vol. II (New York: Springer, 2005), pp.572-596.
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The WTO has turned to the International Labour Organization (ILO) to deal with the 
question of setting internationally recognized labour standards.525 In response, the 
ILO has adopted the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work recognizing some of the ILO conventions as containing fundamental rights, 
which must be respected by all ILO members whether or not they have ratifi ed the 
relevant conventions.526 Article 2 of the Declaration mentions four categories of 
fundamental labour rights. These relate to freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of 
forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.527 These 
rights and prohibitions are also included in the International Human Rights 
Covenants and in the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is 
indicative of their paramount importance in the human rights system.528 However, 
that is not to say they may be used to adopt trade measures to protect labour 
rights abroad. In this respect, the concluding Article of the Declaration is revealing: 
‘nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for 
[protectionist trade] purposes’ and ‘the comparative advantage of any country 
should in no way be called into question by this Declaration and its follow-up’. How 
should these provisions be interpreted? How should ‘protectionist’ be defi ned in 
this respect? The academic literature on this subject does not provide a clear 
answer to these questions.529 With respect to the use of trade measures to protect 
core human rights, Cleveland poses that 
under customary international law, states clearly are authorized to adopt trade sanctions 
to promote human rights values. On the other hand, neither the human rights treaties 
nor customary international law clearly establishes a right of states to impose human 
rights trade measures that cannot be overridden by treaty.530 
525 See Article 4 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 
18 December 1996.
526 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour Conference, 
86th session, Geneva, June 1998. 
527 The special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights under the EU’s Generalized System 
of Preferences are based on these core labour rights. The compatibility of the GSP with WTO law will be 
discussed in more detail in section 2.4 below on international measures. 
528 See Articles 6, 7(a)i, 7(c), 8 and 10(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
Articles 8, 22 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Articles 19 and 32 of the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. With the exception of the prohibition on child labour, 
these rights are also included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
529 See, for example, F. Weiss, ‘Trade and labor I’, p.573.
530 S. Cleveland, ‘Human rights sanctions and the WTO’, in F. Francioni (ed.), Environment, Human Rights and 
International Trade (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p.212
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Mutatis mutandis, whether states may impose labour rights trade measures 
beyond their own jurisdiction depends on the hierarchy of the relevant norms. This 
matter will be discussed in the following section.
2.3 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity
The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions is a multilateral convention open to all ‘members of the United 
Nations, or of any of its specialized agencies, that are invited by the General 
Conference of UNESCO to accede to it’.531 The Convention aims inter alia ‘to protect 
and promote the diversity of cultural expressions’ and ‘to give recognition to the 
distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles of identity, 
values and meaning’.532 
For this purpose, Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Convention on Cultural Diversity 
confi rms the sovereign right of states ‘to adopt measures and policies to protect 
and promote the diversity of cultural expressions within their territory’. These 
measures and policies may consist inter alia in providing public fi nancial 
assistance and support to public institutions. Furthermore, Article 8 of the 
Convention allows Parties to determine ‘the existence of special situations where 
cultural expressions on its territory are at risk of extinction, under serious threat, or 
otherwise in need of urgent safeguarding’. In these circumstances, ‘Parties may 
take all appropriate measures to protect and preserve cultural expressions […] in a 
manner consistent with the provisions of this Convention’. These provisions are 
rather intriguing in light of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Agreement and the principle of non-discrimination in the GATT and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
First, the Convention explicitly allows for Parties to provide public fi nancial 
assistance or support to public institutions. Depending on the kind of measures 
taken, a confl ict with the SCM Agreement is foreseeable. This is especially the case 
with subsidies intended to increase the export of a certain cultural good or 
531 Article 27 of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
adopted in Paris on 20 October 2005 (entry into force 18 March 2007), available at www.unesco.org. As of 
early 2007, 45 states had ratifi ed the Convention on Cultural Diversity. 
532 Article 4(3) defi nes cultural expressions as ‘those expressions that result from the creativity of individuals, 
groups and societies, and that have cultural content’. According to Article 4(4), cultural activities, goods and 
services ‘refers to those activities, goods and services, which at the time they are considered as a specifi c 
attribute, use or purpose, embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they 
may have. Cultural activities may be an end in themselves, or they may contribute to the production of 
cultural goods and services’.
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service.533 Second, measures taken by Parties under the Convention to protect and 
preserve cultural expressions in their territory may include import restrictions or a 
restriction of market access, which results in a confl ict with Article XI of the GATT 
or Article XVI of the GATS, respectively. Third, a confl ict with GATT Article III or 
GATS Article XVII on national treatment may occur, since the Convention implicitly 
allows Parties to favour domestic cultural goods and services over foreign goods 
and services.534 The potential for confl ict also depends on the scope of the 
Convention. Of course, products like movies, books, magazines or music qualify as 
cultural goods and services, but one could also imagine that the Convention 
applies to specifi c local products like champagne or parmesan cheese,535 which 
could be defi ned as embodying a cultural expression. 
Moreover, the potential for confl ict is reinforced through the Convention’s dispute 
settlement mechanism, which may be an alternative to WTO dispute settlement.536 
The Convention does not contain a clear-cut confl ict rule as to its relationship to 
other treaties, such as the WTO agreements. Article 20 of the Convention calls on 
Parties to ‘foster mutual supportiveness’ between this Convention and other 
treaties, and to ‘take into account the relevant provisions of this Convention’ when 
interpreting or applying other treaties, while at the same time it determines that 
‘nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying the rights and 
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are parties’. This 
means that disputes between Parties to the Convention who are also WTO 
Members can be settled both through the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
Convention on Cultural Diversity and through the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. Depending on the law these dispute settlement bodies will apply, this 
could lead to inconsistencies in case law between the two systems. This is 
especially so since it is not clear whether WTO dispute settlement bodies are 
allowed to consider obligations under non-WTO agreements. An even more 
diffi cult problem would arise if a non-Party to this Convention were to bring a 
complaint before a WTO Panel against a Party to the Convention.
533 The SCM Agreement distinguishes ‘prohibited subsidies’ from ‘actionable subsidies’. The example quoted 
above would fall within the category of prohibited subsidies, since it is designed to disrupt trade. On this 
subject, see Part I of this study.
534 On this subject, see T. Voon, ‘UNESCO and the WTO: A clash of cultures?’ in International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, vol. 55 (2006), pp.635-652; and J. Pauwelyn, ‘The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity 
and the WTO: Diversity in international lawmaking?’, in ASIL Insights, 15 November 2005, available at 
www.asil.org/insights/2005/11/insights051115.html. 
535 See J. Pauwelyn, ibid. 
536 The Convention’s dispute settlement mechanism provides for conciliation concerning the interpretation or 
the application of the Convention by a Conciliation Committee. See Article 25 of the Convention and the 
Annex to the Convention on Cultural Diversity.
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 These issues will be considered more generally in the next section.537 
2.4 International measures addressing non-trade concerns
2.4.1 General remarks
An increasing number of regulatory programmes addressing socially and 
environmentally sound production are being developed at the international level. 
Examples of such programmes include those adopted by intergovernmental 
organizations such as the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); by the private 
sector, such as the Euro Retailer Working Group Good Agricultural Practices 
(EurepGAP); and by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council certifi cation programme for timber, and the Sustainable 
Agriculture Network (SAN) certifi cation programme.538 An example of an 
intergovernmental programme providing for special incentive arrangements with 
regard to environmentally and socially sound production in developing countries is 
the EU’s GSP. These programmes should be distinguished from those exclusively 
aimed at setting standards in the fi eld of product-related process and production 
methods, such as the joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme under the auspices 
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. This programme exclusively develops 
standards in the fi eld of food and consumer safety. For the purpose of the current 
discussion, which focuses on non-product related PPMs, the work of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission is therefore considered to be outside the scope of this study. 
2.4.2 Certifi cation programmes
Certifi cation programmes developed by NGOs and/or the private sector are 
voluntary in nature and are primarily aimed at enabling consumers to make 
informed choices concerning the products they buy. Relevant examples of these 
programmes include the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certifi cation programme 
for sustainable timber, the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) certifi cation 
programme initiated by the Rainforest Alliance, and the Fair Trade Organizations 
programme. Whereas the aforementioned certifi cation programmes are aimed at the 
labelling of products to inform consumers, other programmes, such as EurepGAP, a 
partnership of agricultural producers and retailers, use certifi cation for the purpose 
of informing retailers. They also set standards for Good Agricultural Practice (GAP).539 
537 For a discussion of the relation between the two systems and their dispute settlements mechanisms, see T. 
Voon, ‘UNESCO and the WTO: A clash of cultures?’, pp.635-652; and J. Pauwelyn, ‘The UNESCO Convention 
on Cultural Diversity and the WTO’.
538 On the issue of international standards and the requirements of the TBT Agreement, see Part I of this study.
539 See EurepGAP: www.eurepgap.org.
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All of these programmes address both environmental and social concerns. The 
criteria for certifi cation under these programmes are largely based on principles 
from international social and environmental conventions, such as the ILO 
Conventions and environmental agreements such as CITES and the Biodiversity 
Convention. Since adherence to these programmes is voluntary and does not 
involve government regulation, they fall outside the scope of the GATT.540 The TBT 
Agreement, on the other hand, expressly covers voluntary standards set by 
‘recognized’ bodies.541 Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement defi nes standards as 
documents 
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, 
with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production method. 
The TBT Agreement does not defi ne what should be understood by a ‘recognized 
body’. Also, it is not clear whether the TBT Agreement covers non-product related 
processes and production methods. Whereas the fi rst sentence of the provision 
expressly refers to ‘related’ processes and production methods, a specifi c 
reference in this regard is missing in the second sentence.542 The 2001 Doha 
Ministerial Conference instructed the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment 
‘to give particular attention to […] labelling requirements for environmental 
purposes’.543 To date, however, the Committee has not made any substantial 
progress in this fi eld.
540 If a government would were to decide to set voluntary standards (for the purpose of certifi cation), the GATT 
principles on non-discrimination would apply. It should also be noted that – depending on their requirements 
– certifi cation programmes can harm the opportunities for market access of producers in developing 
countries. Whereas the Fair Trade programme provides certifi cation free of charge for small-scale producers 
in developing countries, the strict tracking-and-tracing requirements and social criteria of the Forest 
Stewardship Council programme, for example, place a heavy burden on (small-scale) producers in 
developing countries. Since it is diffi cult and costly for these producers to meet the requirements of the 
programme, their access to the market for sustainable timber is thus de facto restricted. 
541 See also Part I of this study.
542 See C. Dankers, Environmental and Social Standards, Certifi cation and Labelling (Rome: UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 2003), p.76, and Part I of this study.
543 See Article 32(iii) of the 2001 Doha Declaration.
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2.4.3 Some concluding observations
This section has revealed a number of potential confl icts between international 
environmental and human rights agreements and measures addressing non-trade 
concerns on the one hand, and WTO agreements on the other. It has also 
highlighted the basic differences between the environmental and human rights 
systems, in the sense that environmental treaties explicitly use trade measures to 
further their objectives while human rights treaties do not. Also, where trade 
restrictions under environmental treaties in most cases concern product-related 
processes and production methods, the type of human rights trade measures of 
concern for the current discussion generally relate to labour standards, a typical 
example of non-product related PPMs. 
Finally, whereas the GATT contains a clear environmental exception, an explicit 
social clause is absent. The only option to address non-product related social 
concerns will be under the public morals exception of Article XX(a) of the GATT. 
These differences are also of relevance for the determination of the relation 
between WTO law and other international agreements, discussed in the following 
section.
3  Relation between WTO law and other international agreements 
and measures
3.1 General remarks
In this section, the relation between WTO law and other international agreements 
and measures is considered in more detail. Most authors regard trade law, human 
rights law and environmental law as three different branches of public international 
law, without an a priori hierarchy between these systems.544 This means that 
confl icts between WTO agreements and other agreements must be considered 
according to the general rules of treaty interpretation and the general rules of 
international law for resolving confl icts between norms. 
In this section, the relation between these different branches of international law 
will be considered through an evaluation of these rules. Also, the place and role of 
other agreements and measures in WTO practice will be assessed. 
544 See J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); T. Cottier, ‘Trade and human rights: A 
relationship to discover’, in Journal of International Economic Law, vol.5 (2002), pp.114-115; and E.U. 
Petersmann, ‘Human rights and the law of the World Trade Organization’, in Journal of World Trade, vol. 37 
(2003), pp.241-281.
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3.2 Confl ict rules
As no a priori hierarchy exists between trade law, human rights law and 
environmental law, a confl ict between norms in these fi elds must in principle be 
resolved through the rules of treaty interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and through the confl ict rules of Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention.545 
First, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties determines that ‘a 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’. Article 31(2) specifi es what should be understood by the context of a 
treaty, while Article 31(3) provides, inter alia, for ‘any applicable rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ to be taken into 
account.546 In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body concluded that this general rule 
for interpretation has attained the status of customary international law and thus 
forms part of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law that 
WTO dispute settlement bodies must use to clarify the provisions of the WTO 
agreements, as indicated in Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).547 Hence, WTO adjudicating bodies must interpret the WTO 
agreements ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. In 
doing so, they must take into account ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’. 
In the recent EC – Biotech Products case, the Panel qualifi ed the latter rule for 
interpretation. It acknowledged that Article 31(3)(c) ‘…should be interpreted to 
mandate consideration of rules of international law which are applicable between 
all parties to the treaty which is being interpreted’. This approach seems to imply 
that WTO adjudicating bodies are only required to consider other rules of 
international law when interpreting a WTO Agreement if these are applicable 
between all WTO Members. This limits the scope of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention to treaties to which all WTO Members are party and to general 
international law, including customary international law and general principles of 
law. In all other situations, the Panel found that WTO dispute settlement bodies 
545 The focus will be on confl icts in the applicable law. The issue of inherent normative confl ict will be left aside. 
For more on this subject, see J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law, pp.275-326.
546 Ibid., pp. 237-274. See also G. Marceau, ‘Confl icts of norms and confl icts of jurisdiction’, pp.1086-1090. As 
discussed in more detail below, Marceau considers the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior to be part 
of the ‘applicable rules of international law’.
547 See Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p.17.
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‘may consider other relevant rules of international law when interpreting the terms 
of the WTO Agreements if it deems such rules to be informative’, i.e. to determine 
the ordinary meaning of the terms of WTO law under Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention.548 Yet, this still leaves ample room for dispute settlement bodies to take 
into account obligations from other international agreements in interpreting WTO 
law. 
As far as interpretation of the terms of WTO law is concerned, the Panels and the 
Appellate Body have done so on several occasions. In the EC – Bananas III case, the 
Appellate Body, albeit with some reluctance, used the Lomé Convention to interpret 
the GATT/Lomé Waiver adopted by the General Council of the GATT pursuant to Article 
IX of the WTO Agreement at the request of the European Communities and of the 49 
out of the 79 ACP States that were also GATT Contracting Parties.549 Furthermore, in 
US – Shrimp the Appellate Body referred to a number of international agreements, 
amongst which the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, CITES and the Biodiversity 
Convention, to determine the meaning of the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ in 
the general exception clause (g) of Article XX of the GATT.550 The Appellate Body also 
expressly adopted an evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation, when it 
determined that the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ ‘must be read by a treaty 
interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about 
the protection and conservation of the environment’.551
548 See Panel Report, EC – Biotech Products, para 7.49-7.96. For an analysis of the Panel Report, see S. Cho, ‘The 
WTO Panel on the EC – Biotech dispute releases its fi nal report’, in ASIL Insights, vol. 10 (2006). For a 
discussion on the rules of interpretation in the context of the WTO, see J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of Norms in 
Public International Law,pp.257-263. 
549 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III. The issue at stake was what was ‘required’ under the Lomé 
Convention for the purpose of interpreting the scope of the GATT/Lomé waiver. The operative paragraph of 
the GATT/Lomé Waiver read: ‘Subject to the terms and conditions set out hereunder, the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement shall be waived, until 29 February 2000, to the extent 
necessary to permit the European Communities to provide preferential treatment for products originating in 
ACP States as required by the relevant provisions of the Fourth Lomé Convention, without being required to 
extend the same preferential treatment to like products of any other contracting party’ [emphasis added].
550 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para 130.
551 Ibid. The Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recently issued a report on the use of the WTO 
general exception clauses to protect human rights, in which it asserts on the basis of WTO jurisprudence that 
‘international human rights treaties with broad membership would be valid tools to interpret the terms 
“public morals”, “human life or health” and “public order”.’ See Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to Protect 
Human Rights (2005), available at http://ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/WTO.pdf.
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If the confl ict cannot be resolved through interpretation of the confl icting treaty 
provisions, recourse should be made to the confl ict rules of Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention with regard to the application of successive treaties relating to the 
same subject matter. First, Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention states that ‘when 
a treaty specifi es that it is not to be considered as incompatible with an earlier or 
later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail’. As far as the WTO 
Agreement is concerned, no general confl ict clause in respect of either pre-existing 
or future treaties is included. This means that in case of confl ict between WTO law 
and other law, the confl ict rules of the other treaty should be examined. If this does 
not resolve the confl ict, recourse should be made to the lex posterior derogat lex 
anterior principle of Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention and to the customary 
international law principle of lex specialis derogat lex generali. The fi rst principle 
relates to the aspect of temporality (a newer rule prevails over an older rule), while 
the second determines that a more specifi c obligation should prevail over a more 
general obligation. 
Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention determines that between States parties to 
both treaties, ‘the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are 
compatible with those of the later treaty’, while between States not party to both 
treaties, ‘the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and 
obligations’. Although most human rights and environmental agreements predate 
the 1994 WTO Agreement, the principle is of high relevance for the current 
discussion. It is generally accepted that the principle applies not only to treaties, 
but also to other sources of international law.552 This means that provisions of 
human rights or environmental agreements that have crystallized into customary 
international law since 1994 may be of relevance to determine the obligations of 
Parties under WTO law. Examples of (emerging) international customary law 
principles include the precautionary approach, the principle of sustainable use of 
natural resources, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and 
the duty to cooperate for sustainable development. 
Also, Article 11 of the DSU explicitly allows for WTO dispute settlement bodies – 
within certain limits - to ‘make such other fi ndings as will assist the DSB in making 
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered 
552 The sources of public international law are referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice and include treaty law out of the 79 customary international law and general principles of 
international law. There exists no formal hierarchy between these sources. 
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agreements’.553 In Korea – Procurement, the panel stated – albeit in a 
footnote – with regard to its terms of reference: ‘…we do not see any basis for 
arguing that the terms of reference are meant to exclude reference to the broader 
rules of customary international law in interpreting a claim properly before the 
Panel’.554 
Furthermore, Article 30(5) of the Vienna Convention determines that paragraph 4 is 
without prejudice to the possibility to modify multilateral treaties between certain 
of the Parties only under Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. That article provides 
the possibility for Parties to the WTO Agreement to modify the treaty between 
themselves alone if ‘the possibility of such a modifi cation is provided for by the 
treaty’, or if ‘the modifi cation in question is not prohibited by the treaty and does 
not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the 
performance of their obligations’. The WTO Agreement does not provide for 
modifi cation, but does not prohibit it either. The question then arises as to whether 
a modifi cation of the WTO Agreement among certain parties would affect the rights 
and obligations of other WTO Members. The answer to this question depends on 
how the WTO is viewed as a legal system and will be discussed in more detail in 
section 3.3 below. 
The second confl ict rule determines that a more specifi c obligation prevails over a 
more general obligation. Although human rights law, environmental law and trade 
law as such can all be considered lex specialis with regard to general international 
law, this principle is of high relevance to determine the interplay between specifi c 
553 Article 11 reads: ‘The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this 
Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of 
the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other fi ndings as will assist the DSB in 
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should 
consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually 
satisfactory solution’.
554 Panel Report, Korea – Procurement, footnote 755. Yet, in paragraph 7.96 of its report, the Panel states with 
regard to Article 3.2 of the DSU: ‘We take note that Article 3.2 of the DSU requires that we seek within the 
context of a particular dispute to clarify the existing provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. However, the relationship of the WTO 
agreements to customary international law is broader than this. Customary international law applies 
generally to the economic relations between the WTO Members. Such international law applies to the extent 
that the WTO treaty agreements do not ‘contract out’ from it. To put it another way, to the extent there is no 
confl ict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the 
view that the customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty 
formation under the WTO’.
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obligations under human rights or environmental treaties on the one hand, and 
international trade law on the other. Especially in the context of Article XX of the 
GATT, obligations under environmental or human rights law may be considered to 
be lex specialis for the purpose of determining the meaning of the exceptions.555 
Finally, the principle of lex specialis derogat lex generali does not apply to rules of 
general international law that are of a peremptory nature, so-called jus cogens. 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention describes these norms as 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modifi ed only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 
According to Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention, treaties confl icting with 
peremptory norms of international law are void. Although only a few norms in 
international law amount to jus cogens, they do have some relevance for this 
discussion. For example, one of the norms recognized as jus cogens is the 
prohibition on slavery.556 This means that trade in products derived from slave 
labour – an exception not expressly included in the WTO agreements – is 
prohibited.557 
3.3 The WTO as a legal system and the nature of WTO obligations
The question of whether application of relevant environmental or human rights 
norms that have not become part of general international law between Parties to 
those agreements in WTO dispute settlement is possible, depends on how the WTO 
is viewed as a legal system and how to view WTO obligations. In this regard, this 
section will explore the two diametrically opposed conceptions of Marceau and 
Pauwelyn. 
555 See also G. Marceau, ‘Confl icts of norms and confl icts of jurisdiction: The relationship between the WTO 
Agreement and MEAs and other treaties’, in Journal of World Trade, vol. 35(6) (2001), pp.1096-1097. Marceau 
proposes to use the lex posterior and lex specialis principles as rules of interpretation for determining the 
‘relevant rules’ between WTO Members (Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
556 The International Law Commission Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, James Crawford, mentions 
the prohibitions against slavery and the slave trade, genocide, aggression, torture, racial discrimination and 
apartheid, and the obligation to respect the right of self-determination as examples of peremptory norms. 
See J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.246-247.
557 It should be noted that slave labour may also be brought under the exception of Article XX(a) of the GATT. 
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Marceau presents WTO law primarily as a ‘specifi c subsystem of international law 
with specifi c rights and obligations, specifi c claims and causes of action, specifi c 
violations, specifi c enforcement mechanisms and specifi c remedies in case of their 
violation’.558 In her opinion, a confl ict between WTO law and other agreements 
cannot be resolved through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The 
responsibility of States for violations of their environmental or human rights 
obligations should be made effective in other fora, ‘so that the benefi ts obtained in 
one forum may be nullifi ed by the consequences of a violation in another forum’.559 
Moreover, she argues that ‘WTO law ‘cannot be overruled by situations and 
considerations belonging to another subsystem’, even when all parties to a WTO 
dispute are also Parties to the other relevant agreement.560 Marceau advocates 
confl ict avoidance through an extensive application of the interpretation rules of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. In her opinion, the principles of lex posterior 
and lex specialis may also be considered ‘relevant rules of international law’ under 
Article 31(3)(c). This means that as a rule of interpretation, WTO dispute settlement 
bodies may take into account ‘relevant rules’ of other treaties, even as a valid legal 
defence against claims of violation of WTO rules. 
In Marceau’s opinion, no real confl ict exists when a WTO Member invokes a 
relevant multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) as a defence under Article 
XX of the GATT against another Member party to that agreement, because Article 
XX explicitly authorizes trade restrictions for environmental purposes. Also, human 
rights obligations can be taken into account to interpret the exception of Article 
XX(a) of the GATT that addresses measures necessary to protect public morals. 
This can also be the case when the trade measure was not required but permitted, 
or when the trade measure was taken in pursuance of the objectives of the MEA or 
human rights treaty.561 However, when a confl ict cannot be avoided through 
interpretation, Marceau argues that 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention (lex posterior) and the rule on lex specialis may be 
used to identify which should be the prevailing provision (the ‘applicable’ provision). 
Article 30.5 of the Vienna Convention seems to allow two States to modify (distinct 
from an amendment) their rights and obligations within a multilateral treaty as long as 
the rights of third States are not affected.562 
558 G. Marceau, ‘WTO dispute settlement and human rights’, in European Journal of International Law vol. 13 
no. 4 (2002), p.755. 
559 Ibid., p.805. 
560 Ibid, pp.774-775, citing B. Simma, ‘Self-contained regimes’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 
16 (1985), p.111.
561 G. Marceau, ‘Confl icts of norms and confl icts of jurisdiction’, pp.1096-1097.
562 Ibid., p. 1129.
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In her opinion, such a situation would not be possible in the context of WTO 
dispute settlement: allowing a WTO dispute settlement body to give prevalence to 
a non-WTO norm as between the disputing parties would ‘amend’ the WTO 
agreement in question, which would also alter the rights and obligations of other 
WTO members not party to the non-WTO agreement.563 
Pauwelyn, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between the jurisdiction of 
the WTO dispute settlement bodies – which is in his opinion necessarily limited to 
WTO law – and the law they may apply to enforce WTO rules. Pauwelyn argues that 
although the jurisdiction of the WTO adjudicating bodies is limited to claims under 
the WTO agreements, this ‘does not mean that the applicable law available to a 
WTO panel is necessarily limited to WTO covered agreements’.564 In his opinion, the 
dispute settlement system ‘is merely a tool or an instrument to enforce WTO 
covered agreements as they were created and necessarily continue to exist in the 
wider corpus of international law’.565 Since the terms of reference set out in the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) do not explicitly exclude the application 
of other norms of international law by WTO dispute settlement bodies, Pauwelyn 
argues that WTO adjudicating bodies are automatically authorized to apply non-
WTO norms for the purpose of deciding the WTO claims before them. In his 
opinion, if WTO adjudicating bodies are authorized to apply rules of general or 
customary international law to decide WTO claims, they should also be authorized 
to apply human rights or environmental agreements to decide claims brought 
under the WTO agreements, provided that all Parties to the dispute are also Parties 
to the non-WTO agreement in question.566 
In practice, according to Pauwelyn, this means that if a WTO adjudicating body 
determines that the non-WTO norm prevails, the WTO rule cannot be applied.567 If 
this would not be possible, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism would make it 
possible for States to opt out of their obligations under environmental or human 
563 Article 3.2 of the DSU prohibits WTO adjudicating bodies to ‘add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements’.
564 J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law, p.460. 
565 Ibid, p.461.
566 It should be noted that WTO dispute settlement bodies can apply other rules when deciding WTO claims, but 
they cannot judicially enforce these norms. See J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law, 
p.473; G. Marceau, ‘Confl icts of norms and confl icts of jurisdiction’, p.763; and E.U. Petersmann, ‘Human 
rights and the law of the World Trade Organization’, in Journal of World Trade, vol. 37 no. 2 (2003), p.248. In 
practice, according to Pauwelyn, this means that if a WTO adjudicating body determines that the non-WTO 
norm prevails, the WTO rule cannot be applied. 
567 It should be noted that the proper decision of the dispute settlement body would rather be a determination 
that the WTO norm has not been violated.
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rights agreements, which would go ‘to the heart of the legitimacy and democratic 
content of international law’.568 In his opinion, modifi cation of the WTO Agreement 
between Parties to the relevant environmental or human rights agreement is 
possible since WTO obligations are ‘reciprocal’, whereas human rights and 
environmental obligations are of an integral nature. Under a multilateral treaty, 
reciprocal obligations are to be considered as a ‘promise […] made towards each 
and every state individually’ whereas ‘integral obligations, in contrast, imply a 
promise […] towards the collectivity of all state parties taken together’.569 Therefore, 
if a WTO dispute settlement body gives prevalence to an integral norm from a 
relevant human rights or environmental treaty, this does not affect the rights and 
obligations of other WTO Members. It only modifi es the relations between the 
disputing parties, which are all Parties to the non-WTO agreement. 
3.4  Other international agreements: alternative or complementary 
to WTO law?
The previous section has highlighted the different conceptions in the academic 
literature on the WTO as a legal system. The answer to this question is of high 
relevance in view of the key question of whether environmental and human rights 
agreements should be considered alternative or complementary to WTO law. It is 
evident that a narrow conception of the WTO as a closed legal system will lead to a 
different outcome than a more progressive approach, considering WTO law as part 
of the wider corpus of international law. A balanced approach to the WTO as a legal 
system will in this way take into account its place within the wider corpus of 
international law – e.g. as demonstrated by the reference in the preamble of the 
WTO Agreement to sustainable development and to the international law in the 
fi eld of sustainable development – but will also accept its limitations as a 
consequence of its speciality. As the Appellate Body determined in US – Gasoline, 
WTO law should ‘not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law’, 
but that is not to say that environmental and human rights obligations should 
automatically be applied as ‘legal norms’ within the context of the WTO.570 
In the opinion of the present author, using other agreements as interpretation tools 
to determine the ‘relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties’ 
under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, even by means of the principles of 
lex specialis and lex posterior, would clarify the rights and obligations in the WTO 
568 J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law, p.476.
569 Ibid., p. 65.
570 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline.
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Agreement in such a way as to bind all WTO Members.571 It is diffi cult to imagine 
an interpretation of the WTO Agreement that would apply to some but not all WTO 
Members. Also, in the current state of legal doctrine the direct application of non-
WTO norms as ‘legal norms’ would be considered a bridge too far. Nonetheless, 
this should not preclude WTO dispute settlement bodies from expressly 
considering and/or applying environmental agreements in their analysis of Article 
XX(b) or (g) and the chapeau of the GATT, especially where it concerns a dispute 
between WTO Members that are all parties to a relevant MEA or human rights 
treaty. When not all the parties to the dispute are also parties to the relevant MEA 
or human rights treaty, these agreements continue to be highly relevant. 
With regard to the analysis of the exceptions, besides using environmental 
agreements to determine the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the WTO provisions, their role 
as factual evidence is of great importance. The observation that a measure was 
taken pursuant to a widely ratifi ed environmental agreement could be considered 
relevant factual evidence that the measure taken was ‘necessary’ for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health, or that it ‘related to’ the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. .572 The use of environmental agreements as 
evidence is also of relevance to the analysis of the chapeau. In US – Shrimp, the 
Appellate Body used the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles as a factual reference in their analysis of the chapeau.573 
Also, in the context of human and labour rights, agreements in these fi elds could 
be used to determine the meaning of the term ‘public morals’ in Article XX(a) of 
the GATT and serve as proof of the importance of the rights incorporated therein. 
Furthermore, of particular relevance to the discussion on human and labour rights, 
is the extraterritorial application of measures taken pursuant to a multilateral 
treaty. In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body expressly sought to establish a 
territorial link between the measures applied by the United States to protect sea 
turtles by resorting to the migration patterns of these animals. It concluded that 
sea turtles traverse the waters of many countries, including those of the United 
States. Yet, an evolutionary interpretation of the exceptions of Article XX of the 
571 See also J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law, p.476. In the view of Pauwelyn, 
interpreting the WTO treaty differently depending on the parties to a particular dispute, ‘is not allowed and 
would defi nitely threaten the uniformity of WTO law’. 
572 See also J. Pauwelyn, Confl ict of norms in public international law: how WTO law relates to other rules 
of international law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003), p. 463.
573 The Appellate Body used the Inter-American Convention to show the existence of ‘unjustifi able 
discrimination’. In paragraph 172 of its report, the Appellate Body determined ‘clearly, the United States 
negotiated seriously with some, but not with other Members (including the appellees), that export shrimp to 
the United States. The effect is plainly discriminatory and , in our view, unjustifi able’. 
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GATT should have to take into account modern notions such as a duty to cooperate 
for environmental conservation and to promote respect for human rights, which 
denote a common interest of the international community in environmental and 
human rights protection. Although these notions are not yet fully incorporated into 
general international law, it is to be expected that in future they will fi nd 
application in WTO dispute settlement practice. 
Also in the context of human rights, other notions denoting a common interest of 
States in the protection of human rights worldwide are emerging. Where gross and 
massive violations of human rights are at stake, recent developments in 
international law indicate that it might be possible for states to resort to Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter to adopt targeted economic sanctions.574 In addition, States 
sometimes apply unilateral sanctions, for example the economic sanctions by the 
European Union and the United States against Burma. These measures could 
probably be justifi ed under the exceptions of Article XX(a) of the GATT as 
‘necessary to protect public morals’ or even under Article XX(b) as ‘necessary to 
protect human life and health’ because of the erga omnes implications of such 
violations.575 Apart from such situations of gross and massive violations of human 
rights, it seems unlikely that WTO dispute settlement bodies will accept a measure 
to be ‘necessary to protect human life and health’ under Article XX(b), when it 
concerns a measure with extraterritorial effect.576 With regard to the exception of 
Article XX(a) of the GATT, in US – Gambling the Panel defi ned the concept of public 
morals in the context of Article XIV(a) of the GATS as ‘standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation’.577 Although its 
scope is far from clear and its precise interpretation depends on the views of the 
state concerned, it could be contended that an evolutionary interpretation of this 
provision would include, inter alia, some of the core labour standards developed 
574 See the report Strengthening Targeted Sanctions through Fair and Clear Procedures, UN Doc. A/60/887-
S/2006/331, 14 June 2006.
575 Although in principle the exception of Article XX(b) cannot be invoked for the protection of human rights 
abroad, it could be argued that ‘gross and massive violations of human rights’ constitute a violation of erga 
omnes obligations, i.e. owed to the entire international community of states, thus giving other States the 
right to react against these violations. See also G. Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’, in 
EJIL (2002), vol. 13 no. 4, p. 811-812.
576 For trade measures relating to the protection of labour standards for example, it is diffi cult to imagine the 
importing state having a legitimate interest in protecting labour rights outside its own jurisdiction. It could 
only claim a derived interest, in the sense that it indirectly violates its own obligations under human rights 
and labour conventions by profi ting from human rights violations committed in the exporting state.
577 Panel Report, US – Gambling.
202
Unilateral Measures adressing non-trade concerns
by the ILO, such as those relating to forced and prison labour and the worst forms 
of child labour.578 
Finally, an alternative way to ensure that human rights measures, including those 
relating to labour standards, are compatible with WTO law is to follow the 
approach adopted in US – Shrimp. One of the main reasons why the Appellate 
Body in US – Shrimp determined that the discrimination was unjustifi able was that 
the United States had treated WTO Members differently by not attempting to 
negotiate a multilateral treaty with the affected countries, while it had concluded 
an agreement with others. In US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), the Appellate 
Body found that good faith efforts to negotiate a multilateral treaty were suffi cient: 
Requiring that a multilateral agreement be concluded by the United States in order to 
avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimination’ in applying its measure would mean that 
any country party to the negotiations with the United States, whether a WTO Member 
or not, would have, in effect, a veto over whether the United States could fulfi l its WTO 
obligations. Such a requirement would not be reasonable.579 
In the light of this decision, the best way to avoid discrimination is to opt for a 
multilateral agreement expressly containing trade measures to further its 
objectives. This agreement should be open to all WTO Members and must impose 
equal obligations on countries where the same conditions prevail. Furthermore, 
a multilateral treaty that aims at protecting certain core human and labour rights 
and that uses trade measures to further its objectives could constitute evidence 
regarding the legitimacy of the measures adopted. In the context of labour 
standards, the ILO would be the appropriate forum to negotiate such a treaty. 
Also, special arrangements for certain developing countries, adopted pursuant to 
the WTO Enabling Clause, if applied in a non-discriminatory way, are a credible 
alternative for addressing non-trade concerns. 
578 It should be noted that prison labour is already listed among the general exceptions of Article XX of the 
GATT.
579 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 123. The Appellate Body also states in 
paragraph 124 in a more general sense that ‘clearly’, and ‘as far as possible’, a multilateral approach is 
strongly preferred. Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the application of a measure that is 
provisionally justifi ed under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994; it is another to require 
the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding ‘arbitrary or unjustifi able 
discrimination’ under the chapeau of Article XX. We see, in this case, no such requirement’.
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1 Introduction to the economic analysis of policies
This third part of the report presents an economic analysis of measures addressing 
non-trade concerns (NTCs). In economic terms, these concerns are approached as 
market failures. The theory of economic policy has developed a useful approach to 
address market failures that will be reviewed in section 1.1 below. The rest of Part 3 
is devoted to specifi c measures and tools that are used or have been proposed to 
address these non-trade concerns. 
Section 2 will discuss biofuels (and bioethanol in particular) as an instrument to 
curb climate change, and will analyse the sustainability of bioethanol production, 
trade and consumption. Bioethanol and biomass production also offer export 
opportunities for developing countries, but barriers to trade (trade policy 
measures, regulatory barriers) may restrict the realization of these opportunities. 
Animal welfare is the subject of section 3, in which the tool of labelling will be 
analysed. Important issues are the information asymmetry of consumers of animal 
products, the effectiveness of labelling in this respect, and the small market shares 
of products that have been produced in an animal-friendly way. Measures that 
address non-trade concerns often incur extra costs for producers in both rich and 
poor countries. These costs may be borne by consumers, by producers and 
processors or by retailers. Producers in developing countries may be weak links in 
the supply chain and will shoulder part of the cost burden, although there may be 
benefi ts as well. This issue will be discussed for the cases of bioethanol and 
labelling.
1.1 Economic analysis of policies to address market failures
Non-trade concerns can be regarded as the result of market failures: people are 
worried because markets do not produce effi cient outcomes, or resources are 
wasted. There are several reasons for such market failures. First, it may be that the 
social value of products and services is different from their private value. If so, 
there is an externality, the quantities supplied and consumed are not in line with 
the social costs and benefi ts (polluting activities, knowledge creation).580 Second, 
there may be an information problem. If market parties are not well informed, 
supply or demand will be distorted (contaminated food, second-hand cars).581 
A third reason is the public good case: private actors cannot produce and sell the 
product or service at a profi t (law and order). Finally, lack of competition may 
580 Damage to the global commons (due to climate change) is an example of a negative external effect.
581 Labelling may be an instrument to redress this market failure in particular situations. The economic aspects 
of labelling are discussed in section 3. 
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produce a market failure (monopoly prices). Collective decision making is often 
needed to establish the existence of market failures,582 and policies need to be 
devised and implemented to correct them. As policy-making institutions are not 
perfect, the corrective policies sometimes give rise to new problems – government 
failures – such as ineffectiveness (the objective is not realized), and ineffi ciencies 
(the objective can be realized at a lower cost and without undesirable side-effects). 
As this report does not discuss all possible market failures and instruments to 
redress them, we will limit ourselves to the instruments related to the use of 
biofuels and to animal welfare. 
First, in order to design an effective policy, knowledge is needed about the causes 
of the market failure and the interrelationships involved in the failure in order to 
determine which factors should be infl uenced to produce the desired outcome 
without undesirable side-effects. 
Second, the right instruments should be available to produce the impact on the 
factors that will lead to the desired outcome. The design of an effective and 
effi cient policy is often complicated by the desire to serve several objectives by 
using one or a few instruments. Examples include the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy, which in the early stages used one price instrument to serve fi ve objectives, 
and the impossibility of using monetary policy to achieve both infl ation and 
employment targets. The Tinbergen rule formulates the solution: the number of 
independent objectives should be matched by an equal number of independent 
instruments.583 Thus, measures to increase the share of bioethanol in fuel 
consumption will reduce the dependence on mineral fuels and thus contribute to 
energy security. The production of bioethanol might also offer EU farmers new 
opportunities in times of falling prices and decreasing farm subsidies. Finally, 
bioethanol may be used in climate policy. If the fi rst or second objective is chosen, 
this will not by defi nition reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in an 
optimal way, as bioethanol may be produced in a relatively climate unfriendly way. 
Since only one of these three objectives will have to be chosen, we will argue in 
section 2 that bioethanol should be used primarily to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. 
582 In some cases, private groups (e.g. producers’ associations) undertake this role. 
583 J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1952). See also R.A. Mundell, 
International Economics (New York: Macmillan, 1968). The Tinbergen rule is used in the literature on 
economic policy-making in various policy areas (e.g. Central Bank monetary policies, macro-economic 
policies, agricultural policies). See also, e.g. T.R. Michl, Tinbergen Rules the Taylor Rule, Working Paper No. 
444, Levy Economic Institute, 2006; I. Gombi, (2003) ‘Multiple market intervention for target zones’, in: The 
Japanese Economic Review, vol. 54, no. 1 (2003), pp.75-85; S. Mann, ‘Different perspectives on cross-
compliance’, in: Environmental Values, vol. 14, no. 4 (2005), pp.471-482. 
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A policy is effi cient if the objective is realized at the lowest cost in welfare terms. A 
policy instrument that addresses the cause of a market failure directly, i.e. as close 
to the root of the problem as possible, is more effi cient than one that works in an 
indirect way. Thus, if a domestic market does not produce a product in suffi cient 
quantity at the going price because the private net profi t is lower than the social 
benefi t, then paying a subsidy to domestic producers is more effi cient than 
imposing an import tariff on the product. If production or consumption of a 
product affects the local environment or the global commons, measures that have 
a direct impact on the cause of the problem (e.g. setting caps on emissions 
enforced by tradable permits, emission taxes and licences) will be more effi cient 
than measures aimed at curbing production or consumption. 
Effi cient measures generally provide incentives to realize the desired effect with 
minimal negative side-effects. Thus, to reduce GHG emissions, one might curb the 
production and consumption of GHG-emitting activities.584 Such ‘command and 
control regulations’ come at a high welfare cost, however. For example, non-
tradable licences do not provide an incentive to lower levels of the damaging effect 
below the permitted level, and create vested interests in the damaging activity.585 
Economic measures that encourage private parties to develop and apply new 
technologies and processes (such as engines that emit less or no GHG in 
combination with new clean fuels) stimulate static and dynamic effi ciencies. 
Tradable emission permits are a case in point, as these provide an incentive to 
lower the negative effect in order to sell the permit. In equilibrium, the permits end 
up in the hands of those who produce the highest value with the allowed 
emissions (static effi ciency) and propel innovation (dynamic effi ciency). 
Sometimes the most effi cient solutions cannot be applied because the costs of 
organization and implementation may be too high, but there are many second- and 
third-best options. A tax on the damaging effect (e.g. on CO2 emissions) might 
work well in theory, but in practice, a fi rst problem connected to tax measures is to 
defi ne the level of taxes that will exactly redress the market failure. A second 
problem is that frequent changes in the tax level might be necessary to account for 
changes in the pre-tax price. The political cost of variable taxes is very high.586 
Third, the impact of the taxes on the market failure, which may be costly, will have 
to be monitored. These remarks also apply to the differential taxes that have been 
584 Constraining the level of an activity may be required for other reasons, e.g. lowering traffi c density to 
prevent overcrowding of infrastructure. 
585 For an extensive analysis of the tax instrument: OECD, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries: 
Issues and Strategies (Paris: OECD, 2001). 
586 Governments will have to increase carbon taxes if fuel prices fall. 
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proposed to stimulate products or services that have been produced in a less 
damaging way or produce less damage in consumption (reduced excise duties or 
rates of VAT on biofuels, organic meat, low-emission cars, etc.).587 In general, the 
tax instrument is effective, but insuffi cient to realize the objective. It is often used 
to facilitate the transition to a new (improved) product (e.g. unleaded petrol) that 
will be compulsory. 
In general, trade policy measures are third-best measures, as these interventions 
are far away from the cause of the market failure. Trade barriers have an effect on 
domestic and world market prices if there is import demand. Through price 
changes, there will be an impact on consumption and production. The relative 
ineffi ciency of these interventions stem from the fact that they work in an indirect 
way. An import tariff will reduce the welfare of all domestic consumers or 
processors (if the product is used as an input for other industries), it will reduce 
demand and burden the relationship with trade partners. A direct subsidy to 
producers to increase production comes at a lower welfare cost than import 
barriers. If a market failure is caused in consumption, an import barrier does not 
produce much of an incentive to fi nd alternatives that do not have the same 
problem.
Labelling is one way to diminish information asymmetries.588 This is a different 
objective than de facto regulating particular actions by economic agents in the 
case of externalities. This section mainly addresses one particular type of 
asymmetric information, namely, the characteristics of the production process that 
cannot be verifi ed by the consumer. These are the so-called credence attributes of a 
product.589 The supplier may label a product at his own initiative (‘fi rst-party 
labelling’ or ‘self-declaration’). As suppliers are party in the transaction of selling 
the product concerned, buyers may distrust the information they provide. In these 
cases, second- or third-party labelling schemes may be used by industry 
organizations or by independent agents, respectively. Strictly speaking, the 
effectiveness and effi ciency of labelling should be measured against the objective 
of lowering the information asymmetry. If the effectiveness of labelling is 
suffi cient, the ‘credence good’ becomes a ‘search good’: consumers will be able to 
buy the preferred product by inspecting the products on offer. Whether this will be 
realized depends on the communication and design of the label (does the 
587 In the early 1990s, most OECD countries levied a lower excise duty on unleaded petrol than on the leaded 
variety.
588 Other ways to diminish information asymmetries include offi cially required diplomas for service providers, 
voluntary associations of service providers that adhere to a code of conduct, etc. 
589 J.A. Caswell and E.M. Mojduszka, ‘Using informational labelling to infl uence the market for quality in food 
products’, in: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 78, no. 4 (1996), pp.1248-1253. 
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consumer know what label to look for, is it recognizable?), on its credibility, and on 
the amount and quality of information provided on other product varieties (there 
may be an overload of information). In practice, however, many advocates of the 
measures addressing the non-trade concerns concerned will gauge the 
effectiveness of labelling with reference to the observed change in the quantities 
sold of the preferred product. This change will depend not only on the solving of 
the information asymmetry – well-informed consumers may decide to stick to the 
conventional product – but also on the buyer’s preference for the attribute that is 
labelled, whether the label is compulsory, whether there is competition with other 
labels, and product characteristics such as design, and the relative price of the 
labelled product. 
The effi ciency of the labelling instrument is diffi cult to measure, as one has to take 
into account the effi ciency of the labelling and certifi cation, the adaptation of 
process of producing the labelled product and the effects on non-labelled products. 
The net welfare effects will vary for different labelling systems and products.590 It 
may be concluded that labelling may be an effective and effi cient instrument to 
solve information asymmetries. If the labelling does not have the effect that 
campaigners for higher standards hoped for, buyers will continue to choose the 
‘low standard product’ for reasons such as lower prices or other product 
characteristics. The campaigners will probably try to frame their case as an 
externality, instead of an information asymmetry. Collective decision making is 
required to choose between the two alternatives. If an externality is accepted, more 
interventionist measures will be needed, as discussed above.
In practice, policies do not always stand the tests of effectiveness and effi ciency, 
perhaps due to incomplete information or the absence of ‘fi rst-best’ policy 
instruments. In many cases, policy makers design policies in response to the 
demands of special interest groups. For policy makers it is rational to balance 
these special interests against the ‘general interest’. These special interest groups 
may form coalitions with groups that campaign for measures to address non-trade 
concerns, thus producing effective pressure on policy makers. 
590 In a simple model of labelling food products (in the categories ‘organic’, ‘conventional’ and ‘genetically 
modifi ed’) a high level of separation cost between GM and non-GM products substantially increases the 
market share of the organic products, while pushing the conventional products out of the market. All this 
gives rise to a fall in consumer welfare. K. Giannakas and A. Yiannaka, ‘Agricultural biotechnology and 
organic agriculture: National organic standards and labelling of GM products’, in: AgBioForum, vol. 9 no. 2 
(2006), pp.84– 93. 
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2 Measures relating to sustainable production of biofuels
Biofuels are considered to be an important instrument in various policy areas.591 
First, biofuels can be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thus contributing 
the goal of curbing climate change. Second, there is the reasoning that biofuels 
will reduce the dependency on imported fossil fuels, thus increasing energy 
security. Third, biofuels are seen as a solution for agricultural producers who are 
faced with falling prices and incomes as a result of reforms of traditional support 
policies.592 According to the Tinbergen rule, biofuels should be used as an 
instrument for one policy objective, since trying to meet two or more objectives 
will seriously undermine the effectiveness and effi ciency of the measures. This 
section is largely devoted to bioethanol as a substitute for gasoline.593 It is argued 
that bioethanol could be a very effective instrument in climate policy for the 
coming 10–15 years. If policy makers were also to use it for other objectives, the 
climate effect will be seriously reduced. 
2.1 Effectiveness 
Ethanol, or alcohol, is produced from petroleum by the petrochemical industry and 
from various biological feedstocks, including sugar (cane and beet), grain crops, 
cellulosic crops and waste biomass. The ethanol made from biological feedstocks is 
called bioethanol. Biological feedstocks are converted to sugars by different 
technologies. Sugar crops offer the least complicated way to produce ethanol. In 
tropical countries, sugar cane is mostly used as feedstock. It has the advantage that 
the production process yields a byproduct, ‘bagasse’, that is used for the process 
energy in the manufacture of methanol. If grain crops are used, the starchy part of 
the plant is used to produce sugars, leaving considerable fi brous residue. 
A technology that is still under development uses the cellulose of plants (most 
parts of plants consist of cellulose), which can be converted into alcohol (via 
591 M. Stilwell and E. Rose, ‘Biofuels and trade: Perils and promises for policy-makers’, in: ICTSD, Linking Trade, 
Climate Change and Energy (Geneva: ICTSD, 2006). 
592 T. Turner, ‘Biofuels, agriculture, and the developing world’, in: ICTSD, Linking Trade, Climate Change and 
Energy (Geneva: ICTSD, 2006). Turner maintains that biofuels are the solution to the problems of trade 
liberalization in agriculture, as ‘agriculture is changing from an industry that faces limited demand to an 
industry that faces unlimited demand’.
593 Biodiesel is produced in the EU using mainly rapeseed as feedstock. Biodiesel production based on other 
oils and fats, including palm oil (imported from Malaysia and Indonesia) is also increasing. In 2005, the 
world production of biodiesel amounted to 3.5 billion litres, of which 2.8 billion litres were produced in the 
EU using rapeseed as feedstock. The EU’s MFN tariffs on biodiesel are 6.5 per cent on an ad valorem basis. 
The EU did not import biodiesel in 2005. 
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sugar). This process is rather complicated and is not commercially viable. Cellulosic 
ethanol has important advantages – it can be produced using a wide variety of 
feedstocks such as grasses and trees, there is less competition in land use; it 
displaces a greater amount of fossil energy per litre of fuel, and produces much 
lower net ‘well-to-wheels’ greenhouse gas emissions than grain-based alcohol. If 
the production costs can be reduced, cellulosic ethanol offers a promising 
alternative to fossil fuels, but this may take another 10–15 years.594 
Figure 1  Range of estimated greenhouse gas reductions from biofuels
Note: This fi gure shows reductions in wells-to-wheels CO2-equivalent GHG 
emissions per kilometre from various biofuel/feedstock combinations, compared to 
conventional-fuelled vehicles. Ethanol is compared to gasoline vehicles and 
biodiesel to diesel vehicles. Blends provide proportional reductions – e.g. a 10% 
ethanol blend would provide reductions one-tenth of those shown here. 
The vertical thick lines indicate the ranges of estimates. 
Source: IEA (2004).
To calculate the reduction in emissions of GHGs as a result of increased biofuel 
consumption, the whole supply chain has to be taken into account. Various studies 
have been undertaken to estimate the GHG emissions of various alternatives to 
petroleum-based fuels. A review by the International Energy Agency (IEA; see 
Figure 1) compared the different biofuels on a ‘well-to-wheels’ basis and showed 
that the largest reductions in GHG emissions are made by ethanol from sugar cane 
produced in Brazil. Ethanol from cellulosic feedstock is the second-best option, but 
the production process is not yet commercially viable. This is a promising 
technique in terms of both reducing GHG emissions and in not crowding out other 
crops. 
594 International Energy Agency, Biofuels for Transport: An International Perspective (Paris: IEA, 2004), p.42.
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2.2 Effi ciency
Biomass production in tropical and sub-tropical climates is fi ve times more 
productive in terms of photosynthetic effi ciency than in temperate regions.595 
If such regions also have large areas of suitable cropland, the relative costs of 
biofuels will be low. The cost of producing ethanol is lowest for the sugarcane-
based product. Thus, the cost levels in Brazil, India, Pakistan and other developing 
countries are less than half of those of the United States, the European Union and 
other IEA members. This is likely to remain the case until rather far into the future. 
The IEA estimates (Figure 2) indicate that even after 2020, by which time cellulose 
processing technology will have been developed to a much higher level, the cost 
of sugarcane-based ethanol will be in the same range as cellulose-based ethanol, 
and the latter may still be much more costly.596 
Figure 2 Cost ranges for current and future ethanol production (US dollars per gasoline-
equivalent litre) 
Note: ‘F-T’ is Fischer-Tropsch type production process.
Source: IEA (2004).
595 V. Johnson, V. Seebaluck, H. Watson and J. Woods, ‘Bioethanol from sugarcane and sweet sorghum in 
Southern Africa: Agro-industrial development, import substitution and export diversifi cation’, in: ICTSD, 
Linking Trade, Climate Change and Energy (Geneva: ICTSD, 2006). 
596 The price comparisons in this report are not based on organic products. A proper comparison should be 
based on sustainability criteria for production in all countries. 
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2.3  Conclusions on the effectiveness and effi ciency of bioethanol as an 
instrument of climate policy
From the studies reviewed by the IEA, ethanol from Brazil – and probably some 
other developing countries597 – is the ideal substitute for mineral gasoline: it ranks 
highest in terms of GHG emission reductions (more than 80 per cent), it is 
competitive with conventional fuel at current prices, and it is much cheaper than all 
other alternatives available now and in the foreseeable future. Thus, at present, the 
cost per tonne of GHG reductions using Brazilian ethanol is a fraction (around 5 per 
cent) of the cost of using ethanol produced from grain in the EU.598 
The Copernicus Institute (Utrecht University) and the State University of Campinas 
(UNICAMP, Brazil) analyzed the sustainability of ethanol production in Brazil. While 
different types of uncertainties are mentioned, the conclusion for ethanol made 
from sugarcane, is that ‘no prohibitive reasons were identifi ed why ethanol from 
São Paulo in principle could not meet the Dutch sustainability standards set for 
2007’.599 Whether it makes sense to make the importation of bioethanol conditional 
on the meeting of sustainability criteria will be discussed in section 2.5.
Imports of bioethanol from competitive producers in tropical regions have an 
impact on energy security by geographical diversifi cation of sources of energy. 
Promotion of bioethanol production in the EU on the basis of feedstock grown in 
the EU contributes to increased energy security by reducing energy imports. Some 
will consider this a strong form of energy security, but it comes at a very high 
price, as the cost of bioethanol produced in the EU is up to twice that of imported 
bioethanol. The contribution of EU-produced bioethanol to GHG emission 
reductions is almost 50 per cent lower (per kilometre) compared to bioethanol 
from Brazil, which makes the EU product relatively ineffective for the realization of 
the Kyoto objectives.
2.4 Bioethanol production, trade fl ows and trade barriers
The promotion of biofuels to reduce GHG emissions and the introduction of 
standards for animal welfare will have impacts on developing countries’ exports, 
597 See section 2.4 below for other potential exporters. 
598 Worldwatch Institute, Biofuels for Transportation. Global Potential and Implications for Sustainable 
Agriculture and Energy in the 21st Century. Extended summary (Washington, DC, Worldwatch Institute, 
2006).
599 E. Smeets, M. Junginger, A. Faaij, W. Arnaldo and P. Dolzan, Sustainability of Brazilian Bioethanol 
(Utrecht: Copernicus Institute, and Campinas: State University of Campinas, 2006), p.2. 
Available at www.bioenergytrade.org/downloads/sustainabilityofbrazilianbioethanol.pdf. 
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production and development through international trade fl ows and foreign direct 
investment. This section will assess these impacts. For some of these effects, 
research data or estimates are available, while for other potential effects no reliable 
studies have yet been conducted. The section will also discuss trade policy 
measures that have an impact on the trade fl ows studied here. As biofuels and 
animal welfare are rather different policy areas, they are treated separately. 
2.4.1 Bioethanol producing countries
Bioethanol is produced and traded in substantial quantities in many regions 
worldwide. In 2005, global production was more than 35 billion litres. Table 1 
presents the top fi ve producers. 
Table 1  Top fi ve bioethanol producers in 2005
Producing country Production (million litres)
Brazil 16,500
United States 16,230
China  2,000
European Union  950
India  300
Source: Worldwatch Institute (2006).
In the near future, the production of bioethanol in developing countries will rise 
considerably, in response to rising domestic demand for ethanol as a fuel, and to 
rising import demand from temperate countries. Import demand from OECD 
countries is likely to rise, depending on their policies to protect domestic 
production. Given that cellulosic ethanol and synthetic biodiesel will not be 
commercially viable in the coming 10–15 years, the availability of land in the EU 
and the USA will probably limit the realization of their objectives for consumption 
of biofuels.600 In addition, trade liberalization and sound GHG emission reduction 
policies will make more imports of biofuels probable and attractive, as was argued 
in section 2.3. 
Domestic demand in many developing countries (including Brazil, India and China) 
is rising as these countries are introducing compulsory blending, thus reducing the 
quantities available for export. Nevertheless, the potential export capacities in 
600 See IEA, Biofuels for Transport, chapter 6. The European Environment Agency estimates that the EU can 
technically produce signifi cant amounts of biomass to realize ambitious targets, ‘even if strict environmental 
constraints are applied’. EEA, How Much Bioenergy can Europe Produce without Harming the Environment, 
EEA Report 7/2006). Available at http://reports.eea.europa.eu/eea_report_2006_7/en/eea_report_7_2006.pdf. 
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developing countries are promising. Brazil could expand its bioethanol production 
signifi cantly, by increasing the area under sugarcane cultivation and improving the 
productivity of land.601 In India the government is also promoting production by 
paying sugar mills a premium on each litre of bioethanol they produce.602 
Many developing countries already produce small quantities of bioethanol and 
have the potential for larger production. Africa is expected to become one of the 
largest producers of biomass in the future: its potential is estimated to be equal to 
that of Latin America.603 In Africa, where biomass is traditionally used for cooking 
and heating, South Africa is the lead country in the development of bioenergy 
production, but is unlikely to be able to export signifi cant quantities of biofuels if 
the government decides to introduce compulsory blending. Other member 
countries of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) also have 
considerable export potential, particularly the least-developed countries (LDCs) 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Bioethanol production in these countries can 
use both sugar cane and sweet sorghum604 as feedstocks. Johnson et al. estimate 
that these countries have the natural resources to supply 6 per cent of EU demand 
in 2015 and 10 per cent in 2020 (after meeting domestic consumption).605 These 
countries are expected to be competitive if oil prices remain in the range of US$45–
55 and import tariffs are zero. The bottlenecks to realizing this potential are the 
large investments required to expand feedstock production, and to upgrade both 
the processing capacity and transport infrastructure, a large part of which will have 
to come from foreign direct investment (FDI). South–South FDI and technology 
transfer will be part of the solution. Illovo Sugar, a South African fi rm, for example, 
already controls the sugar production capacity in Zambia and has dominant 
positions in Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Tanzania. The participation of 
601 Smeets et al., Sustainability of Brazilian Bioethanol, pp.38–40. 
602 In India, the cost price of ethanol is around US$ 0.15 (of the same order as in Pakistan and Brazil), but the 
premium of US$ 0.18 per litre is encouraging many sugar mills to shift to ethanol production. International 
Energy Agency, Biofuels for Transport: An International Perspective (Paris: IEA, 2004), p.164. Available at 
www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2004/biofuels2004.pdf. 
603 Consultancy and Research for Environmental Management, Dutch Import of Biomass: Producing Countries’ 
Points of View on the Sustainability Biomass Exports (Amsterdam: CREM, 2006). See also B. Batidzirai, A.P.C. 
Faaij and E. Smeets, ‘Biomass and bioenergy supply from Mozambique’, in: Energy for Sustainable 
Development, vol. X, no.1 (2006), pp.54–81. 
604 Sweet sorghum grows faster than sugarcane, and has much lower water requirements and a better drought 
resistance. It is also a more fl exible crop than sugarcane as it is grown from seed, rather than from plantings. 
See F. Johnson, V. Seebaluck, H. Watson and J. Woods, ‘Bio-ethanol from sugarcane and sweet sorghum in 
Southern Afi ca: Agro-industrial development, import substitution and export diversifi cation’, in: ICTSD, 
Linking Trade, Climate Change and Energy (Geneva: ICTSD, 2006). 
605 Ibid.
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foreign sugar companies might be expanded and broadened. The market value of 
the reduction of GHG emissions could be leveraged to fi nance investments.606 
The range of problems to be overcome is well illustrated in the case of Zambia. 
Although at present Zambia is one of the fi ve most effi cient sugar producers, its 
global competitiveness is severely limited by the high costs of transporting sugar 
overland to a seaport.607 These costs will have to be diminished by infrastructure 
development fi nanced by public and/or private investors. As the infrastructure 
improves, so will the connections between neighbouring countries, leading to 
regional integration, in which the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and SADC, supported by donors, are 
the natural lead organizations. Once these regions and the EU conclude Economic 
Partnership Agreements, the EU might play an important role in this programme. 
2.4.2 Trade fl ows and trade barriers: MFN, GSP and EBA; regional trade agreements
Imports of ethanol into the EU averaged 150 million litres per year in 1999–2001, more 
than 250 million litres in 2002–2004, and a record of almost 600 million litres in 2005.608 
These imports are administered under CN code 2207, which has two subcategories, 
undenatured alcohol (code 2207 10) and denatured alcohol (code 2207 20). Although 
both types can be used for biofuels, more than 93 per cent of ethanol imports were in 
the form of undenatured alcohol.609 Increasing quantities of imported bioethanol are 
also blended with other fuels such as petrol, under code 3824. These quantities of 
bioethanol escape statistical observation, reducing the reliability of the fi gures. To 
remedy this situation, the European Commission is now considering a proposal to 
create a separate code for biofuels in the combined nomenclature (CN). 
The two categories of ethanol are subject to different import tariffs: € 19.2 per hl610 
for undenatured, and € 10.2 per hl for denatured alcohol. Given that in the most 
competitive countries (Brazil and Pakistan) production costs are around US$15 per hl, 
these tariffs are very substantial (more than 100 per cent for the undenatured variety, 
depending on transport costs). However, a large part of ethanol imports enter the EU 
on a preferential basis. 
606 Ibid.
607 J. Pilegaard, ‘Symbolic and effective? An LDC perspective on duty-free and quota-free market access’, in: G. 
Faber and J. Orbie (eds) European Union Trade Politics and Developing Countries: Everything but Arms 
Unravelled (London: Routledge, 2007), chapter 8. 
608 European Commission, An EU Strategy for Biofuels. Communication of the Commission SEC(2006)142, 8 
February 2006. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/biomass/biofuel/com2006_34_en.pdf. 
609 Ibid. 
610 1 hectolitre = 100 litres.
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The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) classifi es ethanol as a sensitive 
product. Under the GSP that applies from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008, 
preferences for alcohol under code 2207 have been completely removed; before 
2006 the MFN tariff was reduced to 15 per cent. Under the special drugs regime of 
the GSP that was applicable before 2006, a number of countries (Bolivia, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Pakistan, El 
Salvador and Venezuela) had duty-free access for alcohol.611 Under the GSP+ 
incentive scheme for sustainable development and good governance that more or 
less replaced the drugs regime, these countries now enjoy duty-free and quota-free 
(DFQF) access. Georgia, Moldova, Mongolia and Sri Lanka were also added to the 
group, while Pakistan was removed. Thus, imports of ethanol from Pakistan have 
been subject to the full MFN tariff since 1 January 2006. In the fi rst fi ve months of 
2006, EU imports of ethanol from Pakistan were 8.7 million litres, compared with 
50.3 million litres in the same period in 2005.612 These two examples – the exclusion 
of bioethanol from the GSP and the exclusion of Pakistan from the GSP+ – show 
that these trade preferences are rather unreliable, and are unlikely to create a 
favourable climate for investment in bioethanol production in developing 
countries.
The LDCs also have DFQF access to the EU market, including the three Southern 
African LDCs with the greatest bioethanol export potential (Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zambia). This group of LDCs partly overlaps with the ACP countries that enjoy 
tariff-free access under the Cotonou Agreement until 1 January 2008, when new 
arrangements – Economic Partnership Agreements – have to be in place. The EU 
has proposed to expand DFQF access under the Economic Partnership 
Agreements, which will give all ACP countries access to the EU (with a temporary 
exception for rice and sugar). South Africa is in an exceptional position as it 
concluded a separate bilateral Trade, Cooperation and Development Agreement 
(TCDA) with the EU in 1999 that does not provide for preferential treatment for 
alcohol; as a result, South African ethanol exports are subject to the full MFN tariff. 
Imports that pay the MFN tariff originate mainly from Brazil, the USA and – since 1 
January 2006 – Pakistan. 
611 This special GSP regime was to stimulate the countries concerned to export goods other than drugs. The 
drugs regime was abandoned in 2006. 
612 Data retrieved from the Eurostat Comext database. The European Commission has tried to play down the 
effect of imposing the MFN tariff on ethanol from Pakistan by saying: ‘Pakistan might … be expected to 
continue to be able to export signifi cant quantities of ethanol to the EU, albeit not at the same pace as 
before, thus utilizing the increased production capacity built over the last couple of years’. European 
Commission, An EU Strategy for Biofuels, pp.28
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Table 2 Average annual EU imports of ethanol (CN code 2207) under the various 
preferential trade regimes, 2002–2004
Import regime Average annual imports, 
2002–2004 (million litres)
Share of total imports, 2002–2004 
(%)
GSP normal  23.2  9.0 
GSP+ 117.8  47.5 
ACP/Cotonou Agreement  23.8  9.0 
Everything but Arms  4.5  1.5 
Others  12.2  4.0 
Total preferential 199.8  70.0 
Total MFN 112.5  30.0 
Grand total 312.2  100.0 
 Source: European Commission (2006).
Future trade policy developments with respect to biofuels will depend on the 
outcome of regional and global negotiations. In the framework of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), negotiations are underway to reduce tariffs and non-
tariff barriers in general, and to establish a list of environmental goods and 
services for which trade barriers will be reduced or eliminated. Biofuels are 
candidates on the list of ‘environmentally preferred goods’.613 This might lead to a 
gradual phasing out of tariffs on biofuels, maybe to zero. On a bilateral level, the 
EU–Mercosur negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) have dragged on for 
many years, mainly as a result of differences of opinion on agricultural trade 
liberalization. Whether these two negotiating processes will yield results in the 
near future remains to be seen. 
2.5  Conclusions with respect to measures that relate to the provision 
of the EU with sustainably produced bioethanol
At present the European Union obtains bioethanol from domestic production (950 
million litres in 2005) and imports (312 million litres in 2004). Bioethanol from both 
sources accounts for less than 2 per cent of gasoline consumption (the EU goal for 
2005).614 By 2010 the share of biofuel in transport fuels should rise to 5.75 per cent, 
613 This was proposed by Brazil. See R. Howse and P.B. van Bork, Options for Liberalizing Trade in Environmental 
Goods in the Doha Round, Report no. 2, ICTSD Project on Environmental Goods and Services (Geneva: 
ICTSD, 2006). 
614 Consumption of gasoline in the Netherlands amounted to 5466 million litres in 2005. If the EU objective of 2 
per cent biofuel had been realized, more than 100 million litres of bioethanol would have been consumed. In 
2006 a compulsory blending requirement of 2 per cent entered into force. 
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according to the EU Biofuels Directive.615 Thus, the market is growing rapidly. The 
Commission has indicated that Member States will have to introduce more binding 
measures, such as compulsory blending and tax measures. On the supply side, the 
EU market for biofuels is highly distorted by the Common Agricultural Policy,616 the 
subsidies for innovative fuels and the EU’s common trade policy. As a result, the 
price of bioethanol in the EU does not refl ect its relative scarcity globally. We have 
shown that bioethanol from tropical countries has a high potential to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the short run in an effective and effi cient way. In 
order to realize this potential, the EU will have to devise a coherent trade policy 
with respect to bioethanol. Today this policy is highly segmented.
There is stable free access for ACP and least developed countries, economies that 
have signifi cant potential but small export capacities at the moment. A group of 
developing countries have free access on a temporary and unilateral GSP+ basis, 
as long as they meet specifi c conditions for sustainable production and good 
governance. Competitive producers in other countries pay a very high MFN tariff 
(50 or 100 per cent or more). This patchwork of policy interventions does not 
constitute a consistent climate policy. In order to make bioethanol a competitive 
alternative to mineral fuels, the trade barriers for the two should be equalized over 
a defi ned time path, which means falling tariffs for bioethanol. A gradual erosion of 
tariff preferences will occur. If this is implemented according to a plan, the 
potential of developing countries that are well-endowed with the natural resources 
for biofuel production could be further developed. 
615 EU Directive 2003/30/EC on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport, 8 
May 2003 (OJ, L 123, vol. 46, 17.5.2003). 
616 Special aid for energy crops (€ 45 per ha) was introduced by the 2003 CAP reform. Sugar beet grown for 
bioethanol is exempt from quotas. Investments in biomass processing can be supported under the Rural 
Development Policy. European Commission, An EU Strategy for Biofuels. COM(2006)34 fi nal. For the full 
report, a background memo and press release of 8 February 2006, see http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/
biomass/biofuel/index_en.htm. 
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The European Commission has studied two scenarios for the biofuel supply in the 
EU, one based on current MFN tariffs and one on zero tariffs. In the latter case, all 
bioethanol consumed in the EU in 2010 would be imported (although the EU would 
retain a sizeable biodiesel production capacity). This scenario offers the highest 
greenhouse gas savings.617
This trade policy that is coherent with climate objectives should be complemented 
with a programme to develop the untapped potential for biomass and biofuel 
production in Africa. Support will be necessary to improve the physical 
infrastructure for export, to fi nance feasibility studies, and to create a favourable 
climate for private investment in biomass production. 
Finally, it has been proposed to make the import of bioethanol conditional upon 
sustainability criteria. The Dutch government intends to incorporate sustainability 
criteria in its policy instruments related to biomass production. The project group 
‘Duurzame productie van biomassa’ (the Cramer Commission) has proposed 
criteria related to the production and processing of biomass for energy, fuels and 
chemicals, that should be ‘measurable and broadly supported’. These Cramer 
criteria cover the themes of GHG balance, competition with other crops (including 
food crops), biodiversity, welfare, well-being and the environment.618 Apart from 
the question of whether international obligations under EU and WTO law forbid the 
imposition of such conditions on imports, do these criteria make sense? In this 
discussion we keep in mind that biofuels are used as a means to reduce GHG 
emissions. For this objective, bioethanol from developing countries is an effective 
and effi cient instrument, taking into account GHG emissions on a well-to-wheels 
basis. 
We have already shown that allowing bioethanol imports from developing countries 
(free) entry to the EU would meet the condition of a very high GHG balance. With 
regard to the other criteria, it is questionable whether it would be wise to impose 
these conditions. The broad objective to produce in a sustainable way (preserving 
biodiversity, the environment, benefi ting all segments of society, etc.) applies 
617 European Commission, Annex to the Communication from the Commission, An EU Strategy for Biofuels: 
Impact Assessment, SEC(2006)142. However, the Commission does not make a clear choice. While on the 
one hand it proposes to ‘develop a coherent Biofuels Assistance Package that can be used in developing 
countries which have a potential for biofuels’, on the other, it wants to pursue a ‘balanced approach’ in 
market access that respects ‘the interests of both domestic producers and EU trading partners …’ (p.38). 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/biomass/biofuel/sec2006_142_en.pdf. 
618 Toetsingskader voor duurzame biomassa (Cramer report). Final report of the project group ‘Duurzame 
productie van biomassa’, chaired by Professor Jacqueline Cramer, 2007. 
Available at www.vrom.nl/docs/20070427-toetsingskader-duurzame-biomassa.pdf.
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economy-wide. It is related not only to the way of development, but also to the level 
of development. The idea that making particular imports conditional upon 
sustainability criteria would contribute to the realization of the stated goals may be 
misleading, for several reasons. 
First, an importing country has a potential impact on part of the production only 
(the EU imports only 1 per cent or less of all bioethanol produced in Brazil). Even if 
the exporting country meets the sustainability criteria for that small part of the 
production, little will change in the sector. The exporting country may also respond 
by shifting its exports to less demanding markets.619 Thus, trying to encourage an 
entire economy to adopt more sustainable methods of production by imposing 
conditions on a tiny part of its production, would be a case of the tail wagging the 
dog. Second, even if the exporter were to adapt the production process throughout 
sector, there would then be one sector where the regulatory situation would differ 
signifi cantly from the rest of the economy. This will greatly distort relative prices 
and wages. It cannot be assumed that the sustainability and welfare of the 
exporting economy as a whole would improve; it might even deteriorate. Research 
into the issue of child labour has made it clear that import constraints on goods 
produced using child labour do not necessarily improve the lot of the children in 
the exporting economy.620 
Third, the exporting developing countries may perceive these criteria as eco- or 
labour protectionism. Given the experiences of these countries in the recent past, 
and the imminent risk that regulatory systems are captured by rent-seeking 
groups, this perception is not without grounds. The practical effect of the 
implementation of the criteria will be an increase in the cost of production. 
Although it is diffi cult to give the precise cost-increasing effect as a simple 
percentage, it is clear that it will be substantial. For ethanol produced in the São 
Paulo region (where 60 per cent of Brazilian sugar and ethanol are produced), for 
example, it is estimated that total production costs could rise by 24–56 per cent, 
increasing the cost per litre by € 0.12 (see Box 1 below). This would come on top of 
the EU import tariff of € 0.19 per litre. Taken together, the impression of 
protectionism is diffi cult to refute, and the opportunity to introduce an effective 
and effi cient climate policy based on ethanol will be lost – given the earlier cited 
conclusion that ‘no prohibitive reasons were identifi ed why ethanol from São 
Paulo principally could not meet the Dutch sustainability standards set for 2007’.621 
619 In a seller’s market such as the bioethanol market, this is a realistic scenario. 
620 For a literature review and the fi ndings of their empirical research, see E. Edmonds and N. Pavcnik, Does 
Globalization Increase Child Labor? Evidence from Vietnam, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 8760 
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002). 
621 Smeets et al., Sustainability of Brazilian Bioethanol, p.2. 
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Box 1 The costs of sustainability criteria for bioethanol
 The Cramer Commission has proposed that imports of bioethanol should be 
conditional on a number of sustainability criteria in the exporting country, 
including biodiversity, social conditions, etc. While there are serious doubts as 
to whether an importing country should try to have an impact on the 
regulatory climate of an exporting country by imposing conditions for imports 
of only one product, here we look only at the impacts of such criteria on 
production costs, and the costs of monitoring, testing, traceability and 
certifi cation.  
 With regard the likely increase in the costs of producing bioethanol as a result 
of sustainability criteria, the estimates vary widely, depending on a number of 
factors: 
the precise sustainability conditions applied; –
local physical conditions affecting production (e.g. weather conditions,  –
slope of terrain, geographical situation, etc.); and
the scale of production, soil fertility, etc.  –
 In a study of the impacts of sustainability criteria on bioethanol production in 
Brazil and the Ukraine, Smeets et al. (2006) estimated that total production 
costs would increase by between 35 and 88 per cent.622 Of this, a maximum of 
29 percentage points would be due to meeting the environmental criteria. For 
ethanol produced in the São Paulo region (where 60 per cent of Brazilian 
sugar and ethanol are produced), they estimated that total production costs 
would rise by 24–56 per cent, increasing the cost per litre by € 0.12.623 
 The costs of certifi cation will depend on the complexity of the scheme, 
including the number of benchmarks, the frequency of controls, the nature of 
the supply chain, and the characteristics of production. The last aspect is 
important: if production is scattered over large area, or over many small 
enterprises, inspectors will have to control many units, thus increasing the 
622 E. Smeets, A. Faaij and I. Lewandowski, The Impact of Sustainability Criteria on the Costs and Potentials of 
Bioenergy Production. Report no. NWS-E-2005-6 (Utrecht: NOVEM, 2005), p.67. Smeets et al. applied socio-
economic criteria (related to child labour, wages, employment, health care and education) and 
environmental criteria (related to soil erosion, fresh water use, pollution stemming from the use of fertilizers 
and other agricultural chemicals). 
623 Smeets et al., Sustainability of Brazilian Bioethanol, pp.74 –78. A large part of the increase is due to ‘green’ 
manual harvesting. If mechanical harvesting is used, total costs would increase by ‘only’ 24 per cent 
(or € 0.05 per litre). 
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costs of certifi cation per unit of product. In the case of bioethanol in Brazil, 
production is concentrated geographically, but a substantial share of the 
sugarcane is grown by smallholders (30–35 per cent in the São Paulo region). 
Smeets et al. estimate that the costs of certifi cation in relation to the 
sustainability criteria would be 0.1–1.2 per cent of the cost of production.624
We do not easily dismiss the concerns that gave rise to the proposed Cramer 
sustainability criteria. Our conclusion is, however, that imposing these criteria on 
one product, in combination with a very high import tariff, is not a promising way 
of putting these principles into practice. There are more effective and effi cient ways 
to contribute to achieving these objectives: by concluding international 
agreements, through international cooperation to support aspects of sustainable 
production by fi nancial means, and via transfer of technology. 
3 Labelling for animal welfare
In this section we defi ne the objective of animal welfare as the desire to guarantee 
a minimum standard of welfare in the living conditions of animals that are reared 
for human consumption. If the majority of consumers share this desire, then the 
problem is asymmetrical information: the standard of animal welfare cannot be 
determined from the product. Labelling schemes are a means to resolve this 
problem. There are two forms of labelling: compulsory and voluntary. In the former 
case, producers are obliged to indicate particular data on their products (such as 
the ingredients and nutritional content of food products). A voluntary system does 
not have this obligation. In practice, however, a voluntary system may be 
compulsory. This is the case if consumers come to regard non-labelled goods or 
products as inferior,625 or if producers in a supply chain have no alternative outlets 
for non-labelled products. Although this section focuses on voluntary labelling, 
most of the conclusions apply equally to compulsory labelling schemes.
The concern for the welfare of animals in the agro-food industry is a rather recent 
phenomenon in the EU, yet the EU is a frontrunner in the area compared to other 
countries. As incomes in OECD countries have risen, the preferences of consumers 
624 Ibid., p.88.
625 This argument applies to voluntary and compulsory systems. For example, the National Organic Program 
(NOP) has introduced a label for organic products. One of the criteria is that the products do not contain 
GMOs. Thus, the NOP label is also a ‘non-GMO label’. K. Giannakas and A. Yiannaka, ‘Agricultural 
biotechnology and organic agriculture: National organic standards and labelling of GM products’, in: 
AgBioForum, vol. 9 no. 2 (2006), pp.84–93.
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have shifted towards goods produced in accordance with minimum standards of 
social, environmental and animal welfare. The concern for animal welfare is a 
global one that does not stop at the borders of the Netherlands or the EU. As a 
result of trade liberalization, a rising share of consumption stems from imports. The 
falling costs of transportation and communication have enabled fi rms to segment 
geographically the supply chains of many products.
3.1 Effectiveness
Labelling has an impact on domestic and imported goods. The impact of labelling 
in general may be limited in the sense that fi rms may turn out much larger 
quantities of goods that are not produced in accordance with animal welfare 
standards, and some may not produce goods that require to be labelled at all. 
Thus, while (voluntary) labelling schemes may guarantee that the labelled product 
has been produced in an animal-friendly manner, it does not guarantee that 
domestic and foreign producers have converted their entire production processes 
to meet the required standard of animal welfare. This depends on a number of 
factors, including the share of production destined for markets where labelling is 
necessary, and the possibility to have labelled and non-labelled production lines 
next to each other (such as the cost of separating the two varieties). One may 
argue that labelling one variety of a product implicitly also labels the other variety 
as non-labelled. This may increase the effectiveness of the label, as argued above. 
The label would be more effective if producers were to adopt the animal welfare 
standard of the label for their entire production process. 
Credibility of labels is essential. Certifi cation is required to build up the reputation 
of labels. Labels prescribed by public authorities are generally monitored by public 
or semi-public agencies. In case of voluntary labels, certifi cation is done by 
specialized agencies, such as NGOs or private certifi cation agencies for the private 
labels of particular retailers, or for a group of private fi rms in the same industry. 
Private parties (both fi rms and not-for-profi t organizations) that try to communicate 
particular characteristics of their products or certify these attributes in labels, have 
to invest substantial funds in building up the reputation of their brand name or 
label, by adapting the production process of their own plants or the plants of third 
parties, by setting up a monitoring organization and through marketing campaigns. 
In large part, these investments can be regarded as sunk costs – the investing 
organization cannot retrieve the investment without incurring substantial losses. 
As a result, the investor has an interest in continuing to build his reputation, and 
will monitor the supply chain to ensure that products meet the criteria, or will 
keenly guard the quality of its certifi cation. For the same reason, a retailer will only 
adopt a particular standard, such as for animal welfare, if the marketing benefi ts 
clearly outweigh the costs of creating the label. Suffi cient consumers should be 
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willing to pay a premium on the price of the normal product. NGOs play an 
important role in making consumers aware of the processes involved in the 
production of many consumer goods, and regularly report on different aspects of 
these ‘non-trade concerns’.626 Thus voluntary labels, once established, have the 
advantage that the organization that has adopted a standard has a strong incentive 
to maintain and improve its credibility. 
Do labels effectively diminish the information asymmetry? To fi nd out, the 
European Commission’s Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development 
programme recently conducted an EU-wide survey of consumers to evaluate the 
success of environmental product information schemes.627 The results of the 
surveys were mixed. Consumer awareness of established national ‘eco-labels’ was 
high in Norway (White Swan, 70 per cent) and Germany (Blue Angel, 70 per cent), 
while in Italy and Spain awareness of eco-labels was very low. The EU Flower eco-
label was known by only a few consumers.628 Recognition of the Fair Trade label 
also varies widely, from 90 per cent in the Netherlands, to 25 per cent in the UK in 
2003. The Energy Star label for electrical appliances, a joint initiative of the US 
Environmental Protection Agency and the US Department of Energy launched in 
1992, is now recognized by 63 per cent of respondents. Information campaigns 
may increase the level of awareness of such labels, although full awareness is not 
realistic. A signifi cant proportion of consumers (20–50 per cent in the Netherlands) 
are not interested in information on the food supply chain, believing that this is a 
task for the government and producers.629 Our conclusion is that labels can be very 
effective in resolving the information asymmetry, although they are not always 
entirely successful. This may be because the labels themselves do not 
communicate information effectively, or may be due to disinterest on the part of 
the target group.
626 A recent report by the OECD Trade Committee contains many sector studies. See Informing Consumers of 
CSR in International Trade, Part II: Case Studies (Paris: OECD, 2006). NGOs play an important role in the 
creation of labels and brands that communicate Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the production 
processes for cut fl owers, clothing and cosmetics. Examples of private labels in animal welfare include those 
of the Body Shop and other large cosmetics fi rms. The Coalition for Consumer Information on Cosmetics, 
established by the largest US animal protection groups, has developed the internationally recognized 
Corporate Standard for Compassion for Animals and issues a label, the ‘leaping bunny’. 
627 European Commission, Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development (EESD) programme, 
available at http://cordis.europa.eu/eesd. 
628 European Commission, summary of the EESD research programme: Developing Effective and Effi cient 
Product Information Schemes, available at http://cordis.europa.eu/data/PROJ_FP5/
ACTIONeqDndSESSIONeq112362005919ndDOCeq485ndTBLeqEN_PROJ.htm. 
629 Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Van grond tot mond. Transparantie van de voedselmarkt (Utrecht: SNM, 2004).
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The effectiveness of (voluntary) labels in terms of market share is limited. Products 
that have been produced in accordance with the standards of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), and are labelled as such, have ‘relatively modest but usually 
growing market shares’, according to the OECD.630 A relatively large share of the 
products consumed does not meet the conditions of CSR. For animal welfare, 
some voluntary labels have been relatively successful in terms of market share, 
particularly cosmetics. For meat, they have been less successful, for a number of 
reasons. First, consumers must be willing to pay a premium for meat products 
from animals reared according to animal welfare standards. When asked, 
consumers overwhelmingly say they are willing to pay ‘a little extra’ for ‘ethical 
alternatives’.631 In practice, however, consumers take into account many factors 
when making spending decisions. Although many care for ethically responsible 
production conditions, only a minority rank them above other factors such as 
design and taste (5 per cent of the British public did in 2000). If products (plywood 
articles) are sold in two varieties that are equal in all respects (including price), 
except that one carries an eco-label and the other does not, the majority will buy 
the former.632 For meat, the price difference between labelled and non-labelled 
products may be substantial.633 
A second reason why labels on meat have not been successful is that the label 
may not communicate information effectively. Consumers sometimes distrust the 
claims of socially responsible production methods as they fear that commercial 
interests are the main motive. Alternatively, the labels may provide an overload of 
information, there may be different labelling systems for the same product, or 
discontinuities in labels. Third, voluntary labels are diffi cult to implement in 
particular sectors. The nature of the product (the animal origins of intensively 
processed products and of non-food products may be diffi cult to recognize) and 
the organization of the sector (small-scale production and retailing is costly to 
certify, and free riding is attractive and easy if the price premium is substantial and 
if the supply chain is complex) play a role. 
630 OECD, Informing Consumers of CSR in International Trade, Part I (Paris: OECD, 2006) p.9. 
631 A survey by Co-op UK in 2004 indicated that 84 per cent of respondents answer this question in the 
affi rmative in 2004, compared to 62 per cent in 1994. See Shopping with Attitude (Manchester: Co-op, 2004), 
available at www.pdf.co-operative.co.uk/pdfs/shopping_with_attitude.pdf. 
632 R.C. Anderson and E.N. Hansen, ‘Determining consumer preferences for ecolabeled forest products: An 
experimental approach’, in: Journal of Forestry, vol. 12, no.4 (2004), pp.28-32. For a review of research, see 
OECD, Informing Consumers of CSR in International Trade, Part I, pp.14–16. 
633 For free-range chicken breast the price premium may be almost 50 per cent above the the price of 
conventional chicken (as observed by the author in a Dutch butcher’s shop in December 2006). 
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The question is whether other steps should be taken if the market share of the 
preferred product remains relatively low despite the fact that a voluntary label has 
solved the problem of information asymmetry. One might say that, apparently, the 
concern for animal welfare is not generally supported by consumers to the extent 
necessary to stop production processes that fall short of animal welfare standards. 
Or, to put it differently, as the willingness to pay for the labelled product is 
insuffi cient to make the labelled product the dominant product, there is no 
externality. This view can be challenged. A voluntary label enables consumers to 
take away only part of the externality they face. As far as consumer welfare is 
determined by the living conditions in animal husbandry in general, buying animal 
welfare labelled products has a small effect if the conventional production process 
remains dominant. 
Animal welfare is said to have the characteristics of a public good: it is non-
excludable and non-separable, which makes it impossible to collect payments for 
the supply of the good.634 Before governments take measures to produce the public 
good of animal welfare (by mandatory labelling and/or regulation), the size and 
valuation of the public good should be clear. This is required to make an informed 
trade-off between benefi ts and costs. Much research has been devoted to the 
question of negative external effects of caged hens. The signifi cantly greater 
willingness to pay for eggs from free-range hens is interpreted as an indication of a 
negative external effect. These studies do not distinguish between the individual 
welfare effect of consuming food that meets high standards of animal welfare and 
the collective welfare effect of a general application of these standards. In a 
research setting that made this distinction (for eggs), Carlsson et al. found that 
there is no signifi cantly higher willingness to pay for the regulation solution (the 
collective welfare improvement).635 They concluded that ‘… if a choice is made to 
impose higher welfare standards in farming, it must be based on criteria other than 
economics’.636 However, before a defi nite conclusion can be drawn more empirical 
research is required. 
 
As far as mandatory labelling of negative attributes is concerned, the following 
reasoning may be adopted, based on the question of whether a standard is 
generally accepted as the norm. Swinbank argues that in this case mandatory 
labelling for animal welfare for negative attributes is acceptable where a country 
can demonstrate that ‘there is a clear expectation that consumers expect to be 
634 Farm Foundation, The Future of Animal Agriculture in North America (Oak Brook, Ill.: Farm Foundation, 2006) 
ch. 8, pp.133-151. 
635 F. Carlsson, P. Frykblom and C.J. Lagerkvist, Farm Animal Welfare: Testing Market Failure. Working Papers in 
Economics no. 19, Department of Economics, Göteborg University, 2003. 
636 Farm Foundation, The Future of Animal Agriculture in North America, p.140. 
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warned when the norms are not respected, and that equivalent or more stringent 
standards apply to domestic production …’.637 Thus, the decision on domestic 
regulation on animal welfare is one of collective decision making on ethical 
grounds. Once a regulation on animal welfare has been adopted, this might 
develop into a norm. Swinbank is of the opinion that this proposal should not 
undermine the concept of ‘like’ products and that the proposal does not extend to 
climatic advantage or geographical location. He accedes that the inclusion of 
labour standards would be highly controversial. One might add that the discussion 
as to the minimum standards for animal welfare in the EU has been going on for 
many years already, and is likely to continue. It cannot be concluded that the EU 
rules for animal welfare have developed into a norm, let alone that consumers 
expect to be warned if these standards have not been respected. 
3.2 Effi ciency 
Labelling is a way to communicate to the buyer that a product (or service) has a 
particular attribute that is not visible. As such, labelling diminishes the asymmetry 
in information between sellers and buyers. This enables buyers to purchase those 
goods that better match their preferences. This is welfare enhancing. It is a different 
issue whether voluntary labelling is an effi cient system. 
As indicated above, voluntary labelling is practised by fi rms that consider the label 
to be a device for communicating the special nature of a product. Labels are a way 
of product differentiation. This gives the seller some infl uence in the market for his 
particular variety of product. Depending on the level of competition in the market 
concerned, fi rms will minimize the cost of production. The need for cost-effective 
production applies for the whole supply chain. The fi rm that is responsible for the 
label’s validity (usually the retailer or owner of the brand name) has to take care 
that it observes the label’s conditions at competitive cost levels. As the consumer 
markets where animal welfare labels are relevant are rather competitive, 
particularly in the medium to long run, labels have to be upheld in effi cient ways. 
In addition, improved control systems for labels may lead to reduced product and 
raw material wastage, improved product-cost accounting and increased effi ciency 
and competitiveness.638 
637 A. Swinbank, ‘Like products, animal welfare and the World Trade Organization’, in: Journal of World Trade, 
vol. 40, no.4 (2006), p.707. 
638 S. Jaffee and S. Henson, ‘Agro-food exports from developing countries: The challenges posed by standards’, 
in: M.A. Aksoy and J.C. Beghin (eds) Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2004), chapter 6. 
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Voluntary labelling may give rise to ineffi cient outcomes, i.e. produce labels at cost 
levels that are higher than necessary. This may happen in particular circumstances. 
For example, if the label is a company label and gives the fi rm a monopoly 
position, excessive profi ts will result, at the expense of consumer welfare. Such a 
situation is rather special and will not hold in the long run. One may think of a 
sudden illness among livestock in the ‘normal’ production process that makes the 
public turn en masse to the animal welfare labelled product. 
3.3  Conclusions on the effectiveness and effi ciency of labelling for 
animal welfare
Labels as such are extensively used, as consumers in high-income countries want 
to have a broad choice among different varieties of a product and are increasingly 
attaching value to products that have been produced in socially responsible ways. 
Voluntary labelling schemes are increasingly being used and are taking different 
forms. Labelling is an effective way of reducing information asymmetries. The 
effectiveness in terms of market shares of existing voluntary labels is considerable 
in some cases, although for most products market shares remain in the order of 1–
5 per cent. Considerable funds have to be invested to create, certify and 
communicate labels; these investments have the nature of sunk costs. This is an 
incentive to guarantee the credibility of the label. The effectiveness may be limited 
by unwillingness to pay for the labelled product quality where many other product 
qualities are taken into account. An overload of information may make the 
consumers disinterested in a label. The effi ciency of voluntary labels is relatively 
high, as the private parties that introduced and maintain the label have to compete 
with non-labelled varieties. Sometimes the chain control mechanism leads to cost 
reductions that would not have otherwise occurred. Compulsory labelling has 
some different aspects. Its effectiveness might be somewhat greater as it covers all 
products sold. On the other hand, compulsory labels often are less fl exible, as long 
bureaucratic procedures are involved in their formulation. This may reduce the 
effi ciency of these systems in the long run. 
3.4 Labelling and developing country agro-food exports
3.4.1 General aspects: problems and opportunities
Developing countries have been rather reluctant with respect to labelling 
initiatives. The suspicion of protectionism and the cultural and economic distance 
between high- and low-income countries largely explain this attitude. With the 
ongoing globalization of supply chains, consumers in rich countries are showing 
increasing concern about the safety and other (hidden and apparent) qualities of 
products. Both public and private bodies have reacted by introducing technical 
norms and standards. Labelling and certifi cation are part of this development. For 
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exporters in developing countries, the required new product qualities may indeed 
be diffi cult to realize. This may be due to their complexity, the number of different 
labels and their certifi cation (lack of harmonization), the lack of administrative, 
technical and scientifi c capacities of the exporting countries’ fi rms and public 
agencies.639 In a recent paper, Chen et al. examined the impact of foreign standards 
on the export performance of developing country fi rms, measured by the share of 
production that is exported and the number of export markets a fi rm enters.640 Their 
empirical results – based on the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey 
database – indicate that testing procedures and lengthy inspections reduce exports 
by 9 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. In addition, they fi nd that differences in 
standards cause diseconomies of scale, which reduces the entry into new markets. 
Although this research covers a broader set of standards and technical regulations 
than labelling, it is relevant as public and private labelling has the same effect for 
exporting fi rms: if they do not meet the labelling requirements, there are markets 
or segments of markets that they cannot enter. A limitation of their approach is that 
they assume that compliance with the standards has no effect on demand. Other 
authors take demand into account. They argue that the emerging public and private 
standards offer an opportunity for developing countries to improve their 
competitiveness, as many of these standards are a ‘bridge between increasingly 
demanding consumers requirements and the participation of distant (and 
international) suppliers … The process of standards compliance could conceivably 
provide the basis for a more sustainable and profi table trade over the long-term, 
albeit with some particular winners and losers’.641 
A distinction can be made between (1) the cost of meeting the criteria of a label, (2) 
the certifi cation cost, (3) the issue of who pays the cost, and (4) the impact on the 
primary suppliers in developing countries. 
The costs of upgrading production to higher standards differ enormously. These 
costs may depend on such factors as the criteria of the label, the production 
process, the quality of existing production facilities, the scale of production and 
management techniques used. If sustainability criteria were to be introduced for 
bioethanol production in Brazil (see Box 1 above), it is estimated that total 
production costs could rise by 24–56 per cent, increasing the cost per litre by up to 
€ 0.12. Similarly, complying with sustainability criteria for willow production in the 
Ukraine (for biomass) could increase total production costs by 14 per cent. 
In a brief survey, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
639 Ibid.
640 M.X. Chen, T. Otsuki and J.S. Wilson, Do Standards Matter for Export Success? Policy Research Working 
Paper 3809 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006). 
641 Ibid., pp.6-3.
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(FICCI) found that the cost per farmer of meeting EurepGAP conditions is € 1700, 
a certifi cate of the British Retailers’ Consortium € 4500, and a Kosher Certifi cate 
€ 3500.642 For the production of fruits and vegetables, the costs of meeting 
EurepGAP conditions at the level of individual fi rms are estimated at about 
€ 100,000 in Tanzania and Guinea for initial expenditures, and ongoing annual 
costs of € 20,000 to € 30,000 (see Box 2 below). In order to meet new compulsory 
hygiene standards for shrimps, which were introduced following detentions of the 
product in the US and a ban by the EU, Bangladeshi industries had to make 
investments equal to 2.3 per cent of the total value of the country’s shrimp exports 
over the period 1996–98. For Nicaragua, this fi gure was 0.61 per cent over the 
period 1997–2002.643 It has also been reported that sustainability criteria have 
lowered cost levels per unit as a result of better process management. The cost 
indications presented here are diffi cult to compare. What they do indicate, 
however, is that the compliance costs may be substantial in relative terms. An 
increase in the cost per unit of 10–50 per cent is not uncommon.
As long as the product that meets the criteria fetches an equivalent price premium 
for the producer, the higher standard may create an attractive market segment. 
Whether this happens will depend on the power relations in the supply chain. If 
upstream producers are numerous and not globally organized – as is the case for 
many standardized commodities, fruits and tropical beverages – large trading 
houses and retailers are likely to have a dominant position in the supply chain. As far 
as this is the case, the price premium for the labelled product will accrue to the 
retailer. In a case study on Ugandan coffee, it was reported that farmers had an 
incentive to invest in lower-quality coffee as regulatory penalties are low compared 
to the high cost of investment in better processing investment in the presence of a 
very low price premium for high-quality coffee.644 The same source reports case 
studies in Kenya and Uganda for the fl ower and fi sh industries, where investments in 
quality appear to lead to higher market prices. In the case of fi sh exports by Uganda, 
the investments in higher quality have resulted in a higher market share. ‘It appears 
that these premiums, if any, accrue to producers of high-end value commodities or 
marketing agents closer to the retail end of the production process (i.e. retailers and 
supermarkets in Europe)’. Small farmers and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
in developing countries are in a diffi cult position to pocket whole or part of the price 
premium. NGO-inspired labels such as Fair Trade are an exception, as the existence 
642 FICCI, High Cost of Standard Compliance Making Exports to EU Diffi cult: FICCI Survey (New Delhi: FICCI, 
2006). Available at www.fi cci.com/press/highcost-20march.doc. 
643 S. Jaffee and S. Henson, ‘Agro-food exports from developing countries’. 
644 J.S. Wilson and V.O. Abiola (eds), Standards and Global Trade: A Voice for Africa (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2003). Available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eurvp/web.nsf/pages/standards+in+global+trade+
b/$fi le/executive+summary+(english+version).pdf.
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of these labels relies on the prices primary producers receive. 
The certifi cation costs of a particular production process will vary over different 
processes, the number and strictness of criteria, the ease of measurement, etc. 
Normally, there are fi xed and variable costs. Skal (a third-party certifi cation 
institute) charges fi xed and variable fees for organic certifi cation for processors 
and importers that want to participate in the certifi cation programme ‘Organic 
Production in the Netherlands’. The variable fee is related to turnover,645 and applies 
to processors and agricultural producers. After initial certifi cation, annual audits 
are required to maintain certifi cation. In general, the scale of production is a 
determining factor in the per unit cost of certifi cation. 
For small-scale producers, group certifi cation is an option. This requires a local 
organization of producers that has the means to enforce compliance. If the criteria 
are simple and straightforward, the certifi cation costs are modest, as in the case of 
ISO norms. More complex criteria (such as biodiversity or Forest Stewardship 
Council norms) are more costly to certify. As indicated in Box 2 below, the costs of 
certifi cation for bioethanol in the São Paulo region are rather modest, around 1 per 
cent of total production costs. 
 
Box 2 EurepGap and developing country exports of fruits and vegetables
 EurepGAP is a private certifi cation system established by 22 large European 
retailers. There is a technical committee for fruits that has formulated a 
standard for fruits and vegetables. Although suppliers are represented in the 
committee, none of them are African suppliers. There is no labelling scheme, 
but certifi cation is required in order to gain access to the large retailers. 
The standard has 250 control points. Food safety and traceability are the main 
subjects. Other areas are labour and environmental conditions in production. 
‘Non-trade concerns’ such as provisions for workers (toilets, washing facilities) 
are part of the EurepGAP protocol for fruits and vegetables. 
 In a recent report, UNCTAD tried to establish the burden of this set of private 
standards on local producers in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea.646 
 The report includes an inventory of the institutions that need to be in place, and 
the investments required at the macro-level. It also includes estimates of the costs 
of EurepGAP compliance and certifi cation for private fi rms, based on interviews 
645 Skal (2006) Tariff paper 2006 (available at www.skal.nl, click on ‘costs’).
646 UNCTAD, Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance: United Republic of Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Guinea: Tropical Fruits (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2005). Available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditccom20052_en.pdf.
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and discussions with producers and offi cials, as shown in the table below. 
 Costs of complying with EurepGAP conditions in Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Guinea (in US$, 2005) 
Country Macro costs 
(x 1000)*
Micro: 
setup costs**
Micro: 
ongoing costs**
Tanzania 2520 98,690 20,500
Guinea 3142 2,197,200 27,000
Mozambique 9250 109,400 23,600
  *  at the national level
  **  at the level of the fi rm
The macro costs consist of the costs of setting up the legal framework, developing 
certifi cation, inspection and quarantine capacities, participation in international 
standard-setting bodies, etc. Producers also incur costs, including setting up 
traceability systems, investing in worker health, safety and welfare provisions, and 
introducing management systems in several areas (waste, pesticides, fertilizers, 
soil and substrates). The macro costs can vary signifi cantly, depending on whether 
countries have already made some progress in creating the institutions needed, 
and on the size of the sector and geographical dispersion of producers. The cost of 
EurepGAP compliance is substantial for many producers in the countries 
concerned as ‘it demands a shift from manual and low-skilled labour practices in 
agriculture and light manufacturing to more sophisticated best practices 
comparable to those found in developed countries’.647 This is not a problem for 
foreign investors who usually bring their know-how on producing according to 
EurepGAP standards to their affi liates in developing countries. For small and 
medium-sized local companies and farmers, the costs of meeting the standards 
(the micro-costs in the table in Box 2) will be prohibitive. Only organizing 
themselves into associations of suffi cient size will give them the scale that is 
necessary, but the organization costs (monitoring, training, etc.) will be substantial.
The UNCTAD report also describes the experiences in Kenya in adopting EurepGAP 
standards in order to improve the competitiveness of the horticultural sector. Many 
large farms are already certifi ed and more than 50,000 small outgrowers are said 
to be moving towards compliance. Smallholder groups are often associated with 
exporting companies. A local certifi cation company for EurepGAP has been set up, 
and training programmes and advisory services have been introduced to help 
smallholders in matters such as traceability and allowed farm inputs.
647 J.S. Wilson and V.O. Abiola, Standards and Global Trade, p.xxi. 
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3.4.2 Animal welfare labels and developing country exporters
The costs of upgrading animal farming to higher standards in developing countries 
have not been well researched. Some studies in developed regions, particularly the 
EU, show that these costs include more and different fodder, more labour, higher 
capital investment in buildings and more land needed for free-ranging animals. 
These costs will be different in developing and industrialized countries. In some 
countries labour will be cheaper and land prices lower, while capital may be more 
expensive. The increases in cost in the EU give some indication, but care should be 
taken in applying these data to developing countries. It has been estimated that the 
production cost of chickens (‘broilers’) increases by 5 per cent if the stocking 
density is decreased from 38 to 30 kg/m2. The same increase applies for slower 
growth of broilers (from 40 to 50 days).648 Free-range chicken breast fetches a much 
higher price premium, which may be as much as 50 per cent.649 Complying with 
animal welfare standards may increase the cost of pig production in the UK by 
approximately 10 per cent (free range compared to minimum standards), which is 
covered by a price premium.650 
The effects of labelling schemes on animal food producers in developing countries 
will vary depending on the type of product, and for producers who operate under 
very different regional conditions, use different technologies, etc. Research carried 
out in Brazil by the Dutch Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), 
suggested ‘that it may not be very diffi cult for Brazilian chicken meat exporters … 
to adapt to European ‘sustainability’ standards that affect market access’.651 
For exporters in other countries, such as Thailand, however, complying with the 
labelling standards may be more diffi cult or expensive, according to the LEI report. 
These exporters would probably remain in the unlabelled market segment (e.g. in 
the EU if there is no mandatory labelling for negative attributes), or other markets 
where labelling obligations are less strict. 
Thailand is an interesting case. The EU is importing increasing quantities of cooked 
chicken from Thailand (from 61,105 tonnes in 2003 to 106,503 tonnes in 2005). 
The import tariff on cooked chicken is 10.9 per cent (ad valorem). In the summer of 
648 J. Moynagh, ’U regulation and consumer demand for animal welfare’, in: AgBioForum, vol. 3, no. 2&3 (2000), 
pp.107-114. See also: Farm Foundation, The Future of Animal Agriculture in North America, pp.133-151. 
649 As observed by the author in a small butcher’s shop in the Netherlands in 2006.
650 H.L.I Bornett, J.H. Guy and P.J. Cain, ‘Impact of animal welfare on costs and viability of pig production in the 
UK’, in: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 16, no. 2 (2003), pp.163-186. 
651 D.J.F. Eaton, J. Bourgeois and T.J. Achterbosch, Product Differentiation under the WTO: An Analysis of 
Labelling and Tariff or Tax Measures concerning Farm Animal Welfare (The Hague: Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute (LEI), 2005), p.54. 
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2006, the EU started negotiations with Thailand on a tariff quota, the idea being to 
increase the out-of-quota tariff to € 102 per 100 kg, the tariff for frozen poultry. 
It is diffi cult to justify an increase in tariff and quantitative barriers on a product 
imported from a particular country and subsequently to impose mandatory 
labelling on top of that. As in the case of the sustainability criteria for bioethanol 
(see section 2.5 above), motives of protectionism are diffi cult to refute.
3.5 Conclusions with respect to labelling for animal welfare
From the foregoing discussion of the impacts of labelling on animal welfare 
standards and developing country exports, we can draw the following conclusions. 
First, modern consumers demand a large choice among differentiated products, 
adequate information and a guarantee for a few credence attributes (mainly 
concerning health aspects). These attributes have the nature of a public good and 
should be regulated by offi cial standards and/or mandatory labels. It is far from 
clear, however, whether animal welfare standards have this public good nature. 
For credence attributes that do not have a public good nature, voluntary labelling is 
a suffi cient and effi cient solution to solve the problem of market failures due to 
information asymmetry. 
Second, developing country producers are having to comply with a rapidly 
increasing number of technical norms and standards. Primary producers in 
developing countries may be able to profi t from higher standards as long as they 
are able to invest in upgrading their production processes, in certifi cation and 
marketing. However, fi nancial systems in developing countries might not cater to 
these investment needs as the fi rms may be small and lack collateral, and local 
banks may not operate along the lines of market incentives. Thus higher standards 
(including voluntary private sector schemes such as EurepGAP) may favour large 
production companies and retailers. 
Third, small producers may benefi t if the right institutions are in place to provide 
training, information and certifi cation at reasonable prices. 
Fourth, given the potential problems developing country exporters have in 
complying with higher norms and standards, which are increasingly being 
demanded by private importers in rich countries, and often come on top of high 
tariffs and binding quotas, governments should practice utmost restraint in making 
decisions that will only add to the regulatory barriers to imports from developing 
countries. International coordination should prevent the proliferation of different 
standards, as this will only add to the costs to developing country producers of 
meeting those standards. 
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In addition, development cooperation can play an important role in stimulating the 
export performance of domestic fi rms in developing countries. Technical and 
fi nancial support for research, local extension services, and monitoring and testing 
facilities could assist small and medium-sized fi rms in setting up and improving 
export ventures, and help small producers in organizing collective initiatives in 
labelling, certifi cation and marketing.
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 Conclusions
This study has focused on three main issues:
the consistency of unilateral nPR PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns  –
with the obligations under the WTO Agreement (Part 1);
the relevance of other international agreements for unilateral nPR PPM  –
measures addressing non-trade concerns (Part 2); and
the economic effectiveness and effi ciency, as well as the impact on developing  –
countries, of unilateral nPR PPM measures addressing non-trade concerns 
(Part 3).
These issues are examined primarily with regard to existing, proposed or still 
purely hypothetical measures to give effect to the Cramer criteria for the 
sustainable production of biomass or the protection and promotion of animal 
welfare. With regard to the WTO consistency of these measures, the table below 
indicates the most relevant WTO provisions and refers to the legal analysis 
presented in this report.
Unilateral nPR PPM measures Relevant WTO 
provisions
Relevant 
analysis
Import prohibition on products not produced consistently with 
nPR PPMs (e.g. an import prohibition on biomass not produced 
consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria; or an import 
prohibition on livestock products not produced consistently 
animal welfare requirements)
Article XI of 
the GATT 1994
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.85.
See p.89.
Preferential customs duties for products produced consistently 
with nPR PPMs (e.g. lower customs duties for biomass produced 
consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria; or higher 
customs duties for meat from animals that have not been kept, 
fed, transported or slaughtered in accordance with specifi c 
animal welfare requirements)
Article I.1 of 
the GATT 1994
Enabling 
Clause of the 
GATT 1994
See p.18.
See p.132.
Country-specifi c customs duties for imports from countries that 
have national legislation incorporating specifi c nPR PPMs (e.g. 
lower customs duties for biomass imported from countries that 
have been certifi ed as requiring that the production of biomass 
conforms to the Cramer sustainability criteria and equivalent 
criteria)
Article I.1 of 
the GATT 1994
Enabling 
Clause of the 
GATT 1994
See p.18. 
See p.132.
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Unilateral nPR PPM measures Relevant WTO 
provisions
Relevant 
analysis
Domestic prohibition on the use or sale of products produced 
inconsistently with the nPR PPMs (e.g. a prohibition on the use 
in the production of biofuels of biomass produced inconsistently 
with the Cramer sustainability criteria; or a prohibition on the 
sale of foie gras of geese that were force-fed)
Article III:4 of 
the GATT 1994
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.51.
See p.89.
Technical regulations (mandatory) setting out nPR PPMs for 
products used or sold (e.g. a technical regulation stipulating that 
eggs must be produced in conditions where battery cages do not 
hold more than 8 laying hens per m2)
Article III:4 of 
the GATT 1994 
(and the TBT 
Agreement?)
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.51 
and p.136.
See p.89.
Government or private standards (voluntary) setting out nPR 
PPMs for products used or sold (e.g. a standard agreed upon by 
oil and electricity companies that the biomass they use must 
meet the Cramer sustainability criteria; or a standard agreed 
upon by retailers that they will only sell animal-welfare-friendly 
products)
The TBT 
Agreement 
and Article III:4 
of the GATT 
1994?
See p.51 and 
p.136.
Compulsory blending requirements specifying that the products 
blended must be produced consistently with nPR PPMs (e.g. a 
regulation excluding from the compulsory blending of fossil and 
biofuels, biofuels from biomass not produced consistently with 
the Cramer sustainability criteria)
Article III:4 and 
III:5 of the 
GATT 1994 
(and the TBT 
Agreement?)
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.51 
and p.72
(and p.136).
See p.89.
Mandatory or voluntary labelling regarding nPR PPMs (e.g. 
labelling on livestock products indicating whether they are 
produced consistently with specifi c animal welfare requirements)
The TBT 
Agreement 
and Article III:4 
of the GATT 
1994
See p.51 
and p.136.
Voluntary certifi cation programmes or schemes regarding nPR 
PPMs (e.g. a government or private organization certifying that 
specifi c biomass has been produced consistently with the 
Cramer sustainability criteria; or that livestock products have 
been produced consistently with animal welfare requirements)
Article III:4 of 
the GATT 1994 
(and the TBT 
Agreement?)
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.51 
and p.136.
See p.89.
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Unilateral nPR PPM measures Relevant WTO 
provisions
Relevant 
analysis
Tax reductions, exemptions or rebates for products produced 
consistently with nPR PPMs (e.g. a reduction in excise duties on 
biofuels from biomass produced consistently with the Cramer 
sustainability criteria; or a reduction in VAT on animal-welfare-
friendly products)
Article III:2 of 
the GATT 1994, 
the SCM 
Agreement 
and the 
Agreement on 
Agriculture
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.27, p.158 
and p.160.
See p.89.
Border tax adjustments levied on imported products to offset 
nPR PPM-based domestic taxation
Article II:2 of 
the GATT 1994
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.74.
See p.89.
Government procurement requirements favouring products 
produced consistently with nPR PPMs (e.g. a requirement that 
public buses must use biofuels from biomass produced 
consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria; or a requirement 
that public hospitals and schools may only buy meat from livestock 
produced consistently with animal welfare requirements)
Article III:8 of 
the GATT 1994 
and the WTO 
Agreement on 
Government 
Procurement
See p.73.
Direct subsidies to assist producers with the additional cost 
incurred in meeting nPR PPMs (e.g. payments to oil companies 
or electricity companies to offset the additional costs of using 
biomass or biofuels from biomass produced consistently with 
the Cramer sustainability criteria; or payments to farmers to 
offset the additional costs resulting from compliance with animal 
welfare requirements)
The SCM 
Agreement 
and the 
Agreement on 
Agriculture
See p.158 
and p.160.
Export refunds to overcome the competitive disadvantage that 
producers have on the world market as a result of stricter domestic 
regulation setting out nPR PPMs (e.g. export refunds for meat and 
livestock products to compensate for the higher production costs 
resulting from compliance with animal welfare requirements)
The SCM 
Agreement 
and the 
Agreement on 
Agriculture
See p.158 
and p.160.
Reporting requirements relating to nPR PPMs (e.g. the 
requirement for industrial users of biomass (oil and electricity 
companies) to report whether biomass they use is produced 
consistently with the Cramer sustainability criteria (and 
subsequently leaving it to the consumers/civil society to act on 
the basis of that information)
Article III:4 of 
the GATT 1994 
(and the TBT 
Agreement?)
Article XX of 
the GATT 1994
See p.51 
and p.136.
See p.89.
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As the Appellate Body stated in 1996 in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, WTO 
Members are free to adopt or maintain unilateral nPR PPM measures addressing 
non-trade concerns as long as, in doing so, they act consistently with their 
obligations under WTO law. This report shows that some of the existing, proposed or 
still purely hypothetical measures to give effect to the Cramer criteria for the 
sustainable production of biomass or measures to protect and promote animal 
welfare are clearly WTO-consistent, while others are defi nitely WTO-inconsistent. For 
a signifi cant number of measures, however, there is confusion and uncertainty with 
regard to their WTO consistency. Their WTO conformity will depend, inter alia, upon:
whether, and to what extent, nPR PPMs are relevant in determining whether  –
products are ‘like’;
whether there is a jurisdictional limitation on the application of Article XX; and –
whether measures setting out nPR PPMs fall within the scope of application of  –
the TBT Agreement.
  Relevance of other international agreements for unilateral nPR PPM 
measures addressing non-trade concerns 
Various international agreements on environmental and labour standards and 
human rights contain trade provisions to further their objectives. Out of the 200 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) currently in force, the WTO has 
identifi ed 14 agreements with trade-related provisions. Common features of these 
agreements are import and/or export restrictions both between Parties and with 
regard to non-Parties. In most cases their trade provisions relate to product-related 
processes and production methods (PR PPMs). But Parties may sometimes choose 
to adopt unilateral measures addressing non-product-related PPMs in furtherance 
of the objectives of an environmental agreement. The majority of the trade-related 
environmental treaties also restrict or prohibit trade with non-Parties to the 
agreements and/or promote the transfer of environmentally sound technology to 
developing countries. Both types of measures potentially confl ict with relevant 
WTO rules. Since they violate a priori the GATT non-discrimination obligations 
(Articles I and III) or the prohibition on quantitative restrictions (Article XI), they 
must be held against the requirements of the general exceptions and the chapeau 
of Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
Unlike environmental agreements, most human rights agreements do not contain 
explicit trade-restrictive provisions. The type of human rights measures of concern 
for the current discussion generally relates to labour standards and is a typical 
example of non-product-related PPMs. Because of the jurisdictional limitations 
arguably ‘implied’ by the WTO dispute settlement bodies thus far, it seems 
extremely diffi cult – if not impossible – to justify trade restrictions relating to 
human rights concerns under Article XX of the GATT 1994. Article XX of the GATT 
1994 also lacks an explicit social clause.
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The present report notes that a dispute over confl icting obligations under 
environmental or human rights agreements, and WTO law has not yet arisen. 
However, there is a need to fi nd proper solutions in order to avoid such disputes in 
future. An increasing number of regulatory programmes addressing non-product-
related social and environmentally sound production is being developed at the 
international level. The two main confl ict rules of Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties that relate to the aspects of temporality and 
speciality are applicable but they may not be able to solve all (potential) problems. 
A balanced approach to the WTO as a legal system should take into account its 
place within the wider corpus of international law. Besides using environmental 
and human rights agreements to determine the ordinary meaning of the terms of 
the WTO Agreement, dispute settlement bodies of the WTO should use these 
agreements as a factual reference in their interpretation of Article XX of the GATT 
1994. If a measure was taken pursuant to a widely ratifi ed environmental or human 
rights agreement, it should be considered relevant factual evidence that the 
measure was legitimate. Yet, in the current state of legal doctrine, the direct 
application of non-WTO norms as ‘legal norms’ by the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies is considered a bridge too far. 
The best way to address non-product-related PPM concerns remains the 
negotiation of broad multilateral agreements that expressly contain trade 
measures to further their objectives. These agreements must be open to all WTO 
Members and must impose equal obligations on countries ‘where the same 
conditions prevail’, so as to avoid discrimination.
  Economic effectiveness and effi ciency of unilateral nPR PPM measures 
and their impact on developing countries
The present report has also considered the economic effectiveness and effi ciency 
and possible impact on developing countries of addressing non-trade concerns. 
It has done so by focusing on and analysing existing, proposed or still purely 
hypothetical measures that intend to give effect to sustainability criteria for the 
production of biomass and the protection and promotion of animal welfare. 
Bioethanol from tropical countries, for example, is deemed to be a product of high 
potential in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an effective and effi cient 
way. At present it is being precluded from fully realising this potential in the EU 
because of incoherent trade and agricultural policies. With regard to most 
unilateral nPR PPM measures, it is questioned whether such measures could 
ultimately achieve their intended objectives, given the limited leverage of export 
requirements on the regulatory situation in the economies of exporting countries. 
Developing countries have good reason to fear forms of eco- or labour 
protectionism where regulatory systems of importing countries may be captured 
by rent-seeking groups pursuing other hidden objectives.
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It is far from clear whether most animal welfare aspects have a public good nature. 
For credence attributes that do not have a public good nature, voluntary labelling 
would seem a suffi cient and effi cient solution to solve the problem of market 
failure due to information asymmetry. Primary producers in developing countries 
may be able to profi t from higher standards as long as they are able to invest in 
upgrading their production processes, and in certifi cation and marketing 
programmes. Certifi cation of small fi rms is relatively expensive; collective 
certifi cation could be a solution but requires costly organization and monitoring/
sanctioning. Big, international fi rms are often in a more favourable position. To 
address these problems, international harmonization could prevent the 
proliferation of different standards, as the latter is adding to the costs to 
developing country producers of meeting those standards. Development 
cooperation can play an important role in stimulating the export performance of 
domestic fi rms in developing countries.
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1  TOR drawn up by BZ/DGIS/CE (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate-General for International Cooperation, 
Coherence Unit) and agreed with LNV/IZ (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, International 
Affairs Department), EZ/BEB/Directie Handelspolitiek (Ministry of Economic Affairs, Foreign Economic 
Relations, Trade Policy Department), VROM/DIZ (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, 
International Affairs Directorate), SZW/IZ/IA (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, International Affairs 
Department).
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 Non-trade concerns in te EU and WTO: opportunities and
 threats for developing countries
 Introduction
Non-trade concerns (NTCs) are generally regarded as an important topic of 
discussion within the WTO and the EU and in the dialogue with developing 
countries. At the same time, however, there is a great deal of confusion about the 
precise defi nition of the term. “NTCs” serves as a collective term for all kinds of 
societal developments, concerns and wishes in both developed and developing 
countries, though nearly always in relation to the consequences of regulation and 
side effects on the liberalisation of world trade. Non-trade concerns thus put 
additional pressure on WTO negotiations. The preamble to the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) explicitly refers to non-trade concerns, including food security and 
the need to protect the environment. According to article 20 of the AoA, non-trade 
concerns should be taken into account in the continuation of the reform process. This 
is reiterated for agriculture in paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
(November 2001) and in Annex 2, paragraph 2, of the Doha framework agreement 
(August 2004), without any further defi nition of non-trade concerns being provided. 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration also states that an open and non-
discriminatory multilateral trading system, protection of the environment and the 
promotion of sustainable development must be mutually supportive aims. Similarly, 
the specifi c form and substance of various trading aspects in relation to non-trade 
concerns is also determined in other international conventions and declarations 
(WSSD Declaration (World Summit on Sustainable Development), decisions within 
the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Biosafety Protocol, 
CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species), etc.). In some 
cases explicit reference is made to the interaction with the WTO. 
The EU is the biggest advocate of non-trade concerns in the WTO, particularly in 
relation to agriculture, but also in relation to the environment and labour 
standards. In its negotiating proposal of January 2003 for the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture2 the European Commission states that its proposals to liberalise trade 
and decrease trade-distorting domestic support are conditional upon non-trade 
concerns being adequately addressed in the negotiations. Explicit reference is 
made to food safety (in particular the precautionary principle), mandatory 
2  “The EC’s Proposal for Modalities in the WTO Agriculture Negotiations”, Brussels 27/1/03 (133 Committee, 
MD: 625/02 REV4).
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labelling,3 food security for developing countries, environmental protection, rural 
development (including the economic and social viability of rural areas, 
conservation of biodiversity, etc.) and animal welfare. 
With regard to animal welfare, however, the European Commission recognises in a 
2002 Communication to the Council of Europe and the European Parliament4 that 
achieving consensus in the WTO agriculture negotiations will be diffi cult due to 
ethical, cultural, economic and political differences. There is, in fact, little or no 
support in the Doha Round, especially in relation to market access, with developing 
countries and the US the chief opponents. Recently the European Commission has 
even been reticent in seeking acceptance of non-trade-distorting subsidies devoted 
to animal welfare under the “Green Box” for fear that this might lead to calls to 
impose a cap on permitted “Green Box” subsidies. As alternative options with 
regard to animal welfare, it therefore mentions the development of international 
standards by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, labelling (either voluntary or mandatory) and scientifi c 
work on the link between animal welfare and food safety. 
In the context of the Doha Round, non-trade concerns play a part not only in the 
agriculture negotiations, but also in the fi elds of trade and the environment through 
negotiations on greater market access for environmental goods and services and 
clarifi cation of the relationship between existing WTO rules and specifi c trade 
obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). With regard to 
environmental goods and services, the aim is further tariff reductions and the 
elimination of non-tariff trade barriers (paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration). The EU is the main driving force behind these negotiations, and is fi rst 
of all seeking to draw up a list of environmental goods and services. Some 
developing countries are against the list approach, however, and advocate instead a 
project-based approach with the emphasis on “environmentally preferable goods”. 
This focuses attention on the fundamental discussion concerning the defi nition of 
environmental goods: should only the inherent characteristics of the end product be 
taken into account or should the manufacturing process also be considered? 
With regard to the second element (paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration), the negotiations are unfortunately limited in scope to the applicability 
of existing WTO rules on trade measures among the parties to an MEA. A legal 
3 Two years previously, in its negotiating proposal for the Committee on Agriculture, the EU spoke about 
“consumer concerns”, presenting better provision of information through labelling as a solution 
(G/AG/NG/W/90 of 14/12/2000). By January 2003 the EU was no longer talking about “consumer concerns”, 
but mentions mandatory labelling as an independent NTC.
4 COM(2002) 626 of 18/11/02.
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solution to the serious diffi culty raised in terms of international law – i.e. the 
situation of non-overlapping memberships of the WTO and the MEA in question, 
where the WTO rights of a WTO member who is not a party to this MEA are at 
issue – is even explicitly excluded. For some considerable time now the Committee 
on Trade and Environment (CTE) within the WTO has been the forum for an intense 
debate on this political/legal issue. The Netherlands supports the EU’s active 
commitment in this area. The basic principles are the equivalence of the WTO and 
MEAs as international agreements, attempts to seek mutual support between the 
WTO and MEAs and the promotion of a broad-based approach to international and 
transboundary environmental issues (source-based measures, trade measures 
where necessary, technology transfer and technical and fi nancial assistance). As a 
solution to potential tension in trade matters, the EU has proposed an approach 
based on a “favourable prejudice” in possible WTO dispute settlement for trade 
measures taken by a WTO-MEA party if this is specifi cally authorised by an MEA 
that enjoys broad support. Discussions in the CTE have so far produced little in the 
way of results due to resistance from developing countries and the US.
Non-trade concerns in relation to labour standards did not come up for discussion 
in the Doha Round. Attempts on the part of the US, in particular, to establish a 
direct link in a WTO context between compliance with minimum labour standards 
and the ability to impose trade sanctions met with fundamental resistance from all 
the developing countries. This even extended to granting the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) observer status at the WTO. Paragraph 8 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration merely re-confi rms the Singapore Ministerial Declaration (December 
1996), which talks about commitment to comply with the internationally recognised 
“core labour standards” and designates the ILO as the organisation responsible for 
developing and promoting these standards.
Within the EU, meanwhile, specifi c legislation is being drafted that relates directly 
to or touches on non-trade concerns. Some is of an internal nature, such as 
minimum animal welfare requirements for producers in the EU and specifi c “Green 
Box” subsidies. Other requirements concern product-related process and 
production methods (PPMs) for products from both within and outside the EU. 
Often this involves environment-related measures such as end-of-life management 
of electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), use of hazardous heavy metals 
(RoHS), eco-design of electrical equipment (EuP) and registration and authorisation 
of chemicals (REACH). The proposed legislation also concerns mandatory labelling, 
as in the case of the draft EU Regulation on biological production. More recently 
the EU has also been exploring ways to make non-product-related PPMs 
compulsory for imported products. One example is the EU action plan for animal 
welfare, which includes investigating the possibility of mandatory labelling for both 
locally produced and imported meat products in accordance with “objective and 
measurable” animal welfare indicators.
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The fundamental position of the Dutch government is that attention should be devoted 
to non-trade concerns for two reasons: because of their intrinsic importance and 
because insuffi cient attention may undermine public support for the multilateral 
trading system. The government must actively consider the extent to which non-trade 
concerns can and must be respected, what role it can and must play here and what 
instruments can best be deployed.5 The guiding principle 6 is that measures that are 
needed to achieve the underlying non-trade concern objective may not be 
unnecessarily trade-restrictive or discriminatory in terms of their implementation and 
must fulfi l our WTO obligations. With regard to developing countries, an effort must 
also be made to ensure that the consequences for these countries are specifi cally 
taken into account in the formulation and implementation of such measures (in line 
with the coherence test in article 178 of the EC Treaty). We must exercise caution in 
imposing trade sanctions to enforce compliance with environmental protection, animal 
welfare and public health standards, and instead give priority to positive measures.7
The Dutch government is in regular dialogue with civil society and the business 
community on the subject of non-trade concerns. In response to the 2006 Budget 
Memorandum and National Budget, the Dutch Federation of Agricultural and 
Horticultural Organisations (LTO-Nederland), for instance, has argued that import 
tariffs should not be lowered for products that do not comply with European 
production standards in the areas of environment, welfare, labour and hygiene: “If 
this were to happen, it would lead to EU products being supplanted by products 
that do not meet society’s requirements,” is LTO-Nederland’s view. In parliamentary 
committee meetings with members of government about European agricultural 
policy and the Doha Round, non-trade concerns often come up for discussion and 
the possibility of mandatory legislation on PPMs is raised. In a motion by Dutch 
MPs Kris Douma and Corien Jonker, which was subsequently carried, the 
government was asked to urge the EU to focus its efforts in the next WTO round on 
getting non-trade concerns on the agenda.8 
For discussion purposes, it is enlightening and, indeed, essential to make a 
5 “De WTO in de Winkel”, policy document on the relationship between the world trade system and 
consumers, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999.
6 Sources: De WTO in de Winkel”, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999; Memorandum on Coherence between 
Agricultural and Development Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality, 2001; fi nal report of the Interministerial Policy Review on the reorientation of agricultural policy, 
2002; fi nal report of the Interministerial Policy Review on the effectiveness and coherence of development 
cooperation, 2003.
7  “De WTO in de Winkel”, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999
8 Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO): Motion by MPs Douma and Jonker, House of 
Representatives of the States General, 2004-2005, 25074, no. 92.
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distinction between product-related and non-product-related PPMs. Appendix 1 
contains a conceptual framework drawn up by the OECD for environmental 
measures; this is also applicable to measures relating to animal welfare and labour 
standards. Environmental measures may be product-related or non-product-related 
PPMs, while animal welfare and labour standards are non-product-related PPMs as 
a rule. Whereas product-related PPMs are essentially covered by the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements, this is 
debatable as far as the second group is concerned.9 As a result, there is much 
greater uncertainty about the scope for non-product-related PPMs. The 
consequences for developing countries are also far from clear when it comes to 
non-product-related PPMs. Does linking them to market access lead to economic 
benefi ts and opportunities for these countries or to new de facto and possibly 
insurmountable trade barriers?
The progressive policy in Brussels with regard to product-related and non-product-
related PPMs and the growing debate in the Netherlands about non-trade concerns 
require the government to take a clear and unequivocal stance.10 It is no longer 
enough to make general statements about related measures having to satisfy our 
obligations within the WTO and towards developing countries. It must be 
absolutely clear exactly which measures are legally feasible and effective, and also 
sensible in relation to developing countries. Although much has already been 
written on this subject, for example by the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI)11 and the Centre for World Food Studies (SOW)12 in the Netherlands, 
the fi ndings are equivocal, to some extent contradictory and do not span the entire 
9  The SPS Agreement refers to PPMs, but covers only measures to protect human, animal and plant life or 
health in the country implementing these measures. In most cases, therefore, these will be product-related 
PPMs. The TBT Agreement lays down rules for technical requirements, which may cover, for example, 
product characteristics and product-related PPMs. This also includes labelling requirements that are 
applicable to products or PPMs. The interpretation of the reference to labelling and PPMs is the subject of 
discussion among WTO members.
10 It should be mentioned here that not only the government is confronted with non-trade concerns, but also 
the business sector. Businesses respond to this with Corporate Social Responsibility activities and private 
standards containing environmental, labour and/or animal welfare components. As a consequence, the 
business sector frequently goes further in its PPMs than the statutory national or EU requirements, and new 
government measures sometimes have only a limited impact. In this context it is worth mentioning the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which contain standards not only on labour and the 
environment, but also regarding reporting, combating corruption, consumer interests, science and 
technology, competition and payment of taxes.  
11 “Product differentiation under the WTO: An analysis of labelling and tariff or tax measures concerning farm 
animal welfare”, LEI, report 6.05.11, June 2005.
12 “Labeling and the realization of cultural values” by Michiel Keyzer, De Economist, 150, 487-511, 2002.
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spectrum of possibilities. There is therefore a need for an up-to-the-minute scoping 
paper that can catalyse discussions between ministries and with stakeholders.
Purpose of the paper
The scoping paper should help clarify which NTC-related EU instruments are legally 
feasible within the present WTO framework, and effective in relation to the NTC 
objectives set, focusing specifi cally on non-product-related PPMs. This does not 
affect the commitment of the Netherlands or the EU to seek appropriate solutions to 
the above-mentioned international law diffi culties in the WTO-MEA relationship at 
some point in the future. For each of the instruments identifi ed, the paper should 
provide insight into the economic consequences, opportunities and threats for 
developing countries, with due regard for the diversity of these countries.
 Research questions
General:
What kinds of non-trade concerns can be identifi ed, and what is the range of  –
possible EU instruments that may be linked to these?
What are the WTO, MEA and other disciplines corresponding to these EU instruments? –
Which of these EU instruments are legally feasible and effective in relation to  –
the NTC objectives set, particularly as regards non-product-related PPMs and, 
more specifi cally, non-product-related PPMs that also relate to products from 
third countries and have only a national impact in these countries (category B-4 
in the conceptual framework in Appendix 1)?
What scope is there for labelling (mandatory or otherwise) to provide  –
consumers with information, particularly about such things as non-product-
related PPMs of the product?
In relation to developing countries: 
Which of these EU instruments is of particular importance in relation to  –
developing countries, particularly as regards non-product-related PPMs?
For which developing countries does the use of such instruments have economic  –
consequences, and what are the opportunities and threats for these countries? 
What are the anticipated implementation costs for the government and for  –
producers in these developing countries?
What kind of support, in the form of technical assistance and capacity building,  –
can developed countries give these developing countries, and what sort of 
transition period and/or phased introduction is needed?
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 Methodology
The paper will be written using available data, academic publications, relevant 
treaties, agreements and conventions (GATT, SPS, TBT, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM), Anti-Dumping (AD), MEAs, ILO, etc.), WTO and EU 
case law, relevant policy documents of the EU and the Netherlands, relevant 
economic and other studies conducted by the OECD, and other relevant secondary 
material. The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) 
must be contacted in order to check to what extent its most recent work on 
non-trade concerns can be used as input for the paper.
The paper will be written by an interdisciplinary team with the relevant legal and 
economic expertise and knowledge concerning WTO and EU discussions about 
non-trade concerns.
 Output
The paper will be written in English and will be 25-50 pages in length (including 
footnotes and references, but excluding appendices). It will also contain a lengthy 
abstract for policy and discussion purposes (“policy brief”).
 Procedure and timetable
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after reaching consensus with the ministries of  –
Economic Affairs, Agriculture, Nature & Food Quality, Housing, Spatial Planning 
& the Environment and Social Affairs & Employment, will ask selected authors 
to submit proposals by mutual agreement. On the basis of these proposals, 
it will conclude a contract with each author.
A maximum budget of  – € 25,000 is available for writing the paper.
The contracts will be administered by DGIS/CE (Directorate-General for  –
International Cooperation, Coherence Unit), which will also act as go-between 
for the authors. DGIS/CE will coordinate internally with the departments 
involved (DDE/IM (International Markets Division), DIE/EX (European Integration 
Department), DMW (Environment and Water Department), DES (Economic and 
Ecological Cooperation Department), DSI (Social and Institutional Development 
Department)) and externally with other ministries.
The authors will be responsible for dividing tasks among themselves and for  –
coordinating individual contributions.
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No later than three months after signing the contracts, the authors will deliver a  –
draft version of the paper to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. DGIS/CE will 
circulate this internally and to the other ministries involved, and will pass on all 
the comments received to the authors. A closed meeting may be convened with 
the authors and the ministries involved to discuss the draft paper. The authors 
may incorporate the comments received at their own discretion. 
Within one month of receiving the comments, the authors will deliver the fi nal  –
version of the paper to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (joint narrative report, 
accompanied by a fi nancial report per author). 
The aim is to complete the task by the beginning of September. –
The authors may not distribute the report themselves and cannot assert copyright. –
The authors must be available for any follow-up required (e.g. participation  –
in a possible discussion meeting with representatives from Dutch civil society 
and the business community). Interministerial discussions will take place in due 
course concerning details of the procedure to be followed. 
 Conceptual framework
(based on a classifi cation of PPMs according to their environmental effect)
 * Consumption externality: environmental impact is transmitted by traded products
 ** Production externality: environmental impact is not transmitted by traded products
 *** This may sometimes link to transboundary or global environmental issues
 Source: OECD, Processes and production methods (PPMs): conceptual framework and considerations on use 
of PPM-based trade measures, No. OECD/GD(97)137. Paris, 1997
261
Terms of reference
C
at
eg
o
ry
 A
C
at
eg
o
ry
 B
E
nv
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l
 e
xt
er
n
al
it
y
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
ex
te
rn
al
it
y*
B
-1
B
-2
B
-3
B
-4
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 e
xt
er
n
al
it
y*
*
P
P
M
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t
Pr
o
d
u
ct
-r
el
at
ed
:
- 
P
P
M
 w
h
ic
h
 a
ff
ec
ts
 p
ro
d
u
ct
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
- 
T
B
T
 a
n
d
 S
P
S
 A
g
re
em
en
ts
 c
ov
er
 t
h
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
N
o
n
-p
ro
d
u
ct
 r
el
at
ed
:
- 
P
P
M
 w
h
ic
h
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
af
fe
ct
 p
ro
d
u
ct
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
 -
 O
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
sc
o
p
e 
o
f T
B
T
 a
n
d
 S
P
S
E
nv
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
ef
fe
ct
N
at
io
n
al
**
*
Tr
an
sb
o
u
n
d
ar
y 
p
o
llu
ti
o
n
M
ig
ra
to
ry
 s
p
ec
ie
s 
an
d
 
sh
ar
ed
 li
vi
n
g
 r
es
o
u
rc
es
G
lo
b
al
 c
o
n
ce
rn
s
N
at
io
n
al
Im
p
o
rt
ed
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
p
o
llu
te
 o
r 
af
fe
ct
 d
o
m
es
ti
c 
h
u
m
an
 a
n
d
 a
n
im
al
 h
ea
lt
h
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
t.
(e
.g
. p
la
n
t 
p
es
ts
, h
az
ar
d
o
u
s 
w
as
te
s 
an
d
 
ch
em
ic
al
s,
 p
in
e 
n
em
at
o
d
e 
in
fe
st
ed
 t
im
b
er
) 
T
h
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
t 
is
 t
ra
n
sm
itt
ed
 t
o
 o
th
er
 
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
s 
o
r 
ar
ea
s 
b
ey
o
n
d
 n
at
io
n
al
 
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
 (
e.
g
. 
tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 a
ir
, w
at
er
 o
r 
la
n
d
 p
o
llu
ti
o
n
)
T
h
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
t 
in
vo
lv
es
 m
o
re
 t
h
an
 o
n
e 
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
 o
r 
ar
ea
s 
b
ey
o
n
d
 n
at
io
n
al
 
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
. (
e.
g
. 
co
n
se
rv
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
o
f 
m
ig
ra
to
ry
 a
n
im
al
s,
 b
ir
d
s 
an
d
 fi 
sh
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 s
h
ar
ed
 
liv
in
g
 r
es
o
u
rc
es
)
T
h
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
t 
h
as
 g
lo
b
al
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
(e
.g
. d
ep
le
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
o
zo
n
e 
la
ye
r,
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
g
e,
 h
ar
m
 t
o
 
b
io
d
iv
er
si
ty
, e
ff
ec
ts
 o
n
 
th
re
at
en
ed
 o
r 
en
d
an
g
er
ed
 s
p
ec
ie
s)
T
h
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
t 
is
 li
m
it
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
co
u
n
tr
y 
u
si
n
g
 t
h
e 
P
P
M
.
H
ar
m
o
n
is
at
io
n
 
o
f 
P
P
M
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t
N
at
io
n
al
-I
n
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 r
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
 a
re
 d
es
ir
ab
le
. 
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
m
ay
 d
ev
ia
te
, u
n
d
er
 c
er
ta
in
 
co
n
d
it
io
n
s,
 f
ro
m
 s
u
ch
 r
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
.
Tr
an
sb
o
u
n
d
ar
y 
an
d
 g
lo
b
al
-H
ar
m
o
n
is
at
io
n
 is
 d
es
ir
ab
le
 t
o
 t
h
e 
ex
te
n
t 
p
o
ss
ib
le
.
Tr
an
sb
o
u
n
d
ar
y 
an
d
 g
lo
b
al
-H
ar
m
o
n
is
at
io
n
 c
o
u
ld
 b
e 
re
le
va
n
t.
 
N
at
io
n
al
-H
ar
m
o
n
is
at
io
n
 is
 h
ig
h
ly
 
p
ro
b
le
m
at
ic
 a
n
d
 m
ay
 b
e 
u
n
d
es
ir
ab
le
.
Tr
ad
e 
p
o
lic
y 
as
p
ec
ts
- T
ra
d
e 
re
st
ri
ct
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s
-T
h
e 
tr
ad
e-
re
st
ri
ct
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
o
u
ld
 
re
p
re
se
n
t 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
o
f 
n
at
io
n
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
.
-G
A
T
T
 r
u
le
s 
re
q
u
ir
e 
eq
u
al
 (
n
o
n
-
d
is
cr
im
in
at
o
ry
) 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
an
d
 t
ra
n
sp
ar
en
cy
.
-T
ra
d
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
d
es
ig
n
ed
 t
o
 im
p
o
se
 P
P
M
 r
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
 u
se
d
 in
 im
p
o
rt
in
g
 
co
u
n
tr
y 
o
n
 e
xp
o
rt
in
g
 c
o
u
n
tr
y 
m
ay
 h
av
e 
ex
tr
a-
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
.
-M
u
lt
ila
te
ra
l e
nv
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l a
g
re
em
en
ts
 m
ay
 id
en
ti
fy
 t
ra
d
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
as
 a
n
 
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
to
o
l u
n
d
er
 c
er
ta
in
 c
ir
cu
m
st
an
ce
s.
A
 c
o
u
n
tr
y 
ca
n
 t
ak
e 
th
e 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
ili
ty
 f
o
r 
se
tt
in
g
 a
ny
 P
P
M
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t 
w
it
h
in
 it
s 
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 n
o
n
-
tr
ad
e 
p
o
lic
y 
m
ea
su
re
s
- 
Li
ke
-p
ro
d
u
ct
 
is
su
e
Pr
o
d
u
ct
 d
iff
er
en
ti
at
io
n
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 p
ro
d
u
ct
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
 is
 a
llo
w
ed
 w
it
h
in
 m
u
lt
ila
te
ra
l 
tr
ad
in
g
 r
u
le
s.
O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
m
et
h
o
d
s 
fo
r 
p
ro
d
u
ct
 d
iff
er
en
ti
at
io
n
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
w
h
ic
h
 a
re
 n
o
t 
p
hy
si
ca
lly
 e
m
b
o
d
ie
d
 in
 t
h
e 
p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
h
av
e 
ye
t 
to
 b
e 
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
. M
et
h
o
d
 m
ig
h
t 
in
cl
u
d
e 
ex
am
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
w
h
et
h
er
 im
p
le
m
en
te
d
 o
r 
p
ro
p
o
se
d
 m
ea
su
re
s/
re
q
u
ir
e-
m
en
ts
 a
re
 t
ra
n
sp
ar
en
t,
 p
re
d
ic
ta
b
le
, f
ea
si
b
le
 o
r 
ar
e 
d
is
g
u
is
ed
 r
es
tr
ic
ti
o
n
s 
o
n
 t
ra
d
e.
Unilateral MeasUres 
addressing 
non-trade ConCerns
A Study on WTO Consistency, Relevance of other International Agreements, 
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concerning Non-Product-Related Processes and Production Methods
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Gerrit Faber
This study focuses on the legality and 
appropriateness of policy measures addressing  
non-trade concerns (NTCs). It analyses the 
implications under the legal framework of the  
World Trade Organization (WTO) of a broad range  
of existing, proposed and hypothetical policy 
measures that deal with NTCs, in particular in the 
areas of labour standards, the environment and 
animal welfare. This detailed WTO analysis is 
complemented by a study of the relevance of other 
international agreements, and a closer examination 
of the economic effects on developing countries  
of policy measures on biofuels and animal welfare. 
Besides policy makers and academics, this book  
may be useful for those who have an interest in 
international trade law and effectiveness and 
efficiency of public interventions in markets.  
The study is recommended to non-governmental 
organisations dealing with the interface between 
trade and the environment, animal welfare, 
developing countries and labour standards.  
Also (under)graduate students of international law 
and international relations may find the study 
invaluable.
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